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<title>user/sven/linux.git/security/capability.c, branch v3.8-rc4</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.8-rc4</id>
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<updated>2012-12-14T02:35:24Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook</title>
<updated>2012-12-14T02:35:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-15T21:02:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to
the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let
Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its
read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example,
read extended attributes for signatures, etc.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>consitify do_mount() arguments</title>
<updated>2012-10-12T00:02:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-11T15:42:01Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:808d4e3cfdcc52b19276175464f6dbca4df13b09</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgids</title>
<updated>2012-09-21T10:13:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-01T22:14:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d2b31ca644fdc8704de3367a6a56a5c958c77f53</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and
gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules
only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids.

Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Kentaro Takeda &lt;takedakn@nttdata.co.jp&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>split -&gt;file_mmap() into -&gt;mmap_addr()/-&gt;mmap_file()</title>
<updated>2012-05-31T17:11:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-30T17:30:51Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e5467859f7f79b69fc49004403009dfdba3bec53</id>
<content type='text'>
... i.e. file-dependent and address-dependent checks.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SELinux: rename dentry_open to file_open</title>
<updated>2012-04-09T16:22:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-04-04T17:45:40Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=83d498569e9a7a4b92c4c5d3566f2d6a604f28c9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:83d498569e9a7a4b92c4c5d3566f2d6a604f28c9</id>
<content type='text'>
dentry_open takes a file, rename it to file_open

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: create task_free security callback</title>
<updated>2012-02-09T22:14:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-21T20:17:03Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:1a2a4d06e1e95260c470ebe3a945f61bbe8c1fd8</id>
<content type='text'>
The current LSM interface to cred_free is not sufficient for allowing
an LSM to track the life and death of a task. This patch adds the
task_free hook so that an LSM can clean up resources on task death.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2012-01-15T02:36:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-15T02:36:33Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c49c41a4134679cecb77362e7f6b59acb6320aa7</id>
<content type='text'>
* 'for-linus' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security:
  capabilities: remove __cap_full_set definition
  security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()
  ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing /proc/pid/stat
  capabilities: remove task_ns_* functions
  capabitlies: ns_capable can use the cap helpers rather than lsm call
  capabilities: style only - move capable below ns_capable
  capabilites: introduce new has_ns_capabilities_noaudit
  capabilities: call has_ns_capability from has_capability
  capabilities: remove all _real_ interfaces
  capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit
  capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable
  capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
  selinux: sparse fix: fix several warnings in the security server cod
  selinux: sparse fix: fix warnings in netlink code
  selinux: sparse fix: eliminate warnings for selinuxfs
  selinux: sparse fix: declare selinux_disable() in security.h
  selinux: sparse fix: move selinux_complete_init
  selinux: sparse fix: make selinux_secmark_refcount static
  SELinux: Fix RCU deref check warning in sel_netport_insert()

Manually fix up a semantic mis-merge wrt security_netlink_recv():

 - the interface was removed in commit fd7784615248 ("security: remove
   the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()")

 - a new user of it appeared in commit a38f7907b926 ("crypto: Add
   userspace configuration API")

causing no automatic merge conflict, but Eric Paris pointed out the
issue.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>switch security_path_chmod() to struct path *</title>
<updated>2012-01-07T04:16:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2011-12-08T15:51:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cdcf116d44e78c7216ba9f8be9af1cdfca7af728</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: remove the security_netlink_recv hook as it is equivalent to capable()</title>
<updated>2012-01-05T23:53:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Paris</name>
<email>eparis@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-01-03T17:25:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:fd778461524849afd035679030ae8e8873c72b81</id>
<content type='text'>
Once upon a time netlink was not sync and we had to get the effective
capabilities from the skb that was being received.  Today we instead get
the capabilities from the current task.  This has rendered the entire
purpose of the hook moot as it is now functionally equivalent to the
capable() call.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>switch -&gt;path_mknod() to umode_t</title>
<updated>2012-01-04T03:55:19Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2011-11-21T19:58:38Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:04fc66e789a896e684bfdca30208e57eb832dd96</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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