<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/security/commoncap.c, branch v4.14.236</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.236</id>
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<updated>2021-05-22T08:57:21Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>security: commoncap: fix -Wstringop-overread warning</title>
<updated>2021-05-22T08:57:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-22T16:02:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c7de5dfbb83df21086ffa94c53bde145099ee5c5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 82e5d8cc768b0c7b03c551a9ab1f8f3f68d5f83f upstream.

gcc-11 introdces a harmless warning for cap_inode_getsecurity:

security/commoncap.c: In function ‘cap_inode_getsecurity’:
security/commoncap.c:440:33: error: ‘memcpy’ reading 16 bytes from a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overread]
  440 |                                 memcpy(&amp;nscap-&gt;data, &amp;cap-&gt;data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
      |                                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The problem here is that tmpbuf is initialized to NULL, so gcc assumes
it is not accessible unless it gets set by vfs_getxattr_alloc().  This is
a legitimate warning as far as I can tell, but the code is correct since
it correctly handles the error when that function fails.

Add a separate NULL check to tell gcc about it as well.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jamorris@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Zhizhikin &lt;andrey.z@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert 95ebabde382c ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities")</title>
<updated>2021-03-17T15:34:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-12T21:07:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f95ea27037e279d51d1d515c4dd3bc59198eb88a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3b0c2d3eaa83da259d7726192cf55a137769012f upstream.

It turns out that there are in fact userspace implementations that
care and this recent change caused a regression.

https://github.com/containers/buildah/issues/3071

As the motivation for the original change was future development,
and the impact is existing real world code just revert this change
and allow the ambiguity in v3 file caps.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 95ebabde382c ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities</title>
<updated>2021-03-03T17:22:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-17T15:42:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e516a306ef914bd2cddcb256bae09ec86ae07b05</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 95ebabde382c371572297915b104e55403674e73 ]

The v3 file capabilities have a uid field that records the filesystem
uid of the root user of the user namespace the file capabilities are
valid in.

When someone is silly enough to have the same underlying uid as the
root uid of multiple nested containers a v3 filesystem capability can
be ambiguous.

In the spirit of don't do that then, forbid writing a v3 filesystem
capability if it is ambiguous.

Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cap: fix conversions on getxattr</title>
<updated>2021-02-23T13:00:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-28T09:22:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:83515cf735cc53fb7030703c2a1881fe4a98f2a0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f2b00be488730522d0fb7a8a5de663febdcefe0a ]

If a capability is stored on disk in v2 format cap_inode_getsecurity() will
currently return in v2 format unconditionally.

This is wrong: v2 cap should be equivalent to a v3 cap with zero rootid,
and so the same conversions performed on it.

If the rootid cannot be mapped, v3 is returned unconverted.  Fix this so
that both v2 and v3 return -EOVERFLOW if the rootid (or the owner of the fs
user namespace in case of v2) cannot be mapped into the current user
namespace.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>exec: Always set cap_ambient in cap_bprm_set_creds</title>
<updated>2020-06-03T06:18:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-05-25T17:56:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:04837813603915527a25f4b3257fd4944dc527b6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a4ae32c71fe90794127b32d26d7ad795813b502e ]

An invariant of cap_bprm_set_creds is that every field in the new cred
structure that cap_bprm_set_creds might set, needs to be set every
time to ensure the fields does not get a stale value.

The field cap_ambient is not set every time cap_bprm_set_creds is
called, which means that if there is a suid or sgid script with an
interpreter that has neither the suid nor the sgid bits set the
interpreter should be able to accept ambient credentials.
Unfortuantely because cap_ambient is not reset to it's original value
the interpreter can not accept ambient credentials.

Given that the ambient capability set is expected to be controlled by
the caller, I don't think this is particularly serious.  But it is
definitely worth fixing so the code works correctly.

I have tested to verify my reading of the code is correct and the
interpreter of a sgid can receive ambient capabilities with this
change and cannot receive ambient capabilities without this change.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski &lt;luto@kernel.org&gt;
Fixes: 58319057b784 ("capabilities: ambient capabilities")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cap_inode_getsecurity: use d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias()</title>
<updated>2018-09-09T17:56:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eddie.Horng</name>
<email>eddie.horng@mediatek.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-20T07:30:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5a842ecca279f583c3fdc9a1ed8fe7a4cc348789</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 355139a8dba446cc11a424cddbf7afebc3041ba1 upstream.

The code in cap_inode_getsecurity(), introduced by commit 8db6c34f1dbc
("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities"), should use
d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias() do handle unhashed dentry
correctly. This is needed, for example, if execveat() is called with an
open but unlinked overlayfs file, because overlayfs unhashes dentry on
unlink.
This is a regression of real life application, first reported at
https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-unionfs/msg05363.html

Below reproducer and setup can reproduce the case.
  const char* exec="echo";
  const char *newargv[] = { "echo", "hello", NULL};
  const char *newenviron[] = { NULL };
  int fd, err;

  fd = open(exec, O_PATH);
  unlink(exec);
  err = syscall(322/*SYS_execveat*/, fd, "", newargv, newenviron,
AT_EMPTY_PATH);
  if(err&lt;0)
    fprintf(stderr, "execveat: %s\n", strerror(errno));

gcc compile into ~/test/a.out
mount -t overlay -orw,lowerdir=/mnt/l,upperdir=/mnt/u,workdir=/mnt/w
none /mnt/m
cd /mnt/m
cp /bin/echo .
~/test/a.out

Expected result:
hello
Actually result:
execveat: Invalid argument
dmesg:
Invalid argument reading file caps for /dev/fd/3

The 2nd reproducer and setup emulates similar case but for
regular filesystem:
  const char* exec="echo";
  int fd, err;
  char buf[256];

  fd = open(exec, O_RDONLY);
  unlink(exec);
  err = fgetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 256);
  if(err&lt;0)
    fprintf(stderr, "fgetxattr: %s\n", strerror(errno));

gcc compile into ~/test_fgetxattr

cd /tmp
cp /bin/echo .
~/test_fgetxattr

Result:
fgetxattr: Invalid argument

On regular filesystem, for example, ext4 read xattr from
disk and return to execveat(), will not trigger this issue, however,
the overlay attr handler pass real dentry to vfs_getxattr() will.
This reproducer calls fgetxattr() with an unlinked fd, involkes
vfs_getxattr() then reproduced the case that d_find_alias() in
cap_inode_getsecurity() can't find the unlinked dentry.

Suggested-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Amir Goldstein &lt;amir73il@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v4.14
Signed-off-by: Eddie Horng &lt;eddie.horng@mediatek.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>commoncap: Handle memory allocation failure.</title>
<updated>2018-04-29T09:33:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2018-04-10T06:15:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:77df079be9b480fbac36d407e76df4c29d719407</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1f5781725dcbb026438e77091c91a94f678c3522 upstream.

syzbot is reporting NULL pointer dereference at xattr_getsecurity() [1],
for cap_inode_getsecurity() is returning sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data) when
memory allocation failed. Return -ENOMEM if memory allocation failed.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=a55ba438506fe68649a5f50d2d82d56b365e0107

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc8e06 ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+9369930ca44f29e60e2d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Cc: stable &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 4.14+
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>capabilities: fix buffer overread on very short xattr</title>
<updated>2018-01-05T14:48:57Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-01T15:28:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:df4373c513b310d75aafeb8902917e7f8d0fe6a5</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dc32b5c3e6e2ef29cef76d9ce1b92d394446150e upstream.

If userspace attempted to set a "security.capability" xattr shorter than
4 bytes (e.g. 'setfattr -n security.capability -v x file'), then
cap_convert_nscap() read past the end of the buffer containing the xattr
value because it accessed the -&gt;magic_etc field without verifying that
the xattr value is long enough to contain that field.

Fix it by validating the xattr value size first.

This bug was found using syzkaller with KASAN.  The KASAN report was as
follows (cleaned up slightly):

    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498
    Read of size 4 at addr ffff88002d8741c0 by task syz-executor1/2852

    CPU: 0 PID: 2852 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc6-00200-gcc0aac99d977 #253
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
    Call Trace:
     __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
     dump_stack+0xe3/0x195 lib/dump_stack.c:53
     print_address_description+0x73/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252
     kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
     kasan_report+0x235/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
     cap_convert_nscap+0x514/0x630 security/commoncap.c:498
     setxattr+0x2bd/0x350 fs/xattr.c:446
     path_setxattr+0x168/0x1b0 fs/xattr.c:472
     SYSC_setxattr fs/xattr.c:487 [inline]
     SyS_setxattr+0x36/0x50 fs/xattr.c:483
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x18/0x85

Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>commoncap: move assignment of fs_ns to avoid null pointer dereference</title>
<updated>2017-10-19T02:09:33Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Ian King</name>
<email>colin.king@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-04T17:50:05Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:76ba89c76f2c74e208d93a9e7c698e39eeb3b85c</id>
<content type='text'>
The pointer fs_ns is assigned from inode-&gt;i_ib-&gt;s_user_ns before
a null pointer check on inode, hence if inode is actually null we
will get a null pointer dereference on this assignment. Fix this
by only dereferencing inode after the null pointer check on
inode.

Detected by CoverityScan CID#1455328 ("Dereference before null check")

Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2017-09-24T18:40:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2017-09-24T18:40:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a30282478271ea8e06d424f96c1537094b309c7c</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull misc security layer update from James Morris:
 "This is the remaining 'general' change in the security tree for v4.14,
  following the direct merging of SELinux (+ TOMOYO), AppArmor, and
  seccomp.

  That's everything now for the security tree except IMA, which will
  follow shortly (I've been traveling for the past week with patchy
  internet)"

* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  security: fix description of values returned by cap_inode_need_killpriv
</content>
</entry>
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