<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/security/integrity, branch v3.16.1</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.16.1</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.16.1'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2014-06-12T21:58:08Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ima: introduce ima_kernel_read()</title>
<updated>2014-06-12T21:58:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-08T11:03:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0430e49b6e7c6b5e076be8fefdee089958c9adad'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0430e49b6e7c6b5e076be8fefdee089958c9adad</id>
<content type='text'>
Commit 8aac62706 "move exit_task_namespaces() outside of exit_notify"
introduced the kernel opps since the kernel v3.10, which happens when
Apparmor and IMA-appraisal are enabled at the same time.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
[  106.750167] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
0000000000000018
[  106.750221] IP: [&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.750241] PGD 0
[  106.750254] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  106.750272] Modules linked in: cuse parport_pc ppdev bnep rfcomm
bluetooth rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl nfs lockd sunrpc
fscache dm_crypt intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp
kvm_intel snd_hda_codec_hdmi kvm crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul
ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 glue_helper lrw gf128mul
ablk_helper cryptd snd_hda_codec_realtek dcdbas snd_hda_intel
snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep snd_pcm snd_page_alloc snd_seq_midi
snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi psmouse snd_seq microcode serio_raw
snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore video lpc_ich coretemp mac_hid lp
parport mei_me mei nbd hid_generic e1000e usbhid ahci ptp hid libahci
pps_core
[  106.750658] CPU: 6 PID: 1394 Comm: mysqld Not tainted 3.13.0-rc7-kds+ #15
[  106.750673] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9010/0M9KCM, BIOS A08
09/19/2012
[  106.750689] task: ffff8800de804920 ti: ffff880400fca000 task.ti:
ffff880400fca000
[  106.750704] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;]
our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.750725] RSP: 0018:ffff880400fcba60  EFLAGS: 00010286
[  106.750738] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000100 RCX:
ffff8800d51523e7
[  106.750764] RDX: ffffffffffffffea RSI: ffff880400fcba34 RDI:
ffff880402d20020
[  106.750791] RBP: ffff880400fcbae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:
0000000000000001
[  106.750817] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12:
ffff8800d5152300
[  106.750844] R13: ffff8803eb8df510 R14: ffff880400fcbb28 R15:
ffff8800d51523e7
[  106.750871] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88040d200000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  106.750910] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  106.750935] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000001c0e000 CR4:
00000000001407e0
[  106.750962] Stack:
[  106.750981]  ffffffff813434eb ffff880400fcbb20 ffff880400fcbb18
0000000000000000
[  106.751037]  ffff8800de804920 ffffffff8101b9b9 0001800000000000
0000000000000100
[  106.751093]  0000010000000000 0000000000000002 000000000000000e
ffff8803eb8df500
[  106.751149] Call Trace:
[  106.751172]  [&lt;ffffffff813434eb&gt;] ? aa_path_name+0x2ab/0x430
[  106.751199]  [&lt;ffffffff8101b9b9&gt;] ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
[  106.751225]  [&lt;ffffffff8134a68d&gt;] aa_path_perm+0x7d/0x170
[  106.751250]  [&lt;ffffffff8101b945&gt;] ? native_sched_clock+0x15/0x80
[  106.751276]  [&lt;ffffffff8134aa73&gt;] aa_file_perm+0x33/0x40
[  106.751301]  [&lt;ffffffff81348c5e&gt;] common_file_perm+0x8e/0xb0
[  106.751327]  [&lt;ffffffff81348d78&gt;] apparmor_file_permission+0x18/0x20
[  106.751355]  [&lt;ffffffff8130c853&gt;] security_file_permission+0x23/0xa0
[  106.751382]  [&lt;ffffffff811c77a2&gt;] rw_verify_area+0x52/0xe0
[  106.751407]  [&lt;ffffffff811c789d&gt;] vfs_read+0x6d/0x170
[  106.751432]  [&lt;ffffffff811cda31&gt;] kernel_read+0x41/0x60
[  106.751457]  [&lt;ffffffff8134fd45&gt;] ima_calc_file_hash+0x225/0x280
[  106.751483]  [&lt;ffffffff8134fb52&gt;] ? ima_calc_file_hash+0x32/0x280
[  106.751509]  [&lt;ffffffff8135022d&gt;] ima_collect_measurement+0x9d/0x160
[  106.751536]  [&lt;ffffffff810b552d&gt;] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[  106.751562]  [&lt;ffffffff8134f07c&gt;] ? ima_file_free+0x6c/0xd0
[  106.751587]  [&lt;ffffffff81352824&gt;] ima_update_xattr+0x34/0x60
[  106.751612]  [&lt;ffffffff8134f0d0&gt;] ima_file_free+0xc0/0xd0
[  106.751637]  [&lt;ffffffff811c9635&gt;] __fput+0xd5/0x300
[  106.751662]  [&lt;ffffffff811c98ae&gt;] ____fput+0xe/0x10
[  106.751687]  [&lt;ffffffff81086774&gt;] task_work_run+0xc4/0xe0
[  106.751712]  [&lt;ffffffff81066fad&gt;] do_exit+0x2bd/0xa90
[  106.751738]  [&lt;ffffffff8173c958&gt;] ? retint_swapgs+0x13/0x1b
[  106.751763]  [&lt;ffffffff8106780c&gt;] do_group_exit+0x4c/0xc0
[  106.751788]  [&lt;ffffffff81067894&gt;] SyS_exit_group+0x14/0x20
[  106.751814]  [&lt;ffffffff8174522d&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x1a/0x1f
[  106.751839] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 e8 22 fe ff ff 5d c3
0f 1f 44 00 00 55 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 c9 00 00 48 8b 80 28 06 00 00 48 89
e5 5d &lt;48&gt; 8b 40 18 48 39 87 c0 00 00 00 0f 94 c0 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00
[  106.752185] RIP  [&lt;ffffffff811ec7da&gt;] our_mnt+0x1a/0x30
[  106.752214]  RSP &lt;ffff880400fcba60&gt;
[  106.752236] CR2: 0000000000000018
[  106.752258] ---[ end trace 3c520748b4732721 ]---
----------------------------------------------------------------------

The reason for the oops is that IMA-appraisal uses "kernel_read()" when
file is closed. kernel_read() honors LSM security hook which calls
Apparmor handler, which uses current-&gt;nsproxy-&gt;mnt_ns. The 'guilty'
commit changed the order of cleanup code so that nsproxy-&gt;mnt_ns was
not already available for Apparmor.

Discussion about the issue with Al Viro and Eric W. Biederman suggested
that kernel_read() is too high-level for IMA. Another issue, except
security checking, that was identified is mandatory locking. kernel_read
honors it as well and it might prevent IMA from calculating necessary hash.
It was suggested to use simplified version of the function without security
and locking checks.

This patch introduces special version ima_kernel_read(), which skips security
and mandatory locking checking. It prevents the kernel oops to happen.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: prohibit userspace writing 'security.evm' HMAC value</title>
<updated>2014-06-12T21:58:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-11T04:05:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=2fb1c9a4f2dbc2f0bd2431c7fa64d0b5483864e4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:2fb1c9a4f2dbc2f0bd2431c7fa64d0b5483864e4</id>
<content type='text'>
Calculating the 'security.evm' HMAC value requires access to the
EVM encrypted key.  Only the kernel should have access to it.  This
patch prevents userspace tools(eg. setfattr, cp --preserve=xattr)
from setting/modifying the 'security.evm' HMAC value directly.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: check inode integrity cache in violation check</title>
<updated>2014-06-12T21:58:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-27T08:29:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=14503eb99414ceffe348b82982d5770b745f6626'/>
<id>urn:sha1:14503eb99414ceffe348b82982d5770b745f6626</id>
<content type='text'>
When IMA did not support ima-appraisal, existance of the S_IMA flag
clearly indicated that the file was measured. With IMA appraisal S_IMA
flag indicates that file was measured and/or appraised. Because of
this, when measurement is not enabled by the policy, violations are
still reported.

To differentiate between measurement and appraisal policies this
patch checks the inode integrity cache flags.  The IMA_MEASURED
flag indicates whether the file was actually measured, while the
IMA_MEASURE flag indicates whether the file should be measured.
Unfortunately, the IMA_MEASURED flag is reset to indicate the file
needs to be re-measured.  Thus, this patch checks the IMA_MEASURE
flag.

This patch limits the false positive violation reports, but does
not fix it entirely.  The IMA_MEASURE/IMA_MEASURED flags are
indications that, at some point in time, the file opened for read
was in policy, but might not be in policy now (eg. different uid).
Other changes would be needed to further limit false positive
violation reports.

Changelog:
- expanded patch description based on conversation with Roberto (Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: prevent unnecessary policy checking</title>
<updated>2014-06-12T21:58:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-27T08:54:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=b882fae2d3a832fdcdc194c9f358390b1efca8e7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b882fae2d3a832fdcdc194c9f358390b1efca8e7</id>
<content type='text'>
ima_rdwr_violation_check is called for every file openning.
The function checks the policy even when violation condition
is not met. It causes unnecessary policy checking.

This patch does policy checking only if violation condition is met.

Changelog:
- check writecount is greater than zero (Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: provide option to protect additional SMACK xattrs</title>
<updated>2014-06-12T21:58:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-28T12:31:14Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3e38df56e6ef736f3ab516664697b55caa8f3238'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3e38df56e6ef736f3ab516664697b55caa8f3238</id>
<content type='text'>
Newer versions of SMACK introduced following security xattrs:
SMACK64EXEC, SMACK64TRANSMUTE and SMACK64MMAP.

To protect these xattrs, this patch includes them in the HMAC
calculation.  However, for backwards compatibility with existing
labeled filesystems, including these xattrs needs to be
configurable.

Changelog:
- Add SMACK dependency on new option (Mimi)

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: replace HMAC version with attribute mask</title>
<updated>2014-06-12T21:58:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-28T12:31:04Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d3b33679481d52ef02311119d4342a9a1f3d84db'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d3b33679481d52ef02311119d4342a9a1f3d84db</id>
<content type='text'>
Using HMAC version limits the posibility to arbitrarily add new
attributes such as SMACK64EXEC to the hmac calculation.

This patch replaces hmac version with attribute mask.
Desired attributes can be enabled with configuration parameter.
It allows to build kernels which works with previously labeled
filesystems.

Currently supported attribute is 'fsuuid' which is equivalent of
the former version 2.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: prevent new digsig xattr from being replaced</title>
<updated>2014-06-12T21:58:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-18T03:24:18Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=060bdebfb0b82751be89c0ce4b6e2c88606a354b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:060bdebfb0b82751be89c0ce4b6e2c88606a354b</id>
<content type='text'>
Even though a new xattr will only be appraised on the next access,
set the DIGSIG flag to prevent a signature from being replaced with
a hash on file close.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security</title>
<updated>2014-06-10T17:05:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-10T17:05:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=fad0701eaa091beb8ce5ef2eef04b5e833617368'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fad0701eaa091beb8ce5ef2eef04b5e833617368</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security layer updates from Serge Hallyn:
 "This is a merge of James Morris' security-next tree from 3.14 to
  yesterday's master, plus four patches from Paul Moore which are in
  linux-next, plus one patch from Mimi"

* 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security:
  ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
  selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policy
  selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading selinux policy
  selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES
  selinux:  Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.
  Warning in scanf string typing
  Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd
  Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3
  security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table
  Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check
  Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute
  SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr
  bugfix patch for SMACK
  Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface
  Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
  Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme()
  Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount'
  smack: fix key permission verification
  KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag</title>
<updated>2014-06-03T19:21:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-05-12T13:28:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=f9b2a735bdddf836214b5dca74f6ca7712e5a08c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:f9b2a735bdddf836214b5dca74f6ca7712e5a08c</id>
<content type='text'>
Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy.  When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.

The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash.  The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time.  The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem.  Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages.  A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory.  This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.

Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set.  Based on policy, permit or deny file
access.  This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'.  Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.

Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs</title>
<updated>2014-04-12T21:49:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-12T21:49:50Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5166701b368caea89d57b14bf41cf39e819dad51'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5166701b368caea89d57b14bf41cf39e819dad51</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
 "The first vfs pile, with deep apologies for being very late in this
  window.

  Assorted cleanups and fixes, plus a large preparatory part of iov_iter
  work.  There's a lot more of that, but it'll probably go into the next
  merge window - it *does* shape up nicely, removes a lot of
  boilerplate, gets rid of locking inconsistencie between aio_write and
  splice_write and I hope to get Kent's direct-io rewrite merged into
  the same queue, but some of the stuff after this point is having
  (mostly trivial) conflicts with the things already merged into
  mainline and with some I want more testing.

  This one passes LTP and xfstests without regressions, in addition to
  usual beating.  BTW, readahead02 in ltp syscalls testsuite has started
  giving failures since "mm/readahead.c: fix readahead failure for
  memoryless NUMA nodes and limit readahead pages" - might be a false
  positive, might be a real regression..."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
  missing bits of "splice: fix racy pipe-&gt;buffers uses"
  cifs: fix the race in cifs_writev()
  ceph_sync_{,direct_}write: fix an oops on ceph_osdc_new_request() failure
  kill generic_file_buffered_write()
  ocfs2_file_aio_write(): switch to generic_perform_write()
  ceph_aio_write(): switch to generic_perform_write()
  xfs_file_buffered_aio_write(): switch to generic_perform_write()
  export generic_perform_write(), start getting rid of generic_file_buffer_write()
  generic_file_direct_write(): get rid of ppos argument
  btrfs_file_aio_write(): get rid of ppos
  kill the 5th argument of generic_file_buffered_write()
  kill the 4th argument of __generic_file_aio_write()
  lustre: don't open-code kernel_recvmsg()
  ocfs2: don't open-code kernel_recvmsg()
  drbd: don't open-code kernel_recvmsg()
  constify blk_rq_map_user_iov() and friends
  lustre: switch to kernel_sendmsg()
  ocfs2: don't open-code kernel_sendmsg()
  take iov_iter stuff to mm/iov_iter.c
  process_vm_access: tidy up a bit
  ...
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
