<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/security/integrity, branch v3.18.37</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.18.37</id>
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<updated>2016-03-04T15:18:41Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons</title>
<updated>2016-03-04T15:18:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ryan Ware</name>
<email>ware@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-11T23:58:44Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=6702fc0c98d40442f9e74e10c499d68cd96455df'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6702fc0c98d40442f9e74e10c499d68cd96455df</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1 ]

This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085.  The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12.  This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().

Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo &lt;xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware &lt;ware@linux.intel.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: extend "mask" policy matching support</title>
<updated>2015-08-27T17:25:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T12:53:55Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:36ac1d14682122e3d792c66c8ae8d6d1bd093547</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 747cadeb108665b0474624a374aa9e13f12c9274 ]

commit 4351c294b8c1028077280f761e158d167b592974 upstream.

The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ,
MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC.  This patch extends the "mask"
option to match files opened containing one of these modes.  For
example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition</title>
<updated>2015-08-27T17:25:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-11-05T12:48:36Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9a957a6622ab900a78a256d8c9d941b618135980</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 139069eff7388407f19794384c42a534d618ccd7 ]

The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified
effective uid (euid).  In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures
files with the specified uid or suid.

Changelog:
- fixed checkpatch.pl warnings
- fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein &lt;gw@idfusion.org&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: labeling pseudo filesystems exception</title>
<updated>2015-08-04T18:29:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-04-21T17:59:31Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:7a889192e322242945874e52b25f88c8841c8f47</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 5101a1850bb7ccbf107929dee9af0cd2f400940f ]

To prevent offline stripping of existing file xattrs and relabeling of
them at runtime, EVM allows only newly created files to be labeled.  As
pseudo filesystems are not persistent, stripping of xattrs is not a
concern.

Some LSMs defer file labeling on pseudo filesystems.  This patch
permits the labeling of existing files on pseudo files systems.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()</title>
<updated>2015-07-04T03:02:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-06-11T15:54:42Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:cdbbbe19dd7dde385233508367aeec020e089c25</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 45b26133b97871896b8c5241d59f4ff7839db7b2 ]

This patch fixes a bug introduced in "4d7aeee ima: define new template
ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng".

Changelog:
- change int to uint32 (Roberto Sassu's suggestion)

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;rsassu@suse.de&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.13
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sasha.levin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into for-linus</title>
<updated>2014-10-29T04:03:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-29T04:03:54Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6c880ad51b829006c5387df88967954c0e874993</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: check xattr value length and type in evm_inode_setxattr()</title>
<updated>2014-10-28T14:06:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-28T12:28:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3b1deef6b1289a99505858a3b212c5b50adf0c2f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3b1deef6b1289a99505858a3b212c5b50adf0c2f</id>
<content type='text'>
evm_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. The function does not
check the length so that following command can be used to produce the
kernel oops: setfattr -n security.evm FOO. This patch fixes it.

Changes in v3:
* there is no reason to return different error codes for EVM_XATTR_HMAC
  and non EVM_XATTR_HMAC. Remove unnecessary test then.

Changes in v2:
* testing for validity of xattr type

[ 1106.396921] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
[ 1106.398192] IP: [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.399244] PGD 29048067 PUD 290d7067 PMD 0
[ 1106.399953] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1106.400020] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc evdev serio_raw i2c_piix4 button fuse
[ 1106.400020] CPU: 0 PID: 3635 Comm: setxattr Not tainted 3.16.0-kds+ #2936
[ 1106.400020] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 1106.400020] task: ffff8800291a0000 ti: ffff88002917c000 task.ti: ffff88002917c000
[ 1106.400020] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020] RSP: 0018:ffff88002917fd50  EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1106.400020] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88002917fdf8 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff818136d3 RDI: ffff88002917fdf8
[ 1106.400020] RBP: ffff88002917fd68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000003ec1df
[ 1106.400020] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800438a0a00
[ 1106.400020] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] FS:  00007f7dfa7d7740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000003763e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 1106.400020] Stack:
[ 1106.400020]  ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000 ffff88002917fd98
[ 1106.400020]  ffffffff812a1030 ffff8800438a0a00 ffff88002917fdf8 0000000000000000
[ 1106.400020]  0000000000000000 ffff88002917fde0 ffffffff8116d08a ffff88002917fdc8
[ 1106.400020] Call Trace:
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff812a1030&gt;] security_inode_setxattr+0x5d/0x6a
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d08a&gt;] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x9f
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d1e0&gt;] setxattr+0x122/0x16c
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8114d011&gt;] ? __sb_start_write+0x10f/0x143
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff811687c0&gt;] ? __mnt_want_write+0x48/0x4f
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d3e6&gt;] SyS_setxattr+0x6e/0xb0
[ 1106.400020]  [&lt;ffffffff81529da9&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 1106.400020] Code: c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 55 49 89 d5 41 54 49 89 fc 53 48 89 f3 48 c7 c6 d3 36 81 81 48 89 df e8 18 22 04 00 85 c0 75 07 &lt;41&gt; 80 7d 00 02 74 0d 48 89 de 4c 89 e7 e8 5a fe ff ff eb 03 83
[ 1106.400020] RIP  [&lt;ffffffff812af7b8&gt;] evm_inode_setxattr+0x2a/0x48
[ 1106.400020]  RSP &lt;ffff88002917fd50&gt;
[ 1106.400020] CR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1106.428061] ---[ end trace ae08331628ba3050 ]---

Reported-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: check xattr value length and type in the ima_inode_setxattr()</title>
<updated>2014-10-28T14:03:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-28T11:31:22Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=a48fda9de94500a3152a56b723d0a64ae236547c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a48fda9de94500a3152a56b723d0a64ae236547c</id>
<content type='text'>
ima_inode_setxattr() can be called with no value. Function does not
check the length so that following command can be used to produce
kernel oops: setfattr -n security.ima FOO. This patch fixes it.

Changes in v3:
* for stable reverted "allow setting hash only in fix or log mode"
  It will be a separate patch.

Changes in v2:
* testing validity of xattr type
* allow setting hash only in fix or log mode (Mimi)

[  261.562522] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
[  261.564109] IP: [&lt;ffffffff812af272&gt;] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a
[  261.564109] PGD 3112f067 PUD 42965067 PMD 0
[  261.564109] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[  261.564109] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc evdev serio_raw i2c_piix4 button fuse
[  261.564109] CPU: 0 PID: 3299 Comm: setxattr Not tainted 3.16.0-kds+ #2924
[  261.564109] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[  261.564109] task: ffff8800428c2430 ti: ffff880042be0000 task.ti: ffff880042be0000
[  261.564109] RIP: 0010:[&lt;ffffffff812af272&gt;]  [&lt;ffffffff812af272&gt;] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a
[  261.564109] RSP: 0018:ffff880042be3d50  EFLAGS: 00010246
[  261.564109] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000015
[  261.564109] RDX: 0000001500000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800375cc600
[  261.564109] RBP: ffff880042be3d68 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004d6256
[  261.564109] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88002149ba00
[  261.564109] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  261.564109] FS:  00007f6c1e219740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  261.564109] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  261.564109] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000003b35a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  261.564109] Stack:
[  261.564109]  ffff88002149ba00 ffff880042be3df8 0000000000000000 ffff880042be3d98
[  261.564109]  ffffffff812a101b ffff88002149ba00 ffff880042be3df8 0000000000000000
[  261.564109]  0000000000000000 ffff880042be3de0 ffffffff8116d08a ffff880042be3dc8
[  261.564109] Call Trace:
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff812a101b&gt;] security_inode_setxattr+0x48/0x6a
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d08a&gt;] vfs_setxattr+0x6b/0x9f
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d1e0&gt;] setxattr+0x122/0x16c
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff8114d011&gt;] ? __sb_start_write+0x10f/0x143
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff811687e8&gt;] ? mnt_want_write+0x21/0x45
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff811687c0&gt;] ? __mnt_want_write+0x48/0x4f
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff8116d3e6&gt;] SyS_setxattr+0x6e/0xb0
[  261.564109]  [&lt;ffffffff81529da9&gt;] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[  261.564109] Code: 48 89 f7 48 c7 c6 58 36 81 81 53 31 db e8 73 27 04 00 85 c0 75 28 bf 15 00 00 00 e8 8a a5 d9 ff 84 c0 75 05 83 cb ff eb 15 31 f6 &lt;41&gt; 80 7d 00 03 49 8b 7c 24 68 40 0f 94 c6 e8 e1 f9 ff ff 89 d8
[  261.564109] RIP  [&lt;ffffffff812af272&gt;] ima_inode_setxattr+0x3e/0x5a
[  261.564109]  RSP &lt;ffff880042be3d50&gt;
[  261.564109] CR2: 0000000000000000
[  261.599998] ---[ end trace 39a89a3fc267e652 ]---

Reported-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security, crypto: LLVMLinux: Remove VLAIS from ima_crypto.c</title>
<updated>2014-10-14T08:51:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Behan Webster</name>
<email>behanw@converseincode.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-04T21:18:00Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=357aabed626fe3fc753a99ef1d652f4e2d82ba26'/>
<id>urn:sha1:357aabed626fe3fc753a99ef1d652f4e2d82ba26</id>
<content type='text'>
Replaced the use of a Variable Length Array In Struct (VLAIS) with a C99
compliant equivalent. This patch allocates the appropriate amount of memory
using a char array using the SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK macro.

The new code can be compiled with both gcc and clang.

Signed-off-by: Behan Webster &lt;behanw@converseincode.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mark Charlebois &lt;charlebm@gmail.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan-Simon Möller &lt;dl9pf@gmx.de&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: do zero padding of the key id</title>
<updated>2014-10-06T16:33:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>d.kasatkin@samsung.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-10-06T16:31:58Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=594081ee7145cc30a3977cb4e218f81213b63dc5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:594081ee7145cc30a3977cb4e218f81213b63dc5</id>
<content type='text'>
Latest KEYS code return error if hexadecimal string length id odd.
Fix it.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
