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<title>user/sven/linux.git/security/integrity, branch v4.4.130</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2018-03-22T08:23:30Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ima: relax requiring a file signature for new files with zero length</title>
<updated>2018-03-22T08:23:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-08T12:38:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:76bda31c54844169bc28adec9240e567566cf10b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b7e27bc1d42e8e0cc58b602b529c25cd0071b336 ]

Custom policies can require file signatures based on LSM labels.  These
files are normally created and only afterwards labeled, requiring them
to be signed.

Instead of requiring file signatures based on LSM labels, entire
filesystems could require file signatures.  In this case, we need the
ability of writing new files without requiring file signatures.

The definition of a "new" file was originally defined as any file with
a length of zero.  Subsequent patches redefined a "new" file to be based
on the FILE_CREATE open flag.  By combining the open flag with a file
size of zero, this patch relaxes the file signature requirement.

Fixes: 1ac202e978e1 ima: accept previously set IMA_NEW_FILE
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: fix hash algorithm initialization</title>
<updated>2017-12-09T17:42:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Boshi Wang</name>
<email>wangboshi@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-10-20T08:01:03Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:80f93e24ecfcbbb95667e7e65f75e7646fd0905e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ebe7c0a7be92bbd34c6ff5b55810546a0ee05bee ]

The hash_setup function always sets the hash_setup_done flag, even
when the hash algorithm is invalid.  This prevents the default hash
algorithm defined as CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH from being used.

This patch sets hash_setup_done flag only for valid hash algorithms.

Fixes: e7a2ad7eb6f4 "ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash algorithms"
Signed-off-by: Boshi Wang &lt;wangboshi@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@verizon.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: do not update security.ima if appraisal status is not INTEGRITY_PASS</title>
<updated>2017-11-24T07:32:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-07T10:37:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a9100b6f1a8af4251107a2d67e98854e8a61cd4b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 020aae3ee58c1af0e7ffc4e2cc9fe4dc630338cb upstream.

Commit b65a9cfc2c38 ("Untangling ima mess, part 2: deal with counters")
moved the call of ima_file_check() from may_open() to do_filp_open() at a
point where the file descriptor is already opened.

This breaks the assumption made by IMA that file descriptors being closed
belong to files whose access was granted by ima_file_check(). The
consequence is that security.ima and security.evm are updated with good
values, regardless of the current appraisal status.

For example, if a file does not have security.ima, IMA will create it after
opening the file for writing, even if access is denied. Access to the file
will be allowed afterwards.

Avoid this issue by checking the appraisal status before updating
security.ima.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: accept previously set IMA_NEW_FILE</title>
<updated>2017-05-25T12:30:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Daniel Glöckner</name>
<email>dg@emlix.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-02-24T14:05:14Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:08e589a97d3884820ccbb96fe58af36ae544e31e</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1ac202e978e18f045006d75bd549612620c6ec3a upstream.

Modifying the attributes of a file makes ima_inode_post_setattr reset
the IMA cache flags. So if the file, which has just been created,
is opened a second time before the first file descriptor is closed,
verification fails since the security.ima xattr has not been written
yet. We therefore have to look at the IMA_NEW_FILE even if the file
already existed.

With this patch there should no longer be an error when cat tries to
open testfile:

$ rm -f testfile
$ ( echo test &gt;&amp;3 ; touch testfile ; cat testfile ) 3&gt;testfile

A file being new is no reason to accept that it is missing a digital
signature demanded by the policy.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Glöckner &lt;dg@emlix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: use file_dentry()</title>
<updated>2016-10-16T15:36:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-09-16T10:44:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0040b7466cbd6d7a7f84d0eed86e328da21c0e27</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e71b9dff0634edb127f449e076e883ef24a8c76c upstream.

Ima tries to call -&gt;setxattr() on overlayfs dentry after having locked
underlying inode, which results in a deadlock.

Reported-by: Krisztian Litkey &lt;kli@iki.fi&gt;
Fixes: 4bacc9c9234c ("overlayfs: Make f_path always point to the overlay and f_inode to the underlay")
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: Use crypto_memneq() for digest comparisons</title>
<updated>2016-02-17T20:31:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ryan Ware</name>
<email>ware@linux.intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-02-11T23:58:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8592536bcfcbc717a3bf7cec57d7c1b38f4eec1d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 613317bd212c585c20796c10afe5daaa95d4b0a1 upstream.

This patch fixes vulnerability CVE-2016-2085.  The problem exists
because the vm_verify_hmac() function includes a use of memcmp().
Unfortunately, this allows timing side channel attacks; specifically
a MAC forgery complexity drop from 2^128 to 2^12.  This patch changes
the memcmp() to the cryptographically safe crypto_memneq().

Reported-by: Xiaofei Rex Guo &lt;xiaofei.rex.guo@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Ryan Ware &lt;ware@linux.intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mm, page_alloc: rename __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM</title>
<updated>2015-11-07T01:50:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mel Gorman</name>
<email>mgorman@techsingularity.net</email>
</author>
<published>2015-11-07T00:28:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:71baba4b92dc1fa1bc461742c6ab1942ec6034e9</id>
<content type='text'>
__GFP_WAIT was used to signal that the caller was in atomic context and
could not sleep.  Now it is possible to distinguish between true atomic
context and callers that are not willing to sleep.  The latter should
clear __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so kswapd will still wake.  As clearing
__GFP_WAIT behaves differently, there is a risk that people will clear the
wrong flags.  This patch renames __GFP_WAIT to __GFP_RECLAIM to clearly
indicate what it does -- setting it allows all reclaim activity, clearing
them prevents it.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman &lt;mgorman@techsingularity.net&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka &lt;vbabka@suse.cz&gt;
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner &lt;hannes@cmpxchg.org&gt;
Cc: Christoph Lameter &lt;cl@linux.com&gt;
Acked-by: David Rientjes &lt;rientjes@google.com&gt;
Cc: Vitaly Wool &lt;vitalywool@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Rik van Riel &lt;riel@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data</title>
<updated>2015-10-21T14:18:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-10-21T13:04:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:146aa8b1453bd8f1ff2304ffb71b4ee0eb9acdcc</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk
as it seems pointless to keep them separate.

Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded
user-defined keys.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: prevent loading untrusted certificates on the IMA trusted keyring</title>
<updated>2015-10-09T19:31:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2015-09-10T19:06:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:72e1eed8abb11c79749266d433c817ce36732893</id>
<content type='text'>
If IMA_LOAD_X509 is enabled, either directly or indirectly via
IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT, certificates are loaded onto the IMA
trusted keyring by the kernel via key_create_or_update(). When
the KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag is provided, certificates are loaded
without first verifying the certificate is properly signed by a
trusted key on the system keyring.  This patch removes the
KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED flag.

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com&gt;
Cc:  &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # 3.19+
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux</title>
<updated>2015-07-01T17:49:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2015-07-01T17:49:25Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:02201e3f1b46aed7c6348f406b7b40de80ba6de3</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull module updates from Rusty Russell:
 "Main excitement here is Peter Zijlstra's lockless rbtree optimization
  to speed module address lookup.  He found some abusers of the module
  lock doing that too.

  A little bit of parameter work here too; including Dan Streetman's
  breaking up the big param mutex so writing a parameter can load
  another module (yeah, really).  Unfortunately that broke the usual
  suspects, !CONFIG_MODULES and !CONFIG_SYSFS, so those fixes were
  appended too"

* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: (26 commits)
  modules: only use mod-&gt;param_lock if CONFIG_MODULES
  param: fix module param locks when !CONFIG_SYSFS.
  rcu: merge fix for Convert ACCESS_ONCE() to READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE()
  module: add per-module param_lock
  module: make perm const
  params: suppress unused variable error, warn once just in case code changes.
  modules: clarify CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS help, suggest 'N'.
  kernel/module.c: avoid ifdefs for sig_enforce declaration
  kernel/workqueue.c: remove ifdefs over wq_power_efficient
  kernel/params.c: export param_ops_bool_enable_only
  kernel/params.c: generalize bool_enable_only
  kernel/module.c: use generic module param operaters for sig_enforce
  kernel/params: constify struct kernel_param_ops uses
  sysfs: tightened sysfs permission checks
  module: Rework module_addr_{min,max}
  module: Use __module_address() for module_address_lookup()
  module: Make the mod_tree stuff conditional on PERF_EVENTS || TRACING
  module: Optimize __module_address() using a latched RB-tree
  rbtree: Implement generic latch_tree
  seqlock: Introduce raw_read_seqcount_latch()
  ...
</content>
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