<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/security/integrity, branch v4.4.300</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.300</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.4.300'/>
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<updated>2020-10-29T08:03:01Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update()</title>
<updated>2020-10-29T08:03:01Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-09-04T09:23:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=5dfe2066b8136a9ed12e5e1f06cdeeff120c7581'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5dfe2066b8136a9ed12e5e1f06cdeeff120c7581</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 60386b854008adc951c470067f90a2d85b5d520f upstream.

Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in
ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next
iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling
crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921efd ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules</title>
<updated>2020-06-20T08:23:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-03T15:08:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0cd287657a1f9aa33c48dc7d4e521c60de61b68f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0cd287657a1f9aa33c48dc7d4e521c60de61b68f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 067a436b1b0aafa593344fddd711a755a58afb3b ]

This patch prevents the following oops:

[   10.771813] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000
[...]
[   10.779790] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0xf7/0xb80
[...]
[   10.798576] Call Trace:
[   10.798993]  ? ima_lsm_policy_change+0x2b0/0x2b0
[   10.799753]  ? inode_init_owner+0x1a0/0x1a0
[   10.800484]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x7a/0xd0
[   10.801592]  ima_must_appraise.part.0+0xb6/0xf0
[   10.802313]  ? ima_fix_xattr.isra.0+0xd0/0xd0
[   10.803167]  ima_must_appraise+0x4f/0x70
[   10.804004]  ima_post_path_mknod+0x2e/0x80
[   10.804800]  do_mknodat+0x396/0x3c0

It occurs when there is a failure during IMA initialization, and
ima_init_policy() is not called. IMA hooks still call ima_match_policy()
but ima_rules is NULL. This patch prevents the crash by directly assigning
the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules when ima_rules is defined. This
wouldn't alter the existing behavior, as ima_rules is always set at the end
of ima_init_policy().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x
Fixes: 07f6a79415d7d ("ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules")
Reported-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Fix ima digest hash table key calculation</title>
<updated>2020-06-20T08:23:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Krzysztof Struczynski</name>
<email>krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-28T07:30:10Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:856d5ec8daa76cd8ce5eb03a5ad3366d839aa04b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1129d31b55d509f15e72dc68e4b5c3a4d7b4da8d upstream.

Function hash_long() accepts unsigned long, while currently only one byte
is passed from ima_hash_key(), which calculates a key for ima_htable.

Given that hashing the digest does not give clear benefits compared to
using the digest itself, remove hash_long() and return the modulus
calculated on the first two bytes of the digest with the number of slots.
Also reduce the depth of the hash table by doubling the number of slots.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921ef ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski &lt;krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: David.Laight@aculab.com (big endian system concerns)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc()</title>
<updated>2020-05-27T14:40:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-27T10:28:56Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b30282c3bcc7542fe3faf9f5e1a0980c3c28a507</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 53de3b080d5eae31d0de219617155dcc34e7d698 ]

This patch avoids a kernel panic due to accessing an error pointer set by
crypto_alloc_shash(). It occurs especially when there are many files that
require an unsupported algorithm, as it would increase the likelihood of
the following race condition:

Task A: *tfm = crypto_alloc_shash() &lt;= error pointer
Task B: if (*tfm == NULL) &lt;= *tfm is not NULL, use it
Task B: rc = crypto_shash_init(desc) &lt;= panic
Task A: *tfm = NULL

This patch uses the IS_ERR_OR_NULL macro to determine whether or not a new
crypto context must be created.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d46eb3699502b ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")
Co-developed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski &lt;krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski &lt;krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: always return negative code for error</title>
<updated>2019-10-17T20:40:54Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sascha Hauer</name>
<email>s.hauer@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-02T08:00:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b1b8f7b23a2832f46593707627fee765575bcd7c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f5e1040196dbfe14c77ce3dfe3b7b08d2d961e88 ]

integrity_kernel_read() returns the number of bytes read. If this is
a short read then this positive value is returned from
ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(). Currently this is only indirectly called from
ima_calc_file_hash() and this function only tests for the return value
being zero or nonzero and also doesn't forward the return value.
Nevertheless there's no point in returning a positive value as an error,
so translate a short read into -EINVAL.

Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer &lt;s.hauer@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: fix showing large 'violations' or 'runtime_measurements_count'</title>
<updated>2018-11-21T08:27:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-07T21:33:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:34aa96127aaff4a53df9c82b0a0fd7059a798370</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1e4c8dafbb6bf72fb5eca035b861e39c5896c2b7 upstream.

The 12 character temporary buffer is not necessarily long enough to hold
a 'long' value.  Increase it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "ima: limit file hash setting by user to fix and log modes"</title>
<updated>2018-06-06T14:46:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2016-11-02T13:14:16Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:851ae480e6d09c34b649b738418c30baf8c970d3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f5acb3dcba1ffb7f0b8cbb9dba61500eea5d610b upstream.

Userspace applications have been modified to write security xattrs,
but they are not context aware.  In the case of security.ima, the
security xattr can be either a file hash or a file signature.
Permitting writing one, but not the other requires the application to
be context aware.

In addition, userspace applications might write files to a staging
area, which might not be in policy, and then change some file metadata
(eg. owner) making it in policy.  As a result, these files are not
labeled properly.

This reverts commit c68ed80c97d9720f51ef31fe91560fdd1e121533, which
prevents writing file hashes as security.ima xattrs.

Requested-by: Patrick Ohly &lt;patrick.ohly@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Mike Rapoport &lt;rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Fallback to the builtin hash algorithm</title>
<updated>2018-05-30T05:49:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Petr Vorel</name>
<email>pvorel@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-23T13:41:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5cace4b68c5fd232b871a96f1b2e2bc32a9c09a5</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ab60368ab6a452466885ef4edf0cefd089465132 ]

IMA requires having it's hash algorithm be compiled-in due to it's
early use.  The default IMA algorithm is protected by Kconfig to be
compiled-in.

The ima_hash kernel parameter allows to choose the hash algorithm. When
the specified algorithm is not available or available as a module, IMA
initialization fails, which leads to a kernel panic (mknodat syscall calls
ima_post_path_mknod()).  Therefore as fallback we force IMA to use
the default builtin Kconfig hash algorithm.

Fixed crash:

$ grep CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4 .config
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4=m

[    0.000000] Command line: BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-4.12.14-2.3-default root=UUID=74ae8202-9ca7-4e39-813b-22287ec52f7a video=1024x768-16 plymouth.ignore-serial-consoles console=ttyS0 console=tty resume=/dev/disk/by-path/pci-0000:00:07.0-part3 splash=silent showopts ima_hash=md4
...
[    1.545190] ima: Can not allocate md4 (reason: -2)
...
[    2.610120] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
[    2.611903] IP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390
[    2.612967] PGD 0 P4D 0
[    2.613080] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[    2.613080] Modules linked in: autofs4
[    2.613080] Supported: Yes
[    2.613080] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 4.12.14-2.3-default #1
[    2.613080] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
[    2.613080] task: ffff88003e2d0040 task.stack: ffffc90000190000
[    2.613080] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390
[    2.613080] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000193e88 EFLAGS: 00010296
[    2.613080] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000000004
[    2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff880037071728
[    2.613080] RBP: 0000000000008000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[    2.613080] R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 61c8864680b583eb R12: 00005580ff10086f
[    2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000008000
[    2.613080] FS:  00007f5c1da08940(0000) GS:ffff88003fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    2.613080] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000037002000 CR4: 00000000003406f0
[    2.613080] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[    2.613080] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[    2.613080] Call Trace:
[    2.613080]  ? shmem_mknod+0xbf/0xd0
[    2.613080]  ima_post_path_mknod+0x1c/0x40
[    2.613080]  SyS_mknod+0x210/0x220
[    2.613080]  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
[    2.613080] RIP: 0033:0x7f5c1bfde570
[    2.613080] RSP: 002b:00007ffde1c90dc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000085
[    2.613080] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5c1bfde570
[    2.613080] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000008000 RDI: 00005580ff10086f
[    2.613080] RBP: 00007ffde1c91040 R08: 00005580ff10086f R09: 0000000000000000
[    2.613080] R10: 0000000000104000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005580ffb99660
[    2.613080] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000002
[    2.613080] Code: 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 41 56 44 8d 14 09 41 55 41 54 55 53 44 89 d3 09 cb 48 83 ec 38 48 8b 05 c5 03 29 01 &lt;4c&gt; 8b 20 4c 39 e0 0f 84 d7 01 00 00 4c 89 44 24 08 89 54 24 20
[    2.613080] RIP: ima_match_policy+0x23/0x390 RSP: ffffc90000193e88
[    2.613080] CR2: 0000000000000000
[    2.613080] ---[ end trace 9a9f0a8a73079f6a ]---
[    2.673052] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009
[    2.673052]
[    2.675337] Kernel Offset: disabled
[    2.676405] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x00000009

Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel &lt;pvorel@suse.cz&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Fix Kconfig to select TPM 2.0 CRB interface</title>
<updated>2018-05-30T05:49:10Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jiandi An</name>
<email>anjiandi@codeaurora.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-03-07T05:26:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=edf3bf9ee26ae9655a2b43a251e96e84bc0b0676'/>
<id>urn:sha1:edf3bf9ee26ae9655a2b43a251e96e84bc0b0676</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit fac37c628fd5d68fd7298d9b57ae8601ee1b4723 ]

TPM_CRB driver provides TPM CRB 2.0 support.  If it is built as a
module, the TPM chip is registered after IMA init.  tpm_pcr_read() in
IMA fails and displays the following message even though eventually
there is a TPM chip on the system.

ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass! (rc=-19)

Fix IMA Kconfig to select TPM_CRB so TPM_CRB driver is built in the kernel
and initializes before IMA.

Signed-off-by: Jiandi An &lt;anjiandi@codeaurora.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: relax requiring a file signature for new files with zero length</title>
<updated>2018-03-22T08:23:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-08T12:38:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=76bda31c54844169bc28adec9240e567566cf10b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:76bda31c54844169bc28adec9240e567566cf10b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b7e27bc1d42e8e0cc58b602b529c25cd0071b336 ]

Custom policies can require file signatures based on LSM labels.  These
files are normally created and only afterwards labeled, requiring them
to be signed.

Instead of requiring file signatures based on LSM labels, entire
filesystems could require file signatures.  In this case, we need the
ability of writing new files without requiring file signatures.

The definition of a "new" file was originally defined as any file with
a length of zero.  Subsequent patches redefined a "new" file to be based
on the FILE_CREATE open flag.  By combining the open flag with a file
size of zero, this patch relaxes the file signature requirement.

Fixes: 1ac202e978e1 ima: accept previously set IMA_NEW_FILE
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
