user/sven/linux.git/security/integrity, branch v5.1.16

evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc()

2019-06-09T07:16:15Z

commit 221be106d75c1b511973301542f47d6000d0b63e upstream. This patch prevents memory access beyond the evm_tfm array by checking the validity of the index (hash algorithm) passed to init_desc(). The hash algorithm can be arbitrarily set if the security.ima xattr type is not EVM_XATTR_HMAC. Fixes: 5feeb61183dde ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly

2019-06-09T07:16:15Z

commit 8cdc23a3d9ec0944000ad43bad588e36afdc38cd upstream. Show the '^' character when a policy rule has flag IMA_INMASK. Fixes: 80eae209d63ac ("IMA: allow reading back the current IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: fix wrong signed policy requirement when not appraising

2019-06-09T07:16:14Z

commit f40019475bbbe9b455e7fd4385fcf13896c492ca upstream. Kernel booted just with ima_policy=tcb (not with ima_policy=appraise_tcb) shouldn't require signed policy. Regression found with LTP test ima_policy.sh. Fixes: c52657d93b05 ("ima: refactor ima_init_policy()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-5.0) Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Merge branch 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2019-03-11T00:37:29Z

Pull tpm updates from James Morris: - Clean up the transmission flow Cleaned up the whole transmission flow. Locking of the chip is now done in the level of tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() instead taking the chip lock inside tpm_transmit(). The nested calls inside tpm_transmit(), used with the resource manager, have been refactored out. Should make easier to perform more complex transactions with the TPM without making the subsystem a bigger mess (e.g. encrypted channel patches by James Bottomley). - PPI 1.3 support TPM PPI 1.3 introduces an additional optional command parameter that may be needed for some commands. Display the parameter if the command requires such a parameter. Only command 23 (SetPCRBanks) needs one. The PPI request file will show output like this then: # echo "23 16" > request # cat request 23 16 # echo "5" > request # cat request 5 - Extend all PCR banks in IMA Instead of static PCR banks array, the array of available PCR banks is now allocated dynamically. The digests sizes are determined dynamically using a probe PCR read without relying crypto's static list of hash algorithms. This should finally make sealing of measurements in IMA safe and secure. - TPM 2.0 selftests Added a test suite to tools/testing/selftests/tpm2 previously outside of the kernel tree: https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts * 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits) tpm/ppi: Enable submission of optional command parameter for PPI 1.3 tpm/ppi: Possibly show command parameter if TPM PPI 1.3 is used tpm/ppi: Display up to 101 operations as define for version 1.3 tpm/ppi: rename TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID to TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID_1 tpm/ppi: pass function revision ID to tpm_eval_dsm() tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend() KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip() tpm: move tpm_chip definition to include/linux/tpm.h tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read tpm: rename and export tpm2_digest and tpm2_algorithms tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array tpm: remove @flags from tpm_transmit() tpm: take TPM chip power gating out of tpm_transmit() tpm: introduce tpm_chip_start() and tpm_chip_stop() tpm: remove TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED flag tpm: use tpm_try_get_ops() in tpm-sysfs.c. tpm: remove @space from tpm_transmit() tpm: move TPM space code out of tpm_transmit() tpm: move tpm_validate_commmand() to tpm2-space.c tpm: clean up tpm_try_transmit() error handling flow ...

Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2019-03-11T00:32:04Z

Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "Mimi Zohar says: 'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for verifying the PE kernel image signature. Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated. The remaining patches are cleanup'" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr' encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1 kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring

Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit

2019-03-07T20:20:11Z

Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1. Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another. Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems. All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1" * tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: mark expected switch fall-through audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes audit: join tty records to their syscall audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match audit: ignore fcaps on umount audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic audit: add support for fcaps v3 audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved

Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2019-03-07T19:44:01Z

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: - Extend LSM stacking to allow sharing of cred, file, ipc, inode, and task blobs. This paves the way for more full-featured LSMs to be merged, and is specifically aimed at LandLock and SARA LSMs. This work is from Casey and Kees. - There's a new LSM from Micah Morton: "SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a system-wide whitelist." This feature is currently shipping in ChromeOS. * 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (62 commits) keys: fix missing __user in KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY LSM: Update list of SECURITYFS users in Kconfig LSM: Ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is specified LSM: Update function documentation for cap_capable security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break tomoyo: Bump version. LSM: fix return value check in safesetid_init_securityfs() LSM: SafeSetID: add selftest LSM: SafeSetID: remove unused include LSM: SafeSetID: 'depend' on CONFIG_SECURITY LSM: Add 'name' field for SafeSetID in DEFINE_LSM LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls tomoyo: Allow multiple use_group lines. tomoyo: Coding style fix. tomoyo: Swicth from cred->security to task_struct->security. security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs security: keys: annotate implicit fall throughs security: keys: annotate implicit fall through capabilities:: annotate implicit fall through ...

get rid of legacy 'get_ds()' function

2019-03-04T18:50:14Z

Every in-kernel use of this function defined it to KERNEL_DS (either as an actual define, or as an inline function). It's an entirely historical artifact, and long long long ago used to actually read the segment selector valueof '%ds' on x86. Which in the kernel is always KERNEL_DS. Inspired by a patch from Jann Horn that just did this for a very small subset of users (the ones in fs/), along with Al who suggested a script. I then just took it to the logical extreme and removed all the remaining gunk. Roughly scripted with git grep -l '(get_ds())' -- :^tools/ | xargs sed -i 's/(get_ds())/(KERNEL_DS)/' git grep -lw 'get_ds' -- :^tools/ | xargs sed -i '/^#define get_ds()/d' plus manual fixups to remove a few unusual usage patterns, the couple of inline function cases and to fix up a comment that had become stale. The 'get_ds()' function remains in an x86 kvm selftest, since in user space it actually does something relevant. Inspired-by: Jann Horn Inspired-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing break

2019-02-22T17:56:09Z

In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases where we are expecting to fall through. This patch fixes the following warnings: security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3 Also, add a missing break statement to fix the following warning: security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] Acked-by: John Johansen Acked-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva Acked-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: James Morris

tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()

2019-02-13T07:48:52Z

Currently, tpm_pcr_extend() accepts as an input only a SHA1 digest. This patch replaces the hash parameter of tpm_pcr_extend() with an array of tpm_digest structures, so that the caller can provide a digest for each PCR bank currently allocated in the TPM. tpm_pcr_extend() will not extend banks for which no digest was provided, as it happened before this patch, but instead it requires that callers provide the full set of digests. Since the number of digests will always be chip->nr_allocated_banks, the count parameter has been removed. Due to the API change, ima_pcr_extend() and pcrlock() have been modified. Since the number of allocated banks is not known in advance, the memory for the digests must be dynamically allocated. To avoid performance degradation and to avoid that a PCR extend is not done due to lack of memory, the array of tpm_digest structures is allocated by the users of the TPM driver at initialization time. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Tested-by: Mimi Zohar (on x86 for TPM 1.2 & PTT TPM 2.0) Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen