<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/security/integrity, branch v5.5.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.5.8</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v5.5.8'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-03-05T15:45:22Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes</title>
<updated>2020-03-05T15:45:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Janne Karhunen</name>
<email>janne.karhunen@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-01-15T15:42:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3920a764f2a7c6b890ec386a7f3768bfb55e261c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3920a764f2a7c6b890ec386a7f3768bfb55e261c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 483ec26eed42bf050931d9a5c5f9f0b5f2ad5f3b upstream.

Keep the ima policy rules around from the beginning even if they appear
invalid at the time of loading, as they may become active after an lsm
policy load.  However, loading a custom IMA policy with unknown LSM
labels is only safe after we have transitioned from the "built-in"
policy rules to a custom IMA policy.

Patch also fixes the rule re-use during the lsm policy reload and makes
some prints a bit more human readable.

Changelog:
v4:
- Do not allow the initial policy load refer to non-existing lsm rules.
v3:
- Fix too wide policy rule matching for non-initialized LSMs
v2:
- Fix log prints

Fixes: b16942455193 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Cc: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen &lt;janne.karhunen@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Konsta Karsisto &lt;konsta.karsisto@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>IMA: Check IMA policy flag</title>
<updated>2020-02-24T07:38:14Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Lakshmi Ramasubramanian</name>
<email>nramas@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-11T16:47:02Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=487c47c6ddeb82b345b03cb11b83e62ae36573e6'/>
<id>urn:sha1:487c47c6ddeb82b345b03cb11b83e62ae36573e6</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit c5563bad88e07017e08cce1142903e501598c80c ]

process_buffer_measurement() may be called prior to IMA being
initialized (for instance, when the IMA hook is called when
a key is added to the .builtin_trusted_keys keyring), which
would result in a kernel panic.

This patch adds the check in process_buffer_measurement()
to return immediately if IMA is not initialized yet.

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian &lt;nramas@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>treewide: Use sizeof_field() macro</title>
<updated>2019-12-09T18:36:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Pankaj Bharadiya</name>
<email>pankaj.laxminarayan.bharadiya@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-12-09T18:31:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=c593642c8be046915ca3a4a300243a68077cd207'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c593642c8be046915ca3a4a300243a68077cd207</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace all the occurrences of FIELD_SIZEOF() with sizeof_field() except
at places where these are defined. Later patches will remove the unused
definition of FIELD_SIZEOF().

This patch is generated using following script:

EXCLUDE_FILES="include/linux/stddef.h|include/linux/kernel.h"

git grep -l -e "\bFIELD_SIZEOF\b" | while read file;
do

	if [[ "$file" =~ $EXCLUDE_FILES ]]; then
		continue
	fi
	sed -i  -e 's/\bFIELD_SIZEOF\b/sizeof_field/g' $file;
done

Signed-off-by: Pankaj Bharadiya &lt;pankaj.laxminarayan.bharadiya@intel.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190924105839.110713-3-pankaj.laxminarayan.bharadiya@intel.com
Co-developed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: David Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt; # for net
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/efi: remove unused variables</title>
<updated>2019-11-29T11:23:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>YueHaibing</name>
<email>yuehaibing@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-15T13:08:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=6f090192f8225f52ba95d08785989688cb768cca'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6f090192f8225f52ba95d08785989688cb768cca</id>
<content type='text'>
commit ad723674d675 ("x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions
to new file") leave this unused.

Fixes: ad723674d675 ("x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot &lt;hulkci@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing &lt;yuehaibing@huawei.com&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191115130830.13320-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>powerpc: Load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T13:33:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nayna Jain</name>
<email>nayna@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-11T03:10:36Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8220e22d11a05049aab9693839ab82e5e177ccde'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8220e22d11a05049aab9693839ab82e5e177ccde</id>
<content type='text'>
The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as
secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the
.platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This
enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot
time keys which are trusted by firmware.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter &lt;erichte@linux.ibm.com&gt;
[mpe: Search by compatible in load_powerpc_certs(), not using format]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T13:33:23Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nayna Jain</name>
<email>nayna@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-11-11T03:10:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ad723674d6758478829ee766e3f1a2a24d56236f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ad723674d6758478829ee766e3f1a2a24d56236f</id>
<content type='text'>
The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted
hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc
mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware.

This patch moves the common code from load_uefi.c to keyring_handler.c

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter &lt;erichte@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-4-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T01:25:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nayna Jain</name>
<email>nayna@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-31T03:31:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=273df864cf7466fb170b8dcc1abd672cd08ad8d3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:273df864cf7466fb170b8dcc1abd672cd08ad8d3</id>
<content type='text'>
Asymmetric private keys are used to sign multiple files. The kernel
currently supports checking against blacklisted keys. However, if the
public key is blacklisted, any file signed by the blacklisted key will
automatically fail signature verification. Blacklisting the public key
is not fine enough granularity, as we might want to only blacklist a
particular file.

This patch adds support for checking against the blacklisted hash of
the file, without the appended signature, based on the IMA policy. It
defines a new policy option "appraise_flag=check_blacklist".

In addition to the blacklisted binary hashes stored in the firmware
"dbx" variable, the Linux kernel may be configured to load blacklisted
binary hashes onto the .blacklist keyring as well. The following
example shows how to blacklist a specific kernel module hash.

  $ sha256sum kernel/kheaders.ko
  77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
  kernel/kheaders.ko

  $ grep BLACKLIST .config
  CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING=y
  CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="blacklist-hash-list"

  $ cat certs/blacklist-hash-list
  "bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3"

Update the IMA custom measurement and appraisal policy
rules (/etc/ima-policy):

  measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig
  appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist
  appraise_type=imasig|modsig

After building, installing, and rebooting the kernel:

   545660333 ---lswrv      0     0   \_ blacklist:
  bin:77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3

  measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig
  appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_flag=check_blacklist
  appraise_type=imasig|modsig

  modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'kheaders': Permission denied

  10 0c9834db5a0182c1fb0cdc5d3adcf11a11fd83dd ima-sig
  sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40
  2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0-rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko

  10 82aad2bcc3fa8ed94762356b5c14838f3bcfa6a0 ima-modsig
  sha256:3bc6ed4f0b4d6e31bc1dbc9ef844605abc7afdc6d81a57d77a1ec9407997c40
  2 /usr/lib/modules/5.4.0rc3+/kernel/kernel/kheaders.ko  sha256:77fa889b3
  5a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3
  3082029a06092a864886f70d010702a082028b30820287020101310d300b0609608648
  016503040201300b06092a864886f70d01070131820264....

  10 25b72217cc1152b44b134ce2cd68f12dfb71acb3 ima-buf
  sha256:8b58427fedcf8f4b20bc8dc007f2e232bf7285d7b93a66476321f9c2a3aa132
  b blacklisted-hash
  77fa889b35a05338ec52e51591c1b89d4c8d1c99a21251d7c22b1a8642a6bad3

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-8-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Make process_buffer_measurement() generic</title>
<updated>2019-11-12T01:25:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nayna Jain</name>
<email>nayna@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-10-31T03:31:30Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e14555e3d0e9edfad0a6840c0152f71aba97e793'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e14555e3d0e9edfad0a6840c0152f71aba97e793</id>
<content type='text'>
process_buffer_measurement() is limited to measuring the kexec boot
command line. This patch makes process_buffer_measurement() more
generic, allowing it to measure other types of buffer data (e.g.
blacklisted binary hashes or key hashes).

process_buffer_measurement() may be called directly from an IMA hook
or as an auxiliary measurement record. In both cases the buffer
measurement is based on policy. This patch modifies the function to
conditionally retrieve the policy defined PCR and template for the IMA
hook case.

Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain &lt;nayna@linux.ibm.com&gt;
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: added comment in process_buffer_measurement()]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman &lt;mpe@ellerman.id.au&gt;
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-6-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: remove pointless subdir-$(CONFIG_...)</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T06:29:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>yamada.masahiro@socionext.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-26T02:10:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=7a8beb7ad51551babd17331f3c0f58af25916f67'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7a8beb7ad51551babd17331f3c0f58af25916f67</id>
<content type='text'>
The ima/ and evm/ sub-directories contain built-in objects, so
obj-$(CONFIG_...) is the correct way to descend into them.

subdir-$(CONFIG_...) is redundant.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>integrity: remove unneeded, broken attempt to add -fshort-wchar</title>
<updated>2019-10-05T06:29:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Masahiro Yamada</name>
<email>yamada.masahiro@socionext.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-26T02:10:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=6b190d3ce0a693750517256ba67011a9fa04a12a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6b190d3ce0a693750517256ba67011a9fa04a12a</id>
<content type='text'>
I guess commit 15ea0e1e3e18 ("efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure
Boot") attempted to add -fshort-wchar for building load_uefi.o, but it
has never worked as intended.

load_uefi.o is created in the platform_certs/ sub-directory. If you
really want to add -fshort-wchar, the correct code is:

  $(obj)/platform_certs/load_uefi.o: KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fshort-wchar

But, you do not need to fix it.

Commit 8c97023cf051 ("Kbuild: use -fshort-wchar globally") had already
added -fshort-wchar globally. This code was unneeded in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada &lt;yamada.masahiro@socionext.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
