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<title>user/sven/linux.git/security/loadpin/Kconfig, branch v4.20</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.20</id>
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<updated>2018-10-18T22:29:44Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce"</title>
<updated>2018-10-18T22:29:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-24T21:43:59Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:13523bef1e2154b6d02836cd0f6c0ffc89b2eae6</id>
<content type='text'>
LoadPin's "enabled" setting is really about enforcement, not whether
or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM
enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening
(for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin
is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue
to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is
centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from
its enforcement).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG</title>
<updated>2016-05-17T10:10:30Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-05-17T08:45:52Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b937190c40de0f6f07f592042e3097b16c6b0130</id>
<content type='text'>
Instead of being enabled by default when SECURITY_LOADPIN is selected,
provide an additional (default off) config to determine the boot time
behavior. As before, the "loadpin.enabled=0/1" kernel parameter remains
available.

Suggested-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions</title>
<updated>2016-04-21T00:47:27Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2016-04-20T22:46:28Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9b091556a073a9f5f93e2ad23d118f45c4796a84</id>
<content type='text'>
This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc)
must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that
such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity
or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable
filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without
needing to sign the files individually.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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