user/sven/linux.git/security/loadpin, branch v4.19.280

module: replace the existing LSM hook in init_module

2018-07-16T19:31:57Z

Both the init_module and finit_module syscalls call either directly or indirectly the security_kernel_read_file LSM hook. This patch replaces the direct call in init_module with a call to the new security_kernel_load_data hook and makes the corresponding changes in SELinux, LoadPin, and IMA. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep Cc: Casey Schaufler Cc: Kees Cook Acked-by: Jessica Yu Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: James Morris

get rid of pointless includes of fs_struct.h

2018-02-22T19:28:50Z

Signed-off-by: Al Viro

security: mark LSM hooks as __ro_after_init

2017-03-06T00:00:15Z

Mark all of the registration hooks as __ro_after_init (via the __lsm_ro_after_init macro). Signed-off-by: James Morris Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Acked-by: Kees Cook

LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm

2017-01-19T02:18:29Z

I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Acked-by: John Johansen Acked-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: James Morris

LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG

2016-05-17T10:10:30Z

Instead of being enabled by default when SECURITY_LOADPIN is selected, provide an additional (default off) config to determine the boot time behavior. As before, the "loadpin.enabled=0/1" kernel parameter remains available. Suggested-by: James Morris Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: James Morris

LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions

2016-04-21T00:47:27Z

This LSM enforces that kernel-loaded files (modules, firmware, etc) must all come from the same filesystem, with the expectation that such a filesystem is backed by a read-only device such as dm-verity or CDROM. This allows systems that have a verified and/or unchangeable filesystem to enforce module and firmware loading restrictions without needing to sign the files individually. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Acked-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: James Morris