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<title>user/sven/linux.git/security/security.c, branch v3.18.75</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v3.18.75</id>
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<updated>2014-09-09T20:01:36Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>security: make security_file_set_fowner, f_setown and __f_setown void return</title>
<updated>2014-09-09T20:01:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jeff Layton</name>
<email>jlayton@primarydata.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-08-22T15:27:32Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=e0b93eddfe17dcb7d644eb5d6ad02a86fc41a977'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e0b93eddfe17dcb7d644eb5d6ad02a86fc41a977</id>
<content type='text'>
security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and
__f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the
callers.

Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton &lt;jlayton@primarydata.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware</title>
<updated>2014-07-25T18:47:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-07-22T14:39:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5a9196d715607f76d6b7d96a0970d6065335e62b</id>
<content type='text'>
The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a
new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built
into the kernel.

This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new
security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's
integrity.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook</title>
<updated>2014-07-25T18:47:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2014-02-25T18:28:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:13752fe2d7f2d41c2fd92a5d1b1c6e38c4de0c05</id>
<content type='text'>
In order to validate the contents of firmware being loaded, there must be
a hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel
itself. Without this, there is a risk that a root user could load malicious
firmware designed to mount an attack against kernel memory (e.g. via DMA).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge commit 'v3.15' into next</title>
<updated>2014-06-24T08:46:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-06-24T08:46:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f01387d2693813eb5271a3448e6a082322c7d75d</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'keys-20140314' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next</title>
<updated>2014-04-14T01:42:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-14T01:42:49Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:b13cebe70775e67323e1c2eff20e1cd174e430a4</id>
<content type='text'>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>vfs: add cross-rename</title>
<updated>2014-04-01T15:08:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-01T15:08:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:da1ce0670c14d8380e423a3239e562a1dc15fa9e</id>
<content type='text'>
If flags contain RENAME_EXCHANGE then exchange source and destination files.
There's no restriction on the type of the files; e.g. a directory can be
exchanged with a symlink.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: add flags to rename hooks</title>
<updated>2014-04-01T15:08:43Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@suse.cz</email>
</author>
<published>2014-04-01T15:08:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0b3974eb04c4874e85fa1d4fc70450d12f28611d</id>
<content type='text'>
Add flags to security_path_rename() and security_inode_rename() hooks.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@suse.cz&gt;
Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields &lt;bfields@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h</title>
<updated>2014-03-14T17:44:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-14T17:44:49Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f5895943d91b41b0368830cdb6eaffb8eda0f4c8</id>
<content type='text'>
Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm
parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the
permissions mask flags used in key-&gt;perm.

Whilst we're at it:

 (1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions
     with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h.

 (2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit
     it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related
     directly to that.

Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;d.kasatkin@samsung.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callers</title>
<updated>2014-03-10T07:30:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Nikolay Aleksandrov</name>
<email>nikolay@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2014-03-07T11:44:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:52a4c6404f91f2d2c5592ee6365a8418c4565f53</id>
<content type='text'>
security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -&gt; security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security -&gt;
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) -&gt;
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)

Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.

CC: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
CC: Dave Jones &lt;davej@redhat.com&gt;
CC: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
CC: Fan Du &lt;fan.du@windriver.com&gt;
CC: David S. Miller &lt;davem@davemloft.net&gt;
CC: LSM list &lt;linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org&gt;
CC: SELinux list &lt;selinux@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;

Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov &lt;nikolay@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert &lt;steffen.klassert@secunet.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into ra-next</title>
<updated>2013-10-22T11:26:41Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Morris</name>
<email>james.l.morris@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2013-10-22T11:26:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:6f799c97f37fc0ee2c9c427fa0dada637394886c</id>
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</content>
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