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<title>user/sven/linux.git/security/security.c, branch v3.8-rc4</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2012-12-14T02:35:26Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ima: support new kernel module syscall</title>
<updated>2012-12-14T02:35:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-16T02:10:08Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:fdf90729e57812cb12d7938e2dee7c71e875fb08</id>
<content type='text'>
With the addition of the new kernel module syscall, which defines two
arguments - a file descriptor to the kernel module and a pointer to a NULL
terminated string of module arguments - it is now possible to measure and
appraise kernel modules like any other file on the file system.

This patch adds support to measure and appraise kernel modules in an
extensible and consistent manner.

To support filesystems without extended attribute support, additional
patches could pass the signature as the first parameter.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook</title>
<updated>2012-12-14T02:35:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-15T21:02:07Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839</id>
<content type='text'>
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to
the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let
Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its
read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example,
read extended attributes for signatures, etc.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell &lt;rusty@rustcorp.com.au&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>consitify do_mount() arguments</title>
<updated>2012-10-12T00:02:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-11T15:42:01Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:808d4e3cfdcc52b19276175464f6dbca4df13b09</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security</title>
<updated>2012-10-03T04:38:48Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-10-03T04:38:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:88265322c14cce39f7afbc416726ef4fac413298</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

   - Integrity: add local fs integrity verification to detect offline
     attacks
   - Integrity: add digital signature verification
   - Simple stacking of Yama with other LSMs (per LSS discussions)
   - IBM vTPM support on ppc64
   - Add new driver for Infineon I2C TIS TPM
   - Smack: add rule revocation for subject labels"

Fixed conflicts with the user namespace support in kernel/auditsc.c and
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c.

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
  Documentation: Update git repository URL for Smack userland tools
  ima: change flags container data type
  Smack: setprocattr memory leak fix
  Smack: implement revoking all rules for a subject label
  Smack: remove task_wait() hook.
  ima: audit log hashes
  ima: generic IMA action flag handling
  ima: rename ima_must_appraise_or_measure
  audit: export audit_log_task_info
  tpm: fix tpm_acpi sparse warning on different address spaces
  samples/seccomp: fix 31 bit build on s390
  ima: digital signature verification support
  ima: add support for different security.ima data types
  ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls
  ima: add inode_post_setattr call
  ima: replace iint spinblock with rwlock/read_lock
  ima: allocating iint improvements
  ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules
  ima: integrity appraisal extension
  vfs: move ima_file_free before releasing the file
  ...
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>userns: Teach security_path_chown to take kuids and kgids</title>
<updated>2012-09-21T10:13:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2012-06-01T22:14:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d2b31ca644fdc8704de3367a6a56a5c958c77f53</id>
<content type='text'>
Don't make the security modules deal with raw user space uid and
gids instead pass in a kuid_t and a kgid_t so that security modules
only have to deal with internal kernel uids and gids.

Cc: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Cc: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
Cc: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Cc: Kentaro Takeda &lt;takedakn@nttdata.co.jp&gt;
Cc: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: add ima_inode_setxattr/removexattr function and calls</title>
<updated>2012-09-07T18:57:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2011-03-10T23:54:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:42c63330f2b05aa6077c1bfc2798c04afe54f6b2</id>
<content type='text'>
Based on xattr_permission comments, the restriction to modify 'security'
xattr is left up to the underlying fs or lsm. Ensure that not just anyone
can modify or remove 'security.ima'.

Changelog v1:
- Unless IMA-APPRAISE is configured, use stub ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr()
  functions.  (Moved ima_inode_removexattr()/setxattr() to ima_appraise.c)

Changelog:
  - take i_mutex to fix locking (Dmitry Kasatkin)
  - ima_reset_appraise_flags should only be called when modifying or
    removing the 'security.ima' xattr. Requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privilege.
    (Incorporated fix from Roberto Sassu)
  - Even if allowed to update security.ima, reset the appraisal flags,
    forcing re-appraisal.
  - Replace CAP_MAC_ADMIN with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
  - static inline ima_inode_setxattr()/ima_inode_removexattr() stubs
  - ima_protect_xattr should be static

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@us.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: allow Yama to be unconditionally stacked</title>
<updated>2012-09-05T21:12:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kees Cook</name>
<email>keescook@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-09-04T20:32:13Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c6993e4ac002c92bc75379212e9179c36d4bf7ee</id>
<content type='text'>
Unconditionally call Yama when CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED is selected,
no matter what LSM module is primary.

Ubuntu and Chrome OS already carry patches to do this, and Fedora
has voiced interest in doing this as well. Instead of having multiple
distributions (or LSM authors) carrying these patches, just allow Yama
to be called unconditionally when selected by the new CONFIG.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn &lt;serge.hallyn@canonical.com&gt;
Acked-by: Eric Paris &lt;eparis@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Fix nommu build.</title>
<updated>2012-07-03T11:41:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Mundt</name>
<email>lethal@linux-sh.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-02T05:34:11Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:75331a597cf4cde51d9b0bb22cbd03b9837ef9e4</id>
<content type='text'>
The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined
reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP:

security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot':
security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type
security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in

include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up.

Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt &lt;lethal@linux-sh.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: Fix nommu build.</title>
<updated>2012-07-02T13:56:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Mundt</name>
<email>lethal@linux-sh.org</email>
</author>
<published>2012-07-02T05:34:11Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=659b5e76521c10331495cbd9acb7217e38ff9750'/>
<id>urn:sha1:659b5e76521c10331495cbd9acb7217e38ff9750</id>
<content type='text'>
The security + nommu configuration presently blows up with an undefined
reference to BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP:

security/security.c: In function 'mmap_prot':
security/security.c:687:36: error: dereferencing pointer to incomplete type
security/security.c:688:16: error: 'BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP' undeclared (first use in this function)
security/security.c:688:16: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in

include backing-dev.h directly to fix it up.

Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt &lt;lethal@linux-sh.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.l.morris@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>take calculation of final prot in security_mmap_file() into a helper</title>
<updated>2012-06-01T14:37:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2012-05-30T23:58:30Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:98de59bfe4b2ff6344d9ad8e5296f80de5dcc5b6</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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