<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/security, branch v4.14.138</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.138</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.138'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2019-08-06T17:05:26Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix memory leak in policydb_init()</title>
<updated>2019-08-06T17:05:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-25T10:52:43Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=9e5928f8447053676243c94081842326effb92ea'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9e5928f8447053676243c94081842326effb92ea</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 45385237f65aeee73641f1ef737d7273905a233f upstream.

Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to
destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in
the error path.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: enforce nullbyte at end of tag string</title>
<updated>2019-06-25T03:36:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-28T15:32:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=4758984fa3ba0b1ac39687750e74ca0350ada753'/>
<id>urn:sha1:4758984fa3ba0b1ac39687750e74ca0350ada753</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8404d7a674c49278607d19726e0acc0cae299357 upstream.

A packed AppArmor policy contains null-terminated tag strings that are read
by unpack_nameX(). However, unpack_nameX() uses string functions on them
without ensuring that they are actually null-terminated, potentially
leading to out-of-bounds accesses.

Make sure that the tag string is null-terminated before passing it to
strcmp().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly</title>
<updated>2019-06-09T07:18:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-29T13:30:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=8eb37017409967c658041b806b1c4817e69924b3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:8eb37017409967c658041b806b1c4817e69924b3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8cdc23a3d9ec0944000ad43bad588e36afdc38cd upstream.

Show the '^' character when a policy rule has flag IMA_INMASK.

Fixes: 80eae209d63ac ("IMA: allow reading back the current IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmorfs: fix use-after-free on symlink traversal</title>
<updated>2019-05-25T16:25:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-10T18:04:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=ffbbe8e8bde999133a06de73a2f3bce03c8c0001'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ffbbe8e8bde999133a06de73a2f3bce03c8c0001</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f51dcd0f621caac5380ce90fbbeafc32ce4517ae ]

symlink body shouldn't be freed without an RCU delay.  Switch apparmorfs
to -&gt;destroy_inode() and use of call_rcu(); free both the inode and symlink
body in the callback.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>securityfs: fix use-after-free on symlink traversal</title>
<updated>2019-05-25T16:25:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-10T18:03:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0319e32b053aa35ac0f7c38e573d6eece5c8df7c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0319e32b053aa35ac0f7c38e573d6eece5c8df7c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 46c874419652bbefdfed17420fd6e88d8a31d9ec ]

symlink body shouldn't be freed without an RCU delay.  Switch securityfs
to -&gt;destroy_inode() and use of call_rcu(); free both the inode and symlink
body in the callback.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: open a new file instance if no read permissions</title>
<updated>2019-05-16T17:42:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Goldwyn Rodrigues</name>
<email>rgoldwyn@suse.de</email>
</author>
<published>2018-10-09T15:12:33Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=16be27a5ccfc654a7bd68eb362205362aabbd38b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:16be27a5ccfc654a7bd68eb362205362aabbd38b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a408e4a86b36bf98ad15b9ada531cf0e5118ac67 ]

Open a new file instance as opposed to changing file-&gt;f_mode when
the file is not readable.  This is done to accomodate overlayfs
stacked file operations change.  The real struct file is hidden
behind the overlays struct file.  So, any file-&gt;f_mode manipulations are
not reflected on the real struct file.  Open the file again in read mode
if original file cannot be read, read and calculate the hash.

Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues &lt;rgoldwyn@suse.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-4.19)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: never allow relabeling on context mounts</title>
<updated>2019-05-08T05:20:53Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-21T20:18:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=fdffa672620989dc4e03bcf4dc644fa8bf5618bb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fdffa672620989dc4e03bcf4dc644fa8bf5618bb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit a83d6ddaebe541570291205cb538e35ad4ff94f9 upstream.

In the SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT case we never want to allow relabeling
files/directories, so we should never set the SBLABEL_MNT flag. The
'special handling' in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() is only intended for when
the behavior is set to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS.

While there, make the logic in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() more explicit
and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to make sure that introducing a new
SECURITY_FS_USE_* forces a review of the logic.

Fixes: d5f3a5f6e7e7 ("selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: use kernel linux/socket.h for genheaders and mdp</title>
<updated>2019-05-04T07:15:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paulo Alcantara</name>
<email>paulo@paulo.ac</email>
</author>
<published>2019-02-25T00:55:28Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=760f8522ce08a24abac3208290f93fe3fffc0d6c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:760f8522ce08a24abac3208290f93fe3fffc0d6c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit dfbd199a7cfe3e3cd8531e1353cdbd7175bfbc5e upstream.

When compiling genheaders and mdp from a newer host kernel, the
following error happens:

    In file included from scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c:18:
    ./security/selinux/include/classmap.h:238:2: error: #error New
    address family defined, please update secclass_map.  #error New
    address family defined, please update secclass_map.  ^~~~~
    make[3]: *** [scripts/Makefile.host:107:
    scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders] Error 1 make[2]: ***
    [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux/genheaders] Error 2
    make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.build:599: scripts/selinux] Error 2
    make[1]: *** Waiting for unfinished jobs....

Instead of relying on the host definition, include linux/socket.h in
classmap.h to have PF_MAX.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara &lt;paulo@paulo.ac&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
[PM: manually merge in mdp.c, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>device_cgroup: fix RCU imbalance in error case</title>
<updated>2019-04-27T07:35:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-03-19T01:36:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=80ef021be19d3cdebe162c73b13d0f249d5bd2f3'/>
<id>urn:sha1:80ef021be19d3cdebe162c73b13d0f249d5bd2f3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0fcc4c8c044e117ac126ab6df4138ea9a67fa2a9 upstream.

When dev_exception_add() returns an error (due to a failed memory
allocation), make sure that we move the RCU preemption count back to where
it was before we were called. We dropped the RCU read lock inside the loop
body, so we can't just "break".

sparse complains about this, too:

$ make -s C=2 security/device_cgroup.o
./include/linux/rcupdate.h:647:9: warning: context imbalance in
'propagate_exception' - unexpected unlock

Fixes: d591fb56618f ("device_cgroup: simplify cgroup tree walk in propagate_exception()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Michal Hocko &lt;mhocko@suse.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo &lt;tj@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: do not override context on context mounts</title>
<updated>2019-04-05T20:31:39Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-12-21T20:18:53Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0ce68e869a650f82e77fcbbe72549b45ea05b970'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0ce68e869a650f82e77fcbbe72549b45ea05b970</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 53e0c2aa9a59a48e3798ef193d573ade85aa80f5 ]

Ignore all selinux_inode_notifysecctx() calls on mounts with SBLABEL_MNT
flag unset. This is achived by returning -EOPNOTSUPP for this case in
selinux_inode_setsecurtity() (because that function should not be called
in such case anyway) and translating this error to 0 in
selinux_inode_notifysecctx().

This fixes behavior of kernfs-based filesystems when mounted with the
'context=' option. Before this patch, if a node's context had been
explicitly set to a non-default value and later the filesystem has been
remounted with the 'context=' option, then this node would show up as
having the manually-set context and not the mount-specified one.

Steps to reproduce:
    # mount -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
    # chcon unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/cgroup.stat
    # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
    total 0
    -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0        0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0        0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0        0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0        0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
    -r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0        0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0        0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
    # umount /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
    # mount -o context=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified

Result before:
    # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
    total 0
    -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0         0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0         0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0         0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0         0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
    -r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0         0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0         0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads

Result after:
    # ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
    total 0
    -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
    -r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
    -rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads

Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;sds@tycho.nsa.gov&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
