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<title>user/sven/linux.git/security, branch v4.14.152</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.152</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.152'/>
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<updated>2019-10-11T16:18:37Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ima: always return negative code for error</title>
<updated>2019-10-11T16:18:37Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sascha Hauer</name>
<email>s.hauer@pengutronix.de</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-02T08:00:40Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:27551dbe091615e6bb6ad17ea7117ef1beb8aa81</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f5e1040196dbfe14c77ce3dfe3b7b08d2d961e88 ]

integrity_kernel_read() returns the number of bytes read. If this is
a short read then this positive value is returned from
ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(). Currently this is only indirectly called from
ima_calc_file_hash() and this function only tests for the return value
being zero or nonzero and also doesn't forward the return value.
Nevertheless there's no point in returning a positive value as an error,
so translate a short read into -EINVAL.

Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer &lt;s.hauer@pengutronix.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:55:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-08-22T05:54:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:416a5d0346696d7d70ffeb5e51a911e6709c6575</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e5bfad3d7acc5702f32aafeb388362994f4d7bd0 upstream.

inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is
called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4.
Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use
GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem
transaction to complete.

Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Smack: Don't ignore other bprm-&gt;unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:55:22Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-04T18:44:44Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ca2cf05447866c4653243bfe3ce4d1114eaee953</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3675f052b43ba51b99b85b073c7070e083f3e6fb upstream.

There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds():
If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be
acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other
-&gt;unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that
something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it):

 - task A: create task B with fork()
 - task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS
 - task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some
   conditions
 - task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library
 - task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH
 - task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute
 - task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which
   destroys the ptrace relationship)

Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in
bprm-&gt;unsafe, we reject the execve().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5663884caab1 ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb()</title>
<updated>2019-10-07T16:55:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jia-Ju Bai</name>
<email>baijiaju1990@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-23T10:00:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4b1e27b3b4659ad2c9e49fc52405d751a38acc81</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3f4287e7d98a2954f20bf96c567fdffcd2b63eb9 ]

In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement
on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL:
    if (skb &amp;&amp; skb-&gt;secmark != 0)

This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases.

But on lines 3931 and 3932, skb is used:
    ad.a.u.net-&gt;netif = skb-&gt;skb_iif;
    ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &amp;ad.a, NULL);

Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur when skb is NULL.

To fix these possible bugs, an if statement is added to check skb.

These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us.

Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai &lt;baijiaju1990@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>keys: Fix missing null pointer check in request_key_auth_describe()</title>
<updated>2019-09-21T05:15:45Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Hillf Danton</name>
<email>hdanton@sina.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-02T12:37:29Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f441778096db2531ea54132afb2c909c866790c8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d41a3effbb53b1bcea41e328d16a4d046a508381 ]

If a request_key authentication token key gets revoked, there's a window in
which request_key_auth_describe() can see it with a NULL payload - but it
makes no check for this and something like the following oops may occur:

	BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038
	Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000004ddf30
	Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
	...
	NIP [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x90/0xd0
	LR [...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0
	Call Trace:
	[...] request_key_auth_describe+0x54/0xd0 (unreliable)
	[...] proc_keys_show+0x308/0x4c0
	[...] seq_read+0x3d0/0x540
	[...] proc_reg_read+0x90/0x110
	[...] __vfs_read+0x3c/0x70
	[...] vfs_read+0xb4/0x1b0
	[...] ksys_read+0x7c/0x130
	[...] system_call+0x5c/0x70

Fix this by checking for a NULL pointer when describing such a key.

Also make the read routine check for a NULL pointer to be on the safe side.

[DH: Modified to not take already-held rcu lock and modified to also check
 in the read routine]

Fixes: 04c567d9313e ("[PATCH] Keys: Fix race between two instantiators of a key")
Reported-by: Sachin Sant &lt;sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Hillf Danton &lt;hdanton@sina.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Tested-by: Sachin Sant &lt;sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix memory leak in policydb_init()</title>
<updated>2019-08-06T17:05:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-07-25T10:52:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9e5928f8447053676243c94081842326effb92ea</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 45385237f65aeee73641f1ef737d7273905a233f upstream.

Since roles_init() adds some entries to the role hash table, we need to
destroy also its keys/values on error, otherwise we get a memory leak in
the error path.

Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot+fee3a14d4cdf92646287@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: enforce nullbyte at end of tag string</title>
<updated>2019-06-25T03:36:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-28T15:32:26Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4758984fa3ba0b1ac39687750e74ca0350ada753</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8404d7a674c49278607d19726e0acc0cae299357 upstream.

A packed AppArmor policy contains null-terminated tag strings that are read
by unpack_nameX(). However, unpack_nameX() uses string functions on them
without ensuring that they are actually null-terminated, potentially
leading to out-of-bounds accesses.

Make sure that the tag string is null-terminated before passing it to
strcmp().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly</title>
<updated>2019-06-09T07:18:18Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-05-29T13:30:35Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:8eb37017409967c658041b806b1c4817e69924b3</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8cdc23a3d9ec0944000ad43bad588e36afdc38cd upstream.

Show the '^' character when a policy rule has flag IMA_INMASK.

Fixes: 80eae209d63ac ("IMA: allow reading back the current IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmorfs: fix use-after-free on symlink traversal</title>
<updated>2019-05-25T16:25:35Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-10T18:04:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ffbbe8e8bde999133a06de73a2f3bce03c8c0001</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f51dcd0f621caac5380ce90fbbeafc32ce4517ae ]

symlink body shouldn't be freed without an RCU delay.  Switch apparmorfs
to -&gt;destroy_inode() and use of call_rcu(); free both the inode and symlink
body in the callback.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>securityfs: fix use-after-free on symlink traversal</title>
<updated>2019-05-25T16:25:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Al Viro</name>
<email>viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-10T18:03:45Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=0319e32b053aa35ac0f7c38e573d6eece5c8df7c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0319e32b053aa35ac0f7c38e573d6eece5c8df7c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 46c874419652bbefdfed17420fd6e88d8a31d9ec ]

symlink body shouldn't be freed without an RCU delay.  Switch securityfs
to -&gt;destroy_inode() and use of call_rcu(); free both the inode and symlink
body in the callback.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro &lt;viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
