<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/security, branch v4.14.85</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.85</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.14.85'/>
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<updated>2018-12-01T08:43:00Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>ima: re-initialize iint-&gt;atomic_flags</title>
<updated>2018-12-01T08:43:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-01-23T15:00:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d467320fdaf328fd6f98fc686b3a3fdd226dbaef'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d467320fdaf328fd6f98fc686b3a3fdd226dbaef</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e2598077dc6a26c9644393e5c21f22a90dbdccdb upstream.

Intermittently security.ima is not being written for new files.  This
patch re-initializes the new slab iint-&gt;atomic_flags field before
freeing it.

Fixes: commit 0d73a55208e9 ("ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
Cc: Aditya Kali &lt;adityakali@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: re-introduce own integrity cache lock</title>
<updated>2018-12-01T08:43:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dmitry Kasatkin</name>
<email>dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-12-05T19:06:34Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:281c07f30f71b4982cb535b633e5286bf0c7d056</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0d73a55208e94fc9fb6deaeea61438cd3280d4c0 upstream.

Before IMA appraisal was introduced, IMA was using own integrity cache
lock along with i_mutex. process_measurement and ima_file_free took
the iint-&gt;mutex first and then the i_mutex, while setxattr, chmod and
chown took the locks in reverse order. To resolve the potential deadlock,
i_mutex was moved to protect entire IMA functionality and the redundant
iint-&gt;mutex was eliminated.

Solution was based on the assumption that filesystem code does not take
i_mutex further. But when file is opened with O_DIRECT flag, direct-io
implementation takes i_mutex and produces deadlock. Furthermore, certain
other filesystem operations, such as llseek, also take i_mutex.

More recently some filesystems have replaced their filesystem specific
lock with the global i_rwsem to read a file.  As a result, when IMA
attempts to calculate the file hash, reading the file attempts to take
the i_rwsem again.

To resolve O_DIRECT related deadlock problem, this patch re-introduces
iint-&gt;mutex. But to eliminate the original chmod() related deadlock
problem, this patch eliminates the requirement for chmod hooks to take
the iint-&gt;mutex by introducing additional atomic iint-&gt;attr_flags to
indicate calling of the hooks. The allowed locking order is to take
the iint-&gt;mutex first and then the i_rwsem.

Original flags were cleared in chmod(), setxattr() or removwxattr()
hooks and tested when file was closed or opened again. New atomic flags
are set or cleared in those hooks and tested to clear iint-&gt;flags on
close or on open.

Atomic flags are following:
* IMA_CHANGE_ATTR - indicates that chATTR() was called (chmod, chown,
  chgrp) and file attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA
  to clear iint-&gt;flags to re-evaluate policy and perform IMA functions
  again.
* IMA_CHANGE_XATTR - indicates that setxattr or removexattr was called
  and extended attributes have changed. On file open, it causes IMA to
  clear iint-&gt;flags IMA_DONE_MASK to re-appraise.
* IMA_UPDATE_XATTR - indicates that security.ima needs to be updated.
  It is cleared if file policy changes and no update is needed.
* IMA_DIGSIG - indicates that file security.ima has signature and file
  security.ima must not update to file has on file close.
* IMA_MUST_MEASURE - indicates the file is in the measurement policy.

Fixes: Commit 6552321831dc ("xfs: remove i_iolock and use i_rwsem in
the VFS inode instead")

Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Aditya Kali &lt;adityakali@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>EVM: Add support for portable signature format</title>
<updated>2018-12-01T08:43:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Garrett</name>
<email>mjg59@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-11-07T15:17:42Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e099863340d86741c0957217971c29becf24b881</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 50b977481fce90aa5fbda55e330b9d722733e358 upstream.

The EVM signature includes the inode number and (optionally) the
filesystem UUID, making it impractical to ship EVM signatures in
packages. This patch adds a new portable format intended to allow
distributions to include EVM signatures. It is identical to the existing
format but hardcodes the inode and generation numbers to 0 and does not
include the filesystem UUID even if the kernel is configured to do so.

Removing the inode means that the metadata and signature from one file
could be copied to another file without invalidating it. This is avoided
by ensuring that an IMA xattr is present during EVM validation.

Portable signatures are intended to be immutable - ie, they will never
be transformed into HMACs.

Based on earlier work by Dmitry Kasatkin and Mikhail Kurinnoi.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Mikhail Kurinnoi &lt;viewizard@viewizard.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Aditya Kali &lt;adityakali@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: always measure and audit files in policy</title>
<updated>2018-12-01T08:43:00Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2017-06-18T03:56:23Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=de72a0f9ad28895b57b9403ae29aa5a6a579f31d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:de72a0f9ad28895b57b9403ae29aa5a6a579f31d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit f3cc6b25dcc5616f0d5c720009b2ac66f97df2ff upstream.

All files matching a "measure" rule must be included in the IMA
measurement list, even when the file hash cannot be calculated.
Similarly, all files matching an "audit" rule must be audited, even when
the file hash can not be calculated.

The file data hash field contained in the IMA measurement list template
data will contain 0's instead of the actual file hash digest.

Note:
In general, adding, deleting or in anyway changing which files are
included in the IMA measurement list is not a good idea, as it might
result in not being able to unseal trusted keys sealed to a specific
TPM PCR value.  This patch not only adds file measurements that were
not previously measured, but specifies that the file hash value for
these files will be 0's.

As the IMA measurement list ordering is not consistent from one boot
to the next, it is unlikely that anyone is sealing keys based on the
IMA measurement list.  Remote attestation servers should be able to
process these new measurement records, but might complain about
these unknown records.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Kasatkin &lt;dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: Aditya Kali &lt;adityakali@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: Add __GFP_NOWARN to allocation at str_read()</title>
<updated>2018-12-01T08:42:50Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tetsuo Handa</name>
<email>penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-07T16:42:58Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9520db16756e24873677d867a6a0f9cab3b6726d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 4458bba09788e70e8fb39ad003f087cd9dfbd6ac upstream.

syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
this case.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0

Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa &lt;penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp&gt;
Reported-by: syzbot &lt;syzbot+ac488b9811036cea7ea0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: Fix uninitialized value in aa_split_fqname</title>
<updated>2018-11-27T15:10:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Zubin Mithra</name>
<email>zsm@chromium.org</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-27T21:49:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d0a636aa44f9e7cbac2a90e191bc0ad840b10b9e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d0a636aa44f9e7cbac2a90e191bc0ad840b10b9e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 250f2da49cb8e582215a65c03f50e8ddf5cd119c ]

Syzkaller reported a OOB-read with the stacktrace below. This occurs
inside __aa_lookupn_ns as `n` is not initialized. `n` is obtained from
aa_splitn_fqname. In cases where `name` is invalid, aa_splitn_fqname
returns without initializing `ns_name` and `ns_len`.

Fix this by always initializing `ns_name` and `ns_len`.

	__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
	dump_stack+0x1c4/0x2b4 lib/dump_stack.c:113
	print_address_description.cold.8+0x9/0x1ff mm/kasan/report.c:256
	kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
	kasan_report.cold.9+0x242/0x309 mm/kasan/report.c:412
	__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
	memcmp+0xe3/0x160 lib/string.c:861
	strnstr+0x4b/0x70 lib/string.c:934
	__aa_lookupn_ns+0xc1/0x570 security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:209
	aa_lookupn_ns+0x88/0x1e0 security/apparmor/policy_ns.c:240
	aa_fqlookupn_profile+0x1b9/0x1010 security/apparmor/policy.c:468
	fqlookupn_profile+0x80/0xc0 security/apparmor/label.c:1844
	aa_label_strn_parse+0xa3a/0x1230 security/apparmor/label.c:1908
	aa_label_parse+0x42/0x50 security/apparmor/label.c:1943
	aa_change_profile+0x513/0x3510 security/apparmor/domain.c:1362
	apparmor_setprocattr+0xaa4/0x1150 security/apparmor/lsm.c:658
	security_setprocattr+0x66/0xc0 security/security.c:1298
	proc_pid_attr_write+0x301/0x540 fs/proc/base.c:2555
	__vfs_write+0x119/0x9f0 fs/read_write.c:485
	vfs_write+0x1fc/0x560 fs/read_write.c:549
	ksys_write+0x101/0x260 fs/read_write.c:598
	__do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:610 [inline]
	__se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:607 [inline]
	__x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:607
	do_syscall_64+0x1b9/0x820 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
	entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Fixes: 3b0aaf5866bf ("apparmor: add lib fn to find the "split" for fqnames")
Reported-by: syzbot+61e4b490d9d2da591b50@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra &lt;zsm@chromium.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook &lt;keescook@chromium.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: fix showing large 'violations' or 'runtime_measurements_count'</title>
<updated>2018-11-13T19:15:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-07T21:33:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4c6fda12ff1d187590083a5615cee5501c60142c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1e4c8dafbb6bf72fb5eca035b861e39c5896c2b7 upstream.

The 12 character temporary buffer is not necessarily long enough to hold
a 'long' value.  Increase it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name"</title>
<updated>2018-09-29T10:06:04Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Lubomir Rintel</name>
<email>lkundrak@v3.sk</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-24T12:18:34Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=50ec69edf3f097693e22b56c7b2140acf98f28eb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:50ec69edf3f097693e22b56c7b2140acf98f28eb</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8c0f9f5b309d627182d5da72a69246f58bde1026 upstream.

This changes UAPI, breaking iwd and libell:

  ell/key.c: In function 'kernel_dh_compute':
  ell/key.c:205:38: error: 'struct keyctl_dh_params' has no member named 'private'; did you mean 'dh_private'?
    struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private,
                                        ^~~~~~~
                                        dh_private

This reverts commit 8a2336e549d385bb0b46880435b411df8d8200e8.

Fixes: 8a2336e549d3 ("uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name")
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel &lt;lkundrak@v3.sk&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Randy Dunlap &lt;rdunlap@infradead.org&gt;
cc: Mat Martineau &lt;mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com&gt;
cc: Stephan Mueller &lt;smueller@chronox.de&gt;
cc: James Morris &lt;jmorris@namei.org&gt;
cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
cc: Mat Martineau &lt;mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com&gt;
cc: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
cc: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: check for kstrdup() failure in lsm_append()</title>
<updated>2018-09-26T06:38:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-07-17T17:36:04Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:55bdb77aa991c2dfd107c4805e334ad571f73a4f</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 87ea58433208d17295e200d56be5e2a4fe4ce7d6 ]

lsm_append() should return -ENOMEM if memory allocation failed.

Fixes: d69dece5f5b6 ("LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;james.morris@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailable</title>
<updated>2018-09-26T06:38:09Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Matthew Garrett</name>
<email>mjg59@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-06-08T21:57:42Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:c818695c71068a30580064fc65fea51e074f57bf</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit e2861fa71641c6414831d628a1f4f793b6562580 ]

When EVM attempts to appraise a file signed with a crypto algorithm the
kernel doesn't have support for, it will cause the kernel to trigger a
module load. If the EVM policy includes appraisal of kernel modules this
will in turn call back into EVM - since EVM is holding a lock until the
crypto initialisation is complete, this triggers a deadlock. Add a
CRYPTO_NOLOAD flag and skip module loading if it's set, and add that flag
in the EVM case in order to fail gracefully with an error message
instead of deadlocking.

Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett &lt;mjg59@google.com&gt;
Acked-by: Herbert Xu &lt;herbert@gondor.apana.org.au&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;alexander.levin@microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
