<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>user/sven/linux.git/security, branch v4.19.135</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.135</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/atom?h=v4.19.135'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2020-07-22T07:32:06Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: ensure that dfa state tables have entries</title>
<updated>2020-07-22T07:32:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-03-31T06:37:54Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=fe1219a2893fe93cec9a3217c3c2d5113365e26a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fe1219a2893fe93cec9a3217c3c2d5113365e26a</id>
<content type='text'>
commit c27c6bd2c4d6b6bb779f9b722d5607993e1d5e5c upstream.

Currently it is possible to specify a state machine table with 0 length,
this is not valid as optional tables are specified by not defining
the table as present. Further this allows by-passing the base tables
range check against the next/check tables.

Fixes: d901d6a298dc ("apparmor: dfa split verification of table headers")
Reported-by: Mike Salvatore &lt;mike.salvatore@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: don't try to replace stale label in ptraceme check</title>
<updated>2020-07-01T03:17:03Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jann Horn</name>
<email>jannh@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2018-09-29T01:49:26Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3f9a54ce49147268c6f5be1c00fb08e9a08f01cc'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3f9a54ce49147268c6f5be1c00fb08e9a08f01cc</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ca3fde5214e1d24f78269b337d3f22afd6bf445e ]

begin_current_label_crit_section() must run in sleepable context because
when label_is_stale() is true, aa_replace_current_label() runs, which uses
prepare_creds(), which can sleep.

Until now, the ptraceme access check (which runs with tasklist_lock held)
violated this rule.

Fixes: b2d09ae449ced ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels")
Reported-by: Cyrill Gorcunov &lt;gorcunov@gmail.com&gt;
Reported-by: kernel test robot &lt;rong.a.chen@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn &lt;jannh@google.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix double free</title>
<updated>2020-06-25T13:33:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Tom Rix</name>
<email>trix@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-10T21:57:13Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=cd80735a43a9c8fd5e883f8313e3ba7b27167310'/>
<id>urn:sha1:cd80735a43a9c8fd5e883f8313e3ba7b27167310</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 65de50969a77509452ae590e9449b70a22b923bb upstream.

Clang's static analysis tool reports these double free memory errors.

security/selinux/ss/services.c:2987:4: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
                        kfree(bnames[i]);
                        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
security/selinux/ss/services.c:2990:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc]
        kfree(bvalues);
        ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

So improve the security_get_bools error handling by freeing these variables
and setting their return pointers to NULL and the return len to 0

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix &lt;trix@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley &lt;stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix nnp subset test for unconfined</title>
<updated>2020-06-25T13:32:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-09-25T15:02:48Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3cc2aec68e7db2df9f053d4548c57e3bf1e3ebf9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3cc2aec68e7db2df9f053d4548c57e3bf1e3ebf9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3ed4aaa94fc07db3cd0c91be95e3e1b9782a2710 ]

The subset test is not taking into account the unconfined exception
which will cause profile transitions in the stacked confinement
case to fail when no_new_privs is applied.

This fixes a regression introduced in the fix for
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1839037

BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1844186
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: check/put label on apparmor_sk_clone_security()</title>
<updated>2020-06-25T13:32:52Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mauricio Faria de Oliveira</name>
<email>mfo@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-02T21:15:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=70fa5992352642a30e0e871f3343fa3c393c91c9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:70fa5992352642a30e0e871f3343fa3c393c91c9</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 3b646abc5bc6c0df649daea4c2c976bd4d47e4c8 ]

Currently apparmor_sk_clone_security() does not check for existing
label/peer in the 'new' struct sock; it just overwrites it, if any
(with another reference to the label of the source sock.)

    static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
                                           struct sock *newsk)
    {
            struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
            struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);

            new-&gt;label = aa_get_label(ctx-&gt;label);
            new-&gt;peer = aa_get_label(ctx-&gt;peer);
    }

This might leak label references, which might overflow under load.
Thus, check for and put labels, to prevent such errors.

Note this is similarly done on:

    static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, ...)
    ...
            if (sock-&gt;sk) {
                    struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock-&gt;sk);

                    aa_put_label(ctx-&gt;label);
                    ctx-&gt;label = aa_get_label(label);
            }
    ...

Context:
-------

The label reference count leak is observed if apparmor_sock_graft()
is called previously: this sets the 'ctx-&gt;label' field by getting
a reference to the current label (later overwritten, without put.)

    static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, ...)
    {
            struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);

            if (!ctx-&gt;label)
                    ctx-&gt;label = aa_get_current_label();
    }

And that is the case on crypto/af_alg.c:af_alg_accept():

    int af_alg_accept(struct sock *sk, struct socket *newsock, ...)
    ...
            struct sock *sk2;
            ...
            sk2 = sk_alloc(...);
            ...
            security_sock_graft(sk2, newsock);
            security_sk_clone(sk, sk2);
    ...

Apparently both calls are done on their own right, especially for
other LSMs, being introduced in 2010/2014, before apparmor socket
mediation in 2017 (see commits [1,2,3,4]).

So, it looks OK there! Let's fix the reference leak in apparmor.

Test-case:
---------

Exercise that code path enough to overflow label reference count.

    $ cat aa-refcnt-af_alg.c
    #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
    #include &lt;string.h&gt;
    #include &lt;unistd.h&gt;
    #include &lt;sys/socket.h&gt;
    #include &lt;linux/if_alg.h&gt;

    int main() {
            int sockfd;
            struct sockaddr_alg sa;

            /* Setup the crypto API socket */
            sockfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
            if (sockfd &lt; 0) {
                    perror("socket");
                    return 1;
            }

            memset(&amp;sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
            sa.salg_family = AF_ALG;
            strcpy((char *) sa.salg_type, "rng");
            strcpy((char *) sa.salg_name, "stdrng");

            if (bind(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *) &amp;sa, sizeof(sa)) &lt; 0) {
                    perror("bind");
                    return 1;
            }

            /* Accept a "connection" and close it; repeat. */
            while (!close(accept(sockfd, NULL, 0)));

            return 0;
    }

    $ gcc -o aa-refcnt-af_alg aa-refcnt-af_alg.c

    $ ./aa-refcnt-af_alg
    &lt;a few hours later&gt;

    [ 9928.475953] refcount_t overflow at apparmor_sk_clone_security+0x37/0x70 in aa-refcnt-af_alg[1322], uid/euid: 1000/1000
    ...
    [ 9928.507443] RIP: 0010:apparmor_sk_clone_security+0x37/0x70
    ...
    [ 9928.514286]  security_sk_clone+0x33/0x50
    [ 9928.514807]  af_alg_accept+0x81/0x1c0 [af_alg]
    [ 9928.516091]  alg_accept+0x15/0x20 [af_alg]
    [ 9928.516682]  SYSC_accept4+0xff/0x210
    [ 9928.519609]  SyS_accept+0x10/0x20
    [ 9928.520190]  do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130
    [ 9928.520808]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x3d/0xa2

Note that other messages may be seen, not just overflow, depending on
the value being incremented by kref_get(); on another run:

    [ 7273.182666] refcount_t: saturated; leaking memory.
    ...
    [ 7273.185789] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.

Kprobes:
-------

Using kprobe events to monitor sk -&gt; sk_security -&gt; label -&gt; count (kref):

Original v5.7 (one reference leak every iteration)

 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd2
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd4
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd3
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd5
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd4
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff8a0f36c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x11fd6

Patched v5.7 (zero reference leak per iteration)

 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x593
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x594
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x593
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x594
 ... (af_alg_accept+0x0/0x1c0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x593
 ... (af_alg_release_parent+0x0/0xd0) label=0xffff9ff376c25eb0 label_refcnt=0x594

Commits:
-------

[1] commit 507cad355fc9 ("crypto: af_alg - Make sure sk_security is initialized on accept()ed sockets")
[2] commit 4c63f83c2c2e ("crypto: af_alg - properly label AF_ALG socket")
[3] commit 2acce6aa9f65 ("Networking") a.k.a ("crypto: af_alg - Avoid sock_graft call warning)
[4] commit 56974a6fcfef ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation")

Fixes: 56974a6fcfef ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation")
Reported-by: Brian Moyles &lt;bmoyles@netflix.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira &lt;mfo@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix introspection of of task mode for unconfined tasks</title>
<updated>2020-06-25T13:32:51Z</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-06T01:12:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=86396a494e79f32f05da31d189db74fd0c228000'/>
<id>urn:sha1:86396a494e79f32f05da31d189db74fd0c228000</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit dd2569fbb053719f7df7ef8fdbb45cf47156a701 ]

Fix two issues with introspecting the task mode.

1. If a task is attached to a unconfined profile that is not the
   ns-&gt;unconfined profile then. Mode the mode is always reported
   as -

      $ ps -Z
      LABEL                               PID TTY          TIME CMD
      unconfined                         1287 pts/0    00:00:01 bash
      test (-)                           1892 pts/0    00:00:00 ps

   instead of the correct value of (unconfined) as shown below

      $ ps -Z
      LABEL                               PID TTY          TIME CMD
      unconfined                         2483 pts/0    00:00:01 bash
      test (unconfined)                  3591 pts/0    00:00:00 ps

2. if a task is confined by a stack of profiles that are unconfined
   the output of label mode is again the incorrect value of (-) like
   above, instead of (unconfined). This is because the visibile
   profile count increment is skipped by the special casing of
   unconfined.

Fixes: f1bd904175e8 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Call ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in ima_eventdigest_init()</title>
<updated>2020-06-22T07:05:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-03T15:08:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=fcb067cb457e2326c6d759e346f5f5dfef351d50'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fcb067cb457e2326c6d759e346f5f5dfef351d50</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6cc7c266e5b47d3cd2b5bb7fd3aac4e6bb2dd1d2 ]

If the template field 'd' is chosen and the digest to be added to the
measurement entry was not calculated with SHA1 or MD5, it is
recalculated with SHA1, by using the passed file descriptor. However, this
cannot be done for boot_aggregate, because there is no file descriptor.

This patch adds a call to ima_calc_boot_aggregate() in
ima_eventdigest_init(), so that the digest can be recalculated also for the
boot_aggregate entry.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.13.x
Fixes: 3ce1217d6cd5d ("ima: define template fields library and new helpers")
Reported-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Fix possible memory leak in evm_calc_hmac_or_hash()</title>
<updated>2020-06-22T07:05:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-14T08:01:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=3815f6508d90a7e7c86719a0009fd4bb6b89ad2b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3815f6508d90a7e7c86719a0009fd4bb6b89ad2b</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 0c4395fb2aa77341269ea619c5419ea48171883f upstream.

Don't immediately return if the signature is portable and security.ima is
not present. Just set error so that memory allocated is freed before
returning from evm_calc_hmac_or_hash().

Fixes: 50b977481fce9 ("EVM: Add support for portable signature format")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Directly assign the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules</title>
<updated>2020-06-22T07:05:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Roberto Sassu</name>
<email>roberto.sassu@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-06-03T15:08:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=d52a190318f0901965f200f76eb28dd8426bbb25'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d52a190318f0901965f200f76eb28dd8426bbb25</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 067a436b1b0aafa593344fddd711a755a58afb3b upstream.

This patch prevents the following oops:

[   10.771813] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000
[...]
[   10.779790] RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0xf7/0xb80
[...]
[   10.798576] Call Trace:
[   10.798993]  ? ima_lsm_policy_change+0x2b0/0x2b0
[   10.799753]  ? inode_init_owner+0x1a0/0x1a0
[   10.800484]  ? _raw_spin_lock+0x7a/0xd0
[   10.801592]  ima_must_appraise.part.0+0xb6/0xf0
[   10.802313]  ? ima_fix_xattr.isra.0+0xd0/0xd0
[   10.803167]  ima_must_appraise+0x4f/0x70
[   10.804004]  ima_post_path_mknod+0x2e/0x80
[   10.804800]  do_mknodat+0x396/0x3c0

It occurs when there is a failure during IMA initialization, and
ima_init_policy() is not called. IMA hooks still call ima_match_policy()
but ima_rules is NULL. This patch prevents the crash by directly assigning
the ima_default_policy pointer to ima_rules when ima_rules is defined. This
wouldn't alter the existing behavior, as ima_rules is always set at the end
of ima_init_policy().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.7.x
Fixes: 07f6a79415d7d ("ima: add appraise action keywords and default rules")
Reported-by: Takashi Iwai &lt;tiwai@suse.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Fix ima digest hash table key calculation</title>
<updated>2020-06-22T07:05:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Krzysztof Struczynski</name>
<email>krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-04-28T07:30:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.stealer.net/cgit.cgi/user/sven/linux.git/commit/?id=71381daffeed955d29b40e992bb7eac554e5da23'/>
<id>urn:sha1:71381daffeed955d29b40e992bb7eac554e5da23</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 1129d31b55d509f15e72dc68e4b5c3a4d7b4da8d upstream.

Function hash_long() accepts unsigned long, while currently only one byte
is passed from ima_hash_key(), which calculates a key for ima_htable.

Given that hashing the digest does not give clear benefits compared to
using the digest itself, remove hash_long() and return the modulus
calculated on the first two bytes of the digest with the number of slots.
Also reduce the depth of the hash table by doubling the number of slots.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921ef ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Struczynski &lt;krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: David.Laight@aculab.com (big endian system concerns)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;

</content>
</entry>
</feed>
