user/sven/linux.git/security, branch v5.1.15

apparmor: reset pos on failure to unpack for various functions

2019-06-25T03:34:46Z

commit 156e42996bd84eccb6acf319f19ce0cb140d00e3 upstream. Each function that manipulates the aa_ext struct should reset it's "pos" member on failure. This ensures that, on failure, no changes are made to the state of the aa_ext struct. There are paths were elements are optional and the error path is used to indicate the optional element is not present. This means instead of just aborting on error the unpack stream can become unsynchronized on optional elements, if using one of the affected functions. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy") Signed-off-by: Mike Salvatore Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

apparmor: enforce nullbyte at end of tag string

2019-06-25T03:34:46Z

commit 8404d7a674c49278607d19726e0acc0cae299357 upstream. A packed AppArmor policy contains null-terminated tag strings that are read by unpack_nameX(). However, unpack_nameX() uses string functions on them without ensuring that they are actually null-terminated, potentially leading to out-of-bounds accesses. Make sure that the tag string is null-terminated before passing it to strcmp(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 736ec752d95e ("AppArmor: policy routines for loading and unpacking policy") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

apparmor: fix PROFILE_MEDIATES for untrusted input

2019-06-25T03:34:46Z

commit 23375b13f98c5464c2b4d15f983cc062940f1f4e upstream. While commit 11c236b89d7c2 ("apparmor: add a default null dfa") ensure every profile has a policy.dfa it does not resize the policy.start[] to have entries for every possible start value. Which means PROFILE_MEDIATES is not safe to use on untrusted input. Unforunately commit b9590ad4c4f2 ("apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE") did not take into account the start value usage. The input string in profile_query_cb() is user controlled and is not properly checked to be within the limited start[] entries, even worse it can't be as userspace policy is allowed to make us of entries types the kernel does not know about. This mean usespace can currently cause the kernel to access memory up to 240 entries beyond the start array bounds. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b9590ad4c4f2 ("apparmor: remove POLICY_MEDIATES_SAFE") Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Smack: Restore the smackfsdef mount option and add missing prefixes

2019-06-19T06:00:03Z

commit 6e7739fc938c1ec58d321f70ea41d9548a4cca0f upstream. The 5.1 mount system rework changed the smackfsdef mount option to smackfsdefault. This fixes the regression by making smackfsdef treated the same way as smackfsdefault. Also fix the smack_param_specs[] to have "smack" prefixes on all the names. This isn't visible to a user unless they either: (a) Try to mount a filesystem that's converted to the internal mount API and that implements the ->parse_monolithic() context operation - and only then if they call security_fs_context_parse_param() rather than security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(). There are no examples of this upstream yet, but nfs will probably want to do this for nfs2 or nfs3. (b) Use fsconfig() to configure the filesystem - in which case security_fs_context_parse_param() will be called. This issue is that smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts() checks for the "smack" prefix on the options, but smack_fs_context_parse_param() does not. Fixes: c3300aaf95fb ("smack: get rid of match_token()") Fixes: 2febd254adc4 ("smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jose Bollo Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: David Howells Tested-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()

2019-06-19T06:00:01Z

commit fec6375320c6399c708fa9801f8cfbf950fee623 upstream. In selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), 'arg' is allocated by kmemdup_nul(). It returns NULL when fails. So 'arg' should be checked. And 'mnt_opts' should be freed when error. Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang Fixes: 99dbbb593fe6 ("selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()") Cc: Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: fix a missing-check bug in selinux_add_mnt_opt( )

2019-06-19T06:00:01Z

commit e2e0e09758a6f7597de0f9b819647addfb71b6bd upstream. In selinux_add_mnt_opt(), 'val' is allocated by kmemdup_nul(). It returns NULL when fails. So 'val' should be checked. And 'mnt_opts' should be freed when error. Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang Fixes: 757cbe597fe8 ("LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()") Cc: [PM: fixed some indenting problems] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

selinux: log raw contexts as untrusted strings

2019-06-19T06:00:01Z

commit aff7ed4851680d0d28ad9f52cd2f99213e1371b2 upstream. These strings may come from untrusted sources (e.g. file xattrs) so they need to be properly escaped. Reproducer: # setenforce 0 # touch /tmp/test # setfattr -n security.selinux -v 'kuřecí řízek' /tmp/test # runcon system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 cat /tmp/test (look at the generated AVCs) Actual result: type=AVC [...] trawcon=kuřecí řízek Expected result: type=AVC [...] trawcon=6B75C5996563C3AD20C599C3AD7A656B Fixes: fede148324c3 ("selinux: log invalid contexts in AVCs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.1+ Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc()

2019-06-09T07:16:15Z

commit 221be106d75c1b511973301542f47d6000d0b63e upstream. This patch prevents memory access beyond the evm_tfm array by checking the validity of the index (hash algorithm) passed to init_desc(). The hash algorithm can be arbitrarily set if the security.ima xattr type is not EVM_XATTR_HMAC. Fixes: 5feeb61183dde ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly

2019-06-09T07:16:15Z

commit 8cdc23a3d9ec0944000ad43bad588e36afdc38cd upstream. Show the '^' character when a policy rule has flag IMA_INMASK. Fixes: 80eae209d63ac ("IMA: allow reading back the current IMA policy") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

ima: fix wrong signed policy requirement when not appraising

2019-06-09T07:16:14Z

commit f40019475bbbe9b455e7fd4385fcf13896c492ca upstream. Kernel booted just with ima_policy=tcb (not with ima_policy=appraise_tcb) shouldn't require signed policy. Regression found with LTP test ima_policy.sh. Fixes: c52657d93b05 ("ima: refactor ima_init_policy()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-5.0) Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman