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<title>user/sven/linux.git/security, branch v5.12.8</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2021-05-19T08:56:08Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: Fix memory leak on object td</title>
<updated>2021-05-19T08:56:08Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Colin Ian King</name>
<email>colin.king@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-30T11:37:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3e24fbd37e72e8a67b74991970fecc82d14f57af</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 83a775d5f9bfda95b1c295f95a3a041a40c7f321 upstream.

Two error return paths are neglecting to free allocated object td,
causing a memory leak. Fix this by returning via the error return
path that securely kfree's td.

Fixes clang scan-build warning:
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c:496:10: warning: Potential
memory leak [unix.Malloc]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5df16caada3f ("KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King &lt;colin.king@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers &lt;ndesaulniers@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Fix the error code for restoring the PCR value</title>
<updated>2021-05-14T08:52:46Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Li Huafei</name>
<email>lihuafei1@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-03T03:28:24Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:33df5d11674c7dbf24c778d57753a7c41b12615b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7990ccafaa37dc6d8bb095d4d7cd997e8903fd10 ]

In ima_restore_measurement_list(), hdr[HDR_PCR].data is pointing to a
buffer of type u8, which contains the dumped 32-bit pcr value.
Currently, only the least significant byte is used to restore the pcr
value. We should convert hdr[HDR_PCR].data to a pointer of type u32
before fetching the value to restore the correct pcr value.

Fixes: 47fdee60b47f ("ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers")
Signed-off-by: Li Huafei &lt;lihuafei1@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu &lt;roberto.sassu@huawei.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations</title>
<updated>2021-05-14T08:52:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Bottomley</name>
<email>James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-27T19:06:15Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:364400df2df9ea0410c126dde1ac1fc115231fd0</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit de66514d934d70ce73c302ce0644b54970fc7196 ]

In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number.  The spec actually
recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1
hash as the authorization.  Because the spec doesn't require this
hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex
number.  For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length
passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted
keys for ease of use.  Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this
into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys.

so before

keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=f572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72e94f2258fkeyhandle=81000001" @u

after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new
directly supplied password:

keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=hello keyhandle=81000001" @u

Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct
password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator
for which form is input.

Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix.  The TPM
2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty
authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in
20 bytes of zeros.  A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the
Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch
makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys.

Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips")
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissions</title>
<updated>2021-05-14T08:52:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Paul Moore</name>
<email>paul@paul-moore.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-22T01:15:36Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:336dc1d637f3c889785a718fe791580e01bc2a93</id>
<content type='text'>
commit e4c82eafb609c2badc56f4e11bc50fcf44b8e9eb upstream.

This patch adds the missing NULL termination to the "bpf" and
"perf_event" object class permission lists.

This missing NULL termination should really only affect the tools
under scripts/selinux, with the most important being genheaders.c,
although in practice this has not been an issue on any of my dev/test
systems.  If the problem were to manifest itself it would likely
result in bogus permissions added to the end of the object class;
thankfully with no access control checks using these bogus
permissions and no policies defining these permissions the impact
would likely be limited to some noise about undefined permissions
during policy load.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ec27c3568a34 ("selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations")
Fixes: da97e18458fb ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks")
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>security: commoncap: fix -Wstringop-overread warning</title>
<updated>2021-05-12T06:39:59Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Arnd Bergmann</name>
<email>arnd@arndb.de</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-22T16:02:41Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3cc63b1c6e7a2f2cbf2af5f9f200f9739ac0b88c</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 82e5d8cc768b0c7b03c551a9ab1f8f3f68d5f83f upstream.

gcc-11 introdces a harmless warning for cap_inode_getsecurity:

security/commoncap.c: In function ‘cap_inode_getsecurity’:
security/commoncap.c:440:33: error: ‘memcpy’ reading 16 bytes from a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overread]
  440 |                                 memcpy(&amp;nscap-&gt;data, &amp;cap-&gt;data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
      |                                 ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The problem here is that tmpbuf is initialized to NULL, so gcc assumes
it is not accessible unless it gets set by vfs_getxattr_alloc().  This is
a legitimate warning as far as I can tell, but the code is correct since
it correctly handles the error when that function fails.

Add a separate NULL check to tell gcc about it as well.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Acked-by: Christian Brauner &lt;christian.brauner@ubuntu.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Morris &lt;jamorris@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Zhizhikin &lt;andrey.z@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM reservation for seal/unseal</title>
<updated>2021-04-21T23:28:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>James Bottomley</name>
<email>James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-21T22:42:47Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9d5171eab462a63e2fbebfccf6026e92be018f20</id>
<content type='text'>
The original patch 8c657a0590de ("KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal
and unseal operations") was correct on the mailing list:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20210128235621.127925-4-jarkko@kernel.org/

But somehow got rebased so that the tpm_try_get_ops() in
tpm2_seal_trusted() got lost.  This causes an imbalanced put of the
TPM ops and causes oopses on TIS based hardware.

This fix puts back the lost tpm_try_get_ops()

Fixes: 8c657a0590de ("KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations")
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley &lt;James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>kasan: remove redundant config option</title>
<updated>2021-04-16T23:10:36Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Walter Wu</name>
<email>walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-16T22:46:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:02c587733c8161355a43e6e110c2e29bd0acff72</id>
<content type='text'>
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK and CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE both enable KASAN stack
instrumentation, but we should only need one config, so that we remove
CONFIG_KASAN_STACK_ENABLE and make CONFIG_KASAN_STACK workable.  see [1].

When enable KASAN stack instrumentation, then for gcc we could do no
prompt and default value y, and for clang prompt and default value n.

This patch fixes the following compilation warning:

  include/linux/kasan.h:333:30: warning: 'CONFIG_KASAN_STACK' is not defined, evaluates to 0 [-Wundef]

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix merge snafu]

Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=210221 [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210226012531.29231-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com
Fixes: d9b571c885a8 ("kasan: fix KASAN_STACK dependency for HW_TAGS")
Signed-off-by: Walter Wu &lt;walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor &lt;natechancellor@gmail.com&gt;
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann &lt;arnd@arndb.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov &lt;andreyknvl@google.com&gt;
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin &lt;ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com&gt;
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Cc: Alexander Potapenko &lt;glider@google.com&gt;
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton &lt;akpm@linux-foundation.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds &lt;torvalds@linux-foundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210409' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux</title>
<updated>2021-04-09T18:51:06Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Linus Torvalds</name>
<email>torvalds@linux-foundation.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-09T18:51:06Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:60144b23c94216b4aca6fba90dca9349183f39e1</id>
<content type='text'>
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
 "Three SELinux fixes.

  These fix known problems relating to (re)loading SELinux policy or
  changing the policy booleans, and pass our test suite without problem"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20210409' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: fix race between old and new sidtab
  selinux: fix cond_list corruption when changing booleans
  selinux: make nslot handling in avtab more robust
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix race between old and new sidtab</title>
<updated>2021-04-08T00:42:56Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-07T07:24:43Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9ad6e9cb39c66366bf7b9aece114aca277981a1f</id>
<content type='text'>
Since commit 1b8b31a2e612 ("selinux: convert policy read-write lock to
RCU"), there is a small window during policy load where the new policy
pointer has already been installed, but some threads may still be
holding the old policy pointer in their read-side RCU critical sections.
This means that there may be conflicting attempts to add a new SID entry
to both tables via sidtab_context_to_sid().

See also (and the rest of the thread):
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAFqZXNvfux46_f8gnvVvRYMKoes24nwm2n3sPbMjrB8vKTW00g@mail.gmail.com/

Fix this by installing the new policy pointer under the old sidtab's
spinlock along with marking the old sidtab as "frozen". Then, if an
attempt to add new entry to a "frozen" sidtab is detected, make
sidtab_context_to_sid() return -ESTALE to indicate that a new policy
has been installed and that the caller will have to abort the policy
transaction and try again after re-taking the policy pointer (which is
guaranteed to be a newer policy). This requires adding a retry-on-ESTALE
logic to all callers of sidtab_context_to_sid(), but fortunately these
are easy to determine and aren't that many.

This seems to be the simplest solution for this problem, even if it
looks somewhat ugly. Note that other places in the kernel (e.g.
do_mknodat() in fs/namei.c) use similar stale-retry patterns, so I think
it's reasonable.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1b8b31a2e612 ("selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>selinux: fix cond_list corruption when changing booleans</title>
<updated>2021-04-02T15:46:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Ondrej Mosnacek</name>
<email>omosnace@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-04-02T08:56:19Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:d8f5f0ea5b86300390b026b6c6e7836b7150814a</id>
<content type='text'>
Currently, duplicate_policydb_cond_list() first copies the whole
conditional avtab and then tries to link to the correct entries in
cond_dup_av_list() using avtab_search(). However, since the conditional
avtab may contain multiple entries with the same key, this approach
often fails to find the right entry, potentially leading to wrong rules
being activated/deactivated when booleans are changed.

To fix this, instead start with an empty conditional avtab and add the
individual entries one-by-one while building the new av_lists. This
approach leads to the correct result, since each entry is present in the
av_lists exactly once.

The issue can be reproduced with Fedora policy as follows:

    # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
    allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True
    # setsebool ftpd_anon_write=off ftpd_connect_all_unreserved=off ftpd_connect_db=off ftpd_full_access=off

On fixed kernels, the sesearch output is the same after the setsebool
command:

    # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
    allow ftpd_t public_content_rw_t:dir { add_name create link remove_name rename reparent rmdir setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_anon_write ]:True

While on the broken kernels, it will be different:

    # sesearch -s ftpd_t -t public_content_rw_t -c dir -p create -A
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True
    allow ftpd_t non_security_file_type:dir { add_name create getattr ioctl link lock open read remove_name rename reparent rmdir search setattr unlink watch watch_reads write }; [ ftpd_full_access ]:True

While there, also simplify the computation of nslots. This changes the
nslots values for nrules 2 or 3 to just two slots instead of 4, which
makes the sequence more consistent.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c7c556f1e81b ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek &lt;omosnace@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
