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<title>user/sven/linux.git/security, branch v5.4.111</title>
<subtitle>Linux Kernel
</subtitle>
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<updated>2021-03-30T12:35:24Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>integrity: double check iint_cache was initialized</title>
<updated>2021-03-30T12:35:24Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mimi Zohar</name>
<email>zohar@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-19T15:17:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:752589cd4ea8a0d7fa0884cafde52267bbc95cb6</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 92063f3ca73aab794bd5408d3361fd5b5ea33079 upstream.

The kernel may be built with multiple LSMs, but only a subset may be
enabled on the boot command line by specifying "lsm=".  Not including
"integrity" on the ordered LSM list may result in a NULL deref.

As reported by Dmitry Vyukov:
in qemu:
qemu-system-x86_64       -enable-kvm     -machine q35,nvdimm -cpu
max,migratable=off -smp 4       -m 4G,slots=4,maxmem=16G        -hda
wheezy.img      -kernel arch/x86/boot/bzImage   -nographic -vga std
 -soundhw all     -usb -usbdevice tablet  -bt hci -bt device:keyboard
   -net user,host=10.0.2.10,hostfwd=tcp::10022-:22 -net
nic,model=virtio-net-pci   -object
memory-backend-file,id=pmem1,share=off,mem-path=/dev/zero,size=64M
  -device nvdimm,id=nvdimm1,memdev=pmem1  -append "console=ttyS0
root=/dev/sda earlyprintk=serial rodata=n oops=panic panic_on_warn=1
panic=86400 lsm=smack numa=fake=2 nopcid dummy_hcd.num=8"   -pidfile
vm_pid -m 2G -cpu host

But it crashes on NULL deref in integrity_inode_get during boot:

Run /sbin/init as init process
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000001c
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2+ #97
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
rel-1.13.0-44-g88ab0c15525c-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_alloc+0x2b/0x370 mm/slub.c:2920
Code: 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 41 89 f4 55 48 89 fd 53 48 83 ec 10 44 8b
3d d9 1f 90 0b 65 48 8b 04 25 28 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 31 c0 &lt;8b&gt; 5f
1c 4cf
RSP: 0000:ffffc9000032f9d8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888017fc4f00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888040220000 RSI: 0000000000000c40 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888019263627
R10: ffffffff83937cd1 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000c40
R13: ffff888019263538 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000ffffff
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88802d180000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000001c CR3: 000000000b48e000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 integrity_inode_get+0x47/0x260 security/integrity/iint.c:105
 process_measurement+0x33d/0x17e0 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:237
 ima_bprm_check+0xde/0x210 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:474
 security_bprm_check+0x7d/0xa0 security/security.c:845
 search_binary_handler fs/exec.c:1708 [inline]
 exec_binprm fs/exec.c:1761 [inline]
 bprm_execve fs/exec.c:1830 [inline]
 bprm_execve+0x764/0x19a0 fs/exec.c:1792
 kernel_execve+0x370/0x460 fs/exec.c:1973
 try_to_run_init_process+0x14/0x4e init/main.c:1366
 kernel_init+0x11d/0x1b8 init/main.c:1477
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294
Modules linked in:
CR2: 000000000000001c
---[ end trace 22d601a500de7d79 ]---

Since LSMs and IMA may be configured at build time, but not enabled at
run time, panic the system if "integrity" was not initialized before use.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov &lt;dvyukov@google.com&gt;
Fixes: 79f7865d844c ("LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert 95ebabde382c ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities")</title>
<updated>2021-03-17T16:03:47Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-03-12T21:07:09Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:47a5d1b63f212c7310ce1612caa76964c3f4e681</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 3b0c2d3eaa83da259d7726192cf55a137769012f upstream.

It turns out that there are in fact userspace implementations that
care and this recent change caused a regression.

https://github.com/containers/buildah/issues/3071

As the motivation for the original change was future development,
and the impact is existing real world code just revert this change
and allow the ambiguity in v3 file caps.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 95ebabde382c ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>smackfs: restrict bytes count in smackfs write functions</title>
<updated>2021-03-07T11:20:42Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov</name>
<email>snovitoll@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-28T11:58:01Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:4ceb5ca9e626a8912efb45c924713121b9fc0655</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 7ef4c19d245f3dc233fd4be5acea436edd1d83d8 upstream.

syzbot found WARNINGs in several smackfs write operations where
bytes count is passed to memdup_user_nul which exceeds
GFP MAX_ORDER. Check count size if bigger than PAGE_SIZE.

Per smackfs doc, smk_write_net4addr accepts any label or -CIPSO,
smk_write_net6addr accepts any label or -DELETE. I couldn't find
any general rule for other label lengths except SMK_LABELLEN,
SMK_LONGLABEL, SMK_CIPSOMAX which are documented.

Let's constrain, in general, smackfs label lengths for PAGE_SIZE.
Although fuzzer crashes write to smackfs/netlabel on 0x400000 length.

Here is a quick way to reproduce the WARNING:
python -c "print('A' * 0x400000)" &gt; /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel

Reported-by: syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov &lt;snovitoll@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing</title>
<updated>2021-03-04T09:26:44Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Jarkko Sakkinen</name>
<email>jarkko@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-28T23:56:20Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2910038c09f4c8d839f663df1e09233c4e40a739</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 8da7520c80468c48f981f0b81fc1be6599e3b0ad upstream.

Consider the following transcript:

$ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=helloworld keyhandle=80000000 migratable=1" @u
add_key: Invalid argument

The documentation has the following description:

  migratable=   0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
                default 1 (resealing allowed)

The consequence is that "migratable=1" should succeed. Fix this by
allowing this condition to pass instead of return -EINVAL.

[*] Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" &lt;jejb@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen &lt;jarkko@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion</title>
<updated>2021-03-04T09:26:29Z</updated>
<author>
<name>David Howells</name>
<email>dhowells@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-11-20T18:04:23Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0fec3272abf17bf337dc9d8934d7a0d3ff4e83d8</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 4993e1f9479a4161fd7d93e2b8b30b438f00cb0f ]

KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(),
as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags.  KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as
KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update()
uses it.  LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.

KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot
write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash
from it.

Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set
KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key.  blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass
this to keyring_alloc().

We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag
manually.

Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current
implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the
blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed.

Fixes: 734114f8782f ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring")
Reported-by: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: David Howells &lt;dhowells@redhat.com&gt;
cc: Mickaël Salaün &lt;mic@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
cc: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: David Woodhouse &lt;dwmw2@infradead.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities</title>
<updated>2021-03-04T09:26:26Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric W. Biederman</name>
<email>ebiederm@xmission.com</email>
</author>
<published>2020-12-17T15:42:00Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:33a2e62473e8fe5766e2b28a4db805896458b524</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 95ebabde382c371572297915b104e55403674e73 ]

The v3 file capabilities have a uid field that records the filesystem
uid of the root user of the user namespace the file capabilities are
valid in.

When someone is silly enough to have the same underlying uid as the
root uid of multiple nested containers a v3 filesystem capability can
be ambiguous.

In the spirit of don't do that then, forbid writing a v3 filesystem
capability if it is ambiguous.

Fixes: 8db6c34f1dbc ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan &lt;morgan@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn &lt;serge@hallyn.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Free IMA measurement buffer after kexec syscall</title>
<updated>2021-03-04T09:26:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Lakshmi Ramasubramanian</name>
<email>nramas@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-04T17:49:51Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:091b409383ad7e71fc51752c4b37364ca6831584</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f31e3386a4e92ba6eda7328cb508462956c94c64 ]

IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function.  This buffer is not freed before
completing the kexec system call resulting in memory leak.

Add ima_buffer field in "struct kimage" to store the virtual address
of the buffer allocated for the IMA measurement list.
Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() function.

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian &lt;nramas@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann &lt;bauerman@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Fixes: 7b8589cc29e7 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Free IMA measurement buffer on error</title>
<updated>2021-03-04T09:26:25Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Lakshmi Ramasubramanian</name>
<email>nramas@linux.microsoft.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-02-04T17:49:50Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:e436d3f7bdac29abfb14324bd4dd8eb0a670721d</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 6d14c6517885fa68524238787420511b87d671df ]

IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function.  In error code paths this memory
is not freed resulting in memory leak.

Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
the error code paths in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function.

Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian &lt;nramas@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks &lt;tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com&gt;
Fixes: 7b8589cc29e7 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>evm: Fix memleak in init_desc</title>
<updated>2021-03-04T09:26:21Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dinghao Liu</name>
<email>dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-10T08:02:53Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:3d5afcae9af281aae3299744b132f8572debf72e</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit ccf11dbaa07b328fa469415c362d33459c140a37 ]

tmp_tfm is allocated, but not freed on subsequent kmalloc failure, which
leads to a memory leak.  Free tmp_tfm.

Fixes: d46eb3699502b ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")
Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu &lt;dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn&gt;
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: formatted/reworded patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>cap: fix conversions on getxattr</title>
<updated>2021-02-17T09:35:15Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Miklos Szeredi</name>
<email>mszeredi@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-01-28T09:22:48Z</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:43e3cf46afb132f85df65dcfa1d08336055712b7</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit f2b00be488730522d0fb7a8a5de663febdcefe0a ]

If a capability is stored on disk in v2 format cap_inode_getsecurity() will
currently return in v2 format unconditionally.

This is wrong: v2 cap should be equivalent to a v3 cap with zero rootid,
and so the same conversions performed on it.

If the rootid cannot be mapped, v3 is returned unconverted.  Fix this so
that both v2 and v3 return -EOVERFLOW if the rootid (or the owner of the fs
user namespace in case of v2) cannot be mapped into the current user
namespace.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi &lt;mszeredi@redhat.com&gt;
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" &lt;ebiederm@xmission.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
