user/sven/linux.git/security, branch v5.8.1

ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime

2020-08-11T13:48:11Z

commit 311aa6aafea446c2f954cc19d66425bfed8c4b0b upstream. The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different "ima_appraise=" modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when IMA architecture specific policies are enabled. This prevents properly labeling the filesystem on systems where secure boot is supported, but not enabled on the platform. Only when secure boot is actually enabled should these IMA appraise modes be disabled. This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform. Test results as follows: -> x86-64 with secure boot enabled [ 0.015637] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix [ 0.015668] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=fix boot parameter option -> powerpc with secure boot disabled [ 0.000000] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix [ 0.000000] Secure boot mode disabled -> Running the system without secure boot and with both options set: CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y Audit prompts "missing-hash" but still allow execution and, consequently, filesystem labeling: type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(07/09/2020 12:30:27.778:1691) : pid=4976 uid=root auid=root ses=2 subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data cause=missing-hash comm=bash name=/usr/bin/evmctl dev="dm-0" ino=493150 res=no Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: d958083a8f64 ("x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86") Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0 Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self()

2020-08-11T13:48:09Z

commit beb4ee6770a89646659e6a2178538d2b13e2654e upstream. smk_write_relabel_self() frees memory from the task's credentials with no locking, which can easily cause a use-after-free because multiple tasks can share the same credentials structure. Fix this by using prepare_creds() and commit_creds() to correctly modify the task's credentials. Reproducer for "BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self": #include #include #include static void *thrproc(void *arg) { int fd = open("/sys/fs/smackfs/relabel-self", O_WRONLY); for (;;) write(fd, "foo", 3); } int main() { pthread_t t; pthread_create(&t, NULL, thrproc, NULL); thrproc(NULL); } Reported-by: syzbot+e6416dabb497a650da40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 38416e53936e ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label") Cc: # v4.4+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

integrity/ima: switch to using __kernel_read

2020-07-08T06:27:57Z

__kernel_read has a bunch of additional sanity checks, and this moves the set_fs out of non-core code. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig

Merge tag 'fixes-v5.8-rc3-a' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2020-06-30T19:21:53Z

Pull security subsystem fixes from James Morris: "Two simple fixes for v5.8: - Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr (KP Singh) - Fix the key_permission LSM hook function type (Sami Tolvanen)" * tag 'fixes-v5.8-rc3-a' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: security: Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr security: fix the key_permission LSM hook function type

ima: extend boot_aggregate with kernel measurements

2020-06-25T00:47:24Z

Registers 8-9 are used to store measurements of the kernel and its command line (e.g., grub2 bootloader with tpm module enabled). IMA should include them in the boot aggregate. Registers 8-9 should be only included in non-SHA1 digests to avoid ambiguity. Signed-off-by: Maurizio Drocco Reviewed-by: Bruno Meneguele Tested-by: Bruno Meneguele (TPM 1.2, TPM 2.0) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

security: Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr

2020-06-23T23:39:23Z

inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 to indicate the acceptance of the xattr and 1 to reject it. If the LSM does not know about the xattr, it's expected to return -EOPNOTSUPP, which is the correct default value for this hook. BPF LSM, currently, uses 0 as the default value and thereby falsely allows all overlay fs xattributes to be copied up. The iteration logic is also updated from the "bail-on-fail" call_int_hook to continue on the non-decisive -EOPNOTSUPP and bail out on other values. Fixes: 98e828a0650f ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks") Signed-off-by: KP Singh Signed-off-by: James Morris

Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200621' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

2020-06-21T22:41:24Z

Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore: "Three small patches to fix problems in the SELinux code, all found via clang. Two patches fix potential double-free conditions and one fixes an undefined return value" * tag 'selinux-pr-20200621' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: fix undefined return of cond_evaluate_expr selinux: fix a double free in cond_read_node()/cond_read_list() selinux: fix double free

selinux: fix undefined return of cond_evaluate_expr

2020-06-17T21:36:40Z

clang static analysis reports an undefined return security/selinux/ss/conditional.c:79:2: warning: Undefined or garbage value returned to caller [core.uninitialized.UndefReturn] return s[0]; ^~~~~~~~~~~ static int cond_evaluate_expr( ... { u32 i; int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH]; for (i = 0; i < expr->len; i++) ... return s[0]; When expr->len is 0, the loop which sets s[0] never runs. So return -1 if the loop never runs. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tom Rix Acked-by: Stephen Smalley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

selinux: fix a double free in cond_read_node()/cond_read_list()

2020-06-17T00:25:19Z

Clang static analysis reports this double free error security/selinux/ss/conditional.c:139:2: warning: Attempt to free released memory [unix.Malloc] kfree(node->expr.nodes); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ When cond_read_node fails, it calls cond_node_destroy which frees the node but does not poison the entry in the node list. So when it returns to its caller cond_read_list, cond_read_list deletes the partial list. The latest entry in the list will be deleted twice. So instead of freeing the node in cond_read_node, let list freeing in code_read_list handle the freeing the problem node along with all of the earlier nodes. Because cond_read_node no longer does any error handling, the goto's the error case are redundant. Instead just return the error code. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 60abd3181db2 ("selinux: convert cond_list to array") Signed-off-by: Tom Rix Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore

ima: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array

2020-06-16T04:08:32Z

There is a regular need in the kernel to provide a way to declare having a dynamically sized set of trailing elements in a structure. Kernel code should always use “flexible array members”[1] for these cases. The older style of one-element or zero-length arrays should no longer be used[2]. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flexible_array_member [2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21 Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva