user/sven/linux.git/security, branch v6.1.83

landlock: Fix asymmetric private inodes referring

2024-03-06T14:45:10Z

commit d9818b3e906a0ee1ab02ea79e74a2f755fc5461a upstream. When linking or renaming a file, if only one of the source or destination directory is backed by an S_PRIVATE inode, then the related set of layer masks would be used as uninitialized by is_access_to_paths_allowed(). This would result to indeterministic access for one side instead of always being allowed. This bug could only be triggered with a mounted filesystem containing both S_PRIVATE and !S_PRIVATE inodes, which doesn't seem possible. The collect_domain_accesses() calls return early if is_nouser_or_private() returns false, which means that the directory's superblock has SB_NOUSER or its inode has S_PRIVATE. Because rename or link actions are only allowed on the same mounted filesystem, the superblock is always the same for both source and destination directories. However, it might be possible in theory to have an S_PRIVATE parent source inode with an !S_PRIVATE parent destination inode, or vice versa. To make sure this case is not an issue, explicitly initialized both set of layer masks to 0, which means to allow all actions on the related side. If at least on side has !S_PRIVATE, then collect_domain_accesses() and is_access_to_paths_allowed() check for the required access rights. Cc: Arnd Bergmann Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Günther Noack Cc: Jann Horn Cc: Shervin Oloumi Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: b91c3e4ea756 ("landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240219190345.2928627-1-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

tomoyo: fix UAF write bug in tomoyo_write_control()

2024-03-06T14:45:09Z

commit 2f03fc340cac9ea1dc63cbf8c93dd2eb0f227815 upstream. Since tomoyo_write_control() updates head->write_buf when write() of long lines is requested, we need to fetch head->write_buf after head->io_sem is held. Otherwise, concurrent write() requests can cause use-after-free-write and double-free problems. Reported-by: Sam Sun Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAEkJfYNDspuGxYx5kym8Lvp--D36CMDUErg4rxfWFJuPbbji8g@mail.gmail.com Fixes: bd03a3e4c9a9 ("TOMOYO: Add policy namespace support.") Cc: # Linux 3.1+ Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

apparmor: Free up __cleanup() name

2024-02-23T08:12:51Z

commit 9a1f37ebcfe061721564042254719dc8fd5c9fa0 upstream. In order to use __cleanup for __attribute__((__cleanup__(func))) the name must not be used for anything else. Avoid the conflict. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Acked-by: John Johansen Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230612093537.536441207%40infradead.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lsm: fix the logic in security_inode_getsecctx()

2024-02-23T08:12:37Z

commit 99b817c173cd213671daecd25ca27f56b0c7c4ec upstream. The inode_getsecctx LSM hook has previously been corrected to have -EOPNOTSUPP instead of 0 as the default return value to fix BPF LSM behavior. However, the call_int_hook()-generated loop in security_inode_getsecctx() was left treating 0 as the neutral value, so after an LSM returns 0, the loop continues to try other LSMs, and if one of them returns a non-zero value, the function immediately returns with said value. So in a situation where SELinux and the BPF LSMs registered this hook, -EOPNOTSUPP would be incorrectly returned whenever SELinux returned 0. Fix this by open-coding the call_int_hook() loop and making it use the correct LSM_RET_DEFAULT() value as the neutral one, similar to what other hooks do. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Stephen Smalley Link: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/CAEjxPJ4ev-pasUwGx48fDhnmjBnq_Wh90jYPwRQRAqXxmOKD4Q@mail.gmail.com/ Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2257983 Fixes: b36995b8609a ("lsm: fix default return value for inode_getsecctx") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook

2024-02-01T00:17:00Z

commit f1bb47a31dff6d4b34fb14e99850860ee74bb003 upstream. Some ioctl commands do not require ioctl permission, but are routed to other permissions such as FILE_GETATTR or FILE_SETATTR. This routing is done by comparing the ioctl cmd to a set of 64-bit flags (FS_IOC_*). However, if a 32-bit process is running on a 64-bit kernel, it emits 32-bit flags (FS_IOC32_*) for certain ioctl operations. These flags are being checked erroneously, which leads to these ioctl operations being routed to the ioctl permission, rather than the correct file permissions. This was also noted in a RED-PEN finding from a while back - "/* RED-PEN how should LSM module know it's handling 32bit? */". This patch introduces a new hook, security_file_ioctl_compat(), that is called from the compat ioctl syscall. All current LSMs have been changed to support this hook. Reviewing the three places where we are currently using security_file_ioctl(), it appears that only SELinux needs a dedicated compat change; TOMOYO and SMACK appear to be functional without any change. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 0b24dcb7f2f7 ("Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking"") Signed-off-by: Alfred Piccioni Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley [PM: subject tweak, line length fixes, and alignment corrections] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

Revert "KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep"

2024-01-25T23:27:52Z

commit 1ed4b563100230ea68821a2b25a3d9f25388a3e6 upstream. This reverts commit b4af096b5df5dd131ab796c79cedc7069d8f4882. New encrypted keys are created either from kernel-generated random numbers or user-provided decrypted data. Revert the change requiring user-provided decrypted data. Reported-by: Vishal Verma Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

apparmor: avoid crash when parsed profile name is empty

2024-01-25T23:27:48Z

[ Upstream commit 55a8210c9e7d21ff2644809699765796d4bfb200 ] When processing a packed profile in unpack_profile() described like "profile :ns::samba-dcerpcd /usr/lib*/samba/{,samba/}samba-dcerpcd {...}" a string ":samba-dcerpcd" is unpacked as a fully-qualified name and then passed to aa_splitn_fqname(). aa_splitn_fqname() treats ":samba-dcerpcd" as only containing a namespace. Thus it returns NULL for tmpname, meanwhile tmpns is non-NULL. Later aa_alloc_profile() crashes as the new profile name is NULL now. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 6 PID: 1657 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-dirty #16 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 Call Trace: ? strlen+0x1e/0xa0 aa_policy_init+0x1bb/0x230 aa_alloc_profile+0xb1/0x480 unpack_profile+0x3bc/0x4960 aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0 aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0 policy_update+0x261/0x370 profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0 vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00 ksys_write+0x126/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 It seems such behaviour of aa_splitn_fqname() is expected and checked in other places where it is called (e.g. aa_remove_profiles). Well, there is an explicit comment "a ns name without a following profile is allowed" inside. AFAICS, nothing can prevent unpacked "name" to be in form like ":samba-dcerpcd" - it is passed from userspace. Deny the whole profile set replacement in such case and inform user with EPROTO and an explaining message. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 04dc715e24d0 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

selinux: Fix error priority for bind with AF_UNSPEC on PF_INET6 socket

2024-01-25T23:27:21Z

[ Upstream commit bbf5a1d0e5d0fb3bdf90205aa872636122692a50 ] The IPv6 network stack first checks the sockaddr length (-EINVAL error) before checking the family (-EAFNOSUPPORT error). This was discovered thanks to commit a549d055a22e ("selftests/landlock: Add network tests"). Cc: Eric Paris Cc: Konstantin Meskhidze Cc: Paul Moore Cc: Stephen Smalley Reported-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0584f91c-537c-4188-9e4f-04f192565667@collabora.com Fixes: 0f8db8cc73df ("selinux: add AF_UNSPEC and INADDR_ANY checks to selinux_socket_bind()") Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün Tested-by: Muhammad Usama Anjum Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep

2024-01-25T23:27:19Z

[ Upstream commit b4af096b5df5dd131ab796c79cedc7069d8f4882 ] Add check for strsep() in order to transfer the error. Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") Signed-off-by: Chen Ni Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

keys, dns: Allow key types (eg. DNS) to be reclaimed immediately on expiry

2024-01-01T12:38:58Z

[ Upstream commit 39299bdd2546688d92ed9db4948f6219ca1b9542 ] If a key has an expiration time, then when that time passes, the key is left around for a certain amount of time before being collected (5 mins by default) so that EKEYEXPIRED can be returned instead of ENOKEY. This is a problem for DNS keys because we want to redo the DNS lookup immediately at that point. Fix this by allowing key types to be marked such that keys of that type don't have this extra period, but are reclaimed as soon as they expire and turn this on for dns_resolver-type keys. To make this easier to handle, key->expiry is changed to be permanent if TIME64_MAX rather than 0. Furthermore, give such new-style negative DNS results a 1s default expiry if no other expiry time is set rather than allowing it to stick around indefinitely. This shouldn't be zero as ls will follow a failing stat call immediately with a second with AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW added. Fixes: 1a4240f4764a ("DNS: Separate out CIFS DNS Resolver code") Signed-off-by: David Howells Tested-by: Markus Suvanto cc: Wang Lei cc: Jeff Layton cc: Steve French cc: Marc Dionne cc: Jarkko Sakkinen cc: "David S. Miller" cc: Eric Dumazet cc: Jakub Kicinski cc: Paolo Abeni cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin