user/sven/linux.git/virt, branch v6.1.60

kvm/vfio: ensure kvg instance stays around in kvm_vfio_group_add()

2023-09-13T07:42:46Z

[ Upstream commit 9e0f4f2918c2ff145d3dedee862d9919a6ed5812 ] kvm_vfio_group_add() creates kvg instance, links it to kv->group_list, and calls kvm_vfio_file_set_kvm() with kvg->file as an argument after dropping kv->lock. If we race group addition and deletion calls, kvg instance may get freed by the time we get around to calling kvm_vfio_file_set_kvm(). Previous iterations of the code did not reference kvg->file outside of the critical section, but used a temporary variable. Still, they had similar problem of the file reference being owned by kvg structure and potential for kvm_vfio_group_del() dropping it before kvm_vfio_group_add() had a chance to complete. Fix this by moving call to kvm_vfio_file_set_kvm() under the protection of kv->lock. We already call it while holding the same lock when vfio group is being deleted, so it should be safe here as well. Fixes: 2fc1bec15883 ("kvm: set/clear kvm to/from vfio_group when group add/delete") Reviewed-by: Alex Williamson Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230714224538.404793-1-dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

kvm/vfio: Prepare for accepting vfio device fd

2023-09-13T07:42:46Z

[ Upstream commit 2f99073a722beef5f74f3b0f32bda227ba3df1e0 ] This renames kvm_vfio_group related helpers to prepare for accepting vfio device fd. No functional change is intended. Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian Reviewed-by: Eric Auger Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe Tested-by: Terrence Xu Tested-by: Nicolin Chen Tested-by: Matthew Rosato Tested-by: Yanting Jiang Tested-by: Shameer Kolothum Tested-by: Zhenzhong Duan Signed-off-by: Yi Liu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230718135551.6592-5-yi.l.liu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Stable-dep-of: 9e0f4f2918c2 ("kvm/vfio: ensure kvg instance stays around in kvm_vfio_group_add()") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

KVM: Grab a reference to KVM for VM and vCPU stats file descriptors

2023-08-03T08:24:08Z

commit eed3013faa401aae662398709410a59bb0646e32 upstream. Grab a reference to KVM prior to installing VM and vCPU stats file descriptors to ensure the underlying VM and vCPU objects are not freed until the last reference to any and all stats fds are dropped. Note, the stats paths manually invoke fd_install() and so don't need to grab a reference before creating the file. Fixes: ce55c049459c ("KVM: stats: Support binary stats retrieval for a VCPU") Fixes: fcfe1baeddbf ("KVM: stats: Support binary stats retrieval for a VM") Reported-by: Zheng Zhang Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAC_GQSr3xzZaeZt85k_RCBd5kfiOve8qXo7a81Cq53LuVQ5r=Q@mail.gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Reviewed-by: Kees Cook Message-Id: <20230711230131.648752-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KVM: Avoid illegal stage2 mapping on invalid memory slot

2023-06-28T09:12:23Z

commit 2230f9e1171a2e9731422a14d1bbc313c0b719d1 upstream. We run into guest hang in edk2 firmware when KSM is kept as running on the host. The edk2 firmware is waiting for status 0x80 from QEMU's pflash device (TYPE_PFLASH_CFI01) during the operation of sector erasing or buffered write. The status is returned by reading the memory region of the pflash device and the read request should have been forwarded to QEMU and emulated by it. Unfortunately, the read request is covered by an illegal stage2 mapping when the guest hang issue occurs. The read request is completed with QEMU bypassed and wrong status is fetched. The edk2 firmware runs into an infinite loop with the wrong status. The illegal stage2 mapping is populated due to same page sharing by KSM at (C) even the associated memory slot has been marked as invalid at (B) when the memory slot is requested to be deleted. It's notable that the active and inactive memory slots can't be swapped when we're in the middle of kvm_mmu_notifier_change_pte() because kvm->mn_active_invalidate_count is elevated, and kvm_swap_active_memslots() will busy loop until it reaches to zero again. Besides, the swapping from the active to the inactive memory slots is also avoided by holding &kvm->srcu in __kvm_handle_hva_range(), corresponding to synchronize_srcu_expedited() in kvm_swap_active_memslots(). CPU-A CPU-B ----- ----- ioctl(kvm_fd, KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION) kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region kvm_set_memory_region __kvm_set_memory_region kvm_set_memslot(kvm, old, NULL, KVM_MR_DELETE) kvm_invalidate_memslot kvm_copy_memslot kvm_replace_memslot kvm_swap_active_memslots (A) kvm_arch_flush_shadow_memslot (B) same page sharing by KSM kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start : kvm_mmu_notifier_change_pte kvm_handle_hva_range __kvm_handle_hva_range kvm_set_spte_gfn (C) : kvm_mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_end Fix the issue by skipping the invalid memory slot at (C) to avoid the illegal stage2 mapping so that the read request for the pflash's status is forwarded to QEMU and emulated by it. In this way, the correct pflash's status can be returned from QEMU to break the infinite loop in the edk2 firmware. We tried a git-bisect and the first problematic commit is cd4c71835228 (" KVM: arm64: Convert to the gfn-based MMU notifier callbacks"). With this, clean_dcache_guest_page() is called after the memory slots are iterated in kvm_mmu_notifier_change_pte(). clean_dcache_guest_page() is called before the iteration on the memory slots before this commit. This change literally enlarges the racy window between kvm_mmu_notifier_change_pte() and memory slot removal so that we're able to reproduce the issue in a practical test case. However, the issue exists since commit d5d8184d35c9 ("KVM: ARM: Memory virtualization setup"). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+ Fixes: d5d8184d35c9 ("KVM: ARM: Memory virtualization setup") Reported-by: Shuai Hu Reported-by: Zhenyu Zhang Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton Reviewed-by: Peter Xu Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson Reviewed-by: Shaoqin Huang Message-Id: <20230615054259.14911-1-gshan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KVM: Fix vcpu_array[0] races

2023-05-24T16:32:50Z

commit afb2acb2e3a32e4d56f7fbd819769b98ed1b7520 upstream. In kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu(), add vcpu to vcpu_array iff it's safe to access vcpu via kvm_get_vcpu() and kvm_for_each_vcpu(), i.e. when there's no failure path requiring vcpu removal and destruction. Such order is important because vcpu_array accessors may end up referencing vcpu at vcpu_array[0] even before online_vcpus is set to 1. When online_vcpus=0, any call to kvm_get_vcpu() goes through array_index_nospec() and ends with an attempt to xa_load(vcpu_array, 0): int num_vcpus = atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus); i = array_index_nospec(i, num_vcpus); return xa_load(&kvm->vcpu_array, i); Similarly, when online_vcpus=0, a kvm_for_each_vcpu() does not iterate over an "empty" range, but actually [0, ULONG_MAX]: xa_for_each_range(&kvm->vcpu_array, idx, vcpup, 0, \ (atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus) - 1)) In both cases, such online_vcpus=0 edge case, even if leading to unnecessary calls to XArray API, should not be an issue; requesting unpopulated indexes/ranges is handled by xa_load() and xa_for_each_range(). However, this means that when the first vCPU is created and inserted in vcpu_array *and* before online_vcpus is incremented, code calling kvm_get_vcpu()/kvm_for_each_vcpu() already has access to that first vCPU. This should not pose a problem assuming that once a vcpu is stored in vcpu_array, it will remain there, but that's not the case: kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() first inserts to vcpu_array, then requests a file descriptor. If create_vcpu_fd() fails, newly inserted vcpu is removed from the vcpu_array, then destroyed: vcpu->vcpu_idx = atomic_read(&kvm->online_vcpus); r = xa_insert(&kvm->vcpu_array, vcpu->vcpu_idx, vcpu, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); kvm_get_kvm(kvm); r = create_vcpu_fd(vcpu); if (r < 0) { xa_erase(&kvm->vcpu_array, vcpu->vcpu_idx); kvm_put_kvm_no_destroy(kvm); goto unlock_vcpu_destroy; } atomic_inc(&kvm->online_vcpus); This results in a possible race condition when a reference to a vcpu is acquired (via kvm_get_vcpu() or kvm_for_each_vcpu()) moments before said vcpu is destroyed. Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj Message-Id: <20230510140410.1093987-2-mhal@rbox.co> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c5b077549136 ("KVM: Convert the kvm->vcpus array to a xarray", 2021-12-08) Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KVM: Register /dev/kvm as the _very_ last thing during initialization

2023-03-10T08:34:11Z

commit 2b01281273738bf2d6551da48d65db2df3f28998 upstream. Register /dev/kvm, i.e. expose KVM to userspace, only after all other setup has completed. Once /dev/kvm is exposed, userspace can start invoking KVM ioctls, creating VMs, etc... If userspace creates a VM before KVM is done with its configuration, bad things may happen, e.g. KVM will fail to properly migrate vCPU state if a VM is created before KVM has registered preemption notifiers. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Message-Id: <20221130230934.1014142-2-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

KVM: Destroy target device if coalesced MMIO unregistration fails

2023-03-10T08:34:11Z

commit b1cb1fac22abf102ffeb29dd3eeca208a3869d54 upstream. Destroy and free the target coalesced MMIO device if unregistering said device fails. As clearly noted in the code, kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev() does not destroy the target device. BUG: memory leak unreferenced object 0xffff888112a54880 (size 64): comm "syz-executor.2", pid 5258, jiffies 4297861402 (age 14.129s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 38 c7 67 15 00 c9 ff ff 38 c7 67 15 00 c9 ff ff 8.g.....8.g..... e0 c7 e1 83 ff ff ff ff 00 30 67 15 00 c9 ff ff .........0g..... backtrace: [<0000000006995a8a>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:556 [inline] [<0000000006995a8a>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:690 [inline] [<0000000006995a8a>] kvm_vm_ioctl_register_coalesced_mmio+0x8e/0x3d0 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/coalesced_mmio.c:150 [<00000000022550c2>] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x47d/0x1600 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3323 [<000000008a75102f>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline] [<000000008a75102f>] file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline] [<000000008a75102f>] do_vfs_ioctl+0xbab/0x1160 fs/ioctl.c:696 [<0000000080e3f669>] ksys_ioctl+0x76/0xa0 fs/ioctl.c:713 [<0000000059ef4888>] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline] [<0000000059ef4888>] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline] [<0000000059ef4888>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x6f/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718 [<000000006444fa05>] do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x4e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 [<000000009a4ed50b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe BUG: leak checking failed Fixes: 5d3c4c79384a ("KVM: Stop looking for coalesced MMIO zones if the bus is destroyed") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: 柳菁峰 Reported-by: Michal Luczaj Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221219171924.67989-1-seanjc@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230118220003.1239032-1-mhal@rbox.co Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman

kvm/vfio: Fix potential deadlock on vfio group_lock

2023-02-01T07:34:36Z

[ Upstream commit 51cdc8bc120ef6e42f6fb758341f5d91bc955952 ] Currently it is possible that the final put of a KVM reference comes from vfio during its device close operation. This occurs while the vfio group lock is held; however, if the vfio device is still in the kvm device list, then the following call chain could result in a deadlock: VFIO holds group->group_lock/group_rwsem -> kvm_put_kvm -> kvm_destroy_vm -> kvm_destroy_devices -> kvm_vfio_destroy -> kvm_vfio_file_set_kvm -> vfio_file_set_kvm -> try to hold group->group_lock/group_rwsem The key function is the kvm_destroy_devices() which triggers destroy cb of kvm_device_ops. It calls back to vfio and try to hold group_lock. So if this path doesn't call back to vfio, this dead lock would be fixed. Actually, there is a way for it. KVM provides another point to free the kvm-vfio device which is the point when the device file descriptor is closed. This can be achieved by providing the release cb instead of the destroy cb. Also rename kvm_vfio_destroy() to be kvm_vfio_release(). /* * Destroy is responsible for freeing dev. * * Destroy may be called before or after destructors are called * on emulated I/O regions, depending on whether a reference is * held by a vcpu or other kvm component that gets destroyed * after the emulated I/O. */ void (*destroy)(struct kvm_device *dev); /* * Release is an alternative method to free the device. It is * called when the device file descriptor is closed. Once * release is called, the destroy method will not be called * anymore as the device is removed from the device list of * the VM. kvm->lock is held. */ void (*release)(struct kvm_device *dev); Fixes: 421cfe6596f6 ("vfio: remove VFIO_GROUP_NOTIFY_SET_KVM") Reported-by: Alex Williamson Suggested-by: Kevin Tian Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Yi Liu Reviewed-by: Matthew Rosato Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230114000351.115444-1-mjrosato@linux.ibm.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230120150528.471752-1-yi.l.liu@intel.com [aw: update comment as well, s/destroy/release/] Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin

Merge branch 'kvm-dwmw2-fixes' into HEAD

2022-11-23T23:59:45Z

This brings in a few important fixes for Xen emulation. While nobody should be enabling it, the bug effectively allows userspace to read arbitrary memory. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini

KVM: Update gfn_to_pfn_cache khva when it moves within the same page

2022-11-23T23:58:46Z

In the case where a GPC is refreshed to a different location within the same page, we didn't bother to update it. Mostly we don't need to, but since the ->khva field also includes the offset within the page, that does have to be updated. Fixes: 3ba2c95ea180 ("KVM: Do not incorporate page offset into gfn=>pfn cache user address") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini