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commit 95364f36701e62dd50eee91e1303187fd1a9f567 upstream.
In case a driver wants to return an error from qc_prep, return enum
ata_completion_errors. sata_mv is one of those drivers -- see the next
patch. Other drivers return the newly defined AC_ERR_OK.
[v2] use enum ata_completion_errors and AC_ERR_OK.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: linux-ide@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 25937580a5065d6fbd92d9c8ebd47145ad80052e upstream.
Since we will return enum ata_completion_errors from qc_prep in the next
patch, let's define AC_ERR_OK to mark the OK status.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: linux-ide@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 82d083ab60c3693201c6f5c7a5f23a6ed422098d upstream.
Since kprobe_event= cmdline option allows user to put kprobes on the
functions in initmem, kprobe has to make such probes gone after boot.
Currently the probes on the init functions in modules will be handled
by module callback, but the kernel init text isn't handled.
Without this, kprobes may access non-exist text area to disable or
remove it.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/159972810544.428528.1839307531600646955.stgit@devnote2
Fixes: 970988e19eb0 ("tracing/kprobe: Add kprobe_event= boot parameter")
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2d2fe8433796603091ac8ea235b9165ac5a85f9a ]
In CMT and NPAR the PF is unknown when the GFS block processes the
packet. Therefore cannot use searcher as it has a per PF database,
and thus ARFS must be disabled.
Fixes: d51e4af5c209 ("qed: aRFS infrastructure support")
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Igor Russkikh <irusskikh@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Kalderon <michal.kalderon@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Bogdanov <dbogdanov@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ea740bd5f58e2912e74f401fd01a9d6aa985ca05 ]
Way back when I was writing the RPC/RDMA server-side backchannel
code, I misread the TCP backchannel reply handler logic. When
svc_tcp_recvfrom() successfully receives a backchannel reply, it
does not return -EAGAIN. It sets XPT_DATA and returns zero.
Update svc_rdma_recvfrom() to return zero. Here, XPT_DATA doesn't
need to be set again: it is set whenever a new message is received,
behind a spin lock in a single threaded context.
Also, if handling the cb reply is not successful, the message is
simply dropped. There's no special message framing to deal with as
there is in the TCP case.
Now that the handle_bc_reply() return value is ignored, I've removed
the dprintk call sites in the error exit of handle_bc_reply() in
favor of trace points in other areas that already report the error
cases.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 08ca8b21f760c0ed5034a5c122092eec22ccf8f4 ]
When a subrequest is being detached from the subgroup, we want to
ensure that it is not holding the group lock, or in the process
of waiting for the group lock.
Fixes: 5b2b5187fa85 ("NFS: Fix nfs_page_group_destroy() and nfs_lock_and_join_requests() race cases")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 72e0ef0e5f067fd991f702f0b2635d911d0cf208 ]
On some EFI systems, the video BIOS is provided by the EFI firmware. The
boot stub code stores the physical address of the ROM image in pdev->rom.
Currently we attempt to access this pointer using phys_to_virt(), which
doesn't work with CONFIG_HIGHMEM.
On these systems, attempting to load the radeon module on a x86_32 kernel
can result in the following:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 3e8ed03c
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 317 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.6.0-rc3-next-20200228 #2
Hardware name: Apple Computer, Inc. MacPro1,1/Mac-F4208DC8, BIOS MP11.88Z.005C.B08.0707021221 07/02/07
EIP: radeon_get_bios+0x5ed/0xe50 [radeon]
Code: 00 00 84 c0 0f 85 12 fd ff ff c7 87 64 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 8b 47 08 8b 55 b0 e8 1e 83 e1 d6 85 c0 74 1a 8b 55 c0 85 d2 74 13 <80> 38 55 75 0e 80 78 01 aa 0f 84 a4 03 00 00 8d 74 26 00 68 dc 06
EAX: 3e8ed03c EBX: 00000000 ECX: 3e8ed03c EDX: 00010000
ESI: 00040000 EDI: eec04000 EBP: eef3fc60 ESP: eef3fbe0
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010206
CR0: 80050033 CR2: 3e8ed03c CR3: 2ec77000 CR4: 000006d0
Call Trace:
r520_init+0x26/0x240 [radeon]
radeon_device_init+0x533/0xa50 [radeon]
radeon_driver_load_kms+0x80/0x220 [radeon]
drm_dev_register+0xa7/0x180 [drm]
radeon_pci_probe+0x10f/0x1a0 [radeon]
pci_device_probe+0xd4/0x140
Fix the issue by updating all drivers which can access a platform provided
ROM. Instead of calling the helper function pci_platform_rom() which uses
phys_to_virt(), call ioremap() directly on the pdev->rom.
radeon_read_platform_bios() previously directly accessed an __iomem
pointer. Avoid this by calling memcpy_fromio() instead of kmemdup().
pci_platform_rom() now has no remaining callers, so remove it.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200319021623.5426-1-mikel@mikelr.com
Signed-off-by: Mikel Rychliski <mikel@mikelr.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit eea9673250db4e854e9998ef9da6d4584857f0ea ]
The cred_guard_mutex is problematic as it is held over possibly
indefinite waits for userspace. The possible indefinite waits for
userspace that I have identified are: The cred_guard_mutex is held in
PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT waiting for the tracer. The cred_guard_mutex is
held over "put_user(0, tsk->clear_child_tid)" in exit_mm(). The
cred_guard_mutex is held over "get_user(futex_offset, ...") in
exit_robust_list. The cred_guard_mutex held over copy_strings.
The functions get_user and put_user can trigger a page fault which can
potentially wait indefinitely in the case of userfaultfd or if
userspace implements part of the page fault path.
In any of those cases the userspace process that the kernel is waiting
for might make a different system call that winds up taking the
cred_guard_mutex and result in deadlock.
Holding a mutex over any of those possibly indefinite waits for
userspace does not appear necessary. Add exec_update_mutex that will
just cover updating the process during exec where the permissions and
the objects pointed to by the task struct may be out of sync.
The plan is to switch the users of cred_guard_mutex to
exec_update_mutex one by one. This lets us move forward while still
being careful and not introducing any regressions.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20160921152946.GA24210@dhcp22.suse.cz/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/AM6PR03MB5170B06F3A2B75EFB98D071AE4E60@AM6PR03MB5170.eurprd03.prod.outlook.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20161102181806.GB1112@redhat.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20160923095031.GA14923@redhat.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170213141452.GA30203@redhat.com/
Ref: 45c1a159b85b ("Add PTRACE_O_TRACEVFORKDONE and PTRACE_O_TRACEEXIT facilities.")
Ref: 456f17cd1a28 ("[PATCH] user-vm-unlock-2.5.31-A2")
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 86b18aaa2b5b5bb48e609cd591b3d2d0fdbe0442 ]
sk_buff.qlen can be accessed concurrently as noticed by KCSAN,
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __skb_try_recv_from_queue / unix_dgram_sendmsg
read to 0xffff8a1b1d8a81c0 of 4 bytes by task 5371 on cpu 96:
unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x9a9/0xb70 include/linux/skbuff.h:1821
net/unix/af_unix.c:1761
____sys_sendmsg+0x33e/0x370
___sys_sendmsg+0xa6/0xf0
__sys_sendmsg+0x69/0xf0
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
write to 0xffff8a1b1d8a81c0 of 4 bytes by task 1 on cpu 99:
__skb_try_recv_from_queue+0x327/0x410 include/linux/skbuff.h:2029
__skb_try_recv_datagram+0xbe/0x220
unix_dgram_recvmsg+0xee/0x850
____sys_recvmsg+0x1fb/0x210
___sys_recvmsg+0xa2/0xf0
__sys_recvmsg+0x66/0xf0
__x64_sys_recvmsg+0x51/0x70
do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Since only the read is operating as lockless, it could introduce a logic
bug in unix_recvq_full() due to the load tearing. Fix it by adding
a lockless variant of skb_queue_len() and unix_recvq_full() where
READ_ONCE() is on the read while WRITE_ONCE() is on the write similar to
the commit d7d16a89350a ("net: add skb_queue_empty_lockless()").
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bf07132f96d426bcbf2098227fb680915cf44498 ]
This patch proposes to require marked atomic accesses surrounding
raw_write_seqcount_barrier. We reason that otherwise there is no way to
guarantee propagation nor atomicity of writes before/after the barrier
[1]. For example, consider the compiler tears stores either before or
after the barrier; in this case, readers may observe a partial value,
and because readers are unaware that writes are going on (writes are not
in a seq-writer critical section), will complete the seq-reader critical
section while having observed some partial state.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/793253/
This came up when designing and implementing KCSAN, because KCSAN would
flag these accesses as data-races. After careful analysis, our reasoning
as above led us to conclude that the best thing to do is to propose an
amendment to the raw_seqcount_barrier usage.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4250b047039d324e0ff65267c8beb5bad5052a86 ]
If DEBUG_FS=n, compile fails with the following error:
kernel/trace/trace.c: In function 'tracing_init_dentry':
kernel/trace/trace.c:8658:9: error: passing argument 3 of 'debugfs_create_automount' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
8658 | trace_automount, NULL);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| |
| struct vfsmount * (*)(struct dentry *, void *)
In file included from kernel/trace/trace.c:24:
./include/linux/debugfs.h:206:25: note: expected 'struct vfsmount * (*)(void *)' but argument is of type 'struct vfsmount * (*)(struct dentry *, void *)'
206 | struct vfsmount *(*f)(void *),
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~
Signed-off-by: Kusanagi Kouichi <slash@ac.auone-net.jp>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191121102021787.MLMY.25002.ppp.dion.ne.jp@dmta0003.auone-net.jp
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f3d7c2292d104519195fdb11192daec13229c219 ]
With large eMMC cards, it is possible to create general purpose
partitions that are bigger than 4GB. The size member of the mmc_part
struct is only an unsigned int which overflows for gp partitions larger
than 4GB. Change this to a u64 to handle the overflow.
Signed-off-by: Bradley Bolen <bradleybolen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4a009cb04aeca0de60b73f37b102573354214b52 ]
skb_put_padto() and __skb_put_padto() callers
must check return values or risk use-after-free.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 88b67edd7247466bc47f01e1dc539b0d0d4b931e upstream.
dax_supported() is defined whenever CONFIG_DAX is enabled. So dummy
implementation should be defined only in !CONFIG_DAX case, not in
!CONFIG_FS_DAX case.
Fixes: e2ec51282545 ("dm: Call proper helper to determine dax support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e2ec5128254518cae320d5dc631b71b94160f663 upstream.
DM was calling generic_fsdax_supported() to determine whether a device
referenced in the DM table supports DAX. However this is a helper for "leaf" device drivers so that
they don't have to duplicate common generic checks. High level code
should call dax_supported() helper which that calls into appropriate
helper for the particular device. This problem manifested itself as
kernel messages:
dm-3: error: dax access failed (-95)
when lvm2-testsuite run in cases where a DM device was stacked on top of
another DM device.
Fixes: 7bf7eac8d648 ("dax: Arrange for dax_supported check to span multiple devices")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Tested-by: Adrian Huang <ahuang12@lenovo.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/160061715195.13131.5503173247632041975.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0a355aeb24081e4538d4d424cd189f16c0bbd983 ]
If something goes wrong (such as the SCL being stuck low) then we need
to reset the PCA chip. The issue with this is that on reset we lose all
config settings and the chip ends up in a disabled state which results
in a lock up/high CPU usage. We need to re-apply any configuration that
had previously been set and re-enable the chip.
Signed-off-by: Evan Nimmo <evan.nimmo@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Reviewed-by: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit cc5453a5b7e90c39f713091a7ebc53c1f87d1700 ]
If an sctp connection gets re-used, heartbeats are flagged as invalid
because their vtag doesn't match.
Handle this in a similar way as TCP conntrack when it suspects that the
endpoints and conntrack are out-of-sync.
When a HEARTBEAT request fails its vtag validation, flag this in the
conntrack state and accept the packet.
When a HEARTBEAT_ACK is received with an invalid vtag in the reverse
direction after we allowed such a HEARTBEAT through, assume we are
out-of-sync and re-set the vtag info.
v2: remove left-over snippet from an older incarnation that moved
new_state/old_state assignments, thats not needed so keep that
as-is.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 3b5455636fe26ea21b4189d135a424a6da016418 upstream.
All three generations of Sandisk SSDs lock up hard intermittently.
Experiments showed that disabling NCQ lowered the failure rate significantly
and the kernel has been disabling NCQ for some models of SD7's and 8's,
which is obviously undesirable.
Karthik worked with Sandisk to root cause the hard lockups to trim commands
larger than 128M. This patch implements ATA_HORKAGE_MAX_TRIM_128M which
limits max trim size to 128M and applies it to all three generations of
Sandisk SSDs.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Karthik Shivaram <karthikgs@fb.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7e24969022cbd61ddc586f14824fc205661bb124 upstream.
Block layer usually doesn't support or allow zero-length bvec. Since
commit 1bdc76aea115 ("iov_iter: use bvec iterator to implement
iterate_bvec()"), iterate_bvec() switches to bvec iterator. However,
Al mentioned that 'Zero-length segments are not disallowed' in iov_iter.
Fixes for_each_bvec() so that it can move on after seeing one zero
length bvec.
Fixes: 1bdc76aea115 ("iov_iter: use bvec iterator to implement iterate_bvec()")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+61acc40a49a3e46e25ea@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org/msg2262077.html
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 428fc0aff4e59399ec719ffcc1f7a5d29a4ee476 ]
Otherwise gcc generates warnings if the expression is complicated.
Fixes: 312a0c170945 ("[PATCH] LOG2: Alter roundup_pow_of_two() so that it can use a ilog2() on a constant")
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0-v1-8a2697e3c003+41165-log_brackets_jgg@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ee921183557af39c1a0475f982d43b0fcac25e2e ]
Frontend callback reports EAGAIN to nfnetlink to retry a command, this
is used to signal that module autoloading is required. Unfortunately,
nlmsg_unicast() reports EAGAIN in case the receiver socket buffer gets
full, so it enters a busy-loop.
This patch updates nfnetlink_unicast() to turn EAGAIN into ENOBUFS and
to use nlmsg_unicast(). Remove the flags field in nfnetlink_unicast()
since this is always MSG_DONTWAIT in the existing code which is exactly
what nlmsg_unicast() passes to netlink_unicast() as parameter.
Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Reported-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 35556bed836f8dc07ac55f69c8d17dce3e7f0e25 upstream.
When calling into hid_map_usage(), the passed event code is
blindly stored as is, even if it doesn't fit in the associated bitmap.
This event code can come from a variety of sources, including devices
masquerading as input devices, only a bit more "programmable".
Instead of taking the event code at face value, check that it actually
fits the corresponding bitmap, and if it doesn't:
- spit out a warning so that we know which device is acting up
- NULLify the bitmap pointer so that we catch unexpected uses
Code paths that can make use of untrusted inputs can now check
that the mapping was indeed correct and bail out if not.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d88ca7e1a27eb2df056bbf37ddef62e1c73d37ea ]
syzbot is reporting OOB read bug in vc_do_resize() [1] caused by memcpy()
based on outdated old_{rows,row_size} values, for resize_screen() can
recurse into vc_do_resize() which changes vc->vc_{cols,rows} that outdates
old_{rows,row_size} values which were saved before calling resize_screen().
Daniel Vetter explained that resize_screen() should not recurse into
fbcon_update_vcs() path due to FBINFO_MISC_USEREVENT being still set
when calling resize_screen().
Instead of masking FBINFO_MISC_USEREVENT before calling fbcon_update_vcs(),
we can remove FBINFO_MISC_USEREVENT by calling fbcon_update_vcs() only if
fb_set_var() returned 0. This change assumes that it is harmless to call
fbcon_update_vcs() when fb_set_var() returned 0 without reaching
fb_notifier_call_chain().
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=c70c88cfd16dcf6e1d3c7f0ab8648b3144b5b25e
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+c37a14770d51a085a520@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Suggested-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> for missing #include
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/075b7e37-3278-cd7d-31ab-c5073cfa8e92@i-love.sakura.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 5afced3bf28100d81fb2fe7e98918632a08feaf5 upstream.
Inode's i_io_list list head is used to attach inode to several different
lists - wb->{b_dirty, b_dirty_time, b_io, b_more_io}. When flush worker
prepares a list of inodes to writeback e.g. for sync(2), it moves inodes
to b_io list. Thus it is critical for sync(2) data integrity guarantees
that inode is not requeued to any other writeback list when inode is
queued for processing by flush worker. That's the reason why
writeback_single_inode() does not touch i_io_list (unless the inode is
completely clean) and why __mark_inode_dirty() does not touch i_io_list
if I_SYNC flag is set.
However there are two flaws in the current logic:
1) When inode has only I_DIRTY_TIME set but it is already queued in b_io
list due to sync(2), concurrent __mark_inode_dirty(inode, I_DIRTY_SYNC)
can still move inode back to b_dirty list resulting in skipping
writeback of inode time stamps during sync(2).
2) When inode is on b_dirty_time list and writeback_single_inode() races
with __mark_inode_dirty() like:
writeback_single_inode() __mark_inode_dirty(inode, I_DIRTY_PAGES)
inode->i_state |= I_SYNC
__writeback_single_inode()
inode->i_state |= I_DIRTY_PAGES;
if (inode->i_state & I_SYNC)
bail
if (!(inode->i_state & I_DIRTY_ALL))
- not true so nothing done
We end up with I_DIRTY_PAGES inode on b_dirty_time list and thus
standard background writeback will not writeback this inode leading to
possible dirty throttling stalls etc. (thanks to Martijn Coenen for this
analysis).
Fix these problems by tracking whether inode is queued in b_io or
b_more_io lists in a new I_SYNC_QUEUED flag. When this flag is set, we
know flush worker has queued inode and we should not touch i_io_list.
On the other hand we also know that once flush worker is done with the
inode it will requeue the inode to appropriate dirty list. When
I_SYNC_QUEUED is not set, __mark_inode_dirty() can (and must) move inode
to appropriate dirty list.
Reported-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Tested-by: Martijn Coenen <maco@android.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Fixes: 0ae45f63d4ef ("vfs: add support for a lazytime mount option")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2404b73c3f1a5f15726c6ecd226b56f6f992767f ]
nf_ct_frag6_gather is part of nf_defrag_ipv6.ko, not ipv6 core.
The current use of the netfilter ipv6 stub indirections causes a module
dependency between ipv6 and nf_defrag_ipv6.
This prevents nf_defrag_ipv6 module from being removed because ipv6 can't
be unloaded.
Remove the indirection and always use a direct call. This creates a
depency from nf_conntrack_bridge to nf_defrag_ipv6 instead:
modinfo nf_conntrack
depends: nf_conntrack,nf_defrag_ipv6,bridge
.. and nf_conntrack already depends on nf_defrag_ipv6 anyway.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2c547f9da0539ad1f7ef7f08c8c82036d61b011a ]
When CONFIG_EFI is not enabled, we might get an undefined reference to
efi_enter_virtual_mode() error, if this efi_enabled() call isn't inlined
into start_kernel(). This happens in particular, if start_kernel() is
annodated with __no_sanitize_address.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Elena Petrova <lenaptr@google.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/6514652d3a32d3ed33d6eb5c91d0af63bf0d1a0c.1596544734.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5f77d6ca5ca74e4b4a5e2e010f7ff50c45dea326 ]
Set proper masks to avoid invalid input spillover to reserved bits.
Signed-off-by: Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200724014925.15523-2-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit f0c7baca180046824e07fc5f1326e83a8fd150c7 upstream.
John reported that on a RK3288 system the perf per CPU interrupts are all
affine to CPU0 and provided the analysis:
"It looks like what happens is that because the interrupts are not per-CPU
in the hardware, armpmu_request_irq() calls irq_force_affinity() while
the interrupt is deactivated and then request_irq() with IRQF_PERCPU |
IRQF_NOBALANCING.
Now when irq_startup() runs with IRQ_STARTUP_NORMAL, it calls
irq_setup_affinity() which returns early because IRQF_PERCPU and
IRQF_NOBALANCING are set, leaving the interrupt on its original CPU."
This was broken by the recent commit which blocked interrupt affinity
setting in hardware before activation of the interrupt. While this works in
general, it does not work for this particular case. As contrary to the
initial analysis not all interrupt chip drivers implement an activate
callback, the safe cure is to make the deferred interrupt affinity setting
at activation time opt-in.
Implement the necessary core logic and make the two irqchip implementations
for which this is required opt-in. In hindsight this would have been the
right thing to do, but ...
Fixes: baedb87d1b53 ("genirq/affinity: Handle affinity setting on inactive interrupts correctly")
Reported-by: John Keeping <john@metanate.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87blk4tzgm.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 444da3f52407d74c9aa12187ac6b01f76ee47d62 upstream.
When ur_load_imm_any() is inlined into jeq_imm(), it's possible for the
compiler to deduce a case where _val can only have the value of -1 at
compile time. Specifically,
/* struct bpf_insn: _s32 imm */
u64 imm = insn->imm; /* sign extend */
if (imm >> 32) { /* non-zero only if insn->imm is negative */
/* inlined from ur_load_imm_any */
u32 __imm = imm >> 32; /* therefore, always 0xffffffff */
if (__builtin_constant_p(__imm) && __imm > 255)
compiletime_assert_XXX()
This can result in tripping a BUILD_BUG_ON() in __BF_FIELD_CHECK() that
checks that a given value is representable in one byte (interpreted as
unsigned).
FIELD_FIT() should return true or false at runtime for whether a value
can fit for not. Don't break the build over a value that's too large for
the mask. We'd prefer to keep the inlining and compiler optimizations
though we know this case will always return false.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1697599ee301a ("bitfield.h: add FIELD_FIT() helper")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/CAK7LNASvb0UDJ0U5wkYYRzTAdnEs64HjXpEUL7d=V0CXiAXcNw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Debugged-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 6c4e79d99e6f42b79040f1a33cd4018f5425030b upstream.
The size of the buffers for storing context's and sessions can vary from
arch to arch as PAGE_SIZE can be anything between 4 kB and 256 kB (the
maximum for PPC64). Define a fixed buffer size set to 16 kB. This should be
enough for most use with three handles (that is how many we allow at the
moment). Parametrize the buffer size while doing this, so that it is easier
to revisit this later on if required.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 745b361e989a ("tpm: infrastructure for TPM spaces")
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7f3d176f5f7e3f0477bf82df0f600fcddcdcc4e4 ]
Require that the TCG_PCR_EVENT2.digests.count value strictly matches the
value of TCG_EfiSpecIdEvent.numberOfAlgorithms in the event field of the
TCG_PCClientPCREvent event log header. Also require that
TCG_EfiSpecIdEvent.numberOfAlgorithms is non-zero.
The TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification section 9.1
(Family "2.0", Level 00 Revision 1.04) states:
For each Hash algorithm enumerated in the TCG_PCClientPCREvent entry,
there SHALL be a corresponding digest in all TCG_PCR_EVENT2 structures.
Note: This includes EV_NO_ACTION events which do not extend the PCR.
Section 9.4.5.1 provides this description of
TCG_EfiSpecIdEvent.numberOfAlgorithms:
The number of Hash algorithms in the digestSizes field. This field MUST
be set to a value of 0x01 or greater.
Enforce these restrictions, as required by the above specification, in
order to better identify and ignore invalid sequences of bytes at the
end of an otherwise valid TPM2 event log. Firmware doesn't always have
the means necessary to inform the kernel of the actual event log size so
the kernel's event log parsing code should be stringent when parsing the
event log for resiliency against firmware bugs. This is true, for
example, when firmware passes the event log to the kernel via a reserved
memory region described in device tree.
POWER and some ARM systems use the "linux,sml-base" and "linux,sml-size"
device tree properties to describe the memory region used to pass the
event log from firmware to the kernel. Unfortunately, the
"linux,sml-size" property describes the size of the entire reserved
memory region rather than the size of the event long within the memory
region and the event log format does not include information describing
the size of the event log.
tpm_read_log_of(), in drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/of.c, is where the
"linux,sml-size" property is used. At the end of that function,
log->bios_event_log_end is pointing at the end of the reserved memory
region. That's typically 0x10000 bytes offset from "linux,sml-base",
depending on what's defined in the device tree source.
The firmware event log only fills a portion of those 0x10000 bytes and
the rest of the memory region should be zeroed out by firmware. Even in
the case of a properly zeroed bytes in the remainder of the memory
region, the only thing allowing the kernel's event log parser to detect
the end of the event log is the following conditional in
__calc_tpm2_event_size():
if (event_type == 0 && event_field->event_size == 0)
size = 0;
If that wasn't there, __calc_tpm2_event_size() would think that a 16
byte sequence of zeroes, following an otherwise valid event log, was
a valid event.
However, problems can occur if a single bit is set in the offset
corresponding to either the TCG_PCR_EVENT2.eventType or
TCG_PCR_EVENT2.eventSize fields, after the last valid event log entry.
This could confuse the parser into thinking that an additional entry is
present in the event log and exposing this invalid entry to userspace in
the /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements file. Such
problems have been seen if firmware does not fully zero the memory
region upon a warm reboot.
This patch significantly raises the bar on how difficult it is for
stale/invalid memory to confuse the kernel's event log parser but
there's still, ultimately, a reliance on firmware to properly initialize
the remainder of the memory region reserved for the event log as the
parser cannot be expected to detect a stale but otherwise properly
formatted firmware event log entry.
Fixes: fd5c78694f3f ("tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit f3751ad0116fb6881f2c3c957d66a9327f69cefb upstream.
__tracepoint_string's have their string data stored in .rodata, and an
address to that data stored in the "__tracepoint_str" section. Functions
that refer to those strings refer to the symbol of the address. Compiler
optimization can replace those address references with references
directly to the string data. If the address doesn't appear to have other
uses, then it appears dead to the compiler and is removed. This can
break the /tracing/printk_formats sysfs node which iterates the
addresses stored in the "__tracepoint_str" section.
Like other strings stored in custom sections in this header, mark these
__used to inform the compiler that there are other non-obvious users of
the address, so they should still be emitted.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200730224555.2142154-2-ndesaulniers@google.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 102c9323c35a8 ("tracing: Add __tracepoint_string() to export string pointers")
Reported-by: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Reported-by: Simon MacMullen <simonmacm@google.com>
Suggested-by: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 412055398b9e67e07347a936fc4a6adddabe9cf4 upstream.
svcrdma expects that the payload falls precisely into the xdr_buf
page vector. This does not seem to be the case for
nfsd4_encode_readv().
This code is called only when fops->splice_read is missing or when
RQ_SPLICE_OK is clear, so it's not a noticeable problem in many
common cases.
Add new transport method: ->xpo_read_payload so that when a READ
payload does not fit exactly in rq_res's page vector, the XDR
encoder can inform the RPC transport exactly where that payload is,
without the payload's XDR pad.
That way, when a Write chunk is present, the transport knows what
byte range in the Reply message is supposed to be matched with the
chunk.
Note that the Linux NFS server implementation of NFS/RDMA can
currently handle only one Write chunk per RPC-over-RDMA message.
This simplifies the implementation of this fix.
Fixes: b04209806384 ("nfsd4: allow exotic read compounds")
Buglink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198053
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Timo Rothenpieler <timo@rothenpieler.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 08b5d5014a27e717826999ad20e394a8811aae92 upstream.
set/removexattr on an exported filesystem should break NFS delegations.
This is true in general, but also for the upcoming support for
RFC 8726 (NFSv4 extended attribute support). Make sure that they do.
Additionally, they need to grow a _locked variant, since callers might
call this with i_rwsem held (like the NFS server code).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit ddc9d357b991838c2d975e8d7e4e9db26f37a7ff ]
When a Linux hv_sock app tries to connect to a Service GUID on which no
host app is listening, a recent host (RS3+) sends a
CHANNELMSG_TL_CONNECT_RESULT (23) message to Linux and this triggers such
a warning:
unknown msgtype=23
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c:1031 vmbus_on_msg_dpc
Actually Linux can safely ignore the message because the Linux app's
connect() will time out in 2 seconds: see VSOCK_DEFAULT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT
and vsock_stream_connect(). We don't bother to make use of the message
because: 1) it's only supported on recent hosts; 2) a non-trivial effort
is required to use the message in Linux, but the benefit is small.
So, let's not see the warning by silently ignoring the message.
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit bb0de3131f4c60a9bf976681e0fe4d1e55c7a821 upstream.
The sockmap code currently ignores the value of attach_bpf_fd when
detaching a program. This is contrary to the usual behaviour of
checking that attach_bpf_fd represents the currently attached
program.
Ensure that attach_bpf_fd is indeed the currently attached
program. It turns out that all sockmap selftests already do this,
which indicates that this is unlikely to cause breakage.
Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200629095630.7933-5-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c0842fbc1b18c7a044e6ff3e8fa78bfa822c7d1a upstream.
The addition of percpu.h to the list of includes in random.h revealed
some circular dependencies on arm64 and possibly other platforms. This
include was added solely for the pseudo-random definitions, which have
nothing to do with the rest of the definitions in this file but are
still there for legacy reasons.
This patch moves the pseudo-random parts to linux/prandom.h and the
percpu.h include with it, which is now guarded by _LINUX_PRANDOM_H and
protected against recursive inclusion.
A further cleanup step would be to remove this from <linux/random.h>
entirely, and make people who use the prandom infrastructure include
just the new header file. That's a bit of a churn patch, but grepping
for "prandom_" and "next_pseudo_random32" "struct rnd_state" should
catch most users.
But it turns out that that nice cleanup step is fairly painful, because
a _lot_ of code currently seems to depend on the implicit include of
<linux/random.h>, which can currently come in a lot of ways, including
such fairly core headfers as <linux/net.h>.
So the "nice cleanup" part may or may never happen.
Fixes: 1c9df907da83 ("random: fix circular include dependency on arm64 after addition of percpu.h")
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 83bdc7275e6206f560d247be856bceba3e1ed8f2 upstream.
It turns out that the plugin right now ends up being really unhappy
about the change from 'static' to 'extern' storage that happened in
commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt
and activity").
This is probably a trivial fix for the latent_entropy plugin, but for
now, just remove net_rand_state from the list of things the plugin
worries about.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1c9df907da83812e4f33b59d3d142c864d9da57f upstream.
Daniel Díaz and Kees Cook independently reported that commit
f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and
activity") broke arm64 due to a circular dependency on include files
since the addition of percpu.h in random.h.
The correct fix would definitely be to move all the prandom32 stuff out
of random.h but for backporting, a smaller solution is preferred.
This one replaces linux/percpu.h with asm/percpu.h, and this fixes the
problem on x86_64, arm64, arm, and mips. Note that moving percpu.h
around didn't change anything and that removing it entirely broke
differently. When backporting, such options might still be considered
if this patch fails to help.
[ It turns out that an alternate fix seems to be to just remove the
troublesome <asm/pointer_auth.h> remove from the arm64 <asm/smp.h>
that causes the circular dependency.
But we might as well do the whole belt-and-suspenders thing, and
minimize inclusion in <linux/random.h> too. Either will fix the
problem, and both are good changes. - Linus ]
Reported-by: Daniel Díaz <daniel.diaz@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f227e3ec3b5cad859ad15666874405e8c1bbc1d4 upstream.
This modifies the first 32 bits out of the 128 bits of a random CPU's
net_rand_state on interrupt or CPU activity to complicate remote
observations that could lead to guessing the network RNG's internal
state.
Note that depending on some network devices' interrupt rate moderation
or binding, this re-seeding might happen on every packet or even almost
never.
In addition, with NOHZ some CPUs might not even get timer interrupts,
leaving their local state rarely updated, while they are running
networked processes making use of the random state. For this reason, we
also perform this update in update_process_times() in order to at least
update the state when there is user or system activity, since it's the
only case we care about.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1748f6a2cbc4694523f16da1c892b59861045b9d ]
The rcu_dereference call in rht_ptr_rcu is completely bogus because
we've already dereferenced the value in __rht_ptr and operated on it.
This causes potential double readings which could be fatal. The RCU
dereference must occur prior to the comparison in __rht_ptr.
This patch changes the order of RCU dereference so that it is done
first and the result is then fed to __rht_ptr. The RCU marking
changes have been minimised using casts which will be removed in
a follow-up patch.
Fixes: ba6306e3f648 ("rhashtable: Remove RCU marking from...")
Reported-by: "Gong, Sishuai" <sishuai@purdue.edu>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7d0314b11cdd92bca8b89684c06953bf114605fc ]
When setting the PF interface up/down, notify the firmware to update
uplink state via MODIFY_VPORT_STATE, when E-Switch is enabled.
This behavior will prevent sending traffic out on uplink port when PF is
down, such as sending traffic from a VF interface which is still up.
Currently when calling mlx5e_open/close(), the driver only sends PAOS
command to notify the firmware to set the physical port state to
up/down, however, it is not sufficient. When VF is in "auto" state, it
follows the uplink state, which was not updated on mlx5e_open/close()
before this patch.
When switchdev mode is enabled and uplink representor is first enabled,
set the uplink port state value back to its FW default "AUTO".
Fixes: 63bfd399de55 ("net/mlx5e: Send PAOS command on interface up/down")
Signed-off-by: Ron Diskin <rondi@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 76be93fc0702322179bb0ea87295d820ee46ad14 ]
Previously TLP may send multiple probes of new data in one
flight. This happens when the sender is cwnd limited. After the
initial TLP containing new data is sent, the sender receives another
ACK that acks partial inflight. It may re-arm another TLP timer
to send more, if no further ACK returns before the next TLP timeout
(PTO) expires. The sender may send in theory a large amount of TLP
until send queue is depleted. This only happens if the sender sees
such irregular uncommon ACK pattern. But it is generally undesirable
behavior during congestion especially.
The original TLP design restrict only one TLP probe per inflight as
published in "Reducing Web Latency: the Virtue of Gentle Aggression",
SIGCOMM 2013. This patch changes TLP to send at most one probe
per inflight.
Note that if the sender is app-limited, TLP retransmits old data
and did not have this issue.
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5df96f2b9f58a5d2dc1f30fe7de75e197f2c25f2 upstream.
Commit adc0daad366b62ca1bce3e2958a40b0b71a8b8b3 ("dm: report suspended
device during destroy") broke integrity recalculation.
The problem is dm_suspended() returns true not only during suspend,
but also during resume. So this race condition could occur:
1. dm_integrity_resume calls queue_work(ic->recalc_wq, &ic->recalc_work)
2. integrity_recalc (&ic->recalc_work) preempts the current thread
3. integrity_recalc calls if (unlikely(dm_suspended(ic->ti))) goto unlock_ret;
4. integrity_recalc exits and no recalculating is done.
To fix this race condition, add a function dm_post_suspending that is
only true during the postsuspend phase and use it instead of
dm_suspended().
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka redhat com>
Fixes: adc0daad366b ("dm: report suspended device during destroy")
Cc: stable vger kernel org # v4.18+
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e0b3e0b1a04367fc15c07f44e78361545b55357c upstream.
The !ATOMIC_IOMAP version of io_maping_init_wc will always return
success, even when the ioremap fails.
Since the ATOMIC_IOMAP version returns NULL when the init fails, and
callers check for a NULL return on error this is unexpected.
During a device probe, where the ioremap failed, a crash can look like
this:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000210000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 177 Comm:
RIP: 0010:fill_page_dma [i915]
gen8_ppgtt_create [i915]
i915_ppgtt_create [i915]
intel_gt_init [i915]
i915_gem_init [i915]
i915_driver_probe [i915]
pci_device_probe
really_probe
driver_probe_device
The remap failure occurred much earlier in the probe. If it had been
propagated, the driver would have exited with an error.
Return NULL on ioremap failure.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: detect ioremap_wc() errors earlier]
Fixes: cafaf14a5d8f ("io-mapping: Always create a struct to hold metadata about the io-mapping")
Signed-off-by: Michael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200721171936.81563-1-michael.j.ruhl@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c463bb2a8f8d7d97aa414bf7714fc77e9d3b10df ]
This event code represents the state of a removable cover of a device.
Value 0 means that the cover is open or removed, value 1 means that the
cover is closed.
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Merlijn Wajer <merlijn@wizzup.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200612125402.18393-2-merlijn@wizzup.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6348dd291e3653534a9e28e6917569bc9967b35b ]
There exists a sleep-while-atomic bug while accessing the dmabuf->name
under mutex in the dmabuffs_dname(). This is caused from the SELinux
permissions checks on a process where it tries to validate the inherited
files from fork() by traversing them through iterate_fd() (which
traverse files under spin_lock) and call
match_file(security/selinux/hooks.c) where the permission checks happen.
This audit information is logged using dump_common_audit_data() where it
calls d_path() to get the file path name. If the file check happen on
the dmabuf's fd, then it ends up in ->dmabuffs_dname() and use mutex to
access dmabuf->name. The flow will be like below:
flush_unauthorized_files()
iterate_fd()
spin_lock() --> Start of the atomic section.
match_file()
file_has_perm()
avc_has_perm()
avc_audit()
slow_avc_audit()
common_lsm_audit()
dump_common_audit_data()
audit_log_d_path()
d_path()
dmabuffs_dname()
mutex_lock()--> Sleep while atomic.
Call trace captured (on 4.19 kernels) is below:
___might_sleep+0x204/0x208
__might_sleep+0x50/0x88
__mutex_lock_common+0x5c/0x1068
__mutex_lock_common+0x5c/0x1068
mutex_lock_nested+0x40/0x50
dmabuffs_dname+0xa0/0x170
d_path+0x84/0x290
audit_log_d_path+0x74/0x130
common_lsm_audit+0x334/0x6e8
slow_avc_audit+0xb8/0xf8
avc_has_perm+0x154/0x218
file_has_perm+0x70/0x180
match_file+0x60/0x78
iterate_fd+0x128/0x168
selinux_bprm_committing_creds+0x178/0x248
security_bprm_committing_creds+0x30/0x48
install_exec_creds+0x1c/0x68
load_elf_binary+0x3a4/0x14e0
search_binary_handler+0xb0/0x1e0
So, use spinlock to access dmabuf->name to avoid sleep-while-atomic.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.3+]
Signed-off-by: Charan Teja Kalla <charante@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael J. Ruhl <michael.j.ruhl@intel.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
[sumits: added comment to spinlock_t definition to avoid warning]
Signed-off-by: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/a83e7f0d-4e54-9848-4b58-e1acdbe06735@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit a50ca29523b18baea548bdf5df9b4b923c2bb4f6 upstream.
This adds more hardware IDs for Elan touchpads found in various Lenovo
laptops.
Signed-off-by: Dave Wang <dave.wang@emc.com.tw>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000201d5a8bd$9fead3f0$dfc07bd0$@emc.com.tw
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e8639e1c986a8a9d0f94549170f6db579376c3ae ]
The RTC modules on am3 and am4 need quirk handling to unlock and lock
them for reset so let's add the quirk handling based on what we already
have for legacy platform data. In later patches we will simply drop the
RTC related platform data and the old quirk handling.
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bfe373f608cf81b7626dfeb904001b0e867c5110 ]
Else there may be magic numbers in /sys/kernel/debug/block/*/state.
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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