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reporting
commit 44a3918c8245ab10c6c9719dd12e7a8d291980d8 upstream.
With unprivileged eBPF enabled, eIBRS (without retpoline) is vulnerable
to Spectre v2 BHB-based attacks.
When both are enabled, print a warning message and report it in the
'spectre_v2' sysfs vulnerabilities file.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[fllinden@amazon.com: backported to 5.15]
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1d02b444b8d1345ea4708db3bab4db89a7784b55 upstream.
__setup() handlers should generally return 1 to indicate that the
boot options have been handled.
Using invalid option values causes the entire kernel boot option
string to be reported as Unknown and added to init's environment
strings, polluting it.
Unknown kernel command line parameters "BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc6
kprobe_event=p,syscall_any,$arg1 trace_options=quiet
trace_clock=jiffies", will be passed to user space.
Run /sbin/init as init process
with arguments:
/sbin/init
with environment:
HOME=/
TERM=linux
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc6
kprobe_event=p,syscall_any,$arg1
trace_options=quiet
trace_clock=jiffies
Return 1 from the __setup() handlers so that init's environment is not
polluted with kernel boot options.
Link: lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220303031744.32356-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7bcfaf54f591 ("tracing: Add trace_options kernel command line parameter")
Fixes: e1e232ca6b8f ("tracing: Add trace_clock=<clock> kernel parameter")
Fixes: 970988e19eb0 ("tracing/kprobe: Add kprobe_event= boot parameter")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 1d1898f65616c4601208963c3376c1d828cbf2c7 upstream.
When trying to add a histogram against an event with the "cpu" field, it
was impossible due to "cpu" being a keyword to key off of the running CPU.
So to fix this, it was changed to "common_cpu" to match the other generic
fields (like "common_pid"). But since some scripts used "cpu" for keying
off of the CPU (for events that did not have "cpu" as a field, which is
most of them), a backward compatibility trick was added such that if "cpu"
was used as a key, and the event did not have "cpu" as a field name, then
it would fallback and switch over to "common_cpu".
This fix has a couple of subtle bugs. One was that when switching over to
"common_cpu", it did not change the field name, it just set a flag. But
the code still found a "cpu" field. The "cpu" field is used for filtering
and is returned when the event does not have a "cpu" field.
This was found by:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing
# echo hist:key=cpu,pid:sort=cpu > events/sched/sched_wakeup/trigger
# cat events/sched/sched_wakeup/hist
Which showed the histogram unsorted:
{ cpu: 19, pid: 1175 } hitcount: 1
{ cpu: 6, pid: 239 } hitcount: 2
{ cpu: 23, pid: 1186 } hitcount: 14
{ cpu: 12, pid: 249 } hitcount: 2
{ cpu: 3, pid: 994 } hitcount: 5
Instead of hard coding the "cpu" checks, take advantage of the fact that
trace_event_field_field() returns a special field for "cpu" and "CPU" if
the event does not have "cpu" as a field. This special field has the
"filter_type" of "FILTER_CPU". Check that to test if the returned field is
of the CPU type instead of doing the string compare.
Also, fix the sorting bug by testing for the hist_field flag of
HIST_FIELD_FL_CPU when setting up the sort routine. Otherwise it will use
the special CPU field to know what compare routine to use, and since that
special field does not have a size, it returns tracing_map_cmp_none.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1e3bac71c505 ("tracing/histogram: Rename "cpu" to "common_cpu"")
Reported-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b1e8206582f9d680cff7d04828708c8b6ab32957 upstream.
Where commit 4ef0c5c6b5ba ("kernel/sched: Fix sched_fork() access an
invalid sched_task_group") fixed a fork race vs cgroup, it opened up a
race vs syscalls by not placing the task on the runqueue before it
gets exposed through the pidhash.
Commit 13765de8148f ("sched/fair: Fix fault in reweight_entity") is
trying to fix a single instance of this, instead fix the whole class
of issues, effectively reverting this commit.
Fixes: 4ef0c5c6b5ba ("kernel/sched: Fix sched_fork() access an invalid sched_task_group")
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Zhang Qiao <zhangqiao22@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YgoeCbwj5mbCR0qA@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 30939293262eb433c960c4532a0d59c4073b2b84 upstream.
When tracing the whole disk, 'dropped' and 'msg' will be created
under 'q->debugfs_dir' and 'bt->dir' is NULL, thus blk_trace_free()
won't remove those files. What's worse, the following UAF can be
triggered because of accessing stale 'dropped' and 'msg':
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88816912f3d8 by task blktrace/1188
CPU: 27 PID: 1188 Comm: blktrace Not tainted 5.17.0-rc4-next-20220217+ #469
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190727_073836-4
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xab/0x381
? blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
? blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf
? blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
kasan_check_range+0x140/0x1b0
blk_dropped_read+0x89/0x100
? blk_create_buf_file_callback+0x20/0x20
? kmem_cache_free+0xa1/0x500
? do_sys_openat2+0x258/0x460
full_proxy_read+0x8f/0xc0
vfs_read+0xc6/0x260
ksys_read+0xb9/0x150
? vfs_write+0x3d0/0x3d0
? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x55/0x60
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x39/0x1e0
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fbc080d92fd
Code: ce 20 00 00 75 10 b8 00 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83 1
RSP: 002b:00007fbb95ff9cb0 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fbb95ff9dc0 RCX: 00007fbc080d92fd
RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 00007fbb95ff9cc0 RDI: 0000000000000045
RBP: 0000000000000045 R08: 0000000000406299 R09: 00000000fffffffd
R10: 000000000153afa0 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00007fbb780008c0
R13: 00007fbb78000938 R14: 0000000000608b30 R15: 00007fbb780029c8
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1050:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
__kasan_kmalloc+0x81/0xa0
do_blk_trace_setup+0xcb/0x410
__blk_trace_setup+0xac/0x130
blk_trace_ioctl+0xe9/0x1c0
blkdev_ioctl+0xf1/0x390
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xa5/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Freed by task 1050:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30
__kasan_slab_free+0x103/0x180
kfree+0x9a/0x4c0
__blk_trace_remove+0x53/0x70
blk_trace_ioctl+0x199/0x1c0
blkdev_common_ioctl+0x5e9/0xb30
blkdev_ioctl+0x1a5/0x390
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xa5/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88816912f380
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
The buggy address is located 88 bytes inside of
96-byte region [ffff88816912f380, ffff88816912f3e0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:000000009a1b4e7c refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0f
flags: 0x17ffffc0000200(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
raw: 0017ffffc0000200 ffffea00044f1100 dead000000000002 ffff88810004c780
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88816912f280: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff88816912f300: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
>ffff88816912f380: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88816912f400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
ffff88816912f480: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Fixes: c0ea57608b69 ("blktrace: remove debugfs file dentries from struct blk_trace")
Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220228034354.4047385-1-yukuai3@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0ac983f512033cb7b5e210c9589768ad25b1e36b upstream.
Long story short recursively enforcing RLIMIT_NPROC when it is not
enforced on the process that creates a new user namespace, causes
currently working code to fail. There is no reason to enforce
RLIMIT_NPROC recursively when we don't enforce it normally so update
the code to detect this case.
I would like to simply use capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) to detect when
RLIMIT_NPROC is not enforced upon the caller. Unfortunately because
RLIMIT_NPROC is charged and checked for enforcement based upon the
real uid, using capable() which is euid based is inconsistent with reality.
Come as close as possible to testing for capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) by
testing for when the real uid would match the conditions when
CAP_SYS_RESOURCE would be present if the real uid was the effective
uid.
Reported-by: Etienne Dechamps <etienne@edechamps.fr>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215596
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e9589141-cfeb-90cd-2d0e-83a62787239a@edechamps.fr
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87sfs8jmpz.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0e3135d3bfa5dfb658145238d2bc723a8e30c3a3 ]
It seems inc_misses_counter() suffers from same issue fixed in
the commit d979617aa84d ("bpf: Fixes possible race in update_prog_stats()
for 32bit arches"):
As it can run while interrupts are enabled, it could
be re-entered and the u64_stats syncp could be mangled.
Fixes: 9ed9e9ba2337 ("bpf: Count the number of times recursion was prevented")
Signed-off-by: He Fengqing <hefengqing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220122102936.1219518-1-hefengqing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 61a0abaee2092eee69e44fe60336aa2f5b578938 ]
Commit 316580b69d0a ("u64_stats: provide u64_stats_t type")
fixed possible load/store tearing on 64bit arches.
For instance the following C code
stats->nsecs += sched_clock() - start;
Could be rightfully implemented like this by a compiler,
confusing concurrent readers a lot:
stats->nsecs += sched_clock();
// arbitrary delay
stats->nsecs -= start;
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20211026214133.3114279-4-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1c1857d400355e96f0fe8b32adc6fa7594d03b52 ]
kstrndup() is a memory allocation-related function, it returns NULL when
some internal memory errors happen. It is better to check the return
value of it so to catch the memory error in time.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/tencent_4D6E270731456EB88712ED7F13883C334906@qq.com
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Fixes: a42e3c4de964 ("tracing/probe: Add immediate string parameter support")
Signed-off-by: Xiaoke Wang <xkernel.wang@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8c7224245557707c613f130431cafbaaa4889615 ]
kstrdup() returns NULL when some internal memory errors happen, it is
better to check the return value of it so to catch the memory error in
time.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/tencent_3C2E330722056D7891D2C83F29C802734B06@qq.com
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Fixes: 33ea4b24277b ("perf/core: Implement the 'perf_uprobe' PMU")
Signed-off-by: Xiaoke Wang <xkernel.wang@foxmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4f67cca70c0f615e9cfe6ac42244f3416ec60877 ]
synth_events is returning -EINVAL if the dyn_event create command does
not contain ' \t'. This prevents other systems from getting called back.
synth_events needs to return -ECANCELED in these cases when the command
is not targeting the synth_event system.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/20210930223821.11025-1-beaub@linux.microsoft.com
Fixes: c9e759b1e8456 ("tracing: Rework synthetic event command parsing")
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Beau Belgrave <beaub@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e7f7c99ba911f56bc338845c1cd72954ba591707 ]
Recently while investigating a problem with rr and signals I noticed
that siglock is dropped in ptrace_signal and get_signal does not jump
to relock.
Looking farther to see if the problem is anywhere else I see that
do_signal_stop also returns if signal_group_exit is true. I believe
that test can now never be true, but it is a bit hard to trace
through and be certain.
Testing signal_group_exit is not expensive, so move the test for
signal_group_exit into the for loop inside of get_signal to ensure
the test is never skipped improperly.
This has been a potential problem since I added the test for
signal_group_exit was added.
Fixes: 35634ffa1751 ("signal: Always notice exiting tasks")
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/875yssekcd.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit f37c3bbc635994eda203a6da4ba0f9d05165a8d6 ]
Since referencing user space pointers is special, if the user wants to
filter on a field that is a pointer to user space, then they need to
specify it.
Add a ".ustring" attribute to the field name for filters to state that the
field is pointing to user space such that the kernel can take the
appropriate action to read that pointer.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/yt9d8rvmt2jq.fsf@linux.ibm.com/
Fixes: 77360f9bbc7e ("tracing: Add test for user space strings when filtering on string pointers")
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 13765de8148f71fa795e0a6607de37c49ea5915a ]
Syzbot found a GPF in reweight_entity. This has been bisected to
commit 4ef0c5c6b5ba ("kernel/sched: Fix sched_fork() access an invalid
sched_task_group")
There is a race between sched_post_fork() and setpriority(PRIO_PGRP)
within a thread group that causes a null-ptr-deref in
reweight_entity() in CFS. The scenario is that the main process spawns
number of new threads, which then call setpriority(PRIO_PGRP, 0, -20),
wait, and exit. For each of the new threads the copy_process() gets
invoked, which adds the new task_struct and calls sched_post_fork()
for it.
In the above scenario there is a possibility that
setpriority(PRIO_PGRP) and set_one_prio() will be called for a thread
in the group that is just being created by copy_process(), and for
which the sched_post_fork() has not been executed yet. This will
trigger a null pointer dereference in reweight_entity(), as it will
try to access the run queue pointer, which hasn't been set.
Before the mentioned change the cfs_rq pointer for the task has been
set in sched_fork(), which is called much earlier in copy_process(),
before the new task is added to the thread_group. Now it is done in
the sched_post_fork(), which is called after that. To fix the issue
the remove the update_load param from the update_load param() function
and call reweight_task() only if the task flag doesn't have the
TASK_NEW flag set.
Fixes: 4ef0c5c6b5ba ("kernel/sched: Fix sched_fork() access an invalid sched_task_group")
Reported-by: syzbot+af7a719bc92395ee41b3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220203161846.1160750-1-tadeusz.struk@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 77360f9bbc7e5e2ab7a2c8b4c0244fbbfcfc6f62 ]
Pingfan reported that the following causes a fault:
echo "filename ~ \"cpu\"" > events/syscalls/sys_enter_openat/filter
echo 1 > events/syscalls/sys_enter_at/enable
The reason is that trace event filter treats the user space pointer
defined by "filename" as a normal pointer to compare against the "cpu"
string. The following bug happened:
kvm-03-guest16 login: [72198.026181] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00007fffaae8ef60
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0001) - permissions violation
PGD 80000001008b7067 P4D 80000001008b7067 PUD 2393f1067 PMD 2393ec067 PTE 8000000108f47867
Oops: 0001 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-32.el9.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x0/0x20
Code: 48 89 f9 74 09 48 83 c1 01 80 39 00 75 f7 31 d2 44 0f b6 04 16 44 88 04 11
48 83 c2 01 45 84 c0 75 ee c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 <80> 3f 00 74 10 48 89 f8
48 83 c0 01 80 38 00 75 f7 48 29 f8 c3 31
RSP: 0018:ffffb5b900013e48 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000018 RBX: ffff8fc1c49ede00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: ffff8fc1c02d601c RDI: 00007fffaae8ef60
RBP: 00007fffaae8ef60 R08: 0005034f4ddb8ea4 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8fc1c02d601c R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8fc1c8a6e380
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8fc1c02d6010 R15: ffff8fc1c00453c0
FS: 00007fa86123db40(0000) GS:ffff8fc2ffd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffaae8ef60 CR3: 0000000102880001 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
filter_pred_pchar+0x18/0x40
filter_match_preds+0x31/0x70
ftrace_syscall_enter+0x27a/0x2c0
syscall_trace_enter.constprop.0+0x1aa/0x1d0
do_syscall_64+0x16/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7fa861d88664
The above happened because the kernel tried to access user space directly
and triggered a "supervisor read access in kernel mode" fault. Worse yet,
the memory could not even be loaded yet, and a SEGFAULT could happen as
well. This could be true for kernel space accessing as well.
To be even more robust, test both kernel and user space strings. If the
string fails to read, then simply have the filter fail.
Note, TASK_SIZE is used to determine if the pointer is user or kernel space
and the appropriate strncpy_from_kernel/user_nofault() function is used to
copy the memory. For some architectures, the compare to TASK_SIZE may always
pick user space or kernel space. If it gets it wrong, the only thing is that
the filter will fail to match. In the future, this needs to be fixed to have
the event denote which should be used. But failing a filter is much better
than panicing the machine, and that can be solved later.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220107044951.22080-1-kernelfans@gmail.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220110115532.536088fd@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>
Fixes: 87a342f5db69d ("tracing/filters: Support filtering for char * strings")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 302e9edd54985f584cfc180098f3554774126969 upstream.
If a trigger is set on an event to disable or enable tracing within an
instance, then tracing should be disabled or enabled in the instance and
not at the top level, which is confusing to users.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220223223837.14f94ec3@rorschach.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ae63b31e4d0e2 ("tracing: Separate out trace events from global variables")
Tested-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit ce33c845b030c9cf768370c951bc699470b09fa7 upstream.
The stacktrace event trigger is not dumping the stacktrace to the instance
where it was enabled, but to the global "instance."
Use the private_data, pointing to the trigger file, to figure out the
corresponding trace instance, and use it in the trigger action, like
snapshot_trigger does.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/afbb0b4f18ba92c276865bc97204d438473f4ebc.1645396236.git.bristot@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ae63b31e4d0e2 ("tracing: Separate out trace events from global variables")
Reviewed-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 75134f16e7dd0007aa474b281935c5f42e79f2c8 upstream.
syzbot reported various soft lockups caused by bpf batch operations.
INFO: task kworker/1:1:27 blocked for more than 140 seconds.
INFO: task hung in rcu_barrier
Nothing prevents batch ops to process huge amount of data,
we need to add schedule points in them.
Note that maybe_wait_bpf_programs(map) calls from
generic_map_delete_batch() can be factorized by moving
the call after the loop.
This will be done later in -next tree once we get this fix merged,
unless there is strong opinion doing this optimization sooner.
Fixes: aa2e93b8e58e ("bpf: Add generic support for update and delete batch ops")
Fixes: cb4d03ab499d ("bpf: Add generic support for lookup batch op")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Acked-by: Brian Vazquez <brianvv@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220217181902.808742-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 467a726b754f474936980da793b4ff2ec3e382a7 upstream.
The idea is to check: a) the owning user_ns of cgroup_ns, b)
capabilities in init_user_ns.
The commit 24f600856418 ("cgroup-v1: Require capabilities to set
release_agent") got this wrong in the write handler of release_agent
since it checked user_ns of the opener (may be different from the owning
user_ns of cgroup_ns).
Secondly, to avoid possibly confused deputy, the capability of the
opener must be checked.
Fixes: 24f600856418 ("cgroup-v1: Require capabilities to set release_agent")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/stable/20220216121142.GB30035@blackbody.suse.cz/
Signed-off-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Masami Ichikawa(CIP) <masami.ichikawa@cybertrust.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 05c7b7a92cc87ff8d7fde189d0fade250697573c upstream.
As previously discussed(https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/1/20/51),
cpuset_attach() is affected with similar cpu hotplug race,
as follow scenario:
cpuset_attach() cpu hotplug
--------------------------- ----------------------
down_write(cpuset_rwsem)
guarantee_online_cpus() // (load cpus_attach)
sched_cpu_deactivate
set_cpu_active()
// will change cpu_active_mask
set_cpus_allowed_ptr(cpus_attach)
__set_cpus_allowed_ptr_locked()
// (if the intersection of cpus_attach and
cpu_active_mask is empty, will return -EINVAL)
up_write(cpuset_rwsem)
To avoid races such as described above, protect cpuset_attach() call
with cpu_hotplug_lock.
Fixes: be367d099270 ("cgroups: let ss->can_attach and ss->attach do whole threadgroups at a time")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.32+
Reported-by: Zhao Gongyi <zhaogongyi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Qiao <zhangqiao22@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 28df029d53a2fd80c1b8674d47895648ad26dcfb upstream.
A kernel exception was hit when trying to dump /proc/lockdep_chains after
lockdep report "BUG: MAX_LOCKDEP_CHAIN_HLOCKS too low!":
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00054005450e05c3
...
00054005450e05c3] address between user and kernel address ranges
...
pc : [0xffffffece769b3a8] string+0x50/0x10c
lr : [0xffffffece769ac88] vsnprintf+0x468/0x69c
...
Call trace:
string+0x50/0x10c
vsnprintf+0x468/0x69c
seq_printf+0x8c/0xd8
print_name+0x64/0xf4
lc_show+0xb8/0x128
seq_read_iter+0x3cc/0x5fc
proc_reg_read_iter+0xdc/0x1d4
The cause of the problem is the function lock_chain_get_class() will
shift lock_classes index by 1, but the index don't need to be shifted
anymore since commit 01bb6f0af992 ("locking/lockdep: Change the range
of class_idx in held_lock struct") already change the index to start
from 0.
The lock_classes[-1] located at chain_hlocks array. When printing
lock_classes[-1] after the chain_hlocks entries are modified, the
exception happened.
The output of lockdep_chains are incorrect due to this problem too.
Fixes: f611e8cf98ec ("lockdep: Take read/write status in consideration when generate chainkey")
Signed-off-by: Cheng Jui Wang <cheng-jui.wang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220210105011.21712-1-cheng-jui.wang@mediatek.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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|
commit ddc204b517e60ae64db34f9832dc41dafa77c751 upstream.
I was made aware of the following lockdep splat:
[ 2516.308763] =====================================================
[ 2516.309085] WARNING: HARDIRQ-safe -> HARDIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
[ 2516.309433] 5.14.0-51.el9.aarch64+debug #1 Not tainted
[ 2516.309703] -----------------------------------------------------
[ 2516.310149] stress-ng/153663 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire:
[ 2516.310512] ffff0000e422b198 (&newf->file_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: fd_install+0x368/0x4f0
[ 2516.310944]
and this task is already holding:
[ 2516.311248] ffff0000c08140d8 (&sighand->siglock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: copy_process+0x1e2c/0x3e80
[ 2516.311804] which would create a new lock dependency:
[ 2516.312066] (&sighand->siglock){-.-.}-{2:2} -> (&newf->file_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}
[ 2516.312446]
but this new dependency connects a HARDIRQ-irq-safe lock:
[ 2516.312983] (&sighand->siglock){-.-.}-{2:2}
:
[ 2516.330700] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
[ 2516.331075] CPU0 CPU1
[ 2516.331328] ---- ----
[ 2516.331580] lock(&newf->file_lock);
[ 2516.331790] local_irq_disable();
[ 2516.332231] lock(&sighand->siglock);
[ 2516.332579] lock(&newf->file_lock);
[ 2516.332922] <Interrupt>
[ 2516.333069] lock(&sighand->siglock);
[ 2516.333291]
*** DEADLOCK ***
[ 2516.389845]
stack backtrace:
[ 2516.390101] CPU: 3 PID: 153663 Comm: stress-ng Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-51.el9.aarch64+debug #1
[ 2516.390756] Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
[ 2516.391155] Call trace:
[ 2516.391302] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3e0
[ 2516.391518] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 2516.391717] dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xd8
[ 2516.391938] dump_stack+0x1c/0x38
[ 2516.392247] print_bad_irq_dependency+0x620/0x710
[ 2516.392525] check_irq_usage+0x4fc/0x86c
[ 2516.392756] check_prev_add+0x180/0x1d90
[ 2516.392988] validate_chain+0x8e0/0xee0
[ 2516.393215] __lock_acquire+0x97c/0x1e40
[ 2516.393449] lock_acquire.part.0+0x240/0x570
[ 2516.393814] lock_acquire+0x90/0xb4
[ 2516.394021] _raw_spin_lock+0xe8/0x154
[ 2516.394244] fd_install+0x368/0x4f0
[ 2516.394451] copy_process+0x1f5c/0x3e80
[ 2516.394678] kernel_clone+0x134/0x660
[ 2516.394895] __do_sys_clone3+0x130/0x1f4
[ 2516.395128] __arm64_sys_clone3+0x5c/0x7c
[ 2516.395478] invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x78/0x1f0
[ 2516.395762] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x22c/0x2c4
[ 2516.396050] do_el0_svc+0xb0/0x10c
[ 2516.396252] el0_svc+0x24/0x34
[ 2516.396436] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x12c
[ 2516.396688] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
[ 2517.491197] NET: Registered PF_ATMPVC protocol family
[ 2517.491524] NET: Registered PF_ATMSVC protocol family
[ 2591.991877] sched: RT throttling activated
One way to solve this problem is to move the fd_install() call out of
the sighand->siglock critical section.
Before commit 6fd2fe494b17 ("copy_process(): don't use ksys_close()
on cleanups"), the pidfd installation was done without holding both
the task_list lock and the sighand->siglock. Obviously, holding these
two locks are not really needed to protect the fd_install() call.
So move the fd_install() call down to after the releases of both locks.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220208163912.1084752-1-longman@redhat.com
Fixes: 6fd2fe494b17 ("copy_process(): don't use ksys_close() on cleanups")
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c923a8e7edb010da67424077cbf1a6f1396ebd2e upstream.
During set*id() which cred->ucounts to charge the the current process
to is not known until after set_cred_ucounts. So move the
RLIMIT_NPROC checking into a new helper flag_nproc_exceeded and call
flag_nproc_exceeded after set_cred_ucounts.
This is very much an arbitrary subset of the places where we currently
change the RLIMIT_NPROC accounting, designed to preserve the existing
logic.
Fixing the existing logic will be the subject of another series of
changes.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-4-ebiederm@xmission.com
Fixes: 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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set_user
commit c16bdeb5a39ffa3f32b32f812831a2092d2a3061 upstream.
Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> wrote:
> I'm not aware of anyone actually running into this issue and reporting
> it. The systems that I personally know use suexec along with rlimits
> still run older/distro kernels, so would not yet be affected.
>
> So my mention was based on my understanding of how suexec works, and
> code review. Specifically, Apache httpd has the setting RLimitNPROC,
> which makes it set RLIMIT_NPROC:
>
> https://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.4/mod/core.html#rlimitnproc
>
> The above documentation for it includes:
>
> "This applies to processes forked from Apache httpd children servicing
> requests, not the Apache httpd children themselves. This includes CGI
> scripts and SSI exec commands, but not any processes forked from the
> Apache httpd parent, such as piped logs."
>
> In code, there are:
>
> ./modules/generators/mod_cgid.c: ( (cgid_req.limits.limit_nproc_set) && ((rc = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC,
> ./modules/generators/mod_cgi.c: ((rc = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC,
> ./modules/filters/mod_ext_filter.c: rv = apr_procattr_limit_set(procattr, APR_LIMIT_NPROC, conf->limit_nproc);
>
> For example, in mod_cgi.c this is in run_cgi_child().
>
> I think this means an httpd child sets RLIMIT_NPROC shortly before it
> execs suexec, which is a SUID root program. suexec then switches to the
> target user and execs the CGI script.
>
> Before 2863643fb8b9, the setuid() in suexec would set the flag, and the
> target user's process count would be checked against RLIMIT_NPROC on
> execve(). After 2863643fb8b9, the setuid() in suexec wouldn't set the
> flag because setuid() is (naturally) called when the process is still
> running as root (thus, has those limits bypass capabilities), and
> accordingly execve() would not check the target user's process count
> against RLIMIT_NPROC.
In commit 2863643fb8b9 ("set_user: add capability check when
rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds") capable calls were added to set_user to
make it more consistent with fork. Unfortunately because of call site
differences those capable calls were checking the credentials of the
user before set*id() instead of after set*id().
This breaks enforcement of RLIMIT_NPROC for applications that set the
rlimit and then call set*id() while holding a full set of
capabilities. The capabilities are only changed in the new credential
in security_task_fix_setuid().
The code in apache suexec appears to follow this pattern.
Commit 909cc4ae86f3 ("[PATCH] Fix two bugs with process limits
(RLIMIT_NPROC)") where this check was added describes the targes of this
capability check as:
2/ When a root-owned process (e.g. cgiwrap) sets up process limits and then
calls setuid, the setuid should fail if the user would then be running
more than rlim_cur[RLIMIT_NPROC] processes, but it doesn't. This patch
adds an appropriate test. With this patch, and per-user process limit
imposed in cgiwrap really works.
So the original use case of this check also appears to match the broken
pattern.
Restore the enforcement of RLIMIT_NPROC by removing the bad capable
checks added in set_user. This unfortunately restores the
inconsistent state the code has been in for the last 11 years, but
dealing with the inconsistencies looks like a larger problem.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210907213042.GA22626@openwall.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220212221412.GA29214@openwall.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-1-ebiederm@xmission.com
Fixes: 2863643fb8b9 ("set_user: add capability check when rlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC) exceeds")
History-Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git
Reviewed-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 8f2f9c4d82f24f172ae439e5035fc1e0e4c229dd upstream.
Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com> wrote:
> It was reported that v5.14 behaves differently when enforcing
> RLIMIT_NPROC limit, namely, it allows one more task than previously.
> This is consequence of the commit 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement
> RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts") that missed the sharpness of
> equality in the forking path.
This can be fixed either by fixing the test or by moving the increment
to be before the test. Fix it my moving copy_creds which contains
the increment before is_ucounts_overlimit.
In the case of CLONE_NEWUSER the ucounts in the task_cred changes.
The function is_ucounts_overlimit needs to use the final version of
the ucounts for the new process. Which means moving the
is_ucounts_overlimit test after copy_creds is necessary.
Both the test in fork and the test in set_user were semantically
changed when the code moved to ucounts. The change of the test in
fork was bad because it was before the increment. The test in
set_user was wrong and the change to ucounts fixed it. So this
fix only restores the old behavior in one lcation not two.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220204181144.24462-1-mkoutny@suse.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-2-ebiederm@xmission.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Fixes: 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit a55d07294f1e9b576093bdfa95422f8119941e83 upstream.
Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com> wrote:
> Tasks are associated to multiple users at once. Historically and as per
> setrlimit(2) RLIMIT_NPROC is enforce based on real user ID.
>
> The commit 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
> made the accounting structure "indexed" by euid and hence potentially
> account tasks differently.
>
> The effective user ID may be different e.g. for setuid programs but
> those are exec'd into already existing task (i.e. below limit), so
> different accounting is moot.
>
> Some special setresuid(2) users may notice the difference, justifying
> this fix.
I looked at cred->ucount and it is only used for rlimit operations
that were previously stored in cred->user. Making the fact
cred->ucount can refer to a different user from cred->user a bug,
affecting all uses of cred->ulimit not just RLIMIT_NPROC.
Fix set_cred_ucounts to always use the real uid not the effective uid.
Further simplify set_cred_ucounts by noticing that set_cred_ucounts
somehow retained a draft version of the check to see if alloc_ucounts
was needed that checks the new->user and new->user_ns against the
current_real_cred(). Remove that draft version of the check.
All that matters for setting the cred->ucounts are the user_ns and uid
fields in the cred.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220207121800.5079-4-mkoutny@suse.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-3-ebiederm@xmission.com
Reported-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Fixes: 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
|
commit 99c31f9feda41d0f10d030dc04ba106c93295aa2 upstream.
Any cred that is destined for use by commit_creds must have a non-NULL
cred->ucounts field. Only curing credential construction is a NULL
cred->ucounts valid. Only abort_creds, put_cred, and put_cred_rcu
needs to deal with a cred with a NULL ucount. As set_cred_ucounts is
non of those case don't confuse people by handling something that can
not happen.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/871r4irzds.fsf_-_@disp2133
Tested-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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commit 0cbae9e24fa7d6c6e9f828562f084da82217a0c5 upstream.
While examining is_ucounts_overlimit and reading the various messages
I realized that is_ucounts_overlimit fails to deal with counts that
may have wrapped.
Being wrapped should be a transitory state for counts and they should
never be wrapped for long, but it can happen so handle it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-5-ebiederm@xmission.com
Reviewed-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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[ Upstream commit 3203ce39ac0b2a57a84382ec184c7d4a0bede175 ]
The kernel parameter "tp_printk_stop_on_boot" starts with "tp_printk" which is
the same as another kernel parameter "tp_printk". If "tp_printk" setup is
called before the "tp_printk_stop_on_boot", it will override the latter
and keep it from being set.
This is similar to other kernel parameter issues, such as:
Commit 745a600cf1a6 ("um: console: Ignore console= option")
or init/do_mounts.c:45 (setup function of "ro" kernel param)
Fix it by checking for a "_" right after the "tp_printk" and if that
exists do not process the parameter.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220208195421.969326-1-jsyoo5b@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: JaeSang Yoo <jsyoo5b@gmail.com>
[ Fixed up change log and added space after if condition ]
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
[ Upstream commit dcb85f85fa6f142aae1fe86f399d4503d49f2b60 ]
While the stackleak plugin was already using notrace, objtool is now a
bit more picky. Update the notrace uses to noinstr. Silences the
following objtool warnings when building with:
CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY=y
CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION=y
CONFIG_VMLINUX_VALIDATION=y
CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: do_syscall_64()+0x9: call to stackleak_track_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: do_int80_syscall_32()+0x9: call to stackleak_track_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: exc_general_protection()+0x22: call to stackleak_track_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: fixup_bad_iret()+0x20: call to stackleak_track_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: do_machine_check()+0x27: call to stackleak_track_stack() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: .text+0x5346e: call to stackleak_erase() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: .entry.text+0x143: call to stackleak_erase() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: .entry.text+0x10eb: call to stackleak_erase() leaves .noinstr.text section
vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: .entry.text+0x17f9: call to stackleak_erase() leaves .noinstr.text section
Note that the plugin's addition of calls to stackleak_track_stack() from
noinstr functions is expected to be safe, as it isn't runtime
instrumentation and is self-contained.
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
|
used"
[ Upstream commit 67d6212afda218d564890d1674bab28e8612170f ]
This reverts commit 774a1221e862b343388347bac9b318767336b20b.
We need to finish all async code before the module init sequence is
done. In the reverted commit the PF_USED_ASYNC flag was added to mark a
thread that called async_schedule(). Then the PF_USED_ASYNC flag was
used to determine whether or not async_synchronize_full() needs to be
invoked. This works when modprobe thread is calling async_schedule(),
but it does not work if module dispatches init code to a worker thread
which then calls async_schedule().
For example, PCI driver probing is invoked from a worker thread based on
a node where device is attached:
if (cpu < nr_cpu_ids)
error = work_on_cpu(cpu, local_pci_probe, &ddi);
else
error = local_pci_probe(&ddi);
We end up in a situation where a worker thread gets the PF_USED_ASYNC
flag set instead of the modprobe thread. As a result,
async_synchronize_full() is not invoked and modprobe completes without
waiting for the async code to finish.
The issue was discovered while loading the pm80xx driver:
(scsi_mod.scan=async)
modprobe pm80xx worker
...
do_init_module()
...
pci_call_probe()
work_on_cpu(local_pci_probe)
local_pci_probe()
pm8001_pci_probe()
scsi_scan_host()
async_schedule()
worker->flags |= PF_USED_ASYNC;
...
< return from worker >
...
if (current->flags & PF_USED_ASYNC) <--- false
async_synchronize_full();
Commit 21c3c5d28007 ("block: don't request module during elevator init")
fixed the deadlock issue which the reverted commit 774a1221e862
("module, async: async_synchronize_full() on module init iff async is
used") tried to fix.
Since commit 0fdff3ec6d87 ("async, kmod: warn on synchronous
request_module() from async workers") synchronous module loading from
async is not allowed.
Given that the original deadlock issue is fixed and it is no longer
allowed to call synchronous request_module() from async we can remove
PF_USED_ASYNC flag to make module init consistently invoke
async_synchronize_full() unless async module probe is requested.
Signed-off-by: Igor Pylypiv <ipylypiv@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Changyuan Lyu <changyuanl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 5f4e5ce638e6a490b976ade4a40017b40abb2da0 upstream.
There's list corruption on cgrp_cpuctx_list. This happens on the
following path:
perf_cgroup_switch: list_for_each_entry(cgrp_cpuctx_list)
cpu_ctx_sched_in
ctx_sched_in
ctx_pinned_sched_in
merge_sched_in
perf_cgroup_event_disable: remove the event from the list
Use list_for_each_entry_safe() to allow removing an entry during
iteration.
Fixes: 058fe1c0440e ("perf/core: Make cgroup switch visit only cpuctxs with cgroup events")
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220204004057.2961252-1-song@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5c72263ef2fbe99596848f03758ae2dc593adf2c upstream.
Fatal SIGSYS signals (i.e. seccomp RET_KILL_* syscall filter actions)
were not being delivered to ptraced pid namespace init processes. Make
sure the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE doesn't get set for these cases.
Reported-by: Robert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net>
Suggested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Fixes: 00b06da29cf9 ("signal: Add SA_IMMUTABLE to ensure forced siganls do not get changed")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/878rui8u4a.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 495ac3069a6235bfdf516812a2a9b256671bbdf9 upstream.
If seccomp tries to kill a process, it should never see that process
again. To enforce this proactively, switch the mode to something
impossible. If encountered: WARN, reject all syscalls, and attempt to
kill the process again even harder.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Fixes: 8112c4f140fa ("seccomp: remove 2-phase API")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cb1f65c1e1424a4b5e4a86da8aa3b8fd8459c8ec upstream.
After commit e3728b50cd9b ("ACPI: PM: s2idle: Avoid possible race
related to the EC GPE") wakeup interrupts occurring immediately after
the one discarded by acpi_s2idle_wake() may be missed. Moreover, if
the SCI triggers again immediately after the rearming in
acpi_s2idle_wake(), that wakeup may be missed too.
The problem is that pm_system_irq_wakeup() only calls pm_system_wakeup()
when pm_wakeup_irq is 0, but that's not the case any more after the
interrupt causing acpi_s2idle_wake() to run until pm_wakeup_irq is
cleared by the pm_wakeup_clear() call in s2idle_loop(). However,
there may be wakeup interrupts occurring in that time frame and if
that happens, they will be missed.
To address that issue first move the clearing of pm_wakeup_irq to
the point at which it is known that the interrupt causing
acpi_s2idle_wake() to tun will be discarded, before rearming the SCI
for wakeup. Moreover, because that only reduces the size of the
time window in which the issue may manifest itself, allow
pm_system_irq_wakeup() to register two second wakeup interrupts in
a row and, when discarding the first one, replace it with the second
one. [Of course, this assumes that only one wakeup interrupt can be
discarded in one go, but currently that is the case and I am not
aware of any plans to change that.]
Fixes: e3728b50cd9b ("ACPI: PM: s2idle: Avoid possible race related to the EC GPE")
Cc: 5.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 961c39121759ad09a89598ec4ccdd34ae0468a19 ]
When using per-process mode and event inheritance is set to true,
forked processes will create a new perf events via inherit_event() ->
perf_event_alloc(). But these events will not have ring buffers
assigned to them. Any call to wakeup will be dropped if it's called on
an event with no ring buffer assigned because that's the object that
holds the wakeup list.
If the child event is disabled due to a call to
perf_aux_output_begin() or perf_aux_output_end(), the wakeup is
dropped leaving userspace hanging forever on the poll.
Normally the event is explicitly re-enabled by userspace after it
wakes up to read the aux data, but in this case it does not get woken
up so the event remains disabled.
This can be reproduced when using Arm SPE and 'stress' which forks once
before running the workload. By looking at the list of aux buffers read,
it's apparent that they stop after the fork:
perf record -e arm_spe// -vvv -- stress -c 1
With this patch applied they continue to be printed. This behaviour
doesn't happen when using systemwide or per-cpu mode.
Reported-by: Ruben Ayrapetyan <Ruben.Ayrapetyan@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211206113840.130802-2-james.clark@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 33569ef3c754a82010f266b7b938a66a3ccf90a4 ]
It is an unused wrapper forcing kmalloc allocation for registering
nosave regions. Also, rename __register_nosave_region() to
register_nosave_region() now that there is no need for disambiguation.
Signed-off-by: Amadeusz Sławiński <amadeuszx.slawinski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7e406d1ff39b8ee574036418a5043c86723170cf ]
For PREEMPT/DYNAMIC_PREEMPT the *_unlock() will already trigger a
preemption, no point in then calling preempt_schedule_common()
*again*.
Use _cond_resched() instead, since this is a NOP for the preemptible
configs while it provide a preemption point for the others.
Reported-by: xuhaifeng <xuhaifeng@oppo.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YcGnvDEYBwOiV0cR@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 097f1eefedeab528cecbd35586dfe293853ffb17 upstream.
During expression parsing, a new expression field is created which
should inherit the properties of the operands, such as size and
is_signed.
is_signed propagation was missing, causing spurious errors with signed
operands. Add it in parse_expr() and parse_unary() to fix the problem.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f4dac08742fd7a0920bf80a73c6c44042f5eaa40.1643319703.git.zanussi@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 100719dcef447 ("tracing: Add simple expression support to hist triggers")
Reported-by: Yordan Karadzhov <ykaradzhov@vmware.com>
BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215513
Signed-off-by: Tom Zanussi <zanussi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[sudip: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2bdfd2825c9662463371e6691b1a794e97fa36b4 upstream.
It was found that a "suspicious RCU usage" lockdep warning was issued
with the rcu_read_lock() call in update_sibling_cpumasks(). It is
because the update_cpumasks_hier() function may sleep. So we have
to release the RCU lock, call update_cpumasks_hier() and reacquire
it afterward.
Also add a percpu_rwsem_assert_held() in update_sibling_cpumasks()
instead of stating that in the comment.
Fixes: 4716909cc5c5 ("cpuset: Track cpusets that use parent's effective_cpus")
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3c25fc97f5590060464cabfa25710970ecddbc96 ]
The intent has always been that perf_event_attr::sig_data should also be
modifiable along with PERF_EVENT_IOC_MODIFY_ATTRIBUTES, because it is
observable by user space if SIGTRAP on events is requested.
Currently only PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT is modifiable, and explicitly copies
relevant breakpoint-related attributes in hw_breakpoint_copy_attr().
This misses copying perf_event_attr::sig_data.
Since sig_data is not specific to PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT, introduce a
helper to copy generic event-type-independent attributes on
modification.
Fixes: 97ba62b27867 ("perf: Add support for SIGTRAP on perf events")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220131103407.1971678-1-elver@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit b293dcc473d22a62dc6d78de2b15e4f49515db56 upstream.
After commit 2fd3fb0be1d1 ("kasan, vmalloc: unpoison VM_ALLOC pages
after mapping"), non-VM_ALLOC mappings will be marked as accessible
in __get_vm_area_node() when KASAN is enabled. But now the flag for
ringbuf area is VM_ALLOC, so KASAN will complain out-of-bound access
after vmap() returns. Because the ringbuf area is created by mapping
allocated pages, so use VM_MAP instead.
After the change, info in /proc/vmallocinfo also changes from
[start]-[end] 24576 ringbuf_map_alloc+0x171/0x290 vmalloc user
to
[start]-[end] 24576 ringbuf_map_alloc+0x171/0x290 vmap user
Fixes: 457f44363a88 ("bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it")
Reported-by: syzbot+5ad567a418794b9b5983@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220202060158.6260-1-houtao1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f26d04331360d42dbd6b58448bd98e4edbfbe1c5 upstream.
When an admin enables audit at early boot via the "audit=1" kernel
command line the audit queue behavior is slightly different; the
audit subsystem goes to greater lengths to avoid dropping records,
which unfortunately can result in problems when the audit daemon is
forcibly stopped for an extended period of time.
This patch makes a number of changes designed to improve the audit
queuing behavior so that leaving the audit daemon in a stopped state
for an extended period does not cause a significant impact to the
system.
- kauditd_send_queue() is now limited to looping through the
passed queue only once per call. This not only prevents the
function from looping indefinitely when records are returned
to the current queue, it also allows any recovery handling in
kauditd_thread() to take place when kauditd_send_queue()
returns.
- Transient netlink send errors seen as -EAGAIN now cause the
record to be returned to the retry queue instead of going to
the hold queue. The intention of the hold queue is to store,
perhaps for an extended period of time, the events which led
up to the audit daemon going offline. The retry queue remains
a temporary queue intended to protect against transient issues
between the kernel and the audit daemon.
- The retry queue is now limited by the audit_backlog_limit
setting, the same as the other queues. This allows admins
to bound the size of all of the audit queues on the system.
- kauditd_rehold_skb() now returns records to the end of the
hold queue to ensure ordering is preserved in the face of
recent changes to kauditd_send_queue().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5b52330bbfe63 ("audit: fix auditd/kernel connection state tracking")
Fixes: f4b3ee3c85551 ("audit: improve robustness of the audit queue handling")
Reported-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c80d401c52a2d1baf2a5afeb06f0ffe678e56d23 upstream.
subparts_cpus should be limited as a subset of cpus_allowed, but it is
updated wrongly by using cpumask_andnot(). Use cpumask_and() instead to
fix it.
Fixes: ee8dde0cd2ce ("cpuset: Add new v2 cpuset.sched.partition flag")
Signed-off-by: Tianchen Ding <dtcccc@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 24f6008564183aa120d07c03d9289519c2fe02af upstream.
The cgroup release_agent is called with call_usermodehelper. The function
call_usermodehelper starts the release_agent with a full set fo capabilities.
Therefore require capabilities when setting the release_agaent.
Reported-by: Tabitha Sable <tabitha.c.sable@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Tabitha Sable <tabitha.c.sable@gmail.com>
Fixes: 81a6a5cdd2c5 ("Task Control Groups: automatic userspace notification of idle cgroups")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.24+
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 44585f7bc0cb01095bc2ad4258049c02bbad21ef upstream.
When CONFIG_PROC_FS is disabled psi code generates the following
warnings:
kernel/sched/psi.c:1364:30: warning: 'psi_cpu_proc_ops' defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
1364 | static const struct proc_ops psi_cpu_proc_ops = {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/psi.c:1355:30: warning: 'psi_memory_proc_ops' defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
1355 | static const struct proc_ops psi_memory_proc_ops = {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
kernel/sched/psi.c:1346:30: warning: 'psi_io_proc_ops' defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
1346 | static const struct proc_ops psi_io_proc_ops = {
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Make definitions of these structures and related functions conditional
on CONFIG_PROC_FS config.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220119223940.787748-3-surenb@google.com
Fixes: 0e94682b73bf ("psi: introduce psi monitor")
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c5de60cd622a2607c043ba65e25a6e9998a369f9 upstream.
The active cgroup events are managed in the per-cpu cgrp_cpuctx_list.
This list is only accessed from current cpu and not protected by any
locks. But from the commit ef54c1a476ae ("perf: Rework
perf_event_exit_event()"), it's possible to access (actually modify)
the list from another cpu.
In the perf_remove_from_context(), it can remove an event from the
context without an IPI when the context is not active. This is not
safe with cgroup events which can have some active events in the
context even if ctx->is_active is 0 at the moment. The target cpu
might be in the middle of list iteration at the same time.
If the event is enabled when it's about to be closed, it might call
perf_cgroup_event_disable() and list_del() with the cgrp_cpuctx_list
on a different cpu.
This resulted in a crash due to an invalid list pointer access during
the cgroup list traversal on the cpu which the event belongs to.
Let's fallback to IPI to access the cgrp_cpuctx_list from that cpu.
Similarly, perf_install_in_context() should use IPI for the cgroup
events too.
Fixes: ef54c1a476ae ("perf: Rework perf_event_exit_event()")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220124195808.2252071-1-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 98b0d890220d45418cfbc5157b3382e6da5a12ab ]
Rick reported performance regressions in bugzilla because of cpu frequency
being lower than before:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215045
He bisected the problem to:
commit 1c35b07e6d39 ("sched/fair: Ensure _sum and _avg values stay consistent")
This commit forces util_sum to be synced with the new util_avg after
removing the contribution of a task and before the next periodic sync. By
doing so util_sum is rounded to its lower bound and might lost up to
LOAD_AVG_MAX-1 of accumulated contribution which has not yet been
reflected in util_avg.
Instead of always setting util_sum to the low bound of util_avg, which can
significantly lower the utilization of root cfs_rq after propagating the
change down into the hierarchy, we revert the change of util_sum and
propagate the difference.
In addition, we also check that cfs's util_sum always stays above the
lower bound for a given util_avg as it has been observed that
sched_entity's util_sum is sometimes above cfs one.
Fixes: 1c35b07e6d39 ("sched/fair: Ensure _sum and _avg values stay consistent")
Reported-by: Rick Yiu <rickyiu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220111134659.24961-2-vincent.guittot@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 09f5e7dc7ad705289e1b1ec065439aa3c42951c4 ]
Time readers that cannot take locks (due to NMI etc..) currently make
use of perf_event::shadow_ctx_time, which, for that event gives:
time' = now + (time - timestamp)
or, alternatively arranged:
time' = time + (now - timestamp)
IOW, the progression of time since the last time the shadow_ctx_time
was updated.
There's problems with this:
A) the shadow_ctx_time is per-event, even though the ctx_time it
reflects is obviously per context. The direct concequence of this
is that the context needs to iterate all events all the time to
keep the shadow_ctx_time in sync.
B) even with the prior point, the context itself might not be active
meaning its time should not advance to begin with.
C) shadow_ctx_time isn't consistently updated when ctx_time is
There are 3 users of this stuff, that suffer differently from this:
- calc_timer_values()
- perf_output_read()
- perf_event_update_userpage() /* A */
- perf_event_read_local() /* A,B */
In particular, perf_output_read() doesn't suffer at all, because it's
sample driven and hence only relevant when the event is actually
running.
This same was supposed to be true for perf_event_update_userpage(),
after all self-monitoring implies the context is active *HOWEVER*, as
per commit f79256532682 ("perf/core: fix userpage->time_enabled of
inactive events") this goes wrong when combined with counter
overcommit, in that case those events that do not get scheduled when
the context becomes active (task events typically) miss out on the
EVENT_TIME update and ENABLED time is inflated (for a little while)
with the time the context was inactive. Once the event gets rotated
in, this gets corrected, leading to a non-monotonic timeflow.
perf_event_read_local() made things even worse, it can request time at
any point, suffering all the problems perf_event_update_userpage()
does and more. Because while perf_event_update_userpage() is limited
by the context being active, perf_event_read_local() users have no
such constraint.
Therefore, completely overhaul things and do away with
perf_event::shadow_ctx_time. Instead have regular context time updates
keep track of this offset directly and provide perf_event_time_now()
to complement perf_event_time().
perf_event_time_now() will, in adition to being context wide, also
take into account if the context is active. For inactive context, it
will not advance time.
This latter property means the cgroup perf_cgroup_info context needs
to grow addition state to track this.
Additionally, since all this is strictly per-cpu, we can use barrier()
to order context activity vs context time.
Fixes: 7d9285e82db5 ("perf/bpf: Extend the perf_event_read_local() interface, a.k.a. "bpf: perf event change needed for subsequent bpf helpers"")
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YcB06DasOBtU0b00@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 809232619f5b15e31fb3563985e705454f32621f upstream.
The membarrier command MEMBARRIER_CMD_QUERY allows querying the
available membarrier commands. When the membarrier-rseq fence commands
were added, a new MEMBARRIER_CMD_PRIVATE_EXPEDITED_RSEQ_BITMASK was
introduced with the intent to expose them with the MEMBARRIER_CMD_QUERY
command, the but it was never added to MEMBARRIER_CMD_BITMASK.
The membarrier-rseq fence commands are therefore not wired up with the
query command.
Rename MEMBARRIER_CMD_PRIVATE_EXPEDITED_RSEQ_BITMASK to
MEMBARRIER_PRIVATE_EXPEDITED_RSEQ_BITMASK (the bitmask is not a command
per-se), and change the erroneous
MEMBARRIER_CMD_REGISTER_PRIVATE_EXPEDITED_RSEQ_BITMASK (which does not
actually exist) to MEMBARRIER_CMD_REGISTER_PRIVATE_EXPEDITED_RSEQ.
Wire up MEMBARRIER_PRIVATE_EXPEDITED_RSEQ_BITMASK in
MEMBARRIER_CMD_BITMASK. Fixing this allows discovering availability of
the membarrier-rseq fence feature.
Fixes: 2a36ab717e8f ("rseq/membarrier: Add MEMBARRIER_CMD_PRIVATE_EXPEDITED_RSEQ")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.10+
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220117203010.30129-1-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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