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commit d8794ac20a299b647ba9958f6d657051fc51a540 upstream.
As Andrew pointed out, it will make sense that the PTP core
checked timespec64 struct's tv_sec and tv_nsec range before calling
ptp->info->settime64().
As the man manual of clock_settime() said, if tp.tv_sec is negative or
tp.tv_nsec is outside the range [0..999,999,999], it should return EINVAL,
which include dynamic clocks which handles PTP clock, and the condition is
consistent with timespec64_valid(). As Thomas suggested, timespec64_valid()
only check the timespec is valid, but not ensure that the time is
in a valid range, so check it ahead using timespec64_valid_strict()
in pc_clock_settime() and return -EINVAL if not valid.
There are some drivers that use tp->tv_sec and tp->tv_nsec directly to
write registers without validity checks and assume that the higher layer
has checked it, which is dangerous and will benefit from this, such as
hclge_ptp_settime(), igb_ptp_settime_i210(), _rcar_gen4_ptp_settime(),
and some drivers can remove the checks of itself.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0606f422b453 ("posix clocks: Introduce dynamic clocks")
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241009072302.1754567-2-ruanjinjie@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 214e01ad4ed7158cab66498810094fac5d09b218 upstream.
Calling into kthread unparking unconditionally is mostly harmless when
the kthread is already unparked. The wake up is then simply ignored
because the target is not in TASK_PARKED state.
However if the kthread is per CPU, the wake up is preceded by a call
to kthread_bind() which expects the task to be inactive and in
TASK_PARKED state, which obviously isn't the case if it is unparked.
As a result, calling kthread_stop() on an unparked per-cpu kthread
triggers such a warning:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11 at kernel/kthread.c:525 __kthread_bind_mask kernel/kthread.c:525
<TASK>
kthread_stop+0x17a/0x630 kernel/kthread.c:707
destroy_workqueue+0x136/0xc40 kernel/workqueue.c:5810
wg_destruct+0x1e2/0x2e0 drivers/net/wireguard/device.c:257
netdev_run_todo+0xe1a/0x1000 net/core/dev.c:10693
default_device_exit_batch+0xa14/0xa90 net/core/dev.c:11769
ops_exit_list net/core/net_namespace.c:178 [inline]
cleanup_net+0x89d/0xcc0 net/core/net_namespace.c:640
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3231 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa2c/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
</TASK>
Fix this with skipping unecessary unparking while stopping a kthread.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240913214634.12557-1-frederic@kernel.org
Fixes: 5c25b5ff89f0 ("workqueue: Tag bound workers with KTHREAD_IS_PER_CPU")
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+943d34fa3cf2191e3068@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+943d34fa3cf2191e3068@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton@sina.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1d244784be6b01162b732a5a7d637dfc024c3203 ]
Percpu map is often used, but the map value size limit often ignored,
like issue: https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/issues/2519. Actually,
percpu map value size is bound by PCPU_MIN_UNIT_SIZE, so we
can check the value size whether it exceeds PCPU_MIN_UNIT_SIZE first,
like percpu map of local_storage. Maybe the error message seems clearer
compared with "cannot allocate memory".
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Tao Chen <chen.dylane@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240910144111.1464912-2-chen.dylane@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0b18c852cc6fb8284ac0ab97e3e840974a6a8a64 ]
The saved_cmdlines have three arrays for mapping PIDs to COMMs:
- map_pid_to_cmdline[]
- map_cmdline_to_pid[]
- saved_cmdlines
The map_pid_to_cmdline[] is PID_MAX_DEFAULT in size and holds the index
into the other arrays. The map_cmdline_to_pid[] is a mapping back to the
full pid as it can be larger than PID_MAX_DEFAULT. And the
saved_cmdlines[] just holds the COMMs associated to the pids.
Currently the map_pid_to_cmdline[] and saved_cmdlines[] are allocated
together (in reality the saved_cmdlines is just in the memory of the
rounding of the allocation of the structure as it is always allocated in
powers of two). The map_cmdline_to_pid[] array is allocated separately.
Since the rounding to a power of two is rather large (it allows for 8000
elements in saved_cmdlines), also include the map_cmdline_to_pid[] array.
(This drops it to 6000 by default, which is still plenty for most use
cases). This saves even more memory as the map_cmdline_to_pid[] array
doesn't need to be allocated.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240212174011.068211d9@gandalf.local.home/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240220140703.182330529@goodmis.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Mete Durlu <meted@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: 44dc5c41b5b1 ("tracing: Fix wasted memory in saved_cmdlines logic")
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5efd3e2aef91d2d812290dcb25b2058e6f3f532c ]
This reverts 60be76eeabb3d ("tracing: Add size check when printing
trace_marker output"). The only reason the precision check was added
was because of a bug that miscalculated the write size of the string into
the ring buffer and it truncated it removing the terminating nul byte. On
reading the trace it crashed the kernel. But this was due to the bug in
the code that happened during development and should never happen in
practice. If anything, the precision can hide bugs where the string in the
ring buffer isn't nul terminated and it will not be checked.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/C7E7AF1A-D30F-4D18-B8E5-AF1EF58004F5@linux.ibm.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240227125706.04279ac2@gandalf.local.home
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240302111244.3a1674be@gandalf.local.home/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20240304174341.2a561d9f@gandalf.local.home
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fixes: 60be76eeabb3d ("tracing: Add size check when printing trace_marker output")
Reported-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3840cbe24cf060ea05a585ca497814609f5d47d1 ]
Brandon reports sporadic, non-sensical spikes in cumulative pressure
time (total=) when reading cpu.pressure at a high rate. This is due to
a race condition between reader aggregation and tasks changing states.
While it affects all states and all resources captured by PSI, in
practice it most likely triggers with CPU pressure, since scheduling
events are so frequent compared to other resource events.
The race context is the live snooping of ongoing stalls during a
pressure read. The read aggregates per-cpu records for stalls that
have concluded, but will also incorporate ad-hoc the duration of any
active state that hasn't been recorded yet. This is important to get
timely measurements of ongoing stalls. Those ad-hoc samples are
calculated on-the-fly up to the current time on that CPU; since the
stall hasn't concluded, it's expected that this is the minimum amount
of stall time that will enter the per-cpu records once it does.
The problem is that the path that concludes the state uses a CPU clock
read that is not synchronized against aggregators; the clock is read
outside of the seqlock protection. This allows aggregators to race and
snoop a stall with a longer duration than will actually be recorded.
With the recorded stall time being less than the last snapshot
remembered by the aggregator, a subsequent sample will underflow and
observe a bogus delta value, resulting in an erratic jump in pressure.
Fix this by moving the clock read of the state change into the seqlock
protection. This ensures no aggregation can snoop live stalls past the
time that's recorded when the state concludes.
Reported-by: Brandon Duffany <brandon@buildbuddy.io>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219194
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240827121851.GB438928@cmpxchg.org/
Fixes: df77430639c9 ("psi: Reduce calls to sched_clock() in psi")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Reviewed-by: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 34820304cc2cd1804ee1f8f3504ec77813d29c8e upstream.
xol_add_vma() maps the uninitialized page allocated by __create_xol_area()
into userspace. On some architectures (x86) this memory is readable even
without VM_READ, VM_EXEC results in the same pgprot_t as VM_EXEC|VM_READ,
although this doesn't really matter, debugger can read this memory anyway.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240929162047.GA12611@redhat.com/
Reported-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Fixes: d4b3b6384f98 ("uprobes/core: Allocate XOL slots for uprobes use")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 678379e1d4f7443b170939525d3312cfc37bf86b upstream.
Cloning a descriptor table picks the size that would cover all currently
opened files. That's fine for clone() and unshare(), but for close_range()
there's an additional twist - we clone before we close, and it would be
a shame to have
close_range(3, ~0U, CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE)
leave us with a huge descriptor table when we are not going to keep
anything past stderr, just because some large file descriptor used to
be open before our call has taken it out.
Unfortunately, it had been dealt with in an inherently racy way -
sane_fdtable_size() gets a "don't copy anything past that" argument
(passed via unshare_fd() and dup_fd()), close_range() decides how much
should be trimmed and passes that to unshare_fd().
The problem is, a range that used to extend to the end of descriptor
table back when close_range() had looked at it might very well have stuff
grown after it by the time dup_fd() has allocated a new files_struct
and started to figure out the capacity of fdtable to be attached to that.
That leads to interesting pathological cases; at the very least it's a
QoI issue, since unshare(CLONE_FILES) is atomic in a sense that it takes
a snapshot of descriptor table one might have observed at some point.
Since CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE close_range() is supposed to be a combination
of unshare(CLONE_FILES) with plain close_range(), ending up with a
weird state that would never occur with unshare(2) is confusing, to put
it mildly.
It's not hard to get rid of - all it takes is passing both ends of the
range down to sane_fdtable_size(). There we are under ->files_lock,
so the race is trivially avoided.
So we do the following:
* switch close_files() from calling unshare_fd() to calling
dup_fd().
* undo the calling convention change done to unshare_fd() in
60997c3d45d9 "close_range: add CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE"
* introduce struct fd_range, pass a pointer to that to dup_fd()
and sane_fdtable_size() instead of "trim everything past that point"
they are currently getting. NULL means "we are not going to be punching
any holes"; NR_OPEN_MAX is gone.
* make sane_fdtable_size() use find_last_bit() instead of
open-coding it; it's easier to follow that way.
* while we are at it, have dup_fd() report errors by returning
ERR_PTR(), no need to use a separate int *errorp argument.
Fixes: 60997c3d45d9 "close_range: add CLOSE_RANGE_UNSHARE"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 829e0c9f0855f26b3ae830d17b24aec103f7e915 upstream.
There is another found exception that the "timerlat/1" thread was
scheduled on CPU0, and lead to timer corruption finally:
```
ODEBUG: init active (active state 0) object: ffff888237c2e108 object type: hrtimer hint: timerlat_irq+0x0/0x220
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 426 at lib/debugobjects.c:518 debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 426 Comm: timerlat/1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x7c/0x110
? debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0
? report_bug+0xf1/0x1d0
? prb_read_valid+0x17/0x20
? handle_bug+0x3f/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0
? debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0
? __pfx_timerlat_irq+0x10/0x10
__debug_object_init+0x110/0x150
hrtimer_init+0x1d/0x60
timerlat_main+0xab/0x2d0
? __pfx_timerlat_main+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xb7/0xe0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x40
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
```
After tracing the scheduling event, it was discovered that the migration
of the "timerlat/1" thread was performed during thread creation. Further
analysis confirmed that it is because the CPU online processing for
osnoise is implemented through workers, which is asynchronous with the
offline processing. When the worker was scheduled to create a thread, the
CPU may has already been removed from the cpu_online_mask during the offline
process, resulting in the inability to select the right CPU:
T1 | T2
[CPUHP_ONLINE] | cpu_device_down()
osnoise_hotplug_workfn() |
| cpus_write_lock()
| takedown_cpu(1)
| cpus_write_unlock()
[CPUHP_OFFLINE] |
cpus_read_lock() |
start_kthread(1) |
cpus_read_unlock() |
To fix this, skip online processing if the CPU is already offline.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240924094515.3561410-4-liwei391@huawei.com
Fixes: c8895e271f79 ("trace/osnoise: Support hotplug operations")
Signed-off-by: Wei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 2a13ca2e8abb12ee43ada8a107dadca83f140937 upstream.
The cpuhp online/offline processing race also exists in percpu-mode hwlat
tracer in theory, apply the fix too. That is:
T1 | T2
[CPUHP_ONLINE] | cpu_device_down()
hwlat_hotplug_workfn() |
| cpus_write_lock()
| takedown_cpu(1)
| cpus_write_unlock()
[CPUHP_OFFLINE] |
cpus_read_lock() |
start_kthread(1) |
cpus_read_unlock() |
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240924094515.3561410-5-liwei391@huawei.com
Fixes: ba998f7d9531 ("trace/hwlat: Support hotplug operations")
Signed-off-by: Wei Li <liwei391@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b4afe4183ec77f230851ea139d91e5cf2644c68b upstream.
On a system with CXL memory, the resource tree (/proc/iomem) related to
CXL memory may look like something as follows.
490000000-50fffffff : CXL Window 0
490000000-50fffffff : region0
490000000-50fffffff : dax0.0
490000000-50fffffff : System RAM (kmem)
Because drivers/dax/kmem.c calls add_memory_driver_managed() during
onlining CXL memory, which makes "System RAM (kmem)" a descendant of "CXL
Window X". This confuses region_intersects(), which expects all "System
RAM" resources to be at the top level of iomem_resource. This can lead to
bugs.
For example, when the following command line is executed to write some
memory in CXL memory range via /dev/mem,
$ dd if=data of=/dev/mem bs=$((1 << 10)) seek=$((0x490000000 >> 10)) count=1
dd: error writing '/dev/mem': Bad address
1+0 records in
0+0 records out
0 bytes copied, 0.0283507 s, 0.0 kB/s
the command fails as expected. However, the error code is wrong. It
should be "Operation not permitted" instead of "Bad address". More
seriously, the /dev/mem permission checking in devmem_is_allowed() passes
incorrectly. Although the accessing is prevented later because ioremap()
isn't allowed to map system RAM, it is a potential security issue. During
command executing, the following warning is reported in the kernel log for
calling ioremap() on system RAM.
ioremap on RAM at 0x0000000490000000 - 0x0000000490000fff
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 416 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:216 __ioremap_caller.constprop.0+0x131/0x35d
Call Trace:
memremap+0xcb/0x184
xlate_dev_mem_ptr+0x25/0x2f
write_mem+0x94/0xfb
vfs_write+0x128/0x26d
ksys_write+0xac/0xfe
do_syscall_64+0x9a/0xfd
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
The details of command execution process are as follows. In the above
resource tree, "System RAM" is a descendant of "CXL Window 0" instead of a
top level resource. So, region_intersects() will report no System RAM
resources in the CXL memory region incorrectly, because it only checks the
top level resources. Consequently, devmem_is_allowed() will return 1
(allow access via /dev/mem) for CXL memory region incorrectly.
Fortunately, ioremap() doesn't allow to map System RAM and reject the
access.
So, region_intersects() needs to be fixed to work correctly with the
resource tree with "System RAM" not at top level as above. To fix it, if
we found a unmatched resource in the top level, we will continue to search
matched resources in its descendant resources. So, we will not miss any
matched resources in resource tree anymore.
In the new implementation, an example resource tree
|------------- "CXL Window 0" ------------|
|-- "System RAM" --|
will behave similar as the following fake resource tree for
region_intersects(, IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM, ),
|-- "System RAM" --||-- "CXL Window 0a" --|
Where "CXL Window 0a" is part of the original "CXL Window 0" that
isn't covered by "System RAM".
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240906030713.204292-2-ying.huang@intel.com
Fixes: c221c0b0308f ("device-dax: "Hotplug" persistent memory for use like normal RAM")
Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>
Cc: Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>
Cc: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 62c0b1061593d7012292f781f11145b2d46f43ab upstream.
In perf_adjust_period, we will first calculate period, and then use
this period to calculate delta. However, when delta is less than 0,
there will be a deviation compared to when delta is greater than or
equal to 0. For example, when delta is in the range of [-14,-1], the
range of delta = delta + 7 is between [-7,6], so the final value of
delta/8 is 0. Therefore, the impact of -1 and -2 will be ignored.
This is unacceptable when the target period is very short, because
we will lose a lot of samples.
Here are some tests and analyzes:
before:
# perf record -e cs -F 1000 ./a.out
[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
[ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.022 MB perf.data (518 samples) ]
# perf script
...
a.out 396 257.956048: 23 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 396 257.957891: 23 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 396 257.959730: 23 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 396 257.961545: 23 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 396 257.963355: 23 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 396 257.965163: 23 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 396 257.966973: 23 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 396 257.968785: 23 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 396 257.970593: 23 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
...
after:
# perf record -e cs -F 1000 ./a.out
[ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
[ perf record: Captured and wrote 0.058 MB perf.data (1466 samples) ]
# perf script
...
a.out 395 59.338813: 11 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 395 59.339707: 12 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 395 59.340682: 13 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 395 59.341751: 13 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 395 59.342799: 12 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 395 59.343765: 11 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 395 59.344651: 11 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 395 59.345539: 12 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
a.out 395 59.346502: 13 cs: ffffffff81f4eeec schedul>
...
test.c
int main() {
for (int i = 0; i < 20000; i++)
usleep(10);
return 0;
}
# time ./a.out
real 0m1.583s
user 0m0.040s
sys 0m0.298s
The above results were tested on x86-64 qemu with KVM enabled using
test.c as test program. Ideally, we should have around 1500 samples,
but the previous algorithm had only about 500, whereas the modified
algorithm now has about 1400. Further more, the new version shows 1
sample per 0.001s, while the previous one is 1 sample per 0.002s.This
indicates that the new algorithm is more sensitive to small negative
values compared to old algorithm.
Fixes: bd2b5b12849a ("perf_counter: More aggressive frequency adjustment")
Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240831074316.2106159-2-luogengkun@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit cfa7f3d2c526c224a6271cc78a4a27a0de06f4f0 ]
When tracing user functions with uprobe functionality, it's common to
install the probe (e.g., a BPF program) at the first instruction of the
function. This is often going to be `push %rbp` instruction in function
preamble, which means that within that function frame pointer hasn't
been established yet. This leads to consistently missing an actual
caller of the traced function, because perf_callchain_user() only
records current IP (capturing traced function) and then following frame
pointer chain (which would be caller's frame, containing the address of
caller's caller).
So when we have target_1 -> target_2 -> target_3 call chain and we are
tracing an entry to target_3, captured stack trace will report
target_1 -> target_3 call chain, which is wrong and confusing.
This patch proposes a x86-64-specific heuristic to detect `push %rbp`
(`push %ebp` on 32-bit architecture) instruction being traced. Given
entire kernel implementation of user space stack trace capturing works
under assumption that user space code was compiled with frame pointer
register (%rbp/%ebp) preservation, it seems pretty reasonable to use
this instruction as a strong indicator that this is the entry to the
function. In that case, return address is still pointed to by %rsp/%esp,
so we fetch it and add to stack trace before proceeding to unwind the
rest using frame pointer-based logic.
We also check for `endbr64` (for 64-bit modes) as another common pattern
for function entry, as suggested by Josh Poimboeuf. Even if we get this
wrong sometimes for uprobes attached not at the function entry, it's OK
because stack trace will still be overall meaningful, just with one
extra bogus entry. If we don't detect this, we end up with guaranteed to
be missing caller function entry in the stack trace, which is worse
overall.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240729175223.23914-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 11377947b5861fa59bf77c827e1dd7c081842cc9 ]
Currently, if the rcuscale module's async module parameter is specified
for RCU implementations that do not have async primitives such as RCU
Tasks Rude (which now lacks a call_rcu_tasks_rude() function), there
will be a series of splats due to calls to a NULL pointer. This commit
therefore warns of this situation, but switches to non-async testing.
Signed-off-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraj.upadhyay@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 1d7f856c2ca449f04a22d876e36b464b7a9d28b6 ]
While commit 83ab38ef0a0b ("jump_label: Fix concurrency issues in
static_key_slow_dec()") fixed one problem, it created yet another,
notably the following is now possible:
slow_dec
if (try_dec) // dec_not_one-ish, false
// enabled == 1
slow_inc
if (inc_not_disabled) // inc_not_zero-ish
// enabled == 2
return
guard((mutex)(&jump_label_mutex);
if (atomic_cmpxchg(1,0)==1) // false, we're 2
slow_dec
if (try-dec) // dec_not_one, true
// enabled == 1
return
else
try_dec() // dec_not_one, false
WARN
Use dec_and_test instead of cmpxchg(), like it was prior to
83ab38ef0a0b. Add a few WARNs for the paranoid.
Fixes: 83ab38ef0a0b ("jump_label: Fix concurrency issues in static_key_slow_dec()")
Reported-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9bc2ff871f00437ad2f10c1eceff51aaa72b478f ]
Make the code more obvious and add proper comments to avoid future head
scratching.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240610124406.548322963@linutronix.de
Stable-dep-of: 1d7f856c2ca4 ("jump_label: Fix static_key_slow_dec() yet again")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit fe513c2ef0a172a58f158e2e70465c4317f0a9a2 ]
static_call_module_notify() triggers a WARN_ON(), when memory allocation
fails in __static_call_add_module().
That's not really justified, because the failure case must be correctly
handled by the well known call chain and the error code is passed
through to the initiating userspace application.
A memory allocation fail is not a fatal problem, but the WARN_ON() takes
the machine out when panic_on_warn is set.
Replace it with a pr_warn().
Fixes: 9183c3f9ed71 ("static_call: Add inline static call infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/8734mf7pmb.ffs@tglx
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4b30051c4864234ec57290c3d142db7c88f10d8a ]
Module insertion invokes static_call_add_module() to initialize the static
calls in a module. static_call_add_module() invokes __static_call_init(),
which allocates a struct static_call_mod to either encapsulate the built-in
static call sites of the associated key into it so further modules can be
added or to append the module to the module chain.
If that allocation fails the function returns with an error code and the
module core invokes static_call_del_module() to clean up eventually added
static_call_mod entries.
This works correctly, when all keys used by the module were converted over
to a module chain before the failure. If not then static_call_del_module()
causes a #GP as it blindly assumes that key::mods points to a valid struct
static_call_mod.
The problem is that key::mods is not a individual struct member of struct
static_call_key, it's part of a union to save space:
union {
/* bit 0: 0 = mods, 1 = sites */
unsigned long type;
struct static_call_mod *mods;
struct static_call_site *sites;
};
key::sites is a pointer to the list of built-in usage sites of the static
call. The type of the pointer is differentiated by bit 0. A mods pointer
has the bit clear, the sites pointer has the bit set.
As static_call_del_module() blidly assumes that the pointer is a valid
static_call_mod type, it fails to check for this failure case and
dereferences the pointer to the list of built-in call sites, which is
obviously bogus.
Cure it by checking whether the key has a sites or a mods pointer.
If it's a sites pointer then the key is not to be touched. As the sites are
walked in the same order as in __static_call_init() the site walk can be
terminated because all subsequent sites have not been touched by the init
code due to the error exit.
If it was converted before the allocation fail, then the inner loop which
searches for a module match will find nothing.
A fail in the second allocation in __static_call_init() is harmless and
does not require special treatment. The first allocation succeeded and
converted the key to a module chain. That first entry has mod::mod == NULL
and mod::next == NULL, so the inner loop of static_call_del_module() will
neither find a module match nor a module chain. The next site in the walk
was either already converted, but can't match the module, or it will exit
the outer loop because it has a static_call_site pointer and not a
static_call_mod pointer.
Fixes: 9183c3f9ed71 ("static_call: Add inline static call infrastructure")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230915082126.4187913-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com
Reported-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87zfon6b0s.ffs@tglx
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit f34d086fb7102fec895fd58b9e816b981b284c17 upstream.
module.c was renamed to main.c, but the Makefile directive was copy-pasted
verbatim with the old file name. Fix up the file name.
Fixes: cfc1d277891e ("module: Move all into module/")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/bc0cf790b4839c5e38e2fafc64271f620568a39e.1718092070.git.dvyukov@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a6f88ac32c6e63e69c595bfae220d8641704c9b7 upstream.
There is a deadlock scenario between lockdep and rcu when
rcu nocb feature is enabled, just as following call stack:
rcuop/x
-000|queued_spin_lock_slowpath(lock = 0xFFFFFF817F2A8A80, val = ?)
-001|queued_spin_lock(inline) // try to hold nocb_gp_lock
-001|do_raw_spin_lock(lock = 0xFFFFFF817F2A8A80)
-002|__raw_spin_lock_irqsave(inline)
-002|_raw_spin_lock_irqsave(lock = 0xFFFFFF817F2A8A80)
-003|wake_nocb_gp_defer(inline)
-003|__call_rcu_nocb_wake(rdp = 0xFFFFFF817F30B680)
-004|__call_rcu_common(inline)
-004|call_rcu(head = 0xFFFFFFC082EECC28, func = ?)
-005|call_rcu_zapped(inline)
-005|free_zapped_rcu(ch = ?)// hold graph lock
-006|rcu_do_batch(rdp = 0xFFFFFF817F245680)
-007|nocb_cb_wait(inline)
-007|rcu_nocb_cb_kthread(arg = 0xFFFFFF817F245680)
-008|kthread(_create = 0xFFFFFF80803122C0)
-009|ret_from_fork(asm)
rcuop/y
-000|queued_spin_lock_slowpath(lock = 0xFFFFFFC08291BBC8, val = 0)
-001|queued_spin_lock()
-001|lockdep_lock()
-001|graph_lock() // try to hold graph lock
-002|lookup_chain_cache_add()
-002|validate_chain()
-003|lock_acquire
-004|_raw_spin_lock_irqsave(lock = 0xFFFFFF817F211D80)
-005|lock_timer_base(inline)
-006|mod_timer(inline)
-006|wake_nocb_gp_defer(inline)// hold nocb_gp_lock
-006|__call_rcu_nocb_wake(rdp = 0xFFFFFF817F2A8680)
-007|__call_rcu_common(inline)
-007|call_rcu(head = 0xFFFFFFC0822E0B58, func = ?)
-008|call_rcu_hurry(inline)
-008|rcu_sync_call(inline)
-008|rcu_sync_func(rhp = 0xFFFFFFC0822E0B58)
-009|rcu_do_batch(rdp = 0xFFFFFF817F266680)
-010|nocb_cb_wait(inline)
-010|rcu_nocb_cb_kthread(arg = 0xFFFFFF817F266680)
-011|kthread(_create = 0xFFFFFF8080363740)
-012|ret_from_fork(asm)
rcuop/x and rcuop/y are rcu nocb threads with the same nocb gp thread.
This patch release the graph lock before lockdep call_rcu.
Fixes: a0b0fd53e1e6 ("locking/lockdep: Free lock classes that are no longer in use")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Cc: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Zhiguo Niu <zhiguo.niu@unisoc.com>
Signed-off-by: Xuewen Yan <xuewen.yan@unisoc.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240620225436.3127927-1-cmllamas@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 9a22b2812393d93d84358a760c347c21939029a6 upstream.
When submitting more than 2^32 padata objects to padata_do_serial, the
current sorting implementation incorrectly sorts padata objects with
overflowed seq_nr, causing them to be placed before existing objects in
the reorder list. This leads to a deadlock in the serialization process
as padata_find_next cannot match padata->seq_nr and pd->processed
because the padata instance with overflowed seq_nr will be selected
next.
To fix this, we use an unsigned integer wrap around to correctly sort
padata objects in scenarios with integer overflow.
Fixes: bfde23ce200e ("padata: unbind parallel jobs from specific CPUs")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Christian Gafert <christian.gafert@rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Gafert <christian.gafert@rohde-schwarz.com>
Co-developed-by: Max Ferger <max.ferger@rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: Max Ferger <max.ferger@rohde-schwarz.com>
Signed-off-by: Van Giang Nguyen <vangiang.nguyen@rohde-schwarz.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4b3786a6c5397dc220b1483d8e2f4867743e966f ]
For all non-tracing helpers which formerly had ARG_PTR_TO_{LONG,INT} as input
arguments, zero the value for the case of an error as otherwise it could leak
memory. For tracing, it is not needed given CAP_PERFMON can already read all
kernel memory anyway hence bpf_get_func_arg() and bpf_get_func_ret() is skipped
in here.
Also, the MTU helpers mtu_len pointer value is being written but also read.
Technically, the MEM_UNINIT should not be there in order to always force init.
Removing MEM_UNINIT needs more verifier rework though: MEM_UNINIT right now
implies two things actually: i) write into memory, ii) memory does not have
to be initialized. If we lift MEM_UNINIT, it then becomes: i) read into memory,
ii) memory must be initialized. This means that for bpf_*_check_mtu() we're
readding the issue we're trying to fix, that is, it would then be able to
write back into things like .rodata BPF maps. Follow-up work will rework the
MEM_UNINIT semantics such that the intent can be better expressed. For now
just clear the *mtu_len on error path which can be lifted later again.
Fixes: 8a67f2de9b1d ("bpf: expose bpf_strtol and bpf_strtoul to all program types")
Fixes: d7a4cb9b6705 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_strtol and bpf_strtoul helpers")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/e5edd241-59e7-5e39-0ee5-a51e31b6840a@iogearbox.net
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240913191754.13290-5-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 18752d73c1898fd001569195ba4b0b8c43255f4a ]
When checking malformed helper function signatures, also take other argument
types into account aside from just ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM.
This concerns (formerly) ARG_PTR_TO_{INT,LONG} given uninitialized memory can
be passed there, too.
The func proto sanity check goes back to commit 435faee1aae9 ("bpf, verifier:
add ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK type"), and its purpose was to detect wrong func protos
which had more than just one MEM_UNINIT-tagged type as arguments.
The reason more than one is currently not supported is as we mark stack slots with
STACK_MISC in check_helper_call() in case of raw mode based on meta.access_size to
allow uninitialized stack memory to be passed to helpers when they just write into
the buffer.
Probing for base type as well as MEM_UNINIT tagging ensures that other types do not
get missed (as it used to be the case for ARG_PTR_TO_{INT,LONG}).
Fixes: 57c3bb725a3d ("bpf: Introduce ARG_PTR_TO_{INT,LONG} arg types")
Reported-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240913191754.13290-4-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit cfe69c50b05510b24e26ccb427c7cc70beafd6c1 ]
The bpf_strtol() and bpf_strtoul() helpers are currently broken on 32bit:
The argument type ARG_PTR_TO_LONG is BPF-side "long", not kernel-side "long"
and therefore always considered fixed 64bit no matter if 64 or 32bit underlying
architecture.
This contract breaks in case of the two mentioned helpers since their BPF_CALL
definition for the helpers was added with {unsigned,}long *res. Meaning, the
transition from BPF-side "long" (BPF program) to kernel-side "long" (BPF helper)
breaks here.
Both helpers call __bpf_strtoll() with "long long" correctly, but later assigning
the result into 32-bit "*(long *)" on 32bit architectures. From a BPF program
point of view, this means upper bits will be seen as uninitialised.
Therefore, fix both BPF_CALL signatures to {s,u}64 types to fix this situation.
Now, changing also uapi/bpf.h helper documentation which generates bpf_helper_defs.h
for BPF programs is tricky: Changing signatures there to __{s,u}64 would trigger
compiler warnings (incompatible pointer types passing 'long *' to parameter of type
'__s64 *' (aka 'long long *')) for existing BPF programs.
Leaving the signatures as-is would be fine as from BPF program point of view it is
still BPF-side "long" and thus equivalent to __{s,u}64 on 64 or 32bit underlying
architectures.
Note that bpf_strtol() and bpf_strtoul() are the only helpers with this issue.
Fixes: d7a4cb9b6705 ("bpf: Introduce bpf_strtol and bpf_strtoul helpers")
Reported-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/481fcec8-c12c-9abb-8ecb-76c71c009959@iogearbox.net
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240913191754.13290-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e16c7b07784f3fb03025939c4590b9a7c64970a7 ]
When analyzing a kernel waring message, Peter pointed out that there is a
race condition when the kworker is being frozen and falls into
try_to_freeze() with TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, which could trigger a
might_sleep() warning in try_to_freeze(). Although the root cause is not
related to freeze()[1], it is still worthy to fix this issue ahead.
One possible race scenario:
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
// kthread_worker_fn
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
suspend_freeze_processes()
freeze_processes
static_branch_inc(&freezer_active);
freeze_kernel_threads
pm_nosig_freezing = true;
if (work) { //false
__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
} else if (!freezing(current)) //false, been frozen
freezing():
if (static_branch_unlikely(&freezer_active))
if (pm_nosig_freezing)
return true;
schedule()
}
// state is still TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE
try_to_freeze()
might_sleep() <--- warning
Fix this by explicitly set the TASK_RUNNING before entering
try_to_freeze().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Zs2ZoAcUsZMX2B%2FI@chenyu5-mobl2/ [1]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240827112308.181081-1-yu.c.chen@intel.com
Fixes: b56c0d8937e6 ("kthread: implement kthread_worker")
Signed-off-by: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: David Gow <davidgow@google.com>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3d2786d65aaa954ebd3fcc033ada433e10da21c4 ]
In case of malformed relocation record of kind BPF_CORE_TYPE_ID_LOCAL
referencing a non-existing BTF type, function bpf_core_calc_relo_insn
would cause a null pointer deference.
Fix this by adding a proper check upper in call stack, as malformed
relocation records could be passed from user space.
Simplest reproducer is a program:
r0 = 0
exit
With a single relocation record:
.insn_off = 0, /* patch first instruction */
.type_id = 100500, /* this type id does not exist */
.access_str_off = 6, /* offset of string "0" */
.kind = BPF_CORE_TYPE_ID_LOCAL,
See the link for original reproducer or next commit for a test case.
Fixes: 74753e1462e7 ("libbpf: Replace btf__type_by_id() with btf_type_by_id().")
Reported-by: Liu RuiTong <cnitlrt@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAK55_s6do7C+DVwbwY_7nKfUz0YLDoiA1v6X3Y9+p0sWzipFSA@mail.gmail.com/
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240822080124.2995724-2-eddyz87@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9139f93209d1ffd7f489ab19dee01b7c3a1a43d2 ]
After a CPU is marked offline and until it reaches its final trip to
idle, rcuo has several opportunities to be woken up, either because
a callback has been queued in the meantime or because
rcutree_report_cpu_dead() has issued the final deferred NOCB wake up.
If RCU-boosting is enabled, RCU kthreads are set to SCHED_FIFO policy.
And if RT-bandwidth is enabled, the related hrtimer might be armed.
However this then happens after hrtimers have been migrated at the
CPUHP_AP_HRTIMERS_DYING stage, which is broken as reported by the
following warning:
Call trace:
enqueue_hrtimer+0x7c/0xf8
hrtimer_start_range_ns+0x2b8/0x300
enqueue_task_rt+0x298/0x3f0
enqueue_task+0x94/0x188
ttwu_do_activate+0xb4/0x27c
try_to_wake_up+0x2d8/0x79c
wake_up_process+0x18/0x28
__wake_nocb_gp+0x80/0x1a0
do_nocb_deferred_wakeup_common+0x3c/0xcc
rcu_report_dead+0x68/0x1ac
cpuhp_report_idle_dead+0x48/0x9c
do_idle+0x288/0x294
cpu_startup_entry+0x34/0x3c
secondary_start_kernel+0x138/0x158
Fix this with waking up rcuo using an IPI if necessary. Since the
existing API to deal with this situation only handles swait queue, rcuo
is only woken up from offline CPUs if it's not already waiting on a
grace period. In the worst case some callbacks will just wait for a
grace period to complete before being assigned to a subsequent one.
Reported-by: "Cheng-Jui Wang (王正睿)" <Cheng-Jui.Wang@mediatek.com>
Fixes: 5c0930ccaad5 ("hrtimers: Push pending hrtimers away from outgoing CPU earlier")
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraj.upadhyay@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 24cc57d8faaa4060fd58adf810b858fcfb71a02f ]
In the case where we are forcing the ps.chunk_size to be at least 1,
we are ignoring the caller's alignment.
Move the forcing of ps.chunk_size to be at least 1 before rounding it
up to caller's alignment, so that caller's alignment is honored.
While at it, use max() to force the ps.chunk_size to be at least 1 to
improve readability.
Fixes: 6d45e1c948a8 ("padata: Fix possible divide-by-0 panic in padata_mt_helper()")
Signed-off-by: Kamlesh Gurudasani <kamlesh@ti.com>
Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit e6c2f594ed961273479505b42040782820190305 upstream.
syzbot reported a warning in [1] with the following stacktrace:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5005 at kernel/bpf/btf.c:1988 btf_type_id_size+0x2d9/0x9d0 kernel/bpf/btf.c:1988
...
RIP: 0010:btf_type_id_size+0x2d9/0x9d0 kernel/bpf/btf.c:1988
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
map_check_btf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1024 [inline]
map_create+0x1157/0x1860 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1198
__sys_bpf+0x127f/0x5420 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5040
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5162 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5160 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x79/0xc0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5160
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
With the following btf
[1] DECL_TAG 'a' type_id=4 component_idx=-1
[2] PTR '(anon)' type_id=0
[3] TYPE_TAG 'a' type_id=2
[4] VAR 'a' type_id=3, linkage=static
and when the bpf_attr.btf_key_type_id = 1 (DECL_TAG),
the following WARN_ON_ONCE in btf_type_id_size() is triggered:
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!btf_type_is_modifier(size_type) &&
!btf_type_is_var(size_type)))
return NULL;
Note that 'return NULL' is the correct behavior as we don't want
a DECL_TAG type to be used as a btf_{key,value}_type_id even
for the case like 'DECL_TAG -> STRUCT'. So there
is no correctness issue here, we just want to silence warning.
To silence the warning, I added DECL_TAG as one of kinds in
btf_type_nosize() which will cause btf_type_id_size() returning
NULL earlier without the warning.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/000000000000e0df8d05fc75ba86@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+958967f249155967d42a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230530205029.264910-1-yhs@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Diogo Jahchan Koike <djahchankoike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 98f887f820c993e05a12e8aa816c80b8661d4c87 ]
On a ~2000 CPU powerpc system, hard lockups have been observed in the
workqueue code when stop_machine runs (in this case due to CPU hotplug).
This is due to lots of CPUs spinning in multi_cpu_stop, calling
touch_nmi_watchdog() which ends up calling wq_watchdog_touch().
wq_watchdog_touch() writes to the global variable wq_watchdog_touched,
and that can find itself in the same cacheline as other important
workqueue data, which slows down operations to the point of lockups.
In the case of the following abridged trace, worker_pool_idr was in
the hot line, causing the lockups to always appear at idr_find.
watchdog: CPU 1125 self-detected hard LOCKUP @ idr_find
Call Trace:
get_work_pool
__queue_work
call_timer_fn
run_timer_softirq
__do_softirq
do_softirq_own_stack
irq_exit
timer_interrupt
decrementer_common_virt
* interrupt: 900 (timer) at multi_cpu_stop
multi_cpu_stop
cpu_stopper_thread
smpboot_thread_fn
kthread
Fix this by having wq_watchdog_touch() only write to the line if the
last time a touch was recorded exceeds 1/4 of the watchdog threshold.
Reported-by: Srikar Dronamraju <srikar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 18e24deb1cc92f2068ce7434a94233741fbd7771 ]
Warn in the case it is called with cpu == -1. This does not appear
to happen anywhere.
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 2ab9d830262c132ab5db2f571003d80850d56b2a upstream.
Ole reported that event->mmap_mutex is strictly insufficient to
serialize the AUX buffer, add a per RB mutex to fully serialize it.
Note that in the lock order comment the perf_event::mmap_mutex order
was already wrong, that is, it nesting under mmap_lock is not new with
this patch.
Fixes: 45bfb2e50471 ("perf: Add AUX area to ring buffer for raw data streams")
Reported-by: Ole <ole@binarygecko.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e240b0fde52f33670d1336697c22d90a4fe33c84 upstream.
To prevent unitialized members, use kzalloc to allocate
the xol area.
Fixes: b059a453b1cf1 ("x86/vdso: Add mremap hook to vm_special_mapping")
Signed-off-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240903102313.3402529-1-svens@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 77aeb1b685f9db73d276bad4bb30d48505a6fd23 ]
For CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_WORK=y kernels sscs.work defined by
INIT_WORK_ONSTACK() is initialized by debug_object_init_on_stack() for
the debug check in __init_work() to work correctly.
But this lacks the counterpart to remove the tracked object from debug
objects again, which will cause a debug object warning once the stack is
freed.
Add the missing destroy_work_on_stack() invocation to cure that.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Zqiang <qiang.zhang1211@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240704065213.13559-1-qiang.zhang1211@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 54624acf8843375a6de3717ac18df3b5104c39c5 ]
The test thread will start N benchmark kthreads and then schedule out
until the test time finished and notify the benchmark kthreads to stop.
The benchmark kthreads will keep running until notified to stop.
There's a problem with current implementation when the benchmark
kthreads number is equal to the CPUs on a non-preemptible kernel:
since the scheduler will balance the kthreads across the CPUs and
when the test time's out the test thread won't get a chance to be
scheduled on any CPU then cannot notify the benchmark kthreads to stop.
This can be easily reproduced on a VM (simulated with 16 CPUs) with
PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY:
estuary:/mnt$ ./dma_map_benchmark -t 16 -s 1
rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
rcu: 10-...!: (5221 ticks this GP) idle=ed24/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=142/142 fqs=0
rcu: (t=5254 jiffies g=-559 q=45 ncpus=16)
rcu: rcu_sched kthread starved for 5255 jiffies! g-559 f0x0 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x0 ->cpu=12
rcu: Unless rcu_sched kthread gets sufficient CPU time, OOM is now expected behavior.
rcu: RCU grace-period kthread stack dump:
task:rcu_sched state:R running task stack:0 pid:16 tgid:16 ppid:2 flags:0x00000008
Call trace
__switch_to+0xec/0x138
__schedule+0x2f8/0x1080
schedule+0x30/0x130
schedule_timeout+0xa0/0x188
rcu_gp_fqs_loop+0x128/0x528
rcu_gp_kthread+0x1c8/0x208
kthread+0xec/0xf8
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Sending NMI from CPU 10 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 PID: 332 Comm: dma-map-benchma Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-vanilla-LSE #8
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : arm_smmu_cmdq_issue_cmdlist+0x218/0x730
lr : arm_smmu_cmdq_issue_cmdlist+0x488/0x730
sp : ffff80008748b630
x29: ffff80008748b630 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff80008748b780
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 000000000000bc70 x24: 000000000001bc70
x23: ffff0000c12af080 x22: 0000000000010000 x21: 000000000000ffff
x20: ffff80008748b700 x19: ffff0000c12af0c0 x18: 0000000000010000
x17: 0000000000000001 x16: 0000000000000040 x15: ffffffffffffffff
x14: 0001ffffffffffff x13: 000000000000ffff x12: 00000000000002f1
x11: 000000000001ffff x10: 0000000000000031 x9 : ffff800080b6b0b8
x8 : ffff0000c2a48000 x7 : 000000000001bc71 x6 : 0001800000000000
x5 : 00000000000002f1 x4 : 01ffffffffffffff x3 : 000000000009aaf1
x2 : 0000000000000018 x1 : 000000000000000f x0 : ffff0000c12af18c
Call trace:
arm_smmu_cmdq_issue_cmdlist+0x218/0x730
__arm_smmu_tlb_inv_range+0xe0/0x1a8
arm_smmu_iotlb_sync+0xc0/0x128
__iommu_dma_unmap+0x248/0x320
iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x5c/0xe8
dma_unmap_page_attrs+0x38/0x1d0
map_benchmark_thread+0x118/0x2c0
kthread+0xec/0xf8
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Solve this by adding scheduling point in the kthread loop,
so if there're other threads in the system they may have
a chance to run, especially the thread to notify the test
end. However this may degrade the test concurrency so it's
recommended to run this on an idle system.
Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Acked-by: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 57b56d16800e8961278ecff0dc755d46c4575092 ]
The writing of css->cgroup associated with the cgroup root in
rebind_subsystems() is currently protected only by cgroup_mutex.
However, the reading of css->cgroup in both proc_cpuset_show() and
proc_cgroup_show() is protected just by css_set_lock. That makes the
readers susceptible to racing problems like data tearing or caching.
It is also a problem that can be reported by KCSAN.
This can be fixed by using READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() to access
css->cgroup. Alternatively, the writing of css->cgroup can be moved
under css_set_lock as well which is done by this patch.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 49aa8a1f4d6800721c7971ed383078257f12e8f9 upstream.
In __tracing_open(), when max latency tracers took place on the cpu,
the time start of its buffer would be updated, then event entries with
timestamps being earlier than start of the buffer would be skipped
(see tracing_iter_reset()).
Softlockup will occur if the kernel is non-preemptible and too many
entries were skipped in the loop that reset every cpu buffer, so add
cond_resched() to avoid it.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2f26ebd549b9a ("tracing: use timestamp to determine start of latency traces")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240827124654.3817443-1-zhengyejian@huaweicloud.com
Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d33d26036a0274b472299d7dcdaa5fb34329f91b upstream.
rt_mutex_handle_deadlock() is called with rt_mutex::wait_lock held. In the
good case it returns with the lock held and in the deadlock case it emits a
warning and goes into an endless scheduling loop with the lock held, which
triggers the 'scheduling in atomic' warning.
Unlock rt_mutex::wait_lock in the dead lock case before issuing the warning
and dropping into the schedule for ever loop.
[ tglx: Moved unlock before the WARN(), removed the pointless comment,
massaged changelog, added Fixes tag ]
Fixes: 3d5c9340d194 ("rtmutex: Handle deadlock detection smarter")
Signed-off-by: Roland Xu <mu001999@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ME0P300MB063599BEF0743B8FA339C2CECC802@ME0P300MB0635.AUSP300.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit ea72ce5da22806d5713f3ffb39a6d5ae73841f93 upstream.
iounmap() on x86 occasionally fails to unmap because the provided valid
ioremap address is not below high_memory. It turned out that this
happens due to KASLR.
KASLR uses the full address space between PAGE_OFFSET and vaddr_end to
randomize the starting points of the direct map, vmalloc and vmemmap
regions. It thereby limits the size of the direct map by using the
installed memory size plus an extra configurable margin for hot-plug
memory. This limitation is done to gain more randomization space
because otherwise only the holes between the direct map, vmalloc,
vmemmap and vaddr_end would be usable for randomizing.
The limited direct map size is not exposed to the rest of the kernel, so
the memory hot-plug and resource management related code paths still
operate under the assumption that the available address space can be
determined with MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS.
request_free_mem_region() allocates from (1 << MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS) - 1
downwards. That means the first allocation happens past the end of the
direct map and if unlucky this address is in the vmalloc space, which
causes high_memory to become greater than VMALLOC_START and consequently
causes iounmap() to fail for valid ioremap addresses.
MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS cannot be changed for that because the randomization
does not align with address bit boundaries and there are other places
which actually require to know the maximum number of address bits. All
remaining usage sites of MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS have been analyzed and found
to be correct.
Cure this by exposing the end of the direct map via PHYSMEM_END and use
that for the memory hot-plug and resource management related places
instead of relying on MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS. In the KASLR case PHYSMEM_END
maps to a variable which is initialized by the KASLR initialization and
otherwise it is based on MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS as before.
To prevent future hickups add a check into add_pages() to catch callers
trying to add memory above PHYSMEM_END.
Fixes: 0483e1fa6e09 ("x86/mm: Implement ASLR for kernel memory regions")
Reported-by: Max Ramanouski <max8rr8@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-By: Max Ramanouski <max8rr8@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87ed6soy3z.ffs@tglx
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e4f78057291608f6968a6789c5ebb3bde7d95504 ]
The bypass lock contention mitigation assumes there can be at most
2 contenders on the bypass lock, following this scheme:
1) One kthread takes the bypass lock
2) Another one spins on it and increment the contended counter
3) A third one (a bypass enqueuer) sees the contended counter on and
busy loops waiting on it to decrement.
However this assumption is wrong. There can be only one CPU to find the
lock contended because call_rcu() (the bypass enqueuer) is the only
bypass lock acquire site that may not already hold the NOCB lock
beforehand, all the other sites must first contend on the NOCB lock.
Therefore step 2) is impossible.
The other problem is that the mitigation assumes that contenders all
belong to the same rdp CPU, which is also impossible for a raw spinlock.
In theory the warning could trigger if the enqueuer holds the bypass
lock and another CPU flushes the bypass queue concurrently but this is
prevented from all flush users:
1) NOCB kthreads only flush if they successfully _tried_ to lock the
bypass lock. So no contention management here.
2) Flush on callbacks migration happen remotely when the CPU is offline.
No concurrency against bypass enqueue.
3) Flush on deoffloading happen either locally with IRQs disabled or
remotely when the CPU is not yet online. No concurrency against
bypass enqueue.
4) Flush on barrier entrain happen either locally with IRQs disabled or
remotely when the CPU is offline. No concurrency against
bypass enqueue.
For those reasons, the bypass lock contention mitigation isn't needed
and is even wrong. Remove it but keep the warning reporting a contended
bypass lock on a remote CPU, to keep unexpected contention awareness.
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bd44ca3de49cc1badcff7a96010fa2c64f04868c ]
Currently the dma debugging code can end up indirectly calling printk
under the radix_lock. This happens when a radix tree node allocation
fails.
This is a problem because the printk code, when used together with
netconsole, can end up inside the dma debugging code while trying to
transmit a message over netcons.
This creates the possibility of either a circular deadlock on the same
CPU, with that CPU trying to grab the radix_lock twice, or an ABBA
deadlock between different CPUs, where one CPU grabs the console lock
first and then waits for the radix_lock, while the other CPU is holding
the radix_lock and is waiting for the console lock.
The trace captured by lockdep is of the ABBA variant.
-> #2 (&dma_entry_hash[i].lock){-.-.}-{2:2}:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x5a/0x90
debug_dma_map_page+0x79/0x180
dma_map_page_attrs+0x1d2/0x2f0
bnxt_start_xmit+0x8c6/0x1540
netpoll_start_xmit+0x13f/0x180
netpoll_send_skb+0x20d/0x320
netpoll_send_udp+0x453/0x4a0
write_ext_msg+0x1b9/0x460
console_flush_all+0x2ff/0x5a0
console_unlock+0x55/0x180
vprintk_emit+0x2e3/0x3c0
devkmsg_emit+0x5a/0x80
devkmsg_write+0xfd/0x180
do_iter_readv_writev+0x164/0x1b0
vfs_writev+0xf9/0x2b0
do_writev+0x6d/0x110
do_syscall_64+0x80/0x150
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
-> #0 (console_owner){-.-.}-{0:0}:
__lock_acquire+0x15d1/0x31a0
lock_acquire+0xe8/0x290
console_flush_all+0x2ea/0x5a0
console_unlock+0x55/0x180
vprintk_emit+0x2e3/0x3c0
_printk+0x59/0x80
warn_alloc+0x122/0x1b0
__alloc_pages_slowpath+0x1101/0x1120
__alloc_pages+0x1eb/0x2c0
alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x150
new_slab+0x2dc/0x4e0
___slab_alloc+0xdcb/0x1390
kmem_cache_alloc+0x23d/0x360
radix_tree_node_alloc+0x3c/0xf0
radix_tree_insert+0xf5/0x230
add_dma_entry+0xe9/0x360
dma_map_page_attrs+0x1d2/0x2f0
__bnxt_alloc_rx_frag+0x147/0x180
bnxt_alloc_rx_data+0x79/0x160
bnxt_rx_skb+0x29/0xc0
bnxt_rx_pkt+0xe22/0x1570
__bnxt_poll_work+0x101/0x390
bnxt_poll+0x7e/0x320
__napi_poll+0x29/0x160
net_rx_action+0x1e0/0x3e0
handle_softirqs+0x190/0x510
run_ksoftirqd+0x4e/0x90
smpboot_thread_fn+0x1a8/0x270
kthread+0x102/0x120
ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x40
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
This bug is more likely than it seems, because when one CPU has run out
of memory, chances are the other has too.
The good news is, this bug is hidden behind the CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG, so
not many users are likely to trigger it.
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Reported-by: Konstantin Ovsepian <ovs@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5a830bbce3af16833fe0092dec47b6dd30279825 ]
The hrtimer function callback must not be NULL. It has to be specified by
the call side but it is not validated by the hrtimer code. When a hrtimer
is queued without a function callback, the kernel crashes with a null
pointer dereference when trying to execute the callback in __run_hrtimer().
Introduce a validation before queuing the hrtimer in
hrtimer_start_range_ns().
[anna-maria: Rephrase commit message]
Signed-off-by: Phil Chang <phil.chang@mediatek.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d0304569fb019d1bcfbbbce1ce6df6b96f04079b ]
Kernel timekeeping is designed to keep the change in cycles (since the last
timer interrupt) below max_cycles, which prevents multiplication overflow
when converting cycles to nanoseconds. However, if timer interrupts stop,
the clocksource_cyc2ns() calculation will eventually overflow.
Add protection against that. Simplify by folding together
clocksource_delta() and clocksource_cyc2ns() into cycles_to_nsec_safe().
Check against max_cycles, falling back to a slower higher precision
calculation.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325064023.2997-20-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 56c2cb10120894be40c40a9bf0ce798da14c50f6 ]
During CPU-down hotplug, hrtimers may migrate to isolated CPUs,
compromising CPU isolation.
Address this issue by masking valid CPUs for hrtimers using
housekeeping_cpumask(HK_TYPE_TIMER).
Suggested-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Costa Shulyupin <costa.shul@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240222200856.569036-1-costa.shul@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d24f05987ce8bf61e62d86fedbe47523dc5c3393 ]
Use css directly instead of dereferencing it from &cgroup->self, while
adding the cgroup v2 cft base and psi files in css_populate_dir(). Both
points to the same css, when css->ss is NULL, this avoids extra deferences
and makes code consistent in usage across the function.
Signed-off-by: Kamalesh Babulal <kamalesh.babulal@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0ae9942f03d0d034fdb0a4f44fc99f62a3107987 ]
When using rcutorture as a module, there are a number of conditions that
can abort the modprobe operation, for example, when attempting to run
both RCU CPU stall warning tests and forward-progress tests. This can
cause rcu_torture_cleanup() to be invoked on the unwind path out of
rcu_rcu_torture_init(), which will mean that rcu_gp_slow_unregister()
is invoked without a matching rcu_gp_slow_register(). This will cause
a splat because rcu_gp_slow_unregister() is passed rcu_fwd_cb_nodelay,
which does not match a NULL pointer.
This commit therefore forgives a mismatch involving a NULL pointer, thus
avoiding this false-positive splat.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2cbc482d325ee58001472c4359b311958c4efdd1 ]
When a structure containing an RCU callback rhp is (incorrectly) freed
and reallocated after rhp is passed to call_rcu(), it is not unusual for
rhp->func to be set to NULL. This defeats the debugging prints used by
__call_rcu_common() in kernels built with CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_RCU_HEAD=y,
which expect to identify the offending code using the identity of this
function.
And in kernels build without CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_RCU_HEAD=y, things
are even worse, as can be seen from this splat:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0
... ...
PC is at 0x0
LR is at rcu_do_batch+0x1c0/0x3b8
... ...
(rcu_do_batch) from (rcu_core+0x1d4/0x284)
(rcu_core) from (__do_softirq+0x24c/0x344)
(__do_softirq) from (__irq_exit_rcu+0x64/0x108)
(__irq_exit_rcu) from (irq_exit+0x8/0x10)
(irq_exit) from (__handle_domain_irq+0x74/0x9c)
(__handle_domain_irq) from (gic_handle_irq+0x8c/0x98)
(gic_handle_irq) from (__irq_svc+0x5c/0x94)
(__irq_svc) from (arch_cpu_idle+0x20/0x3c)
(arch_cpu_idle) from (default_idle_call+0x4c/0x78)
(default_idle_call) from (do_idle+0xf8/0x150)
(do_idle) from (cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20)
(cpu_startup_entry) from (0xc01530)
This commit therefore adds calls to mem_dump_obj(rhp) to output some
information, for example:
slab kmalloc-256 start ffff410c45019900 pointer offset 0 size 256
This provides the rough size of the memory block and the offset of the
rcu_head structure, which as least provides at least a few clues to help
locate the problem. If the problem is reproducible, additional slab
debugging can be enabled, for example, CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB=y, which can
provide significantly more information.
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 59f2f841179aa6a0899cb9cf53659149a35749b7 ]
syzbot reported the following lock sequence:
cpu 2:
grabs timer_base lock
spins on bpf_lpm lock
cpu 1:
grab rcu krcp lock
spins on timer_base lock
cpu 0:
grab bpf_lpm lock
spins on rcu krcp lock
bpf_lpm lock can be the same.
timer_base lock can also be the same due to timer migration.
but rcu krcp lock is always per-cpu, so it cannot be the same lock.
Hence it's a false positive.
To avoid lockdep complaining move kfree_rcu() after spin_unlock.
Reported-by: syzbot+1fa663a2100308ab6eab@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240329171439.37813-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 896880ff30866f386ebed14ab81ce1ad3710cfc4 ]
Replace deprecated 0-length array in struct bpf_lpm_trie_key with
flexible array. Found with GCC 13:
../kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:207:51: warning: array subscript i is outside array bounds of 'const __u8[0]' {aka 'const unsigned char[]'} [-Warray-bounds=]
207 | *(__be16 *)&key->data[i]);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
../include/uapi/linux/swab.h:102:54: note: in definition of macro '__swab16'
102 | #define __swab16(x) (__u16)__builtin_bswap16((__u16)(x))
| ^
../include/linux/byteorder/generic.h:97:21: note: in expansion of macro '__be16_to_cpu'
97 | #define be16_to_cpu __be16_to_cpu
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~
../kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:206:28: note: in expansion of macro 'be16_to_cpu'
206 | u16 diff = be16_to_cpu(*(__be16 *)&node->data[i]
^
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from ../include/linux/bpf.h:7:
../include/uapi/linux/bpf.h:82:17: note: while referencing 'data'
82 | __u8 data[0]; /* Arbitrary size */
| ^~~~
And found at run-time under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:218:49
index 0 is out of range for type '__u8 [*]'
Changing struct bpf_lpm_trie_key is difficult since has been used by
userspace. For example, in Cilium:
struct egress_gw_policy_key {
struct bpf_lpm_trie_key lpm_key;
__u32 saddr;
__u32 daddr;
};
While direct references to the "data" member haven't been found, there
are static initializers what include the final member. For example,
the "{}" here:
struct egress_gw_policy_key in_key = {
.lpm_key = { 32 + 24, {} },
.saddr = CLIENT_IP,
.daddr = EXTERNAL_SVC_IP & 0Xffffff,
};
To avoid the build time and run time warnings seen with a 0-sized
trailing array for struct bpf_lpm_trie_key, introduce a new struct
that correctly uses a flexible array for the trailing bytes,
struct bpf_lpm_trie_key_u8. As part of this, include the "header"
portion (which is just the "prefixlen" member), so it can be used
by anything building a bpf_lpr_trie_key that has trailing members that
aren't a u8 flexible array (like the self-test[1]), which is named
struct bpf_lpm_trie_key_hdr.
Unfortunately, C++ refuses to parse the __struct_group() helper, so
it is not possible to define struct bpf_lpm_trie_key_hdr directly in
struct bpf_lpm_trie_key_u8, so we must open-code the union directly.
Adjust the kernel code to use struct bpf_lpm_trie_key_u8 through-out,
and for the selftest to use struct bpf_lpm_trie_key_hdr. Add a comment
to the UAPI header directing folks to the two new options.
Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Closes: https://paste.debian.net/hidden/ca500597/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202206281009.4332AA33@keescook/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240222155612.it.533-kees@kernel.org
Stable-dep-of: 59f2f841179a ("bpf: Avoid kfree_rcu() under lock in bpf_lpm_trie.")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b69f0aeb068980af983d399deafc7477cec8bc04 ]
For pid namespaces, struct pid uses a dynamically sized array member,
"numbers". This was implemented using the ancient 1-element fake
flexible array, which has been deprecated for decades.
Replace it with a C99 flexible array, refactor the array size
calculations to use struct_size(), and address elements via indexes.
Note that the static initializer (which defines a single element) works
as-is, and requires no special handling.
Without this, CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS (and potentially
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE) will trigger bounds checks:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230517-bushaltestelle-super-e223978c1ba6@brauner
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+ac3b41786a2d0565b6d5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
[brauner: dropped unrelated changes and remove 0 with NULL cast]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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