From 278311e417be60f7caef6fcb12bda4da2711ceff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kairui Song Date: Mon, 21 Jan 2019 17:59:29 +0800 Subject: kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify This patch allows the kexec_file_load syscall to verify the PE signed kernel image signature based on the preboot keys stored in the .platform keyring, as fall back, if the signature verification failed due to not finding the public key in the secondary or builtin keyrings. This commit adds a VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING similar to previous VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING indicating that verify_pkcs7_signature should verify the signature using platform keyring. Also, decrease the error message log level when verification failed with -ENOKEY, so that if called tried multiple time with different keyring it won't generate extra noises. Signed-off-by: Kairui Song Cc: David Howells Acked-by: Dave Young (for kexec_file_load part) [zohar@linux.ibm.com: tweaked the first paragraph of the patch description, and fixed checkpatch warning.] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/verification.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h index cfa4730d607a..018fb5f13d44 100644 --- a/include/linux/verification.h +++ b/include/linux/verification.h @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ * should be used. */ #define VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ((struct key *)1UL) +#define VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ((struct key *)2UL) /* * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put. -- cgit v1.2.3 From fdb2410f7702f25f82804a261f90ad03422bd2c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mimi Zohar Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2019 14:06:49 -0600 Subject: ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call If tmpfiles can be made persistent, then newly created tmpfiles need to be treated like any other new files in policy. This patch indicates which newly created tmpfiles are in policy, causing the file hash to be calculated on __fput(). Reported-by: Ignaz Forster [rgoldwyn@suse.com: Call ima_post_create_tmpfile() in vfs_tmpfile() as opposed to do_tmpfile(). This will help the case for overlayfs where copy_up is denied while overwriting a file.] Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- fs/namei.c | 1 + include/linux/ima.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 914178cdbe94..373a7ec4b09d 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -3462,6 +3462,7 @@ struct dentry *vfs_tmpfile(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, int open_flag) inode->i_state |= I_LINKABLE; spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); } + ima_post_create_tmpfile(inode); return child; out_err: diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index b5e16b8c50b7..dc12fbcf484c 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct linux_binprm; #ifdef CONFIG_IMA extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask); +extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode); extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); extern int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id); @@ -56,6 +57,10 @@ static inline int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) return 0; } +static inline void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode) +{ +} + static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file) { return; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 4ffac4f5c647..357edd140c09 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -396,6 +396,33 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); +/** + * ima_post_create_tmpfile - mark newly created tmpfile as new + * @file : newly created tmpfile + * + * No measuring, appraising or auditing of newly created tmpfiles is needed. + * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created + * tmpfiles are in policy. + */ +void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + int must_appraise; + + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK); + if (!must_appraise) + return; + + /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */ + iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); + if (!iint) + return; + + /* needed for writing the security xattrs */ + set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); + iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; +} + /** * ima_post_path_mknod - mark as a new inode * @dentry: newly created dentry @@ -413,9 +440,13 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) if (!must_appraise) return; + /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */ iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); - if (iint) - iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; + if (!iint) + return; + + /* needed for re-opening empty files */ + iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; } /** -- cgit v1.2.3