From 37e4b8df27bc68340f3fc80dbb27e3549c7f881c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jianheng Zhang Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 03:22:03 +0000 Subject: net: stmmac: fix FPE events losing The status bits of register MAC_FPE_CTRL_STS are clear on read. Using 32-bit read for MAC_FPE_CTRL_STS in dwmac5_fpe_configure() and dwmac5_fpe_send_mpacket() clear the status bits. Then the stmmac interrupt handler missing FPE event status and leads to FPE handshaking failure and retries. To avoid clear status bits of MAC_FPE_CTRL_STS in dwmac5_fpe_configure() and dwmac5_fpe_send_mpacket(), add fpe_csr to stmmac_fpe_cfg structure to cache the control bits of MAC_FPE_CTRL_STS and to avoid reading MAC_FPE_CTRL_STS in those methods. Fixes: 5a5586112b92 ("net: stmmac: support FPE link partner hand-shaking procedure") Reviewed-by: Serge Semin Signed-off-by: Jianheng Zhang Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CY5PR12MB637225A7CF529D5BE0FBE59CBF81A@CY5PR12MB6372.namprd12.prod.outlook.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- include/linux/stmmac.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/stmmac.h b/include/linux/stmmac.h index 0b4658a7eceb..dee5ad6e48c5 100644 --- a/include/linux/stmmac.h +++ b/include/linux/stmmac.h @@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ struct stmmac_fpe_cfg { bool hs_enable; /* FPE handshake enable */ enum stmmac_fpe_state lp_fpe_state; /* Link Partner FPE state */ enum stmmac_fpe_state lo_fpe_state; /* Local station FPE state */ + u32 fpe_csr; /* MAC_FPE_CTRL_STS reg cache */ }; struct stmmac_safety_feature_cfg { -- cgit v1.2.3 From 7037d95a047cd89b1f680eed253c6ab586bef1ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kelly Kane Date: Sat, 2 Dec 2023 17:17:12 -0800 Subject: r8152: add vendor/device ID pair for ASUS USB-C2500 The ASUS USB-C2500 is an RTL8156 based 2.5G Ethernet controller. Add the vendor and product ID values to the driver. This makes Ethernet work with the adapter. Signed-off-by: Kelly Kane Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231203011712.6314-1-kelly@hawknetworks.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- drivers/net/usb/r8152.c | 1 + include/linux/usb/r8152.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c b/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c index fcdc9ba0f826..9bf2140fd0a1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/r8152.c @@ -10049,6 +10049,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id rtl8152_table[] = { { USB_DEVICE(VENDOR_ID_NVIDIA, 0x09ff) }, { USB_DEVICE(VENDOR_ID_TPLINK, 0x0601) }, { USB_DEVICE(VENDOR_ID_DLINK, 0xb301) }, + { USB_DEVICE(VENDOR_ID_ASUS, 0x1976) }, {} }; diff --git a/include/linux/usb/r8152.h b/include/linux/usb/r8152.h index 287e9d83fb8b..33a4c146dc19 100644 --- a/include/linux/usb/r8152.h +++ b/include/linux/usb/r8152.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #define VENDOR_ID_NVIDIA 0x0955 #define VENDOR_ID_TPLINK 0x2357 #define VENDOR_ID_DLINK 0x2001 +#define VENDOR_ID_ASUS 0x0b05 #if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_USB_RTL8152) extern u8 rtl8152_get_version(struct usb_interface *intf); -- cgit v1.2.3 From 9396c4ee93f9ac03cd0cea0bb345fbc657772943 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dmitry Safonov Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2023 19:00:44 +0000 Subject: net/tcp: Don't store TCP-AO maclen on reqsk This extra check doesn't work for a handshake when SYN segment has (current_key.maclen != rnext_key.maclen). It could be amended to preserve rnext_key.maclen instead of current_key.maclen, but that requires a lookup on listen socket. Originally, this extra maclen check was introduced just because it was cheap. Drop it and convert tcp_request_sock::maclen into boolean tcp_request_sock::used_tcp_ao. Fixes: 06b22ef29591 ("net/tcp: Wire TCP-AO to request sockets") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni --- include/linux/tcp.h | 8 ++------ net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 5 +++-- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 9 +++------ 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h index 68f3d315d2e1..b646b574b060 100644 --- a/include/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/linux/tcp.h @@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ struct tcp_request_sock { #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AO u8 ao_keyid; u8 ao_rcv_next; - u8 maclen; + bool used_tcp_ao; #endif }; @@ -180,14 +180,10 @@ static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk(const struct request_sock *req) static inline bool tcp_rsk_used_ao(const struct request_sock *req) { - /* The real length of MAC is saved in the request socket, - * signing anything with zero-length makes no sense, so here is - * a little hack.. - */ #ifndef CONFIG_TCP_AO return false; #else - return tcp_rsk(req)->maclen != 0; + return tcp_rsk(req)->used_tcp_ao; #endif } diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c index 18dacfef7a07..f8308d3f565e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ao.c @@ -851,7 +851,7 @@ void tcp_ao_syncookie(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcp_ao_hdr *aoh; struct tcp_ao_key *key; - treq->maclen = 0; + treq->used_tcp_ao = false; if (tcp_parse_auth_options(th, NULL, &aoh) || !aoh) return; @@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ void tcp_ao_syncookie(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, treq->ao_rcv_next = aoh->keyid; treq->ao_keyid = aoh->rnext_keyid; - treq->maclen = tcp_ao_maclen(key); + treq->used_tcp_ao = true; } static enum skb_drop_reason diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index bcb55d98004c..337c8bb07ccc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -7182,11 +7182,12 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, if (tcp_parse_auth_options(tcp_hdr(skb), NULL, &aoh)) goto drop_and_release; /* Invalid TCP options */ if (aoh) { - tcp_rsk(req)->maclen = aoh->length - sizeof(struct tcp_ao_hdr); + tcp_rsk(req)->used_tcp_ao = true; tcp_rsk(req)->ao_rcv_next = aoh->keyid; tcp_rsk(req)->ao_keyid = aoh->rnext_keyid; + } else { - tcp_rsk(req)->maclen = 0; + tcp_rsk(req)->used_tcp_ao = false; } #endif tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn = isn; diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 93eef1dbbc55..f5ef15e1d9ac 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -3720,7 +3720,6 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst, if (tcp_rsk_used_ao(req)) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_AO struct tcp_ao_key *ao_key = NULL; - u8 maclen = tcp_rsk(req)->maclen; u8 keyid = tcp_rsk(req)->ao_keyid; ao_key = tcp_sk(sk)->af_specific->ao_lookup(sk, req_to_sk(req), @@ -3730,13 +3729,11 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst, * for another peer-matching key, but the peer has requested * ao_keyid (RFC5925 RNextKeyID), so let's keep it simple here. */ - if (unlikely(!ao_key || tcp_ao_maclen(ao_key) != maclen)) { - u8 key_maclen = ao_key ? tcp_ao_maclen(ao_key) : 0; - + if (unlikely(!ao_key)) { rcu_read_unlock(); kfree_skb(skb); - net_warn_ratelimited("TCP-AO: the keyid %u with maclen %u|%u from SYN packet is not present - not sending SYNACK\n", - keyid, maclen, key_maclen); + net_warn_ratelimited("TCP-AO: the keyid %u from SYN packet is not present - not sending SYNACK\n", + keyid); return NULL; } key.ao_key = ao_key; -- cgit v1.2.3 From 4b7de801606e504e69689df71475d27e35336fb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiri Olsa Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 09:30:40 +0100 Subject: bpf: Fix prog_array_map_poke_run map poke update Lee pointed out issue found by syscaller [0] hitting BUG in prog array map poke update in prog_array_map_poke_run function due to error value returned from bpf_arch_text_poke function. There's race window where bpf_arch_text_poke can fail due to missing bpf program kallsym symbols, which is accounted for with check for -EINVAL in that BUG_ON call. The problem is that in such case we won't update the tail call jump and cause imbalance for the next tail call update check which will fail with -EBUSY in bpf_arch_text_poke. I'm hitting following race during the program load: CPU 0 CPU 1 bpf_prog_load bpf_check do_misc_fixups prog_array_map_poke_track map_update_elem bpf_fd_array_map_update_elem prog_array_map_poke_run bpf_arch_text_poke returns -EINVAL bpf_prog_kallsyms_add After bpf_arch_text_poke (CPU 1) fails to update the tail call jump, the next poke update fails on expected jump instruction check in bpf_arch_text_poke with -EBUSY and triggers the BUG_ON in prog_array_map_poke_run. Similar race exists on the program unload. Fixing this by moving the update to bpf_arch_poke_desc_update function which makes sure we call __bpf_arch_text_poke that skips the bpf address check. Each architecture has slightly different approach wrt looking up bpf address in bpf_arch_text_poke, so instead of splitting the function or adding new 'checkip' argument in previous version, it seems best to move the whole map_poke_run update as arch specific code. [0] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=97a4fe20470e9bc30810 Fixes: ebf7d1f508a7 ("bpf, x64: rework pro/epilogue and tailcall handling in JIT") Reported-by: syzbot+97a4fe20470e9bc30810@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Yonghong Song Cc: Lee Jones Cc: Maciej Fijalkowski Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231206083041.1306660-2-jolsa@kernel.org --- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/bpf.h | 3 +++ kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 58 ++++++++------------------------------------- 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) (limited to 'include/linux') diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 8c10d9abc239..e89e415aa743 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -3025,3 +3025,49 @@ void arch_bpf_stack_walk(bool (*consume_fn)(void *cookie, u64 ip, u64 sp, u64 bp #endif WARN(1, "verification of programs using bpf_throw should have failed\n"); } + +void bpf_arch_poke_desc_update(struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke, + struct bpf_prog *new, struct bpf_prog *old) +{ + u8 *old_addr, *new_addr, *old_bypass_addr; + int ret; + + old_bypass_addr = old ? NULL : poke->bypass_addr; + old_addr = old ? (u8 *)old->bpf_func + poke->adj_off : NULL; + new_addr = new ? (u8 *)new->bpf_func + poke->adj_off : NULL; + + /* + * On program loading or teardown, the program's kallsym entry + * might not be in place, so we use __bpf_arch_text_poke to skip + * the kallsyms check. + */ + if (new) { + ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target, + BPF_MOD_JUMP, + old_addr, new_addr); + BUG_ON(ret < 0); + if (!old) { + ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass, + BPF_MOD_JUMP, + poke->bypass_addr, + NULL); + BUG_ON(ret < 0); + } + } else { + ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass, + BPF_MOD_JUMP, + old_bypass_addr, + poke->bypass_addr); + BUG_ON(ret < 0); + /* let other CPUs finish the execution of program + * so that it will not possible to expose them + * to invalid nop, stack unwind, nop state + */ + if (!ret) + synchronize_rcu(); + ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target, + BPF_MOD_JUMP, + old_addr, NULL); + BUG_ON(ret < 0); + } +} diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index 6762dac3ef76..cff5bb08820e 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -3175,6 +3175,9 @@ enum bpf_text_poke_type { int bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t, void *addr1, void *addr2); +void bpf_arch_poke_desc_update(struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke, + struct bpf_prog *new, struct bpf_prog *old); + void *bpf_arch_text_copy(void *dst, void *src, size_t len); int bpf_arch_text_invalidate(void *dst, size_t len); diff --git a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c index 2058e89b5ddd..c85ff9162a5c 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c @@ -1012,11 +1012,16 @@ static void prog_array_map_poke_untrack(struct bpf_map *map, mutex_unlock(&aux->poke_mutex); } +void __weak bpf_arch_poke_desc_update(struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke, + struct bpf_prog *new, struct bpf_prog *old) +{ + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); +} + static void prog_array_map_poke_run(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key, struct bpf_prog *old, struct bpf_prog *new) { - u8 *old_addr, *new_addr, *old_bypass_addr; struct prog_poke_elem *elem; struct bpf_array_aux *aux; @@ -1025,7 +1030,7 @@ static void prog_array_map_poke_run(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key, list_for_each_entry(elem, &aux->poke_progs, list) { struct bpf_jit_poke_descriptor *poke; - int i, ret; + int i; for (i = 0; i < elem->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) { poke = &elem->aux->poke_tab[i]; @@ -1044,21 +1049,10 @@ static void prog_array_map_poke_run(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key, * activated, so tail call updates can arrive from here * while JIT is still finishing its final fixup for * non-activated poke entries. - * 3) On program teardown, the program's kallsym entry gets - * removed out of RCU callback, but we can only untrack - * from sleepable context, therefore bpf_arch_text_poke() - * might not see that this is in BPF text section and - * bails out with -EINVAL. As these are unreachable since - * RCU grace period already passed, we simply skip them. - * 4) Also programs reaching refcount of zero while patching + * 3) Also programs reaching refcount of zero while patching * is in progress is okay since we're protected under * poke_mutex and untrack the programs before the JIT - * buffer is freed. When we're still in the middle of - * patching and suddenly kallsyms entry of the program - * gets evicted, we just skip the rest which is fine due - * to point 3). - * 5) Any other error happening below from bpf_arch_text_poke() - * is a unexpected bug. + * buffer is freed. */ if (!READ_ONCE(poke->tailcall_target_stable)) continue; @@ -1068,39 +1062,7 @@ static void prog_array_map_poke_run(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key, poke->tail_call.key != key) continue; - old_bypass_addr = old ? NULL : poke->bypass_addr; - old_addr = old ? (u8 *)old->bpf_func + poke->adj_off : NULL; - new_addr = new ? (u8 *)new->bpf_func + poke->adj_off : NULL; - - if (new) { - ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target, - BPF_MOD_JUMP, - old_addr, new_addr); - BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL); - if (!old) { - ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass, - BPF_MOD_JUMP, - poke->bypass_addr, - NULL); - BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL); - } - } else { - ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass, - BPF_MOD_JUMP, - old_bypass_addr, - poke->bypass_addr); - BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL); - /* let other CPUs finish the execution of program - * so that it will not possible to expose them - * to invalid nop, stack unwind, nop state - */ - if (!ret) - synchronize_rcu(); - ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target, - BPF_MOD_JUMP, - old_addr, NULL); - BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL); - } + bpf_arch_poke_desc_update(poke, new, old); } } } -- cgit v1.2.3