// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Adiantum length-preserving encryption mode * * Copyright 2018 Google LLC */ /* * Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode designed for fast * and secure disk encryption, especially on CPUs without dedicated crypto * instructions. Adiantum encrypts each sector using the XChaCha12 stream * cipher, two passes of an ε-almost-∆-universal (ε-∆U) hash function based on * NH and Poly1305, and an invocation of the AES-256 block cipher on a single * 16-byte block. See the paper for details: * * Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors * (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) * * For flexibility, this implementation also allows other ciphers: * * - Stream cipher: XChaCha12 or XChaCha20 * - Block cipher: any with a 128-bit block size and 256-bit key */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * Size of right-hand part of input data, in bytes; also the size of the block * cipher's block size and the hash function's output. */ #define BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE 16 /* Size of the block cipher key (K_E) in bytes */ #define BLOCKCIPHER_KEY_SIZE 32 /* Size of the hash key (K_H) in bytes */ #define HASH_KEY_SIZE (2 * POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE + NH_KEY_BYTES) /* * The specification allows variable-length tweaks, but Linux's crypto API * currently only allows algorithms to support a single length. The "natural" * tweak length for Adiantum is 16, since that fits into one Poly1305 block for * the best performance. But longer tweaks are useful for fscrypt, to avoid * needing to derive per-file keys. So instead we use two blocks, or 32 bytes. */ #define TWEAK_SIZE 32 struct adiantum_instance_ctx { struct crypto_skcipher_spawn streamcipher_spawn; struct crypto_cipher_spawn blockcipher_spawn; }; struct adiantum_tfm_ctx { struct crypto_skcipher *streamcipher; struct crypto_cipher *blockcipher; struct poly1305_core_key header_hash_key; struct poly1305_core_key msg_poly_key; u32 nh_key[NH_KEY_WORDS]; }; struct nhpoly1305_ctx { /* Running total of polynomial evaluation */ struct poly1305_state poly_state; /* Partial block buffer */ u8 buffer[NH_MESSAGE_UNIT]; unsigned int buflen; /* * Number of bytes remaining until the current NH message reaches * NH_MESSAGE_BYTES. When nonzero, 'nh_hash' holds the partial NH hash. */ unsigned int nh_remaining; __le64 nh_hash[NH_NUM_PASSES]; }; struct adiantum_request_ctx { /* * skcipher sub-request size is unknown at compile-time, so it needs to * go after the members with known sizes. */ union { struct nhpoly1305_ctx hash_ctx; struct skcipher_request streamcipher_req; } u; }; /* * Given the XChaCha stream key K_S, derive the block cipher key K_E and the * hash key K_H as follows: * * K_E || K_H || ... = XChaCha(key=K_S, nonce=1||0^191) * * Note that this denotes using bits from the XChaCha keystream, which here we * get indirectly by encrypting a buffer containing all 0's. */ static int adiantum_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) { struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); struct { u8 iv[XCHACHA_IV_SIZE]; u8 derived_keys[BLOCKCIPHER_KEY_SIZE + HASH_KEY_SIZE]; struct scatterlist sg; struct crypto_wait wait; struct skcipher_request req; /* must be last */ } *data; u8 *keyp; int err; /* Set the stream cipher key (K_S) */ crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tctx->streamcipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tctx->streamcipher, crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tctx->streamcipher, key, keylen); if (err) return err; /* Derive the subkeys */ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data) + crypto_skcipher_reqsize(tctx->streamcipher), GFP_KERNEL); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; data->iv[0] = 1; sg_init_one(&data->sg, data->derived_keys, sizeof(data->derived_keys)); crypto_init_wait(&data->wait); skcipher_request_set_tfm(&data->req, tctx->streamcipher); skcipher_request_set_callback(&data->req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, crypto_req_done, &data->wait); skcipher_request_set_crypt(&data->req, &data->sg, &data->sg, sizeof(data->derived_keys), data->iv); err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&data->req), &data->wait); if (err) goto out; keyp = data->derived_keys; /* Set the block cipher key (K_E) */ crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tctx->blockcipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); crypto_cipher_set_flags(tctx->blockcipher, crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tctx->blockcipher, keyp, BLOCKCIPHER_KEY_SIZE); if (err) goto out; keyp += BLOCKCIPHER_KEY_SIZE; /* Set the hash key (K_H) */ poly1305_core_setkey(&tctx->header_hash_key, keyp); keyp += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; poly1305_core_setkey(&tctx->msg_poly_key, keyp); keyp += POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE; for (int i = 0; i < NH_KEY_WORDS; i++) tctx->nh_key[i] = get_unaligned_le32(&keyp[i * 4]); keyp += NH_KEY_BYTES; WARN_ON(keyp != &data->derived_keys[ARRAY_SIZE(data->derived_keys)]); out: kfree_sensitive(data); return err; } /* Addition in Z/(2^{128}Z) */ static inline void le128_add(le128 *r, const le128 *v1, const le128 *v2) { u64 x = le64_to_cpu(v1->b); u64 y = le64_to_cpu(v2->b); r->b = cpu_to_le64(x + y); r->a = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(v1->a) + le64_to_cpu(v2->a) + (x + y < x)); } /* Subtraction in Z/(2^{128}Z) */ static inline void le128_sub(le128 *r, const le128 *v1, const le128 *v2) { u64 x = le64_to_cpu(v1->b); u64 y = le64_to_cpu(v2->b); r->b = cpu_to_le64(x - y); r->a = cpu_to_le64(le64_to_cpu(v1->a) - le64_to_cpu(v2->a) - (x - y > x)); } /* * Apply the Poly1305 ε-∆U hash function to (bulk length, tweak) and save the * result to @out. This is the calculation * * H_T ← Poly1305_{K_T}(bin_{128}(|L|) || T) * * from the procedure in section 6.4 of the Adiantum paper. The resulting value * is reused in both the first and second hash steps. Specifically, it's added * to the result of an independently keyed ε-∆U hash function (for equal length * inputs only) taken over the left-hand part (the "bulk") of the message, to * give the overall Adiantum hash of the (tweak, left-hand part) pair. */ static void adiantum_hash_header(struct skcipher_request *req, le128 *out) { struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); const struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); const unsigned int bulk_len = req->cryptlen - BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE; struct { __le64 message_bits; __le64 padding; } header = { .message_bits = cpu_to_le64((u64)bulk_len * 8) }; struct poly1305_state state; poly1305_core_init(&state); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(header) % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE != 0); poly1305_core_blocks(&state, &tctx->header_hash_key, &header, sizeof(header) / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1); BUILD_BUG_ON(TWEAK_SIZE % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE != 0); poly1305_core_blocks(&state, &tctx->header_hash_key, req->iv, TWEAK_SIZE / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1); poly1305_core_emit(&state, NULL, out); } /* Pass the next NH hash value through Poly1305 */ static void process_nh_hash_value(struct nhpoly1305_ctx *ctx, const struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *key) { static_assert(NH_HASH_BYTES % POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE == 0); poly1305_core_blocks(&ctx->poly_state, &key->msg_poly_key, ctx->nh_hash, NH_HASH_BYTES / POLY1305_BLOCK_SIZE, 1); } /* * Feed the next portion of the message data, as a whole number of 16-byte * "NH message units", through NH and Poly1305. Each NH hash is taken over * 1024 bytes, except possibly the final one which is taken over a multiple of * 16 bytes up to 1024. Also, in the case where data is passed in misaligned * chunks, we combine partial hashes; the end result is the same either way. */ static void nhpoly1305_units(struct nhpoly1305_ctx *ctx, const struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *key, const u8 *data, size_t len) { do { unsigned int bytes; if (ctx->nh_remaining == 0) { /* Starting a new NH message */ bytes = min(len, NH_MESSAGE_BYTES); nh(key->nh_key, data, bytes, ctx->nh_hash); ctx->nh_remaining = NH_MESSAGE_BYTES - bytes; } else { /* Continuing a previous NH message */ __le64 tmp_hash[NH_NUM_PASSES]; unsigned int pos; pos = NH_MESSAGE_BYTES - ctx->nh_remaining; bytes = min(len, ctx->nh_remaining); nh(&key->nh_key[pos / 4], data, bytes, tmp_hash); for (int i = 0; i < NH_NUM_PASSES; i++) le64_add_cpu(&ctx->nh_hash[i], le64_to_cpu(tmp_hash[i])); ctx->nh_remaining -= bytes; } if (ctx->nh_remaining == 0) process_nh_hash_value(ctx, key); data += bytes; len -= bytes; } while (len); } static void nhpoly1305_init(struct nhpoly1305_ctx *ctx) { poly1305_core_init(&ctx->poly_state); ctx->buflen = 0; ctx->nh_remaining = 0; } static void nhpoly1305_update(struct nhpoly1305_ctx *ctx, const struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *key, const u8 *data, size_t len) { unsigned int bytes; if (ctx->buflen) { bytes = min(len, (int)NH_MESSAGE_UNIT - ctx->buflen); memcpy(&ctx->buffer[ctx->buflen], data, bytes); ctx->buflen += bytes; if (ctx->buflen < NH_MESSAGE_UNIT) return; nhpoly1305_units(ctx, key, ctx->buffer, NH_MESSAGE_UNIT); ctx->buflen = 0; data += bytes; len -= bytes; } if (len >= NH_MESSAGE_UNIT) { bytes = round_down(len, NH_MESSAGE_UNIT); nhpoly1305_units(ctx, key, data, bytes); data += bytes; len -= bytes; } if (len) { memcpy(ctx->buffer, data, len); ctx->buflen = len; } } static void nhpoly1305_final(struct nhpoly1305_ctx *ctx, const struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *key, le128 *out) { if (ctx->buflen) { memset(&ctx->buffer[ctx->buflen], 0, NH_MESSAGE_UNIT - ctx->buflen); nhpoly1305_units(ctx, key, ctx->buffer, NH_MESSAGE_UNIT); } if (ctx->nh_remaining) process_nh_hash_value(ctx, key); poly1305_core_emit(&ctx->poly_state, NULL, out); } /* * Hash the left-hand part (the "bulk") of the message as follows: * * H_L ← Poly1305_{K_L}(NH_{K_N}(pad_{128}(L))) * * See section 6.4 of the Adiantum paper. This is an ε-almost-∆-universal * (ε-∆U) hash function for equal-length inputs over Z/(2^{128}Z), where the "∆" * operation is addition. It hashes 1024-byte chunks of the input with the NH * hash function, reducing the input length by 32x. The resulting NH hashes are * evaluated as a polynomial in GF(2^{130}-5), like in the Poly1305 MAC. Note * that the polynomial evaluation by itself would suffice to achieve the ε-∆U * property; NH is used for performance since it's much faster than Poly1305. */ static void adiantum_hash_message(struct skcipher_request *req, struct scatterlist *sgl, le128 *out) { struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); const struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); struct adiantum_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); unsigned int len = req->cryptlen - BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE; struct scatter_walk walk; nhpoly1305_init(&rctx->u.hash_ctx); scatterwalk_start(&walk, sgl); while (len) { unsigned int n = scatterwalk_next(&walk, len); nhpoly1305_update(&rctx->u.hash_ctx, tctx, walk.addr, n); scatterwalk_done_src(&walk, n); len -= n; } nhpoly1305_final(&rctx->u.hash_ctx, tctx, out); } static int adiantum_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, bool enc) { struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req); const struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); struct adiantum_request_ctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req); const unsigned int bulk_len = req->cryptlen - BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE; struct scatterlist *src = req->src, *dst = req->dst; /* * Buffer for right-hand part of data, i.e. * * P_L => P_M => C_M => C_R when encrypting, or * C_R => C_M => P_M => P_L when decrypting. * * Also used to build the IV for the stream cipher. */ union { u8 bytes[XCHACHA_IV_SIZE]; __le32 words[XCHACHA_IV_SIZE / sizeof(__le32)]; le128 bignum; /* interpret as element of Z/(2^{128}Z) */ } rbuf; le128 header_hash, msg_hash; unsigned int stream_len; int err; if (req->cryptlen < BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE) return -EINVAL; /* * First hash step * enc: P_M = P_R + H_{K_H}(T, P_L) * dec: C_M = C_R + H_{K_H}(T, C_L) */ adiantum_hash_header(req, &header_hash); if (src->length >= req->cryptlen && src->offset + req->cryptlen <= PAGE_SIZE) { /* Fast path for single-page source */ void *virt = kmap_local_page(sg_page(src)) + src->offset; nhpoly1305_init(&rctx->u.hash_ctx); nhpoly1305_update(&rctx->u.hash_ctx, tctx, virt, bulk_len); nhpoly1305_final(&rctx->u.hash_ctx, tctx, &msg_hash); memcpy(&rbuf.bignum, virt + bulk_len, sizeof(le128)); kunmap_local(virt); } else { /* Slow path that works for any source scatterlist */ adiantum_hash_message(req, src, &msg_hash); memcpy_from_sglist(&rbuf.bignum, src, bulk_len, sizeof(le128)); } le128_add(&rbuf.bignum, &rbuf.bignum, &header_hash); le128_add(&rbuf.bignum, &rbuf.bignum, &msg_hash); /* If encrypting, encrypt P_M with the block cipher to get C_M */ if (enc) crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tctx->blockcipher, rbuf.bytes, rbuf.bytes); /* Initialize the rest of the XChaCha IV (first part is C_M) */ BUILD_BUG_ON(BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE != 16); BUILD_BUG_ON(XCHACHA_IV_SIZE != 32); /* nonce || stream position */ rbuf.words[4] = cpu_to_le32(1); rbuf.words[5] = 0; rbuf.words[6] = 0; rbuf.words[7] = 0; /* * XChaCha needs to be done on all the data except the last 16 bytes; * for disk encryption that usually means 4080 or 496 bytes. But ChaCha * implementations tend to be most efficient when passed a whole number * of 64-byte ChaCha blocks, or sometimes even a multiple of 256 bytes. * And here it doesn't matter whether the last 16 bytes are written to, * as the second hash step will overwrite them. Thus, round the XChaCha * length up to the next 64-byte boundary if possible. */ stream_len = bulk_len; if (round_up(stream_len, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) <= req->cryptlen) stream_len = round_up(stream_len, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE); skcipher_request_set_tfm(&rctx->u.streamcipher_req, tctx->streamcipher); skcipher_request_set_crypt(&rctx->u.streamcipher_req, req->src, req->dst, stream_len, &rbuf); skcipher_request_set_callback(&rctx->u.streamcipher_req, req->base.flags, NULL, NULL); err = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(&rctx->u.streamcipher_req); if (err) return err; /* If decrypting, decrypt C_M with the block cipher to get P_M */ if (!enc) crypto_cipher_decrypt_one(tctx->blockcipher, rbuf.bytes, rbuf.bytes); /* * Second hash step * enc: C_R = C_M - H_{K_H}(T, C_L) * dec: P_R = P_M - H_{K_H}(T, P_L) */ le128_sub(&rbuf.bignum, &rbuf.bignum, &header_hash); if (dst->length >= req->cryptlen && dst->offset + req->cryptlen <= PAGE_SIZE) { /* Fast path for single-page destination */ struct page *page = sg_page(dst); void *virt = kmap_local_page(page) + dst->offset; nhpoly1305_init(&rctx->u.hash_ctx); nhpoly1305_update(&rctx->u.hash_ctx, tctx, virt, bulk_len); nhpoly1305_final(&rctx->u.hash_ctx, tctx, &msg_hash); le128_sub(&rbuf.bignum, &rbuf.bignum, &msg_hash); memcpy(virt + bulk_len, &rbuf.bignum, sizeof(le128)); flush_dcache_page(page); kunmap_local(virt); } else { /* Slow path that works for any destination scatterlist */ adiantum_hash_message(req, dst, &msg_hash); le128_sub(&rbuf.bignum, &rbuf.bignum, &msg_hash); memcpy_to_sglist(dst, bulk_len, &rbuf.bignum, sizeof(le128)); } return 0; } static int adiantum_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) { return adiantum_crypt(req, true); } static int adiantum_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) { return adiantum_crypt(req, false); } static int adiantum_init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) { struct skcipher_instance *inst = skcipher_alg_instance(tfm); struct adiantum_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst); struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); struct crypto_skcipher *streamcipher; struct crypto_cipher *blockcipher; int err; streamcipher = crypto_spawn_skcipher(&ictx->streamcipher_spawn); if (IS_ERR(streamcipher)) return PTR_ERR(streamcipher); blockcipher = crypto_spawn_cipher(&ictx->blockcipher_spawn); if (IS_ERR(blockcipher)) { err = PTR_ERR(blockcipher); goto err_free_streamcipher; } tctx->streamcipher = streamcipher; tctx->blockcipher = blockcipher; BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct adiantum_request_ctx, u) != sizeof(struct adiantum_request_ctx)); crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize( tfm, max(sizeof(struct adiantum_request_ctx), offsetofend(struct adiantum_request_ctx, u.streamcipher_req) + crypto_skcipher_reqsize(streamcipher))); return 0; err_free_streamcipher: crypto_free_skcipher(streamcipher); return err; } static void adiantum_exit_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) { struct adiantum_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); crypto_free_skcipher(tctx->streamcipher); crypto_free_cipher(tctx->blockcipher); } static void adiantum_free_instance(struct skcipher_instance *inst) { struct adiantum_instance_ctx *ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst); crypto_drop_skcipher(&ictx->streamcipher_spawn); crypto_drop_cipher(&ictx->blockcipher_spawn); kfree(inst); } /* * Check for a supported set of inner algorithms. * See the comment at the beginning of this file. */ static bool adiantum_supported_algorithms(struct skcipher_alg_common *streamcipher_alg, struct crypto_alg *blockcipher_alg) { if (strcmp(streamcipher_alg->base.cra_name, "xchacha12") != 0 && strcmp(streamcipher_alg->base.cra_name, "xchacha20") != 0) return false; if (blockcipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_min_keysize > BLOCKCIPHER_KEY_SIZE || blockcipher_alg->cra_cipher.cia_max_keysize < BLOCKCIPHER_KEY_SIZE) return false; if (blockcipher_alg->cra_blocksize != BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE) return false; return true; } static int adiantum_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) { u32 mask; struct skcipher_instance *inst; struct adiantum_instance_ctx *ictx; struct skcipher_alg_common *streamcipher_alg; struct crypto_alg *blockcipher_alg; int err; err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER, &mask); if (err) return err; inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ictx), GFP_KERNEL); if (!inst) return -ENOMEM; ictx = skcipher_instance_ctx(inst); /* Stream cipher, e.g. "xchacha12" */ err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ictx->streamcipher_spawn, skcipher_crypto_instance(inst), crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]), 0, mask | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC /* sync only */); if (err) goto err_free_inst; streamcipher_alg = crypto_spawn_skcipher_alg_common(&ictx->streamcipher_spawn); /* Block cipher, e.g. "aes" */ err = crypto_grab_cipher(&ictx->blockcipher_spawn, skcipher_crypto_instance(inst), crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[2]), 0, mask); if (err) goto err_free_inst; blockcipher_alg = crypto_spawn_cipher_alg(&ictx->blockcipher_spawn); /* * Originally there was an optional third parameter, for requesting a * specific implementation of "nhpoly1305" for message hashing. This is * no longer supported. The best implementation is just always used. */ if (crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[3]) != ERR_PTR(-ENOENT)) { err = -ENOENT; goto err_free_inst; } /* Check the set of algorithms */ if (!adiantum_supported_algorithms(streamcipher_alg, blockcipher_alg)) { pr_warn("Unsupported Adiantum instantiation: (%s,%s)\n", streamcipher_alg->base.cra_name, blockcipher_alg->cra_name); err = -EINVAL; goto err_free_inst; } /* Instance fields */ err = -ENAMETOOLONG; if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "adiantum(%s,%s)", streamcipher_alg->base.cra_name, blockcipher_alg->cra_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) goto err_free_inst; if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "adiantum(%s,%s)", streamcipher_alg->base.cra_driver_name, blockcipher_alg->cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) goto err_free_inst; inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = BLOCKCIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE; inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct adiantum_tfm_ctx); inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = streamcipher_alg->base.cra_alignmask; /* * The block cipher is only invoked once per message, so for long * messages (e.g. sectors for disk encryption) its performance doesn't * matter as much as that of the stream cipher. Thus, weigh the block * cipher's ->cra_priority less. */ inst->alg.base.cra_priority = (4 * streamcipher_alg->base.cra_priority + blockcipher_alg->cra_priority) / 5; inst->alg.setkey = adiantum_setkey; inst->alg.encrypt = adiantum_encrypt; inst->alg.decrypt = adiantum_decrypt; inst->alg.init = adiantum_init_tfm; inst->alg.exit = adiantum_exit_tfm; inst->alg.min_keysize = streamcipher_alg->min_keysize; inst->alg.max_keysize = streamcipher_alg->max_keysize; inst->alg.ivsize = TWEAK_SIZE; inst->free = adiantum_free_instance; err = skcipher_register_instance(tmpl, inst); if (err) { err_free_inst: adiantum_free_instance(inst); } return err; } /* adiantum(streamcipher_name, blockcipher_name) */ static struct crypto_template adiantum_tmpl = { .name = "adiantum", .create = adiantum_create, .module = THIS_MODULE, }; static int __init adiantum_module_init(void) { return crypto_register_template(&adiantum_tmpl); } static void __exit adiantum_module_exit(void) { crypto_unregister_template(&adiantum_tmpl); } module_init(adiantum_module_init); module_exit(adiantum_module_exit); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Adiantum length-preserving encryption mode"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); MODULE_AUTHOR("Eric Biggers "); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("adiantum"); MODULE_IMPORT_NS("CRYPTO_INTERNAL");