/*
 *  Capabilities Linux Security Module
 *
 *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
 *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
 *	the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
 *	(at your option) any later version.
 *
 */

#include <linux/config.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>

int cap_capable (struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
{
	/* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
	if (cap_raised (tsk->cap_effective, cap))
		return 0;
	else
		return -EPERM;
}

int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
{
	/* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
	if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
	    !capable (CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
		return -EPERM;
	else
		return 0;
}

int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
		kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
	/* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
	*effective = cap_t (target->cap_effective);
	*inheritable = cap_t (target->cap_inheritable);
	*permitted = cap_t (target->cap_permitted);
	return 0;
}

int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
		      kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
	/* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capset. */
	/* verify restrictions on target's new Inheritable set */
	if (!cap_issubset (*inheritable,
			   cap_combine (target->cap_inheritable,
					current->cap_permitted))) {
		return -EPERM;
	}

	/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
	if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
			   cap_combine (target->cap_permitted,
					current->cap_permitted))) {
		return -EPERM;
	}

	/* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
	if (!cap_issubset (*effective, *permitted)) {
		return -EPERM;
	}

	return 0;
}

void cap_capset_set (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
		     kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
	target->cap_effective = *effective;
	target->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
	target->cap_permitted = *permitted;
}

int cap_bprm_set_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
	/* Copied from fs/exec.c:prepare_binprm. */

	/* We don't have VFS support for capabilities yet */
	cap_clear (bprm->cap_inheritable);
	cap_clear (bprm->cap_permitted);
	cap_clear (bprm->cap_effective);

	/*  To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
	 *  executables under compatibility mode, we raise all three
	 *  capability sets for the file.
	 *
	 *  If only the real uid is 0, we only raise the inheritable
	 *  and permitted sets of the executable file.
	 */

	if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT)) {
		if (bprm->e_uid == 0 || current->uid == 0) {
			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_inheritable);
			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_permitted);
		}
		if (bprm->e_uid == 0)
			cap_set_full (bprm->cap_effective);
	}
	return 0;
}

/* Copied from fs/exec.c */
static inline int must_not_trace_exec (struct task_struct *p)
{
	return (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP);
}

void cap_bprm_compute_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
	/* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
	kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
	int do_unlock = 0;

	new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset);
	working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable,
				 current->cap_inheritable);
	new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working);

	if (!cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) {
		current->mm->dumpable = 0;

		lock_kernel ();
		if (must_not_trace_exec (current)
		    || atomic_read (&current->fs->count) > 1
		    || atomic_read (&current->files->count) > 1
		    || atomic_read (&current->sig->count) > 1) {
			if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) {
				new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted,
							       current->
							       cap_permitted);
			}
		}
		do_unlock = 1;
	}

	/* For init, we want to retain the capabilities set
	 * in the init_task struct. Thus we skip the usual
	 * capability rules */
	if (current->pid != 1) {
		current->cap_permitted = new_permitted;
		current->cap_effective =
		    cap_intersect (new_permitted, bprm->cap_effective);
	}

	/* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */

	if (do_unlock)
		unlock_kernel ();

	current->keep_capabilities = 0;
}

/* moved from kernel/sys.c. */
/* 
 * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
 * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
 *
 *  1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
 *  {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
 *  cleared.
 *
 *  2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
 *  capabilities of the process are cleared.
 *
 *  3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
 *  capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
 *
 *  fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should 
 *  never happen.
 *
 *  -astor 
 *
 * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
 * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
 * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
 * effective sets will be retained.
 * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
 * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
 * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
 * files..
 * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
 */
static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid (int old_ruid, int old_euid,
					int old_suid)
{
	if ((old_ruid == 0 || old_euid == 0 || old_suid == 0) &&
	    (current->uid != 0 && current->euid != 0 && current->suid != 0) &&
	    !current->keep_capabilities) {
		cap_clear (current->cap_permitted);
		cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
	}
	if (old_euid == 0 && current->euid != 0) {
		cap_clear (current->cap_effective);
	}
	if (old_euid != 0 && current->euid == 0) {
		current->cap_effective = current->cap_permitted;
	}
}

int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
			  int flags)
{
	switch (flags) {
	case LSM_SETID_RE:
	case LSM_SETID_ID:
	case LSM_SETID_RES:
		/* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setreuid/setuid/setresuid. */
		if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
			cap_emulate_setxuid (old_ruid, old_euid, old_suid);
		}
		break;
	case LSM_SETID_FS:
		{
			uid_t old_fsuid = old_ruid;

			/* Copied from kernel/sys.c:setfsuid. */

			/*
			 * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
			 *          if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
			 */

			if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
				if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
					cap_t (current->cap_effective) &=
					    ~CAP_FS_MASK;
				}
				if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
					cap_t (current->cap_effective) |=
					    (cap_t (current->cap_permitted) &
					     CAP_FS_MASK);
				}
			}
			break;
		}
	default:
		return -EINVAL;
	}

	return 0;
}

void cap_task_kmod_set_label (void)
{
	cap_set_full (current->cap_effective);
	return;
}

void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
{
	p->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
	p->cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET;
	p->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET;
	p->keep_capabilities = 0;
	return;
}

EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capable);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_ptrace);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capget);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capset_check);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_capset_set);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bprm_set_security);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bprm_compute_creds);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_post_setuid);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_kmod_set_label);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_task_reparent_to_init);

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY


static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
	.ptrace =			cap_ptrace,
	.capget =			cap_capget,
	.capset_check =			cap_capset_check,
	.capset_set =			cap_capset_set,
	.capable =			cap_capable,

	.bprm_compute_creds =		cap_bprm_compute_creds,
	.bprm_set_security =		cap_bprm_set_security,

	.task_post_setuid =		cap_task_post_setuid,
	.task_kmod_set_label =		cap_task_kmod_set_label,
	.task_reparent_to_init =	cap_task_reparent_to_init,
};

#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES_MODULE)
#define MY_NAME THIS_MODULE->name
#else
#define MY_NAME "capability"
#endif

/* flag to keep track of how we were registered */
static int secondary;


static int __init capability_init (void)
{
	/* register ourselves with the security framework */
	if (register_security (&capability_ops)) {
		printk (KERN_INFO
			"Failure registering capabilities with the kernel\n");
		/* try registering with primary module */
		if (mod_reg_security (MY_NAME, &capability_ops)) {
			printk (KERN_INFO "Failure registering capabilities "
				"with primary security module.\n");
			return -EINVAL;
		}
		secondary = 1;
	}
	printk (KERN_INFO "Capability LSM initialized\n");
	return 0;
}

static void __exit capability_exit (void)
{
	/* remove ourselves from the security framework */
	if (secondary) {
		if (mod_unreg_security (MY_NAME, &capability_ops))
			printk (KERN_INFO "Failure unregistering capabilities "
				"with primary module.\n");
		return;
	}

	if (unregister_security (&capability_ops)) {
		printk (KERN_INFO
			"Failure unregistering capabilities with the kernel\n");
	}
}

module_init (capability_init);
module_exit (capability_exit);

MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Standard Linux Capabilities Security Module");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY */