| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|---|
|
The majority of error exit cases in json_lex_string() failed to
set lex->token_terminator, causing problems for the error context
reporting code: it would see token_terminator less than token_start
and do something more or less nuts. In v14 and up the end result
could be as bad as a crash in report_json_context(). Older
versions accidentally avoided that fate; but all versions produce
error context lines that are far less useful than intended,
because they'd stop at the end of the prior token instead of
continuing to where the actually-bad input is.
To fix, invent some macros that make it less notationally painful
to do the right thing. Also add documentation about what the
function is actually required to do; and in >= v14, add an assertion
in report_json_context about token_terminator being sufficiently
far advanced.
Per report from Nikolay Shaplov. Back-patch to all supported
versions.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/7332649.x5DLKWyVIX@thinkpad-pgpro
|
|
This prevents marking the argument string for translation for gettext,
and it also prevents the given string (which is already translated) from
being translated at runtime.
Also, mark the strings used as arguments to check_rolespec_name for
translation.
Backpatch all the way back as appropriate. None of this is caught by
any tests (necessarily so), so I verified it manually.
|
|
An incorrectly-encoded multibyte character near the end of a string
could cause various processing loops to run past the string's
terminating NUL, with results ranging from no detectable issue to
a program crash, depending on what happens to be in the following
memory.
This isn't an issue in the server, because we take care to verify
the encoding of strings before doing any interesting processing
on them. However, that lack of care leaked into client-side code
which shouldn't assume that anyone has validated the encoding of
its input.
Although this is certainly a bug worth fixing, the PG security team
elected not to regard it as a security issue, primarily because
any untrusted text should be sanitized by PQescapeLiteral or
the like before being incorporated into a SQL or psql command.
(If an app fails to do so, the same technique can be used to
cause SQL injection, with probably much more dire consequences
than a mere client-program crash.) Those functions were already
made proof against this class of problem, cf CVE-2006-2313.
To fix, invent PQmblenBounded() which is like PQmblen() except it
won't return more than the number of bytes remaining in the string.
In HEAD we can make this a new libpq function, as PQmblen() is.
It seems imprudent to change libpq's API in stable branches though,
so in the back branches define PQmblenBounded as a macro in the files
that need it. (Note that just changing PQmblen's behavior would not
be a good idea; notably, it would completely break the escaping
functions' defense against this exact problem. So we just want a
version for those callers that don't have any better way of handling
this issue.)
Per private report from houjingyi. Back-patch to all supported branches.
|
|
Point to the specific line where the error was detected; the
previous code tended to include several preceding lines as well.
Avoid re-scanning the entire input to recompute which line that
was. Simplify the logic a bit. Add test cases.
Simon Riggs and Hamid Akhtar, reviewed by Daniel Gustafsson and myself
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CANbhV-EPBnXm3MF_TTWBwwqgn1a1Ghmep9VHfqmNBQ8BT0f+_g@mail.gmail.com
|
|
Backpatch-through: 9.5
|
|
Thomas Munro fixed a longstanding annoyance in pg_bsd_indent, that
it would misformat lines containing IsA() macros on the assumption
that the IsA() call should be treated like a cast. This improves
some other cases involving field/variable names that match typedefs,
too. The only places that get worse are a couple of uses of the
OpenSSL macro STACK_OF(); we'll gladly take that trade-off.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20200114221814.GA19630@alvherre.pgsql
|
|
Includes some manual cleanup of places that pgindent messed up,
most of which weren't per project style anyway.
Notably, it seems some people didn't absorb the style rules of
commit c9d297751, because there were a bunch of new occurrences
of function calls with a newline just after the left paren, all
with faulty expectations about how the rest of the call would get
indented.
|
|
SQL includes provisions for numeric Unicode escapes in string
literals and identifiers. Previously we only accepted those
if they represented ASCII characters or the server encoding
was UTF-8, making the conversion to internal form trivial.
This patch adjusts things so that we'll call the appropriate
encoding conversion function in less-trivial cases, allowing
the escape sequence to be accepted so long as it corresponds
to some character available in the server encoding.
This also applies to processing of Unicode escapes in JSONB.
However, the old restriction still applies to client-side
JSON processing, since that hasn't got access to the server's
encoding conversion infrastructure.
This patch includes some lexer infrastructure that simplifies
throwing errors with error cursors pointing into the middle of
a string (or other complex token). For the moment I only used
it for errors relating to Unicode escapes, but we might later
expand the usage to some other cases.
Patch by me, reviewed by John Naylor.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/2393.1578958316@sss.pgh.pa.us
|
|
To make this work, (1) makeJsonLexContextCstringLen now takes the
encoding to be used as an argument; (2) check_stack_depth() is made to
do nothing in frontend code, and (3) elog(ERROR, ...) is changed to
pg_log_fatal + exit in frontend code.
Mark Dilger, reviewed and slightly revised by me.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmoYfOXhd27MUDGioVh6QtpD0C1K-f6ObSA10AWiHBAL5bA@mail.gmail.com
|
