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author | Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> | 2024-05-20 20:22:02 +0000 |
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committer | Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> | 2024-05-21 12:33:08 -0700 |
commit | 75631a3cd84887657c634a35d1095f4a0884e48a (patch) | |
tree | abf405d3105dc1f7cda30c6e33bb9d77513f8a6b /merge-blobs.c | |
parent | 197a772c48652d94ddb340fc6bcd8ed4440ff233 (diff) |
Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning"
This defense-in-depth was intended to protect the clone operation
against future escalations where bugs in `git clone` would allow
attackers to write arbitrary files in the `.git/` directory would allow
for Remote Code Execution attacks via maliciously-placed hooks.
However, it turns out that the `core.hooksPath` protection has
unintentional side effects so severe that they do not justify the
benefit of the protections. For example, it has been reported in
https://lore.kernel.org/git/FAFA34CB-9732-4A0A-87FB-BDB272E6AEE8@alchemists.io/
that the following invocation, which is intended to make `git clone`
safer, is itself broken by that protective measure:
git clone --config core.hooksPath=/dev/null <url>
Since it turns out that the benefit does not justify the cost, let's revert
20f3588efc6 (core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning,
2024-03-30).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'merge-blobs.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions