diff options
| author | Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> | 2018-12-12 11:20:49 -0600 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-01-09 17:38:36 +0100 |
| commit | eb734900aa8341ee2d564ac0ab8a207f49e47cd3 (patch) | |
| tree | fedb36125b1821b1e51d768f8e49985e5520e4b3 /drivers | |
| parent | 56971d62c7591ea6dcec95b92c0762a6d1fa1ba9 (diff) | |
ALSA: emux: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerabilities
commit 4aea96f4237cea0c51a8bc87c0db31f0f932f1f0 upstream.
info.mode and info.port are indirectly controlled by user-space,
hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1
vulnerability.
These issues were detected with the help of Smatch:
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:72 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls' [w] (local cap)
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs' [w] (local cap)
sound/synth/emux/emux_hwdep.c:75 snd_emux_hwdep_misc_mode() warn: potential spectre issue 'emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls' [w] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing both info.mode and info.port before using them
to index emu->portptrs[i]->ctrls, emu->portptrs[info.port]->ctrls and
emu->portptrs.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions