diff options
| author | Andrew Morton <akpm@digeo.com> | 2003-05-25 01:12:07 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@home.transmeta.com> | 2003-05-25 01:12:07 -0700 |
| commit | 09d35c2a24ba41f7fe356e775ebe2dd6e2a48837 (patch) | |
| tree | 6b1130f37f9ce484422c1d2dd7d0ddb57a305738 /include | |
| parent | ea7870c8206312a84d65e1bc4bcae7290983597a (diff) | |
[PATCH] Process Attribute API for Security Modules (fixlet)
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
This patch, relative to the /proc/pid/attr patch against 2.5.69, fixes the
mode values of the /proc/pid/attr nodes to avoid interference by the normal
Linux access checks for these nodes (and also fixes the /proc/pid/attr/prev
mode to reflect its read-only nature).
Otherwise, when the dumpable flag is cleared by a set[ug]id or unreadable
executable, a process will lose the ability to set its own attributes via
writes to /proc/pid/attr due to a DAC failure (/proc/pid inodes are
assigned the root uid/gid if the task is not dumpable, and the original
mode only permitted the owner to write).
The security module should implement appropriate permission checking in its
[gs]etprocattr hook functions. In the case of SELinux, the setprocattr
hook function only allows a process to write to its own /proc/pid/attr
nodes as well as imposing other policy-based restrictions, and the
getprocattr hook function performs a permission check between the security
labels of the current process and target process to determine whether the
operation is permitted.
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
