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| author | Jon DeVree <nuxi@vault24.org> | 2019-04-19 23:35:16 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2019-05-31 06:46:18 -0700 |
| commit | 6fa6381a2da04ddd32fe98ffdb786c13b13cc194 (patch) | |
| tree | 7ffb8d93a2e8ea3b61b25109982f13c041c9fd88 /include | |
| parent | fec8a09f79ec1d96c2a1c1760b8acade1042312c (diff) | |
random: fix CRNG initialization when random.trust_cpu=1
[ Upstream commit fe6f1a6a8eedc1aa538fee0baa612b6a59639cf8 ]
When the system boots with random.trust_cpu=1 it doesn't initialize the
per-NUMA CRNGs because it skips the rest of the CRNG startup code. This
means that the code from 1e7f583af67b ("random: make /dev/urandom scalable
for silly userspace programs") is not used when random.trust_cpu=1.
crash> dmesg | grep random:
[ 0.000000] random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x94/0x530 with crng_init=0
[ 0.314029] random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)
crash> print crng_node_pool
$6 = (struct crng_state **) 0x0
After adding the missing call to numa_crng_init() the per-NUMA CRNGs are
initialized again:
crash> dmesg | grep random:
[ 0.000000] random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x94/0x530 with crng_init=0
[ 0.314031] random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)
crash> print crng_node_pool
$1 = (struct crng_state **) 0xffff9a915f4014a0
The call to invalidate_batched_entropy() was also missing. This is
important for architectures like PPC and S390 which only have the
arch_get_random_seed_* functions.
Fixes: 39a8883a2b98 ("random: add a config option to trust the CPU's hwrng")
Signed-off-by: Jon DeVree <nuxi@vault24.org>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
