ptr_ring: disable KCSAN warnings

Eric Dumazet reported KCSAN warnings:

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in pfifo_fast_dequeue / pfifo_fast_enqueue

write to 0xffff88811d5ccc00 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
__ptr_ring_zero_tail include/linux/ptr_ring.h:259 [inline]
__ptr_ring_discard_one include/linux/ptr_ring.h:291 [inline]
__ptr_ring_consume include/linux/ptr_ring.h:311 [inline]
__skb_array_consume include/linux/skb_array.h:98 [inline]
pfifo_fast_dequeue+0x770/0x8f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:770
dequeue_skb net/sched/sch_generic.c:297 [inline]
qdisc_restart net/sched/sch_generic.c:402 [inline]
__qdisc_run+0x189/0xc80 net/sched/sch_generic.c:420
qdisc_run include/net/pkt_sched.h:120 [inline]
net_tx_action+0x379/0x590 net/core/dev.c:5793
handle_softirqs+0xb9/0x280 kernel/softirq.c:622
do_softirq+0x45/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:523
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x70/0x80 kernel/softirq.c:450
local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
bpf_test_run+0x2db/0x620 net/bpf/test_run.c:426
bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x9a4/0xef0 net/bpf/test_run.c:1159
bpf_prog_test_run+0x204/0x340 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4721
__sys_bpf+0x52e/0x7e0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6246
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6341 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6339 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x41/0x50 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6339
x64_sys_call+0x10cb/0x3020 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:322
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x12c/0x370 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

read to 0xffff88811d5ccc00 of 8 bytes by task 22632 on cpu 1:
__ptr_ring_produce include/linux/ptr_ring.h:106 [inline]
ptr_ring_produce include/linux/ptr_ring.h:129 [inline]
skb_array_produce include/linux/skb_array.h:44 [inline]
pfifo_fast_enqueue+0xd5/0x2c0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:741
dev_qdisc_enqueue net/core/dev.c:4144 [inline]
__dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:4188 [inline]
__dev_queue_xmit+0x6a4/0x1f20 net/core/dev.c:4795
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3384 [inline]
__bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2153 [inline]
__bpf_redirect_common net/core/filter.c:2197 [inline]
__bpf_redirect+0x862/0x990 net/core/filter.c:2204
____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2487 [inline]
bpf_clone_redirect+0x20c/0x290 net/core/filter.c:2450
bpf_prog_53f18857bc887b09+0x22/0x2a
bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1402 [inline]
__bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:723 [inline]
bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:730 [inline]
bpf_test_run+0x29d/0x620 net/bpf/test_run.c:423
bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0x9a4/0xef0 net/bpf/test_run.c:1159
bpf_prog_test_run+0x204/0x340 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4721
__sys_bpf+0x52e/0x7e0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6246
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6341 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6339 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x41/0x50 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6339
x64_sys_call+0x10cb/0x3020 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:322
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x12c/0x370 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

value changed: 0xffff888104a93a00 -> 0x0000000000000000

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 22632 Comm: syz.0.4135 Tainted: G W syzkaller #0
PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 01/24/2026

There is no race on ring accesses: reading/writing a partial pointer
would be fine, because the reading is done by the producer
which merely cares about NULL/non NULL.
Document and disable the warnings using data_race().

Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/dd3984b3bce9df3591927f927668cb31cc7ecf34.1774460059.git.mst@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/ptr_ring.h b/include/linux/ptr_ring.h
index 534531807d95..d2c3629bbe45 100644
--- a/include/linux/ptr_ring.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptr_ring.h
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ struct ptr_ring {
  */
 static inline bool __ptr_ring_full(struct ptr_ring *r)
 {
-	return r->queue[r->producer];
+	return data_race(r->queue[r->producer]);
 }
 
 static inline bool ptr_ring_full(struct ptr_ring *r)
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static inline bool ptr_ring_full_bh(struct ptr_ring *r)
  */
 static inline int __ptr_ring_produce(struct ptr_ring *r, void *ptr)
 {
-	if (unlikely(!r->size) || r->queue[r->producer])
+	if (unlikely(!r->size) || data_race(r->queue[r->producer]))
 		return -ENOSPC;
 
 	/* Make sure the pointer we are storing points to a valid data. */
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ static inline void *__ptr_ring_peek(struct ptr_ring *r)
 static inline bool __ptr_ring_empty(struct ptr_ring *r)
 {
 	if (likely(r->size))
-		return !r->queue[READ_ONCE(r->consumer_head)];
+		return !data_race(r->queue[READ_ONCE(r->consumer_head)]);
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static inline void __ptr_ring_zero_tail(struct ptr_ring *r, int consumer_head)
 	 * besides the first one until we write out all entries.
 	 */
 	while (likely(head > r->consumer_tail))
-		r->queue[--head] = NULL;
+		data_race(r->queue[--head] = NULL);
 
 	r->consumer_tail = consumer_head;
 }