cgroup: Use open-time credentials for process migraton perm checks

commit 1756d7994ad85c2479af6ae5a9750b92324685af upstream.

cgroup process migration permission checks are performed at write time as
whether a given operation is allowed or not is dependent on the content of
the write - the PID. This currently uses current's credentials which is a
potential security weakness as it may allow scenarios where a less
privileged process tricks a more privileged one into writing into a fd that
it created.

This patch makes both cgroup2 and cgroup1 process migration interfaces to
use the credentials saved at the time of open (file->f_cred) instead of
current's.

Reported-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Fixes: 187fe84067bd ("cgroup: require write perm on common ancestor when moving processes on the default hierarchy")
Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
[OP: backport to v4.19: apply original __cgroup_procs_write() changes to
cgroup_threads_write() and cgroup_procs_write()]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

2 files changed, 20 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c
index ced2b3f3547c..7fb6b3ad75ce 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c
@@ -535,10 +535,11 @@ static ssize_t __cgroup1_procs_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	/*
-	 * Even if we're attaching all tasks in the thread group, we only
-	 * need to check permissions on one of them.
+	 * Even if we're attaching all tasks in the thread group, we only need
+	 * to check permissions on one of them. Check permissions using the
+	 * credentials from file open to protect against inherited fd attacks.
 	 */
-	cred = current_cred();
+	cred = of->file->f_cred;
 	tcred = get_task_cred(task);
 	if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) &&
 	    !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) &&
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
index 63eff85f251f..1bac7c56f648 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c
@@ -4487,6 +4487,7 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_procs_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 {
 	struct cgroup *src_cgrp, *dst_cgrp;
 	struct task_struct *task;
+	const struct cred *saved_cred;
 	ssize_t ret;
 
 	dst_cgrp = cgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn, false);
@@ -4503,8 +4504,15 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_procs_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 	src_cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(task, &cgrp_dfl_root);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock);
 
+	/*
+	 * Process and thread migrations follow same delegation rule. Check
+	 * permissions using the credentials from file open to protect against
+	 * inherited fd attacks.
+	 */
+	saved_cred = override_creds(of->file->f_cred);
 	ret = cgroup_procs_write_permission(src_cgrp, dst_cgrp,
 					    of->file->f_path.dentry->d_sb);
+	revert_creds(saved_cred);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_finish;
 
@@ -4528,6 +4536,7 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_threads_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 {
 	struct cgroup *src_cgrp, *dst_cgrp;
 	struct task_struct *task;
+	const struct cred *saved_cred;
 	ssize_t ret;
 
 	buf = strstrip(buf);
@@ -4546,9 +4555,15 @@ static ssize_t cgroup_threads_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 	src_cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(task, &cgrp_dfl_root);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock);
 
-	/* thread migrations follow the cgroup.procs delegation rule */
+	/*
+	 * Process and thread migrations follow same delegation rule. Check
+	 * permissions using the credentials from file open to protect against
+	 * inherited fd attacks.
+	 */
+	saved_cred = override_creds(of->file->f_cred);
 	ret = cgroup_procs_write_permission(src_cgrp, dst_cgrp,
 					    of->file->f_path.dentry->d_sb);
+	revert_creds(saved_cred);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_finish;