diff options
| author | Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> | 2026-01-26 12:20:46 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-01-31 16:16:08 -0800 |
| commit | 96a54b8ffc8c4567c32fe0b6996669f1132b026d (patch) | |
| tree | 3ef47ef9b6475ef7c562681e61f509b978bdad4f /kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c | |
| parent | b50634c5e84a7a57c20b03e367a43f1b63b7ea23 (diff) | |
crash_dump: fix dm_crypt keys locking and ref leak
crash_load_dm_crypt_keys() reads dm-crypt volume keys from the user
keyring. It uses user_key_payload_locked() without holding key->sem,
which makes lockdep complain when kexec_file_load() assembles the crash
image:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
-----------------------------
./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
no locks held by kexec/4875.
stack backtrace:
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x4e/0x96
crash_load_dm_crypt_keys+0x314/0x390
bzImage64_load+0x116/0x9a0
? __lock_acquire+0x464/0x1ba0
__do_sys_kexec_file_load+0x26a/0x4f0
do_syscall_64+0xbd/0x430
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
In addition, the key returned by request_key() is never key_put()'d,
leaking a key reference on each load attempt.
Take key->sem while copying the payload and drop the key reference
afterwards.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/patch.git-2d4d76083a5c.your-ad-here.call-01769426386-ext-2560@work.hours
Fixes: 479e58549b0f ("crash_dump: store dm crypt keys in kdump reserved memory")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c b/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c index 0d23dc1de67c..37129243054d 100644 --- a/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c +++ b/kernel/crash_dump_dm_crypt.c @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static int read_key_from_user_keying(struct dm_crypt_key *dm_key) { const struct user_key_payload *ukp; struct key *key; + int ret = 0; kexec_dprintk("Requesting logon key %s", dm_key->key_desc); key = request_key(&key_type_logon, dm_key->key_desc, NULL); @@ -152,20 +153,28 @@ static int read_key_from_user_keying(struct dm_crypt_key *dm_key) return PTR_ERR(key); } + down_read(&key->sem); ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key); - if (!ukp) - return -EKEYREVOKED; + if (!ukp) { + ret = -EKEYREVOKED; + goto out; + } if (ukp->datalen > KEY_SIZE_MAX) { pr_err("Key size %u exceeds maximum (%u)\n", ukp->datalen, KEY_SIZE_MAX); - return -EINVAL; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; } memcpy(dm_key->data, ukp->data, ukp->datalen); dm_key->key_size = ukp->datalen; kexec_dprintk("Get dm crypt key (size=%u) %s: %8ph\n", dm_key->key_size, dm_key->key_desc, dm_key->data); - return 0; + +out: + up_read(&key->sem); + key_put(key); + return ret; } struct config_key { |
