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authorAndrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>2021-09-13 18:35:28 +0300
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2021-09-22 11:47:58 +0200
commit148339cb18ed38a4b1de2269d1a4227fd51376ef (patch)
treee66130f4d4ef1e83e947f4d50f9d1995a7138bcb /kernel
parentcaee4103f09e3dcce2ec0d0faf6ff245a6cffbad (diff)
bpf: Reject indirect var_off stack access in raw mode
commit f2bcd05ec7b839ff826d2008506ad2d2dff46a59 upstream. It's hard to guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on helper return if uninitialized stack is accessed with variable offset since specific bounds are unknown to verifier. This may cause uninitialized stack leaking. Reject such an access in check_stack_boundary to prevent possible leaking. There are no known use-cases for indirect uninitialized stack access with variable offset so it shouldn't break anything. Fixes: 2011fccfb61b ("bpf: Support variable offset stack access from helpers") Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c9
1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 47395fa40219..a5360b603e4c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1811,6 +1811,15 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
if (err)
return err;
} else {
+ /* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed
+ * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to
+ * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on
+ * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may
+ * cause uninitialized stack leaking.
+ */
+ if (meta && meta->raw_mode)
+ meta = NULL;
+
min_off = reg->smin_value + reg->off;
max_off = reg->umax_value + reg->off;
err = __check_stack_boundary(env, regno, min_off, access_size,