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| author | Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> | 2025-12-18 13:55:01 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> | 2025-12-18 13:55:01 +0100 |
| commit | 3e82accd3e9c35acfc68e44e12b37e5fd350c768 (patch) | |
| tree | 66df313498771397eb1586bf2a6471e6e8e7adb3 /net | |
| parent | 78a47532ab4d0beebb13e67c4ef97b3fe9f56be0 (diff) | |
| parent | fec7b0795548b43e2c3c46e3143c34ef6070341c (diff) | |
Merge tag 'nf-25-12-16' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf
Florian Westphal says:
====================
netfilter: updates for net
The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for *net*:
1) Jozsef Kadlecsik is retiring. Fortunately Jozsef will still keep an
eye on ipset patches.
2) remove a bogus direction check from nat core, this caused spurious
flakes in the 'reverse clash' selftest, from myself.
3) nf_tables doesn't need to do chain validation on register store,
from Pablo Neira Ayuso.
4) nf_tables shouldn't revisit chains during ruleset (graph) validation
if possible. Both 3 and 4 were slated for -next initially but there
are now two independent reports of people hitting soft lockup errors
during ruleset validation, so it makes no sense anymore to route
this via -next given this is -stable material. From myself.
5) call cond_resched() in a more frequently visited place during nf_tables
chain validation, this wasn't possible earlier due to rcu read lock,
but nowadays its not held anymore during set walks.
6) Don't fail conntrack packetdrill test with HZ=100 kernels.
netfilter pull request nf-25-12-16
* tag 'nf-25-12-16' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
selftests: netfilter: packetdrill: avoid failure on HZ=100 kernel
netfilter: nf_tables: avoid softlockup warnings in nft_chain_validate
netfilter: nf_tables: avoid chain re-validation if possible
netfilter: nf_tables: remove redundant chain validation on register store
netfilter: nf_nat: remove bogus direction check
MAINTAINERS: Remove Jozsef Kadlecsik from MAINTAINERS file
====================
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251216190904.14507-1-fw@strlen.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 84 |
2 files changed, 68 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c index 78a61dac4ade..e6b24586d2fe 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c @@ -294,25 +294,13 @@ nf_nat_used_tuple_new(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(thash); - /* NB: IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL should be impossible because - * nf_nat_used_tuple() handles origin collisions. - * - * Handle remote chance other CPU confirmed its ct right after. - */ - if (thash->tuple.dst.dir != IP_CT_DIR_REPLY) - goto out; - /* clashing connection subject to NAT? Retry with new tuple. */ if (READ_ONCE(ct->status) & uses_nat) goto out; if (nf_ct_tuple_equal(&ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple, - &ignored_ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple) && - nf_ct_tuple_equal(&ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple, - &ignored_ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_ORIGINAL].tuple)) { + &ignored_ct->tuplehash[IP_CT_DIR_REPLY].tuple)) taken = false; - goto out; - } out: nf_ct_put(ct); return taken; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index f3de2f9bbebf..618af6e90773 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -123,6 +123,29 @@ static void nft_validate_state_update(struct nft_table *table, u8 new_validate_s table->validate_state = new_validate_state; } + +static bool nft_chain_vstate_valid(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, + const struct nft_chain *chain) +{ + const struct nft_base_chain *base_chain; + enum nft_chain_types type; + u8 hooknum; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!nft_is_base_chain(ctx->chain))) + return false; + + base_chain = nft_base_chain(ctx->chain); + hooknum = base_chain->ops.hooknum; + type = base_chain->type->type; + + /* chain is already validated for this call depth */ + if (chain->vstate.depth >= ctx->level && + chain->vstate.hook_mask[type] & BIT(hooknum)) + return true; + + return false; +} + static void nf_tables_trans_destroy_work(struct work_struct *w); static void nft_trans_gc_work(struct work_struct *work); @@ -4079,6 +4102,29 @@ static void nf_tables_rule_release(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_rule *r nf_tables_rule_destroy(ctx, rule); } +static void nft_chain_vstate_update(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_chain *chain) +{ + const struct nft_base_chain *base_chain; + enum nft_chain_types type; + u8 hooknum; + + /* ctx->chain must hold the calling base chain. */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!nft_is_base_chain(ctx->chain))) { + memset(&chain->vstate, 0, sizeof(chain->vstate)); + return; + } + + base_chain = nft_base_chain(ctx->chain); + hooknum = base_chain->ops.hooknum; + type = base_chain->type->type; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(BIT(NF_INET_NUMHOOKS) > U8_MAX); + + chain->vstate.hook_mask[type] |= BIT(hooknum); + if (chain->vstate.depth < ctx->level) + chain->vstate.depth = ctx->level; +} + /** nft_chain_validate - loop detection and hook validation * * @ctx: context containing call depth and base chain @@ -4088,15 +4134,25 @@ static void nf_tables_rule_release(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_rule *r * and set lookups until either the jump limit is hit or all reachable * chains have been validated. */ -int nft_chain_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_chain *chain) +int nft_chain_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_chain *chain) { struct nft_expr *expr, *last; struct nft_rule *rule; int err; + BUILD_BUG_ON(NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE > 255); if (ctx->level == NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE) return -EMLINK; + if (ctx->level > 0) { + /* jumps to base chains are not allowed. */ + if (nft_is_base_chain(chain)) + return -ELOOP; + + if (nft_chain_vstate_valid(ctx, chain)) + return 0; + } + list_for_each_entry(rule, &chain->rules, list) { if (fatal_signal_pending(current)) return -EINTR; @@ -4115,8 +4171,11 @@ int nft_chain_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_chain *chain) if (err < 0) return err; } + + cond_resched(); } + nft_chain_vstate_update(ctx, chain); return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nft_chain_validate); @@ -4128,7 +4187,7 @@ static int nft_table_validate(struct net *net, const struct nft_table *table) .net = net, .family = table->family, }; - int err; + int err = 0; list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) { if (!nft_is_base_chain(chain)) @@ -4137,12 +4196,14 @@ static int nft_table_validate(struct net *net, const struct nft_table *table) ctx.chain = chain; err = nft_chain_validate(&ctx, chain); if (err < 0) - return err; - - cond_resched(); + goto err; } - return 0; +err: + list_for_each_entry(chain, &table->chains, list) + memset(&chain->vstate, 0, sizeof(chain->vstate)); + + return err; } int nft_setelem_validate(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, @@ -11676,21 +11737,10 @@ static int nft_validate_register_store(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, enum nft_data_types type, unsigned int len) { - int err; - switch (reg) { case NFT_REG_VERDICT: if (type != NFT_DATA_VERDICT) return -EINVAL; - - if (data != NULL && - (data->verdict.code == NFT_GOTO || - data->verdict.code == NFT_JUMP)) { - err = nft_chain_validate(ctx, data->verdict.chain); - if (err < 0) - return err; - } - break; default: if (type != NFT_DATA_VALUE) |
