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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-handle-vc.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c132
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.c13
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile22
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/startup/exports.h14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/startup/gdt_idt.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-shared.c327
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c210
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c30
12 files changed, 228 insertions, 535 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 3a38fdcdb9bd..74657589264d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ LDFLAGS_vmlinux += -T
hostprogs := mkpiggy
HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += -I$(srctree)/tools/include
-sed-voffset := -e 's/^\([0-9a-fA-F]*\) [ABbCDGRSTtVW] \(_text\|__start_rodata\|__bss_start\|_end\)$$/\#define VO_\2 _AC(0x\1,UL)/p'
+sed-voffset := -e 's/^\([0-9a-fA-F]*\) [ABbCDGRSTtVW] \(_text\|__start_rodata\|_sinittext\|__inittext_end\|__bss_start\|_end\)$$/\#define VO_\2 _AC(0x\1,UL)/p'
quiet_cmd_voffset = VOFFSET $@
cmd_voffset = $(NM) $< | sed -n $(sed-voffset) > $@
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
index 94b5991da001..0f41ca0e52c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c
@@ -332,6 +332,8 @@ static size_t parse_elf(void *output)
}
const unsigned long kernel_text_size = VO___start_rodata - VO__text;
+const unsigned long kernel_inittext_offset = VO__sinittext - VO__text;
+const unsigned long kernel_inittext_size = VO___inittext_end - VO__sinittext;
const unsigned long kernel_total_size = VO__end - VO__text;
static u8 boot_heap[BOOT_HEAP_SIZE] __aligned(4);
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-handle-vc.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-handle-vc.c
index 89dd02de2a0f..7530ad8b768b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-handle-vc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-handle-vc.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include "misc.h"
+#include "error.h"
#include "sev.h"
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -14,6 +15,8 @@
#include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
#define __BOOT_COMPRESSED
+#undef __init
+#define __init
/* Basic instruction decoding support needed */
#include "../../lib/inat.c"
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index fd1b67dfea22..6e5c32a53d03 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -32,102 +32,47 @@ struct ghcb *boot_ghcb;
#undef __init
#define __init
-#undef __head
-#define __head
-
#define __BOOT_COMPRESSED
-extern struct svsm_ca *boot_svsm_caa;
-extern u64 boot_svsm_caa_pa;
-
-struct svsm_ca *svsm_get_caa(void)
-{
- return boot_svsm_caa;
-}
-
-u64 svsm_get_caa_pa(void)
-{
- return boot_svsm_caa_pa;
-}
-
-int svsm_perform_call_protocol(struct svsm_call *call);
-
u8 snp_vmpl;
+u16 ghcb_version;
+
+u64 boot_svsm_caa_pa;
/* Include code for early handlers */
#include "../../boot/startup/sev-shared.c"
-int svsm_perform_call_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
-{
- struct ghcb *ghcb;
- int ret;
-
- if (boot_ghcb)
- ghcb = boot_ghcb;
- else
- ghcb = NULL;
-
- do {
- ret = ghcb ? svsm_perform_ghcb_protocol(ghcb, call)
- : svsm_perform_msr_protocol(call);
- } while (ret == -EAGAIN);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
static bool sev_snp_enabled(void)
{
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED;
}
-static void __page_state_change(unsigned long paddr, enum psc_op op)
-{
- u64 val, msr;
-
- /*
- * If private -> shared then invalidate the page before requesting the
- * state change in the RMP table.
- */
- if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED)
- pvalidate_4k_page(paddr, paddr, false);
-
- /* Save the current GHCB MSR value */
- msr = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
-
- /* Issue VMGEXIT to change the page state in RMP table. */
- sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_GFN(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, op));
- VMGEXIT();
-
- /* Read the response of the VMGEXIT. */
- val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
- if ((GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP) || GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val))
- sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PSC);
-
- /* Restore the GHCB MSR value */
- sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(msr);
-
- /*
- * Now that page state is changed in the RMP table, validate it so that it is
- * consistent with the RMP entry.
- */
- if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE)
- pvalidate_4k_page(paddr, paddr, true);
-}
-
void snp_set_page_private(unsigned long paddr)
{
+ struct psc_desc d = {
+ SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE,
+ (struct svsm_ca *)boot_svsm_caa_pa,
+ boot_svsm_caa_pa
+ };
+
if (!sev_snp_enabled())
return;
- __page_state_change(paddr, SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE);
+ __page_state_change(paddr, paddr, &d);
}
void snp_set_page_shared(unsigned long paddr)
{
+ struct psc_desc d = {
+ SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED,
+ (struct svsm_ca *)boot_svsm_caa_pa,
+ boot_svsm_caa_pa
+ };
+
if (!sev_snp_enabled())
return;
- __page_state_change(paddr, SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED);
+ __page_state_change(paddr, paddr, &d);
}
bool early_setup_ghcb(void)
@@ -152,8 +97,14 @@ bool early_setup_ghcb(void)
void snp_accept_memory(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end)
{
+ struct psc_desc d = {
+ SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE,
+ (struct svsm_ca *)boot_svsm_caa_pa,
+ boot_svsm_caa_pa
+ };
+
for (phys_addr_t pa = start; pa < end; pa += PAGE_SIZE)
- __page_state_change(pa, SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE);
+ __page_state_change(pa, pa, &d);
}
void sev_es_shutdown_ghcb(void)
@@ -235,15 +186,23 @@ bool sev_es_check_ghcb_fault(unsigned long address)
MSR_AMD64_SNP_VMSA_REG_PROT | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT13 | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_BIT15 | \
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC | \
MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESERVED_MASK)
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_SECURE_AVIC
+#define SNP_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_AVIC
+#else
+#define SNP_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC 0
+#endif
+
/*
* SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT is the mask of SNP features that are implemented
* by the guest kernel. As and when a new feature is implemented in the
* guest kernel, a corresponding bit should be added to the mask.
*/
#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (MSR_AMD64_SNP_DEBUG_SWAP | \
- MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)
+ MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC | \
+ SNP_FEATURE_SECURE_AVIC)
u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status)
{
@@ -347,7 +306,7 @@ static bool early_snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
* running at VMPL0. The CA will be used to communicate with the
* SVSM and request its services.
*/
- svsm_setup_ca(cc_info);
+ svsm_setup_ca(cc_info, rip_rel_ptr(&boot_ghcb_page));
/*
* Pass run-time kernel a pointer to CC info via boot_params so EFI
@@ -391,6 +350,8 @@ static int sev_check_cpu_support(void)
if (!(eax & BIT(1)))
return -ENODEV;
+ sev_snp_needs_sfw = !(ebx & BIT(31));
+
return ebx & 0x3f;
}
@@ -453,30 +414,16 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
*/
if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED) {
u64 hv_features;
- int ret;
hv_features = get_hv_features();
if (!(hv_features & GHCB_HV_FT_SNP))
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
/*
- * Enforce running at VMPL0 or with an SVSM.
- *
- * Use RMPADJUST (see the rmpadjust() function for a description of
- * what the instruction does) to update the VMPL1 permissions of a
- * page. If the guest is running at VMPL0, this will succeed. If the
- * guest is running at any other VMPL, this will fail. Linux SNP guests
- * only ever run at a single VMPL level so permission mask changes of a
- * lesser-privileged VMPL are a don't-care.
- */
- ret = rmpadjust((unsigned long)&boot_ghcb_page, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1);
-
- /*
- * Running at VMPL0 is not required if an SVSM is present and the hypervisor
- * supports the required SVSM GHCB events.
+ * Running at VMPL0 is required unless an SVSM is present and
+ * the hypervisor supports the required SVSM GHCB events.
*/
- if (ret &&
- !(snp_vmpl && (hv_features & GHCB_HV_FT_SNP_MULTI_VMPL)))
+ if (snp_vmpl && !(hv_features & GHCB_HV_FT_SNP_MULTI_VMPL))
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_NOT_VMPL0);
}
@@ -550,7 +497,6 @@ bool early_is_sevsnp_guest(void)
/* Obtain the address of the calling area to use */
boot_rdmsr(MSR_SVSM_CAA, &m);
- boot_svsm_caa = (void *)m.q;
boot_svsm_caa_pa = m.q;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.c b/arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.c
index 63e037e94e4c..916bac09b464 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.c
@@ -106,18 +106,5 @@ void get_cpuflags(void)
cpuid(0x80000001, &ignored, &ignored, &cpu.flags[6],
&cpu.flags[1]);
}
-
- if (max_amd_level >= 0x8000001f) {
- u32 ebx;
-
- /*
- * The X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO feature bit is in
- * the virtualization flags entry (word 8) and set by
- * scattered.c, so the bit needs to be explicitly set.
- */
- cpuid(0x8000001f, &ignored, &ebx, &ignored, &ignored);
- if (ebx & BIT(31))
- set_bit(X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO, cpu.flags);
- }
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile
index b514f7e81332..e8fdf020b422 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/Makefile
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ KBUILD_AFLAGS += -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS -mcmodel=small -fPIC \
-Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
$(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) \
+ $(DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) \
-fno-stack-protector -D__NO_FORTIFY \
-fno-jump-tables \
-include $(srctree)/include/linux/hidden.h
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += gdt_idt.o map_kernel.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += sme.o sev-startup.o
+pi-objs := $(patsubst %.o,$(obj)/%.o,$(obj-y))
lib-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += la57toggle.o
lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += efi-mixed.o
@@ -28,3 +30,23 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += efi-mixed.o
# to be linked into the decompressor or the EFI stub but not vmlinux
#
$(patsubst %.o,$(obj)/%.o,$(lib-y)): OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD := y
+
+#
+# Invoke objtool for each object individually to check for absolute
+# relocations, even if other objtool actions are being deferred.
+#
+$(pi-objs): objtool-enabled = 1
+$(pi-objs): objtool-args = $(if $(delay-objtool),,$(objtool-args-y)) --noabs
+
+#
+# Confine the startup code by prefixing all symbols with __pi_ (for position
+# independent). This ensures that startup code can only call other startup
+# code, or code that has explicitly been made accessible to it via a symbol
+# alias.
+#
+$(obj)/%.pi.o: OBJCOPYFLAGS := --prefix-symbols=__pi_
+$(obj)/%.pi.o: $(obj)/%.o FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,objcopy)
+
+targets += $(obj-y)
+obj-y := $(patsubst %.o,%.pi.o,$(obj-y))
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/exports.h b/arch/x86/boot/startup/exports.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..01d2363dc445
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/exports.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+
+/*
+ * The symbols below are functions that are implemented by the startup code,
+ * but called at runtime by the SEV code residing in the core kernel.
+ */
+PROVIDE(early_set_pages_state = __pi_early_set_pages_state);
+PROVIDE(early_snp_set_memory_private = __pi_early_snp_set_memory_private);
+PROVIDE(early_snp_set_memory_shared = __pi_early_snp_set_memory_shared);
+PROVIDE(get_hv_features = __pi_get_hv_features);
+PROVIDE(sev_es_terminate = __pi_sev_es_terminate);
+PROVIDE(snp_cpuid = __pi_snp_cpuid);
+PROVIDE(snp_cpuid_get_table = __pi_snp_cpuid_get_table);
+PROVIDE(svsm_issue_call = __pi_svsm_issue_call);
+PROVIDE(svsm_process_result_codes = __pi_svsm_process_result_codes);
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/gdt_idt.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/gdt_idt.c
index a3112a69b06a..d16102abdaec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/gdt_idt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/gdt_idt.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
static gate_desc bringup_idt_table[NUM_EXCEPTION_VECTORS] __page_aligned_data;
/* This may run while still in the direct mapping */
-void __head startup_64_load_idt(void *vc_handler)
+void startup_64_load_idt(void *vc_handler)
{
struct desc_ptr desc = {
.address = (unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(bringup_idt_table),
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ void __head startup_64_load_idt(void *vc_handler)
/*
* Setup boot CPU state needed before kernel switches to virtual addresses.
*/
-void __head startup_64_setup_gdt_idt(void)
+void __init startup_64_setup_gdt_idt(void)
{
struct gdt_page *gp = rip_rel_ptr((void *)(__force unsigned long)&gdt_page);
void *handler = NULL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c
index 332dbe6688c4..83ba98d61572 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/map_kernel.c
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static inline bool check_la57_support(void)
return true;
}
-static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
+static unsigned long __init sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
pmdval_t *pmd,
unsigned long p2v_offset)
{
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static unsigned long __head sme_postprocess_startup(struct boot_params *bp,
* the 1:1 mapping of memory. Kernel virtual addresses can be determined by
* subtracting p2v_offset from the RIP-relative address.
*/
-unsigned long __head __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset,
+unsigned long __init __startup_64(unsigned long p2v_offset,
struct boot_params *bp)
{
pmd_t (*early_pgts)[PTRS_PER_PMD] = rip_rel_ptr(early_dynamic_pgts);
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-shared.c
index a34cd19796f9..4e22ffd73516 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-shared.c
@@ -12,35 +12,12 @@
#include <asm/setup_data.h>
#ifndef __BOOT_COMPRESSED
-#define error(v) pr_err(v)
#define has_cpuflag(f) boot_cpu_has(f)
#else
#undef WARN
#define WARN(condition, format...) (!!(condition))
-#undef vc_forward_exception
-#define vc_forward_exception(c) panic("SNP: Hypervisor requested exception\n")
#endif
-/*
- * SVSM related information:
- * During boot, the page tables are set up as identity mapped and later
- * changed to use kernel virtual addresses. Maintain separate virtual and
- * physical addresses for the CAA to allow SVSM functions to be used during
- * early boot, both with identity mapped virtual addresses and proper kernel
- * virtual addresses.
- */
-struct svsm_ca *boot_svsm_caa __ro_after_init;
-u64 boot_svsm_caa_pa __ro_after_init;
-
-/*
- * Since feature negotiation related variables are set early in the boot
- * process they must reside in the .data section so as not to be zeroed
- * out when the .bss section is later cleared.
- *
- * GHCB protocol version negotiated with the hypervisor.
- */
-static u16 ghcb_version __ro_after_init;
-
/* Copy of the SNP firmware's CPUID page. */
static struct snp_cpuid_table cpuid_table_copy __ro_after_init;
@@ -54,17 +31,9 @@ static u32 cpuid_std_range_max __ro_after_init;
static u32 cpuid_hyp_range_max __ro_after_init;
static u32 cpuid_ext_range_max __ro_after_init;
-bool __init sev_es_check_cpu_features(void)
-{
- if (!has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
- error("RDRAND instruction not supported - no trusted source of randomness available\n");
- return false;
- }
+bool sev_snp_needs_sfw;
- return true;
-}
-
-void __head __noreturn
+void __noreturn
sev_es_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason)
{
u64 val = GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ;
@@ -83,7 +52,7 @@ sev_es_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason)
/*
* The hypervisor features are available from GHCB version 2 onward.
*/
-u64 get_hv_features(void)
+u64 __init get_hv_features(void)
{
u64 val;
@@ -100,72 +69,7 @@ u64 get_hv_features(void)
return GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_RESP_VAL(val);
}
-void snp_register_ghcb_early(unsigned long paddr)
-{
- unsigned long pfn = paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- u64 val;
-
- sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_REG_GPA_REQ_VAL(pfn));
- VMGEXIT();
-
- val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
-
- /* If the response GPA is not ours then abort the guest */
- if ((GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_REG_GPA_RESP) ||
- (GHCB_MSR_REG_GPA_RESP_VAL(val) != pfn))
- sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_REGISTER);
-}
-
-bool sev_es_negotiate_protocol(void)
-{
- u64 val;
-
- /* Do the GHCB protocol version negotiation */
- sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO_REQ);
- VMGEXIT();
- val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
-
- if (GHCB_MSR_INFO(val) != GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO_RESP)
- return false;
-
- if (GHCB_MSR_PROTO_MAX(val) < GHCB_PROTOCOL_MIN ||
- GHCB_MSR_PROTO_MIN(val) > GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX)
- return false;
-
- ghcb_version = min_t(size_t, GHCB_MSR_PROTO_MAX(val), GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX);
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static enum es_result verify_exception_info(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
-{
- u32 ret;
-
- ret = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1 & GENMASK_ULL(31, 0);
- if (!ret)
- return ES_OK;
-
- if (ret == 1) {
- u64 info = ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2;
- unsigned long v = info & SVM_EVTINJ_VEC_MASK;
-
- /* Check if exception information from hypervisor is sane. */
- if ((info & SVM_EVTINJ_VALID) &&
- ((v == X86_TRAP_GP) || (v == X86_TRAP_UD)) &&
- ((info & SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_MASK) == SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_EXEPT)) {
- ctxt->fi.vector = v;
-
- if (info & SVM_EVTINJ_VALID_ERR)
- ctxt->fi.error_code = info >> 32;
-
- return ES_EXCEPTION;
- }
- }
-
- return ES_VMM_ERROR;
-}
-
-static inline int svsm_process_result_codes(struct svsm_call *call)
+int svsm_process_result_codes(struct svsm_call *call)
{
switch (call->rax_out) {
case SVSM_SUCCESS:
@@ -193,7 +97,7 @@ static inline int svsm_process_result_codes(struct svsm_call *call)
* - RAX specifies the SVSM protocol/callid as input and the return code
* as output.
*/
-static __always_inline void svsm_issue_call(struct svsm_call *call, u8 *pending)
+void svsm_issue_call(struct svsm_call *call, u8 *pending)
{
register unsigned long rax asm("rax") = call->rax;
register unsigned long rcx asm("rcx") = call->rcx;
@@ -216,7 +120,7 @@ static __always_inline void svsm_issue_call(struct svsm_call *call, u8 *pending)
call->r9_out = r9;
}
-static int svsm_perform_msr_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
+int svsm_perform_msr_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
{
u8 pending = 0;
u64 val, resp;
@@ -247,63 +151,6 @@ static int svsm_perform_msr_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
return svsm_process_result_codes(call);
}
-static int svsm_perform_ghcb_protocol(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct svsm_call *call)
-{
- struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;
- u8 pending = 0;
-
- vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
-
- /*
- * Fill in protocol and format specifiers. This can be called very early
- * in the boot, so use rip-relative references as needed.
- */
- ghcb->protocol_version = ghcb_version;
- ghcb->ghcb_usage = GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE;
-
- ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, SVM_VMGEXIT_SNP_RUN_VMPL);
- ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
- ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
-
- sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
-
- svsm_issue_call(call, &pending);
-
- if (pending)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- switch (verify_exception_info(ghcb, &ctxt)) {
- case ES_OK:
- break;
- case ES_EXCEPTION:
- vc_forward_exception(&ctxt);
- fallthrough;
- default:
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- return svsm_process_result_codes(call);
-}
-
-enum es_result sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(struct ghcb *ghcb,
- struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
- u64 exit_code, u64 exit_info_1,
- u64 exit_info_2)
-{
- /* Fill in protocol and format specifiers */
- ghcb->protocol_version = ghcb_version;
- ghcb->ghcb_usage = GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE;
-
- ghcb_set_sw_exit_code(ghcb, exit_code);
- ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, exit_info_1);
- ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, exit_info_2);
-
- sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(__pa(ghcb));
- VMGEXIT();
-
- return verify_exception_info(ghcb, ctxt);
-}
-
static int __sev_cpuid_hv(u32 fn, int reg_idx, u32 *reg)
{
u64 val;
@@ -342,44 +189,7 @@ static int __sev_cpuid_hv_msr(struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
return ret;
}
-static int __sev_cpuid_hv_ghcb(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
-{
- u32 cr4 = native_read_cr4();
- int ret;
-
- ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, leaf->fn);
- ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, leaf->subfn);
-
- if (cr4 & X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)
- /* Safe to read xcr0 */
- ghcb_set_xcr0(ghcb, xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK));
- else
- /* xgetbv will cause #UD - use reset value for xcr0 */
- ghcb_set_xcr0(ghcb, 1);
-
- ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_CPUID, 0, 0);
- if (ret != ES_OK)
- return ret;
-
- if (!(ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) &&
- ghcb_rbx_is_valid(ghcb) &&
- ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb) &&
- ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb)))
- return ES_VMM_ERROR;
- leaf->eax = ghcb->save.rax;
- leaf->ebx = ghcb->save.rbx;
- leaf->ecx = ghcb->save.rcx;
- leaf->edx = ghcb->save.rdx;
-
- return ES_OK;
-}
-
-static int sev_cpuid_hv(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
-{
- return ghcb ? __sev_cpuid_hv_ghcb(ghcb, ctxt, leaf)
- : __sev_cpuid_hv_msr(leaf);
-}
/*
* This may be called early while still running on the initial identity
@@ -412,7 +222,7 @@ const struct snp_cpuid_table *snp_cpuid_get_table(void)
*
* Return: XSAVE area size on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
-static u32 __head snp_cpuid_calc_xsave_size(u64 xfeatures_en, bool compacted)
+static u32 snp_cpuid_calc_xsave_size(u64 xfeatures_en, bool compacted)
{
const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table();
u64 xfeatures_found = 0;
@@ -448,7 +258,7 @@ static u32 __head snp_cpuid_calc_xsave_size(u64 xfeatures_en, bool compacted)
return xsave_size;
}
-static bool __head
+static bool
snp_cpuid_get_validated_func(struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
{
const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table();
@@ -484,21 +294,21 @@ snp_cpuid_get_validated_func(struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
return false;
}
-static void snp_cpuid_hv(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
+static void snp_cpuid_hv_msr(void *ctx, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
{
- if (sev_cpuid_hv(ghcb, ctxt, leaf))
+ if (__sev_cpuid_hv_msr(leaf))
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_CPUID_HV);
}
-static int __head
-snp_cpuid_postprocess(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
- struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
+static int
+snp_cpuid_postprocess(void (*cpuid_fn)(void *ctx, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf),
+ void *ctx, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
{
struct cpuid_leaf leaf_hv = *leaf;
switch (leaf->fn) {
case 0x1:
- snp_cpuid_hv(ghcb, ctxt, &leaf_hv);
+ cpuid_fn(ctx, &leaf_hv);
/* initial APIC ID */
leaf->ebx = (leaf_hv.ebx & GENMASK(31, 24)) | (leaf->ebx & GENMASK(23, 0));
@@ -517,7 +327,7 @@ snp_cpuid_postprocess(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
break;
case 0xB:
leaf_hv.subfn = 0;
- snp_cpuid_hv(ghcb, ctxt, &leaf_hv);
+ cpuid_fn(ctx, &leaf_hv);
/* extended APIC ID */
leaf->edx = leaf_hv.edx;
@@ -565,7 +375,7 @@ snp_cpuid_postprocess(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
}
break;
case 0x8000001E:
- snp_cpuid_hv(ghcb, ctxt, &leaf_hv);
+ cpuid_fn(ctx, &leaf_hv);
/* extended APIC ID */
leaf->eax = leaf_hv.eax;
@@ -586,8 +396,8 @@ snp_cpuid_postprocess(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
* Returns -EOPNOTSUPP if feature not enabled. Any other non-zero return value
* should be treated as fatal by caller.
*/
-int __head
-snp_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
+int snp_cpuid(void (*cpuid_fn)(void *ctx, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf),
+ void *ctx, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
{
const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table = snp_cpuid_get_table();
@@ -621,7 +431,7 @@ snp_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
return 0;
}
- return snp_cpuid_postprocess(ghcb, ctxt, leaf);
+ return snp_cpuid_postprocess(cpuid_fn, ctx, leaf);
}
/*
@@ -629,7 +439,7 @@ snp_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct cpuid_leaf *leaf)
* page yet, so it only supports the MSR based communication with the
* hypervisor and only the CPUID exit-code.
*/
-void __head do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
+void do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
{
unsigned int subfn = lower_bits(regs->cx, 32);
unsigned int fn = lower_bits(regs->ax, 32);
@@ -648,13 +458,24 @@ void __head do_vc_no_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
leaf.fn = fn;
leaf.subfn = subfn;
- ret = snp_cpuid(NULL, NULL, &leaf);
+ /*
+ * If SNP is active, then snp_cpuid() uses the CPUID table to obtain the
+ * CPUID values (with possible HV interaction during post-processing of
+ * the values). But if SNP is not active (no CPUID table present), then
+ * snp_cpuid() returns -EOPNOTSUPP so that an SEV-ES guest can call the
+ * HV to obtain the CPUID information.
+ */
+ ret = snp_cpuid(snp_cpuid_hv_msr, NULL, &leaf);
if (!ret)
goto cpuid_done;
if (ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
goto fail;
+ /*
+ * This is reached by a SEV-ES guest and needs to invoke the HV for
+ * the CPUID data.
+ */
if (__sev_cpuid_hv_msr(&leaf))
goto fail;
@@ -705,7 +526,7 @@ struct cc_setup_data {
* Search for a Confidential Computing blob passed in as a setup_data entry
* via the Linux Boot Protocol.
*/
-static __head
+static __init
struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_setup_data(struct boot_params *bp)
{
struct cc_setup_data *sd = NULL;
@@ -733,7 +554,7 @@ struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob_setup_data(struct boot_params *bp)
* mapping needs to be updated in sync with all the changes to virtual memory
* layout and related mapping facilities throughout the boot process.
*/
-static void __head setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
+static void __init setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
{
const struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table_fw, *cpuid_table;
int i;
@@ -761,13 +582,24 @@ static void __head setup_cpuid_table(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
}
}
-static void __head svsm_pval_4k_page(unsigned long paddr, bool validate)
+static int svsm_call_msr_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ do {
+ ret = svsm_perform_msr_protocol(call);
+ } while (ret == -EAGAIN);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void svsm_pval_4k_page(unsigned long paddr, bool validate,
+ struct svsm_ca *caa, u64 caa_pa)
{
struct svsm_pvalidate_call *pc;
struct svsm_call call = {};
unsigned long flags;
u64 pc_pa;
- int ret;
/*
* This can be called very early in the boot, use native functions in
@@ -775,10 +607,10 @@ static void __head svsm_pval_4k_page(unsigned long paddr, bool validate)
*/
flags = native_local_irq_save();
- call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
+ call.caa = caa;
pc = (struct svsm_pvalidate_call *)call.caa->svsm_buffer;
- pc_pa = svsm_get_caa_pa() + offsetof(struct svsm_ca, svsm_buffer);
+ pc_pa = caa_pa + offsetof(struct svsm_ca, svsm_buffer);
pc->num_entries = 1;
pc->cur_index = 0;
@@ -792,20 +624,24 @@ static void __head svsm_pval_4k_page(unsigned long paddr, bool validate)
call.rax = SVSM_CORE_CALL(SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE);
call.rcx = pc_pa;
- ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
- if (ret)
+ /*
+ * Use the MSR protocol exclusively, so that this code is usable in
+ * startup code where VA/PA translations of the GHCB page's address may
+ * be problematic.
+ */
+ if (svsm_call_msr_protocol(&call))
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PVALIDATE);
native_local_irq_restore(flags);
}
-static void __head pvalidate_4k_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
- bool validate)
+static void pvalidate_4k_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
+ bool validate, struct svsm_ca *caa, u64 caa_pa)
{
int ret;
if (snp_vmpl) {
- svsm_pval_4k_page(paddr, validate);
+ svsm_pval_4k_page(paddr, validate, caa, caa_pa);
} else {
ret = pvalidate(vaddr, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, validate);
if (ret)
@@ -816,15 +652,51 @@ static void __head pvalidate_4k_page(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
* If validating memory (making it private) and affected by the
* cache-coherency vulnerability, perform the cache eviction mitigation.
*/
- if (validate && !has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_COHERENCY_SFW_NO))
+ if (validate && sev_snp_needs_sfw)
sev_evict_cache((void *)vaddr, 1);
}
+static void __page_state_change(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
+ const struct psc_desc *desc)
+{
+ u64 val, msr;
+
+ /*
+ * If private -> shared then invalidate the page before requesting the
+ * state change in the RMP table.
+ */
+ if (desc->op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED)
+ pvalidate_4k_page(vaddr, paddr, false, desc->ca, desc->caa_pa);
+
+ /* Save the current GHCB MSR value */
+ msr = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
+
+ /* Issue VMGEXIT to change the page state in RMP table. */
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_GFN(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, desc->op));
+ VMGEXIT();
+
+ /* Read the response of the VMGEXIT. */
+ val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
+ if ((GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP) || GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val))
+ sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PSC);
+
+ /* Restore the GHCB MSR value */
+ sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(msr);
+
+ /*
+ * Now that page state is changed in the RMP table, validate it so that it is
+ * consistent with the RMP entry.
+ */
+ if (desc->op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE)
+ pvalidate_4k_page(vaddr, paddr, true, desc->ca, desc->caa_pa);
+}
+
/*
* Maintain the GPA of the SVSM Calling Area (CA) in order to utilize the SVSM
* services needed when not running in VMPL0.
*/
-static bool __head svsm_setup_ca(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
+static bool __init svsm_setup_ca(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info,
+ void *page)
{
struct snp_secrets_page *secrets_page;
struct snp_cpuid_table *cpuid_table;
@@ -847,7 +719,7 @@ static bool __head svsm_setup_ca(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
* routine is running identity mapped when called, both by the decompressor
* code and the early kernel code.
*/
- if (!rmpadjust((unsigned long)rip_rel_ptr(&boot_ghcb_page), RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1))
+ if (!rmpadjust((unsigned long)page, RMP_PG_SIZE_4K, 1))
return false;
/*
@@ -875,11 +747,6 @@ static bool __head svsm_setup_ca(const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
if (caa & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_SVSM_CAA);
- /*
- * The CA is identity mapped when this routine is called, both by the
- * decompressor code and the early kernel code.
- */
- boot_svsm_caa = (struct svsm_ca *)caa;
boot_svsm_caa_pa = caa;
/* Advertise the SVSM presence via CPUID. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
index 0b7e3b950183..09725428d3e6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
@@ -41,143 +41,14 @@
#include <asm/cpuid/api.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
-/* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */
-struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
-
-/*
- * Needs to be in the .data section because we need it NULL before bss is
- * cleared
- */
-struct ghcb *boot_ghcb __section(".data");
-
-/* Bitmap of SEV features supported by the hypervisor */
-u64 sev_hv_features __ro_after_init;
-
-/* Secrets page physical address from the CC blob */
-u64 sev_secrets_pa __ro_after_init;
-
-/* For early boot SVSM communication */
-struct svsm_ca boot_svsm_ca_page __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
-
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svsm_ca *, svsm_caa);
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, svsm_caa_pa);
-
-/*
- * Nothing shall interrupt this code path while holding the per-CPU
- * GHCB. The backup GHCB is only for NMIs interrupting this path.
- *
- * Callers must disable local interrupts around it.
- */
-noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
-{
- struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
- struct ghcb *ghcb;
-
- WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
-
- data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
- ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
-
- if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
- /* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
-
- if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active)) {
- /*
- * Backup-GHCB is also already in use. There is no way
- * to continue here so just kill the machine. To make
- * panic() work, mark GHCBs inactive so that messages
- * can be printed out.
- */
- data->ghcb_active = false;
- data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
-
- instrumentation_begin();
- panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
- instrumentation_end();
- }
-
- /* Mark backup_ghcb active before writing to it */
- data->backup_ghcb_active = true;
-
- state->ghcb = &data->backup_ghcb;
-
- /* Backup GHCB content */
- *state->ghcb = *ghcb;
- } else {
- state->ghcb = NULL;
- data->ghcb_active = true;
- }
-
- return ghcb;
-}
-
/* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
#include "sev-shared.c"
-noinstr void __sev_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
-{
- struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
- struct ghcb *ghcb;
-
- WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
-
- data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
- ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
-
- if (state->ghcb) {
- /* Restore GHCB from Backup */
- *ghcb = *state->ghcb;
- data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
- state->ghcb = NULL;
- } else {
- /*
- * Invalidate the GHCB so a VMGEXIT instruction issued
- * from userspace won't appear to be valid.
- */
- vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
- data->ghcb_active = false;
- }
-}
-
-int svsm_perform_call_protocol(struct svsm_call *call)
-{
- struct ghcb_state state;
- unsigned long flags;
- struct ghcb *ghcb;
- int ret;
-
- /*
- * This can be called very early in the boot, use native functions in
- * order to avoid paravirt issues.
- */
- flags = native_local_irq_save();
-
- if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
- ghcb = __sev_get_ghcb(&state);
- else if (boot_ghcb)
- ghcb = boot_ghcb;
- else
- ghcb = NULL;
-
- do {
- ret = ghcb ? svsm_perform_ghcb_protocol(ghcb, call)
- : svsm_perform_msr_protocol(call);
- } while (ret == -EAGAIN);
-
- if (sev_cfg.ghcbs_initialized)
- __sev_put_ghcb(&state);
-
- native_local_irq_restore(flags);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-void __head
+void
early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
- unsigned long npages, enum psc_op op)
+ unsigned long npages, const struct psc_desc *desc)
{
unsigned long paddr_end;
- u64 val;
vaddr = vaddr & PAGE_MASK;
@@ -185,42 +56,22 @@ early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
paddr_end = paddr + (npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
while (paddr < paddr_end) {
- /* Page validation must be rescinded before changing to shared */
- if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED)
- pvalidate_4k_page(vaddr, paddr, false);
-
- /*
- * Use the MSR protocol because this function can be called before
- * the GHCB is established.
- */
- sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_PSC_REQ_GFN(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, op));
- VMGEXIT();
-
- val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
-
- if (GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP)
- goto e_term;
-
- if (GHCB_MSR_PSC_RESP_VAL(val))
- goto e_term;
-
- /* Page validation must be performed after changing to private */
- if (op == SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE)
- pvalidate_4k_page(vaddr, paddr, true);
+ __page_state_change(vaddr, paddr, desc);
vaddr += PAGE_SIZE;
paddr += PAGE_SIZE;
}
-
- return;
-
-e_term:
- sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_PSC);
}
-void __head early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
+void __init early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
unsigned long npages)
{
+ struct psc_desc d = {
+ SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE,
+ rip_rel_ptr(&boot_svsm_ca_page),
+ boot_svsm_caa_pa
+ };
+
/*
* This can be invoked in early boot while running identity mapped, so
* use an open coded check for SNP instead of using cc_platform_has().
@@ -234,12 +85,18 @@ void __head early_snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long padd
* Ask the hypervisor to mark the memory pages as private in the RMP
* table.
*/
- early_set_pages_state(vaddr, paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_PRIVATE);
+ early_set_pages_state(vaddr, paddr, npages, &d);
}
-void __head early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
+void __init early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
unsigned long npages)
{
+ struct psc_desc d = {
+ SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED,
+ rip_rel_ptr(&boot_svsm_ca_page),
+ boot_svsm_caa_pa
+ };
+
/*
* This can be invoked in early boot while running identity mapped, so
* use an open coded check for SNP instead of using cc_platform_has().
@@ -250,7 +107,7 @@ void __head early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr
return;
/* Ask hypervisor to mark the memory pages shared in the RMP table. */
- early_set_pages_state(vaddr, paddr, npages, SNP_PAGE_STATE_SHARED);
+ early_set_pages_state(vaddr, paddr, npages, &d);
}
/*
@@ -266,7 +123,7 @@ void __head early_snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr
*
* Scan for the blob in that order.
*/
-static __head struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
+static struct cc_blob_sev_info *__init find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
{
struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
@@ -287,15 +144,15 @@ static __head struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)
found_cc_info:
if (cc_info->magic != CC_BLOB_SEV_HDR_MAGIC)
- snp_abort();
+ sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
return cc_info;
}
-static __head void svsm_setup(struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
+static void __init svsm_setup(struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
{
+ struct snp_secrets_page *secrets = (void *)cc_info->secrets_phys;
struct svsm_call call = {};
- int ret;
u64 pa;
/*
@@ -303,7 +160,7 @@ static __head void svsm_setup(struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
* running at VMPL0. The CA will be used to communicate with the
* SVSM to perform the SVSM services.
*/
- if (!svsm_setup_ca(cc_info))
+ if (!svsm_setup_ca(cc_info, rip_rel_ptr(&boot_svsm_ca_page)))
return;
/*
@@ -315,25 +172,25 @@ static __head void svsm_setup(struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info)
pa = (u64)rip_rel_ptr(&boot_svsm_ca_page);
/*
- * Switch over to the boot SVSM CA while the current CA is still
- * addressable. There is no GHCB at this point so use the MSR protocol.
+ * Switch over to the boot SVSM CA while the current CA is still 1:1
+ * mapped and thus addressable with VA == PA. There is no GHCB at this
+ * point so use the MSR protocol.
*
* SVSM_CORE_REMAP_CA call:
* RAX = 0 (Protocol=0, CallID=0)
* RCX = New CA GPA
*/
- call.caa = svsm_get_caa();
+ call.caa = (struct svsm_ca *)secrets->svsm_caa;
call.rax = SVSM_CORE_CALL(SVSM_CORE_REMAP_CA);
call.rcx = pa;
- ret = svsm_perform_call_protocol(&call);
- if (ret)
+
+ if (svsm_call_msr_protocol(&call))
sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_LINUX, GHCB_TERM_SVSM_CA_REMAP_FAIL);
- boot_svsm_caa = (struct svsm_ca *)pa;
boot_svsm_caa_pa = pa;
}
-bool __head snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
+bool __init snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
{
struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
@@ -361,8 +218,3 @@ bool __head snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
return true;
}
-
-void __head __noreturn snp_abort(void)
-{
- sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
-}
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
index 70ea1748c0a7..e7ea65f3f1d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sme.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct sme_populate_pgd_data {
*/
static char sme_workarea[2 * PMD_SIZE] __section(".init.scratch");
-static void __head sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size;
pgd_t *pgd_p;
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static void __head sme_clear_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size);
}
-static pud_t __head *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static pud_t __init *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
p4d_t *p4d;
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ static pud_t __head *sme_prepare_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
return pud;
}
-static void __head sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static void __head sme_populate_pgd_large(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(ppd->paddr | ppd->pmd_flags));
}
-static void __head sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ static void __head sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
set_pte(pte, __pte(ppd->paddr | ppd->pte_flags));
}
-static void __head __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) {
sme_populate_pgd_large(ppd);
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ static void __head __sme_map_range_pmd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
}
}
-static void __head __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
while (ppd->vaddr < ppd->vaddr_end) {
sme_populate_pgd(ppd);
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static void __head __sme_map_range_pte(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
}
}
-static void __head __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd,
+static void __init __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd,
pmdval_t pmd_flags, pteval_t pte_flags)
{
unsigned long vaddr_end;
@@ -229,22 +229,22 @@ static void __head __sme_map_range(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd,
__sme_map_range_pte(ppd);
}
-static void __head sme_map_range_encrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init sme_map_range_encrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_ENC, PTE_FLAGS_ENC);
}
-static void __head sme_map_range_decrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC, PTE_FLAGS_DEC);
}
-static void __head sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
+static void __init sme_map_range_decrypted_wp(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
{
__sme_map_range(ppd, PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP, PTE_FLAGS_DEC_WP);
}
-static unsigned long __head sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
+static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
{
unsigned long entries = 0, tables = 0;
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static unsigned long __head sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
return entries + tables;
}
-void __head sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
+void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
{
unsigned long workarea_start, workarea_end, workarea_len;
unsigned long execute_start, execute_end, execute_len;
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ void __head sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp)
native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
}
-void __head sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
+void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
unsigned long feature_mask;
@@ -521,6 +521,7 @@ void __head sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
return;
me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
+ sev_snp_needs_sfw = !(ebx & BIT(31));
/* Check the SEV MSR whether SEV or SME is enabled */
sev_status = msr = native_rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SEV);
@@ -531,7 +532,7 @@ void __head sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
* enablement abort the guest.
*/
if (snp_en ^ !!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED))
- snp_abort();
+ sev_es_terminate(SEV_TERM_SET_GEN, GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED);
/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */
if (feature_mask == AMD_SME_BIT) {
@@ -567,7 +568,6 @@ void __head sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
/* Local version for startup code, which never operates on user page tables */
-__weak
pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
{
return pgd;