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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c24
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c20
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c86
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/x86.c50
9 files changed, 110 insertions, 93 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
index 9792e329343e..1baa86dfe029 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
#define EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE 68
#define EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK 74
#define EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY 75
+#define EXIT_REASON_SEAMCALL 76
#define EXIT_REASON_TDCALL 77
#define EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ_IMM 84
#define EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE_IMM 85
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
index f286b5706d7c..fef00546c885 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/avic.c
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ static void avic_deactivate_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
* This function is called from IOMMU driver to notify
* SVM to schedule in a particular vCPU of a particular VM.
*/
-int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag)
+static int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag)
{
unsigned long flags;
struct kvm_svm *kvm_svm;
@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ int avic_init_vcpu(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&svm->ir_list);
- spin_lock_init(&svm->ir_list_lock);
+ raw_spin_lock_init(&svm->ir_list_lock);
if (!enable_apicv || !irqchip_in_kernel(vcpu->kvm))
return 0;
@@ -816,9 +816,9 @@ static void svm_ir_list_del(struct kvm_kernel_irqfd *irqfd)
if (!vcpu)
return;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&to_svm(vcpu)->ir_list_lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_svm(vcpu)->ir_list_lock, flags);
list_del(&irqfd->vcpu_list);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&to_svm(vcpu)->ir_list_lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&to_svm(vcpu)->ir_list_lock, flags);
}
int avic_pi_update_irte(struct kvm_kernel_irqfd *irqfd, struct kvm *kvm,
@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ int avic_pi_update_irte(struct kvm_kernel_irqfd *irqfd, struct kvm *kvm,
* list of IRQs being posted to the vCPU, to ensure the IRTE
* isn't programmed with stale pCPU/IsRunning information.
*/
- guard(spinlock_irqsave)(&svm->ir_list_lock);
+ guard(raw_spinlock_irqsave)(&svm->ir_list_lock);
/*
* Update the target pCPU for IOMMU doorbells if the vCPU is
@@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ static void __avic_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
* up-to-date entry information, or that this task will wait until
* svm_ir_list_add() completes to set the new target pCPU.
*/
- spin_lock_irqsave(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
entry = svm->avic_physical_id_entry;
WARN_ON_ONCE(entry & AVIC_PHYSICAL_ID_ENTRY_IS_RUNNING_MASK);
@@ -997,7 +997,7 @@ static void __avic_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
avic_update_iommu_vcpu_affinity(vcpu, h_physical_id, action);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
}
void avic_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
@@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ static void __avic_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum avic_vcpu_action action)
* or that this task will wait until svm_ir_list_add() completes to
* mark the vCPU as not running.
*/
- spin_lock_irqsave(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
avic_update_iommu_vcpu_affinity(vcpu, -1, action);
@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ static void __avic_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum avic_vcpu_action action)
svm->avic_physical_id_entry = entry;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm->ir_list_lock, flags);
}
void avic_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -1243,3 +1243,9 @@ bool __init avic_hardware_setup(void)
return true;
}
+
+void avic_hardware_unsetup(void)
+{
+ if (avic)
+ amd_iommu_register_ga_log_notifier(NULL);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index a6443feab252..da6e80b3ac35 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -677,11 +677,10 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb12
*/
svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb02, vmcb12);
vmcb02->save.dbgctl &= ~DEBUGCTL_RESERVED_BITS;
- svm_update_lbrv(&svm->vcpu);
-
- } else if (unlikely(vmcb01->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)) {
+ } else {
svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb02, vmcb01);
}
+ svm_update_lbrv(&svm->vcpu);
}
static inline bool is_evtinj_soft(u32 evtinj)
@@ -833,11 +832,7 @@ static void nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
svm->soft_int_next_rip = vmcb12_rip;
}
- vmcb02->control.virt_ext = vmcb01->control.virt_ext &
- LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
- if (guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV))
- vmcb02->control.virt_ext |=
- (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK);
+ /* LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK is controlled by svm_update_lbrv() */
if (!nested_vmcb_needs_vls_intercept(svm))
vmcb02->control.virt_ext |= VIRTUAL_VMLOAD_VMSAVE_ENABLE_MASK;
@@ -1189,13 +1184,12 @@ int nested_svm_vmexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, &svm->vcpu);
if (unlikely(guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
- (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK))) {
+ (svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)))
svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb12, vmcb02);
- svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
- } else if (unlikely(vmcb01->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK)) {
+ else
svm_copy_lbrs(vmcb01, vmcb02);
- svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
- }
+
+ svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
if (vnmi) {
if (vmcb02->control.int_ctl & V_NMI_BLOCKING_MASK)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 153c12dbf3eb..10c21e4c5406 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -806,60 +806,43 @@ void svm_copy_lbrs(struct vmcb *to_vmcb, struct vmcb *from_vmcb)
vmcb_mark_dirty(to_vmcb, VMCB_LBR);
}
-void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void __svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
-
- svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
- svm_recalc_lbr_msr_intercepts(vcpu);
-
- /* Move the LBR msrs to the vmcb02 so that the guest can see them. */
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
- svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb, svm->vmcb01.ptr);
+ to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
}
-static void svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+void svm_enable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
-
- KVM_BUG_ON(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm), vcpu->kvm);
- svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
+ __svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu);
svm_recalc_lbr_msr_intercepts(vcpu);
-
- /*
- * Move the LBR msrs back to the vmcb01 to avoid copying them
- * on nested guest entries.
- */
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
- svm_copy_lbrs(svm->vmcb01.ptr, svm->vmcb);
}
-static struct vmcb *svm_get_lbr_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
+static void __svm_disable_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- /*
- * If LBR virtualization is disabled, the LBR MSRs are always kept in
- * vmcb01. If LBR virtualization is enabled and L1 is running VMs of
- * its own, the MSRs are moved between vmcb01 and vmcb02 as needed.
- */
- return svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK ? svm->vmcb :
- svm->vmcb01.ptr;
+ KVM_BUG_ON(sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm), vcpu->kvm);
+ to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.virt_ext &= ~LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
}
void svm_update_lbrv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
bool current_enable_lbrv = svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
- bool enable_lbrv = (svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) ||
+ bool enable_lbrv = (svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl & DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR) ||
(is_guest_mode(vcpu) && guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LBRV) &&
(svm->nested.ctl.virt_ext & LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK));
- if (enable_lbrv == current_enable_lbrv)
- return;
+ if (enable_lbrv && !current_enable_lbrv)
+ __svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu);
+ else if (!enable_lbrv && current_enable_lbrv)
+ __svm_disable_lbrv(vcpu);
- if (enable_lbrv)
- svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu);
- else
- svm_disable_lbrv(vcpu);
+ /*
+ * During nested transitions, it is possible that the current VMCB has
+ * LBR_CTL set, but the previous LBR_CTL had it cleared (or vice versa).
+ * In this case, even though LBR_CTL does not need an update, intercepts
+ * do, so always recalculate the intercepts here.
+ */
+ svm_recalc_lbr_msr_intercepts(vcpu);
}
void disable_nmi_singlestep(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
@@ -921,6 +904,8 @@ static void svm_hardware_unsetup(void)
{
int cpu;
+ avic_hardware_unsetup();
+
sev_hardware_unsetup();
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
@@ -2722,19 +2707,19 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux;
break;
case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
- msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl;
+ msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl;
break;
case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP:
- msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_from;
+ msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.br_from;
break;
case MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP:
- msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.br_to;
+ msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.br_to;
break;
case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP:
- msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_from;
+ msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.last_excp_from;
break;
case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP:
- msr_info->data = svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.last_excp_to;
+ msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.last_excp_to;
break;
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
msr_info->data = svm->nested.hsave_msr;
@@ -3002,7 +2987,11 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
if (data & DEBUGCTL_RESERVED_BITS)
return 1;
- svm_get_lbr_vmcb(svm)->save.dbgctl = data;
+ if (svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl == data)
+ break;
+
+ svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl = data;
+ vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_LBR);
svm_update_lbrv(vcpu);
break;
case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA:
@@ -5386,12 +5375,6 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
svm_hv_hardware_setup();
- for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
- r = svm_cpu_init(cpu);
- if (r)
- goto err;
- }
-
enable_apicv = avic_hardware_setup();
if (!enable_apicv) {
enable_ipiv = false;
@@ -5435,6 +5418,13 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
svm_set_cpu_caps();
kvm_caps.inapplicable_quirks &= ~KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ r = svm_cpu_init(cpu);
+ if (r)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
return 0;
err:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index e4b04f435b3d..c856d8e0f95e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
* back into remapped mode).
*/
struct list_head ir_list;
- spinlock_t ir_list_lock;
+ raw_spinlock_t ir_list_lock;
struct vcpu_sev_es_state sev_es;
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ extern struct kvm_x86_nested_ops svm_nested_ops;
)
bool __init avic_hardware_setup(void);
-int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag);
+void avic_hardware_unsetup(void);
void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm);
int avic_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm);
void avic_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct vmcb *vmcb);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
index bc5ece76533a..412d0829d7a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static inline int __vmx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK)
? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
- if (error_code & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID)
+ if (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID)
error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED) ?
PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 76271962cb70..bcea087b642f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -6728,6 +6728,14 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
case EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY:
/* Notify VM exit is not exposed to L1 */
return false;
+ case EXIT_REASON_SEAMCALL:
+ case EXIT_REASON_TDCALL:
+ /*
+ * SEAMCALL and TDCALL unconditionally VM-Exit, but aren't
+ * virtualized by KVM for L1 hypervisors, i.e. L1 should
+ * never want or expect such an exit.
+ */
+ return false;
default:
return true;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index f87c216d976d..91b6f2f3edc2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6032,6 +6032,12 @@ static int handle_vmx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 1;
}
+static int handle_tdx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+ return 1;
+}
+
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
@@ -6157,6 +6163,8 @@ static int (*kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
[EXIT_REASON_ENCLS] = handle_encls,
[EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK] = handle_bus_lock_vmexit,
[EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY] = handle_notify,
+ [EXIT_REASON_SEAMCALL] = handle_tdx_instruction,
+ [EXIT_REASON_TDCALL] = handle_tdx_instruction,
[EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ_IMM] = handle_rdmsr_imm,
[EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE_IMM] = handle_wrmsr_imm,
};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index b4b5d2d09634..c9c2aa6f4705 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -3874,15 +3874,9 @@ static void record_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
/*
* Returns true if the MSR in question is managed via XSTATE, i.e. is context
- * switched with the rest of guest FPU state. Note! S_CET is _not_ context
- * switched via XSTATE even though it _is_ saved/restored via XSAVES/XRSTORS.
- * Because S_CET is loaded on VM-Enter and VM-Exit via dedicated VMCS fields,
- * the value saved/restored via XSTATE is always the host's value. That detail
- * is _extremely_ important, as the guest's S_CET must _never_ be resident in
- * hardware while executing in the host. Loading guest values for U_CET and
- * PL[0-3]_SSP while executing in the kernel is safe, as U_CET is specific to
- * userspace, and PL[0-3]_SSP are only consumed when transitioning to lower
- * privilege levels, i.e. are effectively only consumed by userspace as well.
+ * switched with the rest of guest FPU state.
+ *
+ * Note, S_CET is _not_ saved/restored via XSAVES/XRSTORS.
*/
static bool is_xstate_managed_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
{
@@ -3905,6 +3899,11 @@ static bool is_xstate_managed_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
* MSR that is managed via XSTATE. Note, the caller is responsible for doing
* the initial FPU load, this helper only ensures that guest state is resident
* in hardware (the kernel can load its FPU state in IRQ context).
+ *
+ * Note, loading guest values for U_CET and PL[0-3]_SSP while executing in the
+ * kernel is safe, as U_CET is specific to userspace, and PL[0-3]_SSP are only
+ * consumed when transitioning to lower privilege levels, i.e. are effectively
+ * only consumed by userspace as well.
*/
static __always_inline void kvm_access_xstate_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct msr_data *msr_info,
@@ -11807,6 +11806,9 @@ static int complete_emulated_mmio(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
/* Swap (qemu) user FPU context for the guest FPU context. */
static void kvm_load_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->in_use, vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
/* Exclude PKRU, it's restored separately immediately after VM-Exit. */
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, true);
trace_kvm_fpu(1);
@@ -11815,6 +11817,9 @@ static void kvm_load_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
/* When vcpu_run ends, restore user space FPU context. */
static void kvm_put_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
+ if (KVM_BUG_ON(!vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->in_use, vcpu->kvm))
+ return;
+
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, false);
++vcpu->stat.fpu_reload;
trace_kvm_fpu(0);
@@ -12137,9 +12142,6 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
int r;
vcpu_load(vcpu);
- if (kvm_mpx_supported())
- kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
-
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_lock(vcpu);
r = kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
@@ -12156,9 +12158,6 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_mpstate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
out:
kvm_vcpu_srcu_read_unlock(vcpu);
-
- if (kvm_mpx_supported())
- kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
vcpu_put(vcpu);
return r;
}
@@ -12788,6 +12787,7 @@ static void kvm_xstate_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
{
struct fpstate *fpstate = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate;
u64 xfeatures_mask;
+ bool fpu_in_use;
int i;
/*
@@ -12811,13 +12811,23 @@ static void kvm_xstate_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(xfeatures_mask) * BITS_PER_BYTE <= XFEATURE_MAX);
/*
- * All paths that lead to INIT are required to load the guest's FPU
- * state (because most paths are buried in KVM_RUN).
- */
- kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
+ * Unload guest FPU state (if necessary) before zeroing XSTATE fields
+ * as the kernel can only modify the state when its resident in memory,
+ * i.e. when it's not loaded into hardware.
+ *
+ * WARN if the vCPU's desire to run, i.e. whether or not its in KVM_RUN,
+ * doesn't match the loaded/in-use state of the FPU, as KVM_RUN is the
+ * only path that can trigger INIT emulation _and_ loads FPU state, and
+ * KVM_RUN should _always_ load FPU state.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->wants_to_run != fpstate->in_use);
+ fpu_in_use = fpstate->in_use;
+ if (fpu_in_use)
+ kvm_put_guest_fpu(vcpu);
for_each_set_bit(i, (unsigned long *)&xfeatures_mask, XFEATURE_MAX)
fpstate_clear_xstate_component(fpstate, i);
- kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
+ if (fpu_in_use)
+ kvm_load_guest_fpu(vcpu);
}
void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-11-10 21:56:27 +0000