diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/crypto/keysetup.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 108 |
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c index 4f3b9ecbfe4e..4bd3918f50e3 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c @@ -253,11 +253,8 @@ static int setup_per_mode_enc_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, sizeof(sb->s_uuid)); hkdf_infolen += sizeof(sb->s_uuid); } - err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, - hkdf_context, hkdf_info, hkdf_infolen, - mode_key, mode->keysize); - if (err) - goto out_unlock; + fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, hkdf_context, hkdf_info, + hkdf_infolen, mode_key, mode->keysize); err = fscrypt_prepare_key(prep_key, mode_key, ci); memzero_explicit(mode_key, mode->keysize); if (err) @@ -278,36 +275,25 @@ out_unlock: * as a pair of 64-bit words. Therefore, on big endian CPUs we have to do an * endianness swap in order to get the same results as on little endian CPUs. */ -static int fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk, - u8 context, const u8 *info, - unsigned int infolen, siphash_key_t *key) +static void fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk, + u8 context, const u8 *info, + unsigned int infolen, siphash_key_t *key) { - int err; - - err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, context, info, infolen, - (u8 *)key, sizeof(*key)); - if (err) - return err; - + fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, context, info, infolen, + (u8 *)key, sizeof(*key)); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*key) != 16); BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(key->key) != 2); le64_to_cpus(&key->key[0]); le64_to_cpus(&key->key[1]); - return 0; } -int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, - const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) +void fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, + const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk) { - int err; - - err = fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(mk, HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRHASH_KEY, - ci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE, - &ci->ci_dirhash_key); - if (err) - return err; + fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(mk, HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRHASH_KEY, + ci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE, + &ci->ci_dirhash_key); ci->ci_dirhash_key_initialized = true; - return 0; } void fscrypt_hash_inode_number(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, @@ -338,17 +324,12 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, if (mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized) goto unlock; - err = fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(mk, - HKDF_CONTEXT_INODE_HASH_KEY, - NULL, 0, &mk->mk_ino_hash_key); - if (err) - goto unlock; + fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(mk, HKDF_CONTEXT_INODE_HASH_KEY, + NULL, 0, &mk->mk_ino_hash_key); /* pairs with smp_load_acquire() above */ smp_store_release(&mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized, true); unlock: mutex_unlock(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex); - if (err) - return err; } /* @@ -402,13 +383,10 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, } else { u8 derived_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_RAW_KEY_SIZE]; - err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, - HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_FILE_ENC_KEY, - ci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE, - derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize); - if (err) - return err; - + fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, + HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_FILE_ENC_KEY, + ci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE, + derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize); err = fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(ci, derived_key); memzero_explicit(derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize); } @@ -416,11 +394,8 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci, return err; /* Derive a secret dirhash key for directories that need it. */ - if (need_dirhash_key) { - err = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(ci, mk); - if (err) - return err; - } + if (need_dirhash_key) + fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(ci, mk); return 0; } @@ -642,15 +617,16 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, goto out; /* - * For existing inodes, multiple tasks may race to set ->i_crypt_info. - * So use cmpxchg_release(). This pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in - * fscrypt_get_inode_info(). I.e., here we publish ->i_crypt_info with - * a RELEASE barrier so that other tasks can ACQUIRE it. + * For existing inodes, multiple tasks may race to set the inode's + * fscrypt info pointer. So use cmpxchg_release(). This pairs with the + * smp_load_acquire() in fscrypt_get_inode_info(). I.e., publish the + * pointer with a RELEASE barrier so that other tasks can ACQUIRE it. */ - if (cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL) { + if (cmpxchg_release(fscrypt_inode_info_addr(inode), NULL, crypt_info) == + NULL) { /* - * We won the race and set ->i_crypt_info to our crypt_info. - * Now link it into the master key's inode list. + * We won the race and set the inode's fscrypt info to our + * crypt_info. Now link it into the master key's inode list. */ if (mk) { crypt_info->ci_master_key = mk; @@ -681,13 +657,13 @@ out: * %false unless the operation being performed is needed in * order for files (or directories) to be deleted. * - * Set up ->i_crypt_info, if it hasn't already been done. + * Set up the inode's encryption key, if it hasn't already been done. * - * Note: unless ->i_crypt_info is already set, this isn't %GFP_NOFS-safe. So + * Note: unless the key setup was already done, this isn't %GFP_NOFS-safe. So * generally this shouldn't be called from within a filesystem transaction. * - * Return: 0 if ->i_crypt_info was set or was already set, *or* if the - * encryption key is unavailable. (Use fscrypt_has_encryption_key() to + * Return: 0 if the key is now set up, *or* if it couldn't be set up because the + * needed master key is absent. (Use fscrypt_has_encryption_key() to * distinguish these cases.) Also can return another -errno code. */ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, bool allow_unsupported) @@ -741,9 +717,9 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, bool allow_unsupported) * ->i_ino doesn't need to be set yet. * @encrypt_ret: (output) set to %true if the new inode will be encrypted * - * If the directory is encrypted, set up its ->i_crypt_info in preparation for + * If the directory is encrypted, set up its encryption key in preparation for * encrypting the name of the new file. Also, if the new inode will be - * encrypted, set up its ->i_crypt_info and set *encrypt_ret=true. + * encrypted, set up its encryption key too and set *encrypt_ret=true. * * This isn't %GFP_NOFS-safe, and therefore it should be called before starting * any filesystem transaction to create the inode. For this reason, ->i_ino @@ -752,8 +728,8 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, bool allow_unsupported) * This doesn't persist the new inode's encryption context. That still needs to * be done later by calling fscrypt_set_context(). * - * Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the encryption key is missing, or another - * -errno code + * Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if a key needs to be set up for @dir or @inode + * but the needed master key is absent, or another -errno code */ int fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, bool *encrypt_ret) @@ -800,8 +776,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_prepare_new_inode); */ void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode) { - put_crypt_info(inode->i_crypt_info); - inode->i_crypt_info = NULL; + /* + * Ideally we'd start with a lightweight IS_ENCRYPTED() check here + * before proceeding to retrieve and check the pointer. However, during + * inode creation, the fscrypt_inode_info is set before S_ENCRYPTED. If + * an error occurs, it needs to be cleaned up regardless. + */ + struct fscrypt_inode_info **ci_addr = fscrypt_inode_info_addr(inode); + + put_crypt_info(*ci_addr); + *ci_addr = NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_put_encryption_info); |