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path: root/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
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Diffstat (limited to 'fs/crypto/keysetup.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/keysetup.c108
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
index 4f3b9ecbfe4e..4bd3918f50e3 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
@@ -253,11 +253,8 @@ static int setup_per_mode_enc_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
sizeof(sb->s_uuid));
hkdf_infolen += sizeof(sb->s_uuid);
}
- err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf,
- hkdf_context, hkdf_info, hkdf_infolen,
- mode_key, mode->keysize);
- if (err)
- goto out_unlock;
+ fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, hkdf_context, hkdf_info,
+ hkdf_infolen, mode_key, mode->keysize);
err = fscrypt_prepare_key(prep_key, mode_key, ci);
memzero_explicit(mode_key, mode->keysize);
if (err)
@@ -278,36 +275,25 @@ out_unlock:
* as a pair of 64-bit words. Therefore, on big endian CPUs we have to do an
* endianness swap in order to get the same results as on little endian CPUs.
*/
-static int fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
- u8 context, const u8 *info,
- unsigned int infolen, siphash_key_t *key)
+static void fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
+ u8 context, const u8 *info,
+ unsigned int infolen, siphash_key_t *key)
{
- int err;
-
- err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, context, info, infolen,
- (u8 *)key, sizeof(*key));
- if (err)
- return err;
-
+ fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, context, info, infolen,
+ (u8 *)key, sizeof(*key));
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*key) != 16);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(key->key) != 2);
le64_to_cpus(&key->key[0]);
le64_to_cpus(&key->key[1]);
- return 0;
}
-int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
- const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
+void fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
+ const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
- int err;
-
- err = fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(mk, HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRHASH_KEY,
- ci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE,
- &ci->ci_dirhash_key);
- if (err)
- return err;
+ fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(mk, HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRHASH_KEY,
+ ci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE,
+ &ci->ci_dirhash_key);
ci->ci_dirhash_key_initialized = true;
- return 0;
}
void fscrypt_hash_inode_number(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
@@ -338,17 +324,12 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
if (mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized)
goto unlock;
- err = fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(mk,
- HKDF_CONTEXT_INODE_HASH_KEY,
- NULL, 0, &mk->mk_ino_hash_key);
- if (err)
- goto unlock;
+ fscrypt_derive_siphash_key(mk, HKDF_CONTEXT_INODE_HASH_KEY,
+ NULL, 0, &mk->mk_ino_hash_key);
/* pairs with smp_load_acquire() above */
smp_store_release(&mk->mk_ino_hash_key_initialized, true);
unlock:
mutex_unlock(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex);
- if (err)
- return err;
}
/*
@@ -402,13 +383,10 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
} else {
u8 derived_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_RAW_KEY_SIZE];
- err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf,
- HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_FILE_ENC_KEY,
- ci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE,
- derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
+ fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf,
+ HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_FILE_ENC_KEY,
+ ci->ci_nonce, FSCRYPT_FILE_NONCE_SIZE,
+ derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
err = fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(ci, derived_key);
memzero_explicit(derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
}
@@ -416,11 +394,8 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
return err;
/* Derive a secret dirhash key for directories that need it. */
- if (need_dirhash_key) {
- err = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(ci, mk);
- if (err)
- return err;
- }
+ if (need_dirhash_key)
+ fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(ci, mk);
return 0;
}
@@ -642,15 +617,16 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode,
goto out;
/*
- * For existing inodes, multiple tasks may race to set ->i_crypt_info.
- * So use cmpxchg_release(). This pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in
- * fscrypt_get_inode_info(). I.e., here we publish ->i_crypt_info with
- * a RELEASE barrier so that other tasks can ACQUIRE it.
+ * For existing inodes, multiple tasks may race to set the inode's
+ * fscrypt info pointer. So use cmpxchg_release(). This pairs with the
+ * smp_load_acquire() in fscrypt_get_inode_info(). I.e., publish the
+ * pointer with a RELEASE barrier so that other tasks can ACQUIRE it.
*/
- if (cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL) {
+ if (cmpxchg_release(fscrypt_inode_info_addr(inode), NULL, crypt_info) ==
+ NULL) {
/*
- * We won the race and set ->i_crypt_info to our crypt_info.
- * Now link it into the master key's inode list.
+ * We won the race and set the inode's fscrypt info to our
+ * crypt_info. Now link it into the master key's inode list.
*/
if (mk) {
crypt_info->ci_master_key = mk;
@@ -681,13 +657,13 @@ out:
* %false unless the operation being performed is needed in
* order for files (or directories) to be deleted.
*
- * Set up ->i_crypt_info, if it hasn't already been done.
+ * Set up the inode's encryption key, if it hasn't already been done.
*
- * Note: unless ->i_crypt_info is already set, this isn't %GFP_NOFS-safe. So
+ * Note: unless the key setup was already done, this isn't %GFP_NOFS-safe. So
* generally this shouldn't be called from within a filesystem transaction.
*
- * Return: 0 if ->i_crypt_info was set or was already set, *or* if the
- * encryption key is unavailable. (Use fscrypt_has_encryption_key() to
+ * Return: 0 if the key is now set up, *or* if it couldn't be set up because the
+ * needed master key is absent. (Use fscrypt_has_encryption_key() to
* distinguish these cases.) Also can return another -errno code.
*/
int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, bool allow_unsupported)
@@ -741,9 +717,9 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, bool allow_unsupported)
* ->i_ino doesn't need to be set yet.
* @encrypt_ret: (output) set to %true if the new inode will be encrypted
*
- * If the directory is encrypted, set up its ->i_crypt_info in preparation for
+ * If the directory is encrypted, set up its encryption key in preparation for
* encrypting the name of the new file. Also, if the new inode will be
- * encrypted, set up its ->i_crypt_info and set *encrypt_ret=true.
+ * encrypted, set up its encryption key too and set *encrypt_ret=true.
*
* This isn't %GFP_NOFS-safe, and therefore it should be called before starting
* any filesystem transaction to create the inode. For this reason, ->i_ino
@@ -752,8 +728,8 @@ int fscrypt_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, bool allow_unsupported)
* This doesn't persist the new inode's encryption context. That still needs to
* be done later by calling fscrypt_set_context().
*
- * Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the encryption key is missing, or another
- * -errno code
+ * Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if a key needs to be set up for @dir or @inode
+ * but the needed master key is absent, or another -errno code
*/
int fscrypt_prepare_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode,
bool *encrypt_ret)
@@ -800,8 +776,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_prepare_new_inode);
*/
void fscrypt_put_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
{
- put_crypt_info(inode->i_crypt_info);
- inode->i_crypt_info = NULL;
+ /*
+ * Ideally we'd start with a lightweight IS_ENCRYPTED() check here
+ * before proceeding to retrieve and check the pointer. However, during
+ * inode creation, the fscrypt_inode_info is set before S_ENCRYPTED. If
+ * an error occurs, it needs to be cleaned up regardless.
+ */
+ struct fscrypt_inode_info **ci_addr = fscrypt_inode_info_addr(inode);
+
+ put_crypt_info(*ci_addr);
+ *ci_addr = NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_put_encryption_info);