diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 34 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 26 |
2 files changed, 29 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index b50479bd0286..8a23dfab7fac 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -358,17 +358,17 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) return error; } -static bool rootid_owns_currentns(vfsuid_t rootvfsuid) +/** + * kuid_root_in_ns - check whether the given kuid is root in the given ns + * @kuid: the kuid to be tested + * @ns: the user namespace to test against + * + * Returns true if @kuid represents the root user in @ns, false otherwise. + */ +static bool kuid_root_in_ns(kuid_t kuid, struct user_namespace *ns) { - struct user_namespace *ns; - kuid_t kroot; - - if (!vfsuid_valid(rootvfsuid)) - return false; - - kroot = vfsuid_into_kuid(rootvfsuid); - for (ns = current_user_ns();; ns = ns->parent) { - if (from_kuid(ns, kroot) == 0) + for (;; ns = ns->parent) { + if (from_kuid(ns, kuid) == 0) return true; if (ns == &init_user_ns) break; @@ -377,6 +377,16 @@ static bool rootid_owns_currentns(vfsuid_t rootvfsuid) return false; } +static bool vfsuid_root_in_currentns(vfsuid_t vfsuid) +{ + kuid_t kuid; + + if (!vfsuid_valid(vfsuid)) + return false; + kuid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); + return kuid_root_in_ns(kuid, current_user_ns()); +} + static __u32 sansflags(__u32 m) { return m & ~VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE; @@ -481,7 +491,7 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, goto out_free; } - if (!rootid_owns_currentns(vfsroot)) { + if (!vfsuid_root_in_currentns(vfsroot)) { size = -EOVERFLOW; goto out_free; } @@ -722,7 +732,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, /* Limit the caps to the mounter of the filesystem * or the more limited uid specified in the xattr. */ - if (!rootid_owns_currentns(rootvfsuid)) + if (!vfsuid_root_in_currentns(rootvfsuid)) return -ENODATA; cpu_caps->permitted.val = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[0].permitted); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 91656e44b326..8bc6efa8accb 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -333,25 +333,19 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, } blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf.data[offset], blob_len); + if (blob_len < 0) + rc = blob_len; out: tpm_buf_destroy(&sized); tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - if (rc > 0) { - if (tpm2_rc_value(rc) == TPM2_RC_HASH) - rc = -EINVAL; - else - rc = -EPERM; - } - if (blob_len < 0) - rc = blob_len; - else + if (!rc) payload->blob_len = blob_len; out_put: tpm_put_ops(chip); - return rc; + return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); } /** @@ -455,10 +449,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, out: tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - if (rc > 0) - rc = -EPERM; - - return rc; + return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); } /** @@ -521,8 +512,6 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf); rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing"); rc = tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(chip, &buf, rc); - if (rc > 0) - rc = -EPERM; if (!rc) { data_len = be16_to_cpup( @@ -555,7 +544,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, out: tpm_buf_destroy(&buf); - return rc; + return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); } /** @@ -587,6 +576,5 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, out: tpm_put_ops(chip); - - return rc; + return tpm_ret_to_err(rc); } |