diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/landlock/fs.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/min_addr.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 114 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/avc.c | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 73 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 20 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/security.h | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 2 |
14 files changed, 172 insertions, 93 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 4816fc74f81e..285f284dfcac 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ endchoice config LSM string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" + depends on SECURITY default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,ipe,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 8e1cc229b41b..b3f7a3258a2c 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ static void apparmor_task_free(struct task_struct *task) } static int apparmor_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, - unsigned long clone_flags) + u64 clone_flags) { struct aa_task_ctx *new = task_ctx(task); @@ -2530,6 +2530,9 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks), &apparmor_lsmid); + /* Inform the audit system that secctx is used */ + audit_cfg_lsm(&apparmor_lsmid, AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_SUBJECT); + /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ apparmor_initialized = 1; if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c index c04f8879ad03..0bade2c5aa1d 100644 --- a/security/landlock/fs.c +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c @@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@ static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb) struct landlock_object *object; /* Only handles referenced inodes. */ - if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count)) + if (!icount_read(inode)) continue; /* diff --git a/security/min_addr.c b/security/min_addr.c index df1bc643d886..c55bb84b8632 100644 --- a/security/min_addr.c +++ b/security/min_addr.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/sysctl.h> +#include <linux/minmax.h> /* amount of vm to protect from userspace access by both DAC and the LSM*/ unsigned long mmap_min_addr; @@ -16,10 +17,7 @@ unsigned long dac_mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR; static void update_mmap_min_addr(void) { #ifdef CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR - if (dac_mmap_min_addr > CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) - mmap_min_addr = dac_mmap_min_addr; - else - mmap_min_addr = CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR; + mmap_min_addr = umax(dac_mmap_min_addr, CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR); #else mmap_min_addr = dac_mmap_min_addr; #endif diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index ad163f06bf7a..301104d63fde 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -283,6 +283,9 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed) lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_xattr_count, &blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_bdev, &blob_sizes.lbs_bdev); + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_bpf_map, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map); + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_bpf_prog, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog); + lsm_set_blob_size(&needed->lbs_bpf_token, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token); } /* Prepare LSM for initialization. */ @@ -480,6 +483,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) init_debug("tun device blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_tun_dev); init_debug("xattr slots = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count); init_debug("bdev blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bdev); + init_debug("bpf map blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map); + init_debug("bpf prog blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog); + init_debug("bpf token blob size = %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token); /* * Create any kmem_caches needed for blobs @@ -823,17 +829,50 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp) */ static int lsm_bdev_alloc(struct block_device *bdev) { - if (blob_sizes.lbs_bdev == 0) { - bdev->bd_security = NULL; - return 0; - } + return lsm_blob_alloc(&bdev->bd_security, blob_sizes.lbs_bdev, + GFP_KERNEL); +} - bdev->bd_security = kzalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_bdev, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!bdev->bd_security) - return -ENOMEM; +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +/** + * lsm_bpf_map_alloc - allocate a composite bpf_map blob + * @map: the bpf_map that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the bpf_map blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + return lsm_blob_alloc(&map->security, blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map, GFP_KERNEL); +} - return 0; +/** + * lsm_bpf_prog_alloc - allocate a composite bpf_prog blob + * @prog: the bpf_prog that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the bpf_prog blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + return lsm_blob_alloc(&prog->aux->security, blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog, GFP_KERNEL); +} + +/** + * lsm_bpf_token_alloc - allocate a composite bpf_token blob + * @token: the bpf_token that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the bpf_token blob for all the modules + * + * Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_bpf_token_alloc(struct bpf_token *token) +{ + return lsm_blob_alloc(&token->security, blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token, GFP_KERNEL); } +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ /** * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob @@ -3185,7 +3224,7 @@ int security_file_truncate(struct file *file) * * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. */ -int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) +int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) { int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); @@ -4342,17 +4381,31 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); * security_lsmprop_to_secctx() - Convert a lsm_prop to a secctx * @prop: lsm specific information * @cp: the LSM context + * @lsmid: which security module to report * * Convert a @prop entry to security context. If @cp is NULL the * length of the result will be returned. This does mean that the * length could change between calls to check the length and the * next call which actually allocates and returns the @cp. * + * @lsmid identifies which LSM should supply the context. + * A value of LSM_ID_UNDEF indicates that the first LSM suppling + * the hook should be used. This is used in cases where the + * ID of the supplying LSM is unambiguous. + * * Return: Return length of data on success, error on failure. */ -int security_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, struct lsm_context *cp) +int security_lsmprop_to_secctx(struct lsm_prop *prop, struct lsm_context *cp, + int lsmid) { - return call_int_hook(lsmprop_to_secctx, prop, cp); + struct lsm_static_call *scall; + + lsm_for_each_hook(scall, lsmprop_to_secctx) { + if (lsmid != LSM_ID_UNDEF && lsmid != scall->hl->lsmid->id) + continue; + return scall->hl->hook.lsmprop_to_secctx(prop, cp); + } + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(lsmprop_to_secctx); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_lsmprop_to_secctx); @@ -5714,7 +5767,16 @@ int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel) { - return call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, map, attr, token, kernel); + int rc; + + rc = lsm_bpf_map_alloc(map); + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + + rc = call_int_hook(bpf_map_create, map, attr, token, kernel); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_bpf_map_free(map); + return rc; } /** @@ -5733,7 +5795,16 @@ int security_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr, int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel) { - return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, prog, attr, token, kernel); + int rc; + + rc = lsm_bpf_prog_alloc(prog); + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + + rc = call_int_hook(bpf_prog_load, prog, attr, token, kernel); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_bpf_prog_free(prog); + return rc; } /** @@ -5750,7 +5821,16 @@ int security_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr, int security_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr, const struct path *path) { - return call_int_hook(bpf_token_create, token, attr, path); + int rc; + + rc = lsm_bpf_token_alloc(token); + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + + rc = call_int_hook(bpf_token_create, token, attr, path); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_bpf_token_free(token); + return rc; } /** @@ -5794,6 +5874,8 @@ int security_bpf_token_capable(const struct bpf_token *token, int cap) void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) { call_void_hook(bpf_map_free, map); + kfree(map->security); + map->security = NULL; } /** @@ -5805,6 +5887,8 @@ void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog) { call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free, prog); + kfree(prog->aux->security); + prog->aux->security = NULL; } /** @@ -5816,6 +5900,8 @@ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog) void security_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token) { call_void_hook(bpf_token_free, token); + kfree(token->security); + token->security = NULL; } #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 4b4837a20225..430b0e23ee00 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -292,27 +292,26 @@ static struct avc_xperms_decision_node struct avc_xperms_decision_node *xpd_node; struct extended_perms_decision *xpd; - xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, - GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); + xpd_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_decision_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT); if (!xpd_node) return NULL; xpd = &xpd_node->xpd; if (which & XPERMS_ALLOWED) { xpd->allowed = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep, - GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); + GFP_NOWAIT); if (!xpd->allowed) goto error; } if (which & XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) { xpd->auditallow = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep, - GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); + GFP_NOWAIT); if (!xpd->auditallow) goto error; } if (which & XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) { xpd->dontaudit = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_data_cachep, - GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); + GFP_NOWAIT); if (!xpd->dontaudit) goto error; } @@ -340,7 +339,7 @@ static struct avc_xperms_node *avc_xperms_alloc(void) { struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node; - xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); + xp_node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_xperms_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT); if (!xp_node) return xp_node; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head); @@ -495,7 +494,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void) { struct avc_node *node; - node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT | __GFP_NOWARN); + node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_NOWAIT); if (!node) goto out; diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index c95a5874bf7d..76b66845a1c3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -476,7 +476,9 @@ static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb) !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") || (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() && (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") || - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))); + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))) || + (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel() && + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs")); } static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) @@ -741,7 +743,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") || !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || - !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs")) + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs") || + (selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel() && + !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "functionfs"))) sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || @@ -4144,7 +4148,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file) /* task security operations */ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, - unsigned long clone_flags) + u64 clone_flags) { u32 sid = current_sid(); @@ -5885,7 +5889,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ - sk = sk_to_full_sk(skb->sk); + sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); if (sk) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec; @@ -7062,14 +7066,14 @@ static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid) if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) { map = file->private_data; - bpfsec = map->security; + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_map_security(map); ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL); if (ret) return ret; } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) { prog = file->private_data; - bpfsec = prog->aux->security; + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_prog_security(prog); ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); if (ret) @@ -7083,7 +7087,7 @@ static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) u32 sid = current_sid(); struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; - bpfsec = map->security; + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_map_security(map); return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL); } @@ -7093,7 +7097,7 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) u32 sid = current_sid(); struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; - bpfsec = prog->aux->security; + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_prog_security(prog); return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); } @@ -7103,69 +7107,33 @@ static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr, { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; - bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!bpfsec) - return -ENOMEM; - + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_map_security(map); bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); - map->security = bpfsec; return 0; } -static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) -{ - struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security; - - map->security = NULL; - kfree(bpfsec); -} - static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr, struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; - bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!bpfsec) - return -ENOMEM; - + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_prog_security(prog); bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); - prog->aux->security = bpfsec; return 0; } -static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog) -{ - struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = prog->aux->security; - - prog->aux->security = NULL; - kfree(bpfsec); -} - static int selinux_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr, const struct path *path) { struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; - bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!bpfsec) - return -ENOMEM; - + bpfsec = selinux_bpf_token_security(token); bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); - token->security = bpfsec; return 0; } - -static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token) -{ - struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security; - - token->security = NULL; - kfree(bpfsec); -} #endif struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { @@ -7183,6 +7151,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { .lbs_xattr_count = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS, .lbs_tun_dev = sizeof(struct tun_security_struct), .lbs_ib = sizeof(struct ib_security_struct), + .lbs_bpf_map = sizeof(struct bpf_security_struct), + .lbs_bpf_prog = sizeof(struct bpf_security_struct), + .lbs_bpf_token = sizeof(struct bpf_security_struct), }; #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS @@ -7536,9 +7507,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map), LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free, selinux_bpf_map_free), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free, selinux_bpf_prog_free), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_free, selinux_bpf_token_free), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS @@ -7618,6 +7586,11 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void) /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ cred_init_security(); + /* Inform the audit system that secctx is used */ + audit_cfg_lsm(&selinux_lsmid, + AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_SUBJECT | + AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_OBJECT); + default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC); if (!default_noexec) pr_notice("SELinux: virtual memory is executable by default\n"); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 1d7ac59015a1..2d5139c6d45b 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> +#include <linux/bpf.h> #include "flask.h" #include "avc.h" @@ -245,4 +246,23 @@ selinux_perf_event(void *perf_event) return perf_event + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_perf_event; } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +static inline struct bpf_security_struct * +selinux_bpf_map_security(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + return map->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map; +} + +static inline struct bpf_security_struct * +selinux_bpf_prog_security(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + return prog->aux->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog; +} + +static inline struct bpf_security_struct * +selinux_bpf_token_security(struct bpf_token *token) +{ + return token->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h index 7405154e6c42..135a969f873c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum { POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM, POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD, POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD, + POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL, __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX }; #define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h index d8962fcf2ff9..ff8882887651 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = { "netlink_xperm", "netif_wildcard", "genfs_seclabel_wildcard", + "functionfs_seclabel", }; /* clang-format on */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 8201e6a3ac0f..0f954a40d3fc 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -203,10 +203,10 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netlink_xperm(void) selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM]); } -static inline bool selinux_policycap_netif_wildcard(void) +static inline bool selinux_policycap_functionfs_seclabel(void) { return READ_ONCE( - selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD]); + selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_FUNCTIONFS_SECLABEL]); } struct selinux_policy_convert_data; diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index 9aa1d03ab612..232e087bce3e 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -1203,7 +1203,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info; - char *page = NULL; + char buffer[4]; ssize_t length; ssize_t ret; int cur_enforcing; @@ -1217,27 +1217,19 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, fsi->bool_pending_names[index])) goto out_unlock; - ret = -ENOMEM; - page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!page) - goto out_unlock; - cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(index); if (cur_enforcing < 0) { ret = cur_enforcing; goto out_unlock; } - length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing, - fsi->bool_pending_values[index]); + length = scnprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d %d", !!cur_enforcing, + !!fsi->bool_pending_values[index]); mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex); - ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length); -out_free: - free_page((unsigned long)page); - return ret; + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buffer, length); out_unlock: mutex_unlock(&selinux_state.policy_mutex); - goto out_free; + return ret; } static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf, diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index fc340a6f0dde..fdf2f193a291 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -5267,6 +5267,11 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) /* initialize the smack_known_list */ init_smack_known_list(); + /* Inform the audit system that secctx is used */ + audit_cfg_lsm(&smack_lsmid, + AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_SUBJECT | + AUDIT_CFG_LSM_SECCTX_OBJECT); + return 0; } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index d6ebcd9db80a..48fc59d38ab2 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes tomoyo_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { * Returns 0. */ static int tomoyo_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, - unsigned long clone_flags) + u64 clone_flags) { struct tomoyo_task *old = tomoyo_task(current); struct tomoyo_task *new = tomoyo_task(task); |