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Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c25
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a6153b677b6d..b774b78dafea 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include <linux/kd.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
@@ -1733,8 +1734,32 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
{
struct avc_audit_data ad;
struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
+ struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
long j = -1;
+ if (tty) {
+ file_list_lock();
+ file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_list);
+ if (file) {
+ /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
+ Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
+ than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
+ file may belong to another process and we are only
+ interested in the inode-based check here. */
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+ if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
+ FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE,
+ NULL, NULL)) {
+ /* Reset controlling tty. */
+ current->signal->tty = NULL;
+ current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ file_list_unlock();
+ }
+
+ /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
+
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
spin_lock(&files->file_lock);