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authorNeil Conway <neilc@samurai.com>2006-07-13 04:15:25 +0000
committerNeil Conway <neilc@samurai.com>2006-07-13 04:15:25 +0000
commit1abf76e82cbb5c09f5517d155ea404727f67a507 (patch)
tree8d286cfb4963dc8e13bbb322569e36d8a008e797 /contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c
parent99ac1e69ba750c40cc83e344a1eb65aaa325a296 (diff)
"Annual" pgcrypto update from Marko Kreen:
Few cleanups and couple of new things: - add SHA2 algorithm to older OpenSSL - add BIGNUM math to have public-key cryptography work on non-OpenSSL build. - gen_random_bytes() function The status of SHA2 algoritms and public-key encryption can now be changed to 'always available.' That makes pgcrypto functionally complete and unless there will be new editions of AES, SHA2 or OpenPGP standards, there is no major changes planned.
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c')
-rw-r--r--contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c44
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c b/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c
index cf69cee28bc..cd08fd2bc68 100644
--- a/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c
+++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
- * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c,v 1.6 2006/05/21 20:22:16 tgl Exp $
+ * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/contrib/pgcrypto/fortuna.c,v 1.7 2006/07/13 04:15:24 neilc Exp $
*/
#include "postgres.h"
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ struct fortuna_state
struct timeval last_reseed_time;
unsigned pool0_bytes;
unsigned rnd_pos;
- int counter_init;
+ int tricks_done;
};
typedef struct fortuna_state FState;
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ add_entropy(FState * st, const uint8 *data, unsigned len)
/*
* Make sure the pool 0 is initialized, then update randomly.
*/
- if (st->reseed_count == 0 && st->pool0_bytes < POOL0_FILL)
+ if (st->reseed_count == 0)
pos = 0;
else
pos = get_rand_pool(st);
@@ -357,21 +357,34 @@ rekey(FState * st)
}
/*
- * Fortuna relies on AES standing known-plaintext attack.
- * In case it does not, slow down the attacker by initialising
- * the couter to random value.
+ * Hide public constants. (counter, pools > 0)
+ *
+ * This can also be viewed as spreading the startup
+ * entropy over all of the components.
*/
static void
-init_counter(FState * st)
+startup_tricks(FState * st)
{
+ int i;
+ uint8 buf[BLOCK];
+
/* Use next block as counter. */
encrypt_counter(st, st->counter);
+ /* Now shuffle pools, excluding #0 */
+ for (i = 1; i < NUM_POOLS; i++)
+ {
+ encrypt_counter(st, buf);
+ encrypt_counter(st, buf + CIPH_BLOCK);
+ md_update(&st->pool[i], buf, BLOCK);
+ }
+ memset(buf, 0, BLOCK);
+
/* Hide the key. */
rekey(st);
- /* The counter can be shuffled only once. */
- st->counter_init = 1;
+ /* This can be done only once. */
+ st->tricks_done = 1;
}
static void
@@ -380,13 +393,14 @@ extract_data(FState * st, unsigned count, uint8 *dst)
unsigned n;
unsigned block_nr = 0;
- /* Can we reseed? */
- if (st->pool0_bytes >= POOL0_FILL && enough_time_passed(st))
- reseed(st);
+ /* Should we reseed? */
+ if (st->pool0_bytes >= POOL0_FILL || st->reseed_count == 0)
+ if (enough_time_passed(st))
+ reseed(st);
- /* Is counter initialized? */
- if (!st->counter_init)
- init_counter(st);
+ /* Do some randomization on first call */
+ if (!st->tricks_done)
+ startup_tricks(st);
while (count > 0)
{