diff options
author | Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> | 2020-07-22 14:52:50 +0900 |
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committer | Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> | 2020-07-22 14:52:50 +0900 |
commit | eceb415c6ff0eb2494f90397433a966a182f3908 (patch) | |
tree | 9dca3e40d3aaed9f3311ea4247afd0278981c99e /contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql | |
parent | 22b96f883fe2a454476b4d5fd69ee46b15889169 (diff) |
Fix corner case with PGP decompression in pgcrypto
A compressed stream may end with an empty packet, and PGP decompression
finished before reading this empty packet in the remaining stream. This
caused a failure in pgcrypto, handling this case as corrupted data.
This commit makes sure to consume such extra data, avoiding a failure
when decompression the entire stream. This corner case was reproducible
with a data length of 16kB, and existed since its introduction in
e94dd6a. A cheap regression test is added to cover this case.
Thanks to Jeff Janes for the extra investigation.
Reported-by: Frank Gagnepain
Author: Kyotaro Horiguchi, Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16476-692ef7b84e5fb893@postgresql.org
Backpatch-through: 9.5
Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql')
-rw-r--r-- | contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql | 21 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql b/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql index ca9ee1fc008..87c59c6cabc 100644 --- a/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql +++ b/contrib/pgcrypto/sql/pgp-compression.sql @@ -28,3 +28,24 @@ select pgp_sym_decrypt( pgp_sym_encrypt('Secret message', 'key', 'compress-algo=2, compress-level=0'), 'key', 'expect-compress-algo=0'); + +-- check corner case involving an input string of 16kB, as per bug #16476. +SELECT setseed(0); +WITH random_string AS +( + -- This generates a random string of 16366 bytes. This is chosen + -- as random so that it does not get compressed, and the decompression + -- would work on a string with the same length as the origin, making the + -- test behavior more predictible. lpad() ensures that the generated + -- hexadecimal value is completed by extra zero characters if random() + -- has generated a value strictly lower than 16. + SELECT string_agg(decode(lpad(to_hex((random()*256)::int), 2, '0'), 'hex'), '') as bytes + FROM generate_series(0, 16365) +) +SELECT bytes = + pgp_sym_decrypt_bytea( + pgp_sym_encrypt_bytea(bytes, 'key', + 'compress-algo=1,compress-level=1'), + 'key', 'expect-compress-algo=1') + AS is_same + FROM random_string; |