Document security implications of search_path and the public schema.

The ability to create like-named objects in different schemas opens up
the potential for users to change the behavior of other users' queries,
maliciously or accidentally.  When you connect to a PostgreSQL server,
you should remove from your search_path any schema for which a user
other than yourself or superusers holds the CREATE privilege.  If you do
not, other users holding CREATE privilege can redefine the behavior of
your commands, causing them to perform arbitrary SQL statements under
your identity.  "SET search_path = ..." and "SELECT
pg_catalog.set_config(...)" are not vulnerable to such hijacking, so one
can use either as the first command of a session.  As special
exceptions, the following client applications behave as documented
regardless of search_path settings and schema privileges: clusterdb
createdb createlang createuser dropdb droplang dropuser ecpg (not
programs it generates) initdb oid2name pg_archivecleanup pg_basebackup
pg_config pg_controldata pg_ctl pg_dump pg_dumpall pg_isready
pg_receivewal pg_recvlogical pg_resetwal pg_restore pg_rewind pg_standby
pg_test_fsync pg_test_timing pg_upgrade pg_waldump reindexdb vacuumdb
vacuumlo.  Not included are core client programs that run user-specified
SQL commands, namely psql and pgbench.  PostgreSQL encourages non-core
client applications to do likewise.

Document this in the context of libpq connections, psql connections,
dblink connections, ECPG connections, extension packaging, and schema
usage patterns.  The principal defense for applications is "SELECT
pg_catalog.set_config('search_path', '', false)", and the principal
defense for databases is "REVOKE CREATE ON SCHEMA public FROM PUBLIC".
Either one is sufficient to prevent attack.  After a REVOKE, consider
auditing the public schema for objects named like pg_catalog objects.

Authors of SECURITY DEFINER functions use some of the same defenses, and
the CREATE FUNCTION reference page already covered them thoroughly.
This is a good opportunity to audit SECURITY DEFINER functions for
robust security practice.

Back-patch to 9.3 (all supported versions).

Reviewed by Michael Paquier and Jonathan S. Katz.  Reported by Arseniy
Sharoglazov.

Security: CVE-2018-1058

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/ref/psql-ref.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/ref/psql-ref.sgml
index 120bdb02eb1..c2800a2e51c 100644
--- a/doc/src/sgml/ref/psql-ref.sgml
+++ b/doc/src/sgml/ref/psql-ref.sgml
@@ -678,6 +678,18 @@ testdb=>
     </para>
 
     <para>
+    If untrusted users have access to a database that has not adopted a
+    <link linkend="ddl-schemas-patterns">secure schema usage pattern</link>,
+    begin your session by removing publicly-writable schemas
+    from <varname>search_path</varname>.  One can
+    add <literal>options=-csearch_path=</literal> to the connection string or
+    issue <literal>SELECT pg_catalog.set_config('search_path', '',
+    false)</literal> before other SQL commands.  This consideration is not
+    specific to <application>psql</application>; it applies to every interface
+    for executing arbitrary SQL commands.
+    </para>
+
+    <para>
     Whenever a command is executed, <application>psql</application> also polls
     for asynchronous notification events generated by
     <xref linkend="SQL-LISTEN"> and