Support SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication (RFC 5802 and 7677).

This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the
GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL
authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL
messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage
messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows
adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall
protocol.

Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later.

The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet
implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with
non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep.
That will hopefully be added later.

Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification,
are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same
functionality, anyway.

If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing
an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from
a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is
created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these
motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user
exists, to unauthenticated users.

Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file.

Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different
stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev,
and many others.

Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi

1 files changed, 136 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
index 824e40837b4..ebf10bbbaef 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
@@ -30,10 +30,12 @@
 #include "libpq/crypt.h"
 #include "libpq/libpq.h"
 #include "libpq/pqformat.h"
+#include "libpq/scram.h"
 #include "miscadmin.h"
 #include "replication/walsender.h"
 #include "storage/ipc.h"
 #include "utils/backend_random.h"
+#include "utils/timestamp.h"
 
 
 /*----------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -197,6 +199,12 @@ static int pg_SSPI_make_upn(char *accountname,
 static int	CheckRADIUSAuth(Port *port);
 
 
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * SASL authentication
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+static int	CheckSASLAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail);
+
 /*
  * Maximum accepted size of GSS and SSPI authentication tokens.
  *
@@ -212,6 +220,13 @@ static int	CheckRADIUSAuth(Port *port);
  */
 #define PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH	65535
 
+/*
+ * Maximum accepted size of SASL messages.
+ *
+ * The messages that the server or libpq generate are much smaller than this,
+ * but have some headroom.
+ */
+#define PG_MAX_SASL_MESSAGE_LENGTH	1024
 
 /*----------------------------------------------------------------
  * Global authentication functions
@@ -275,6 +290,7 @@ auth_failed(Port *port, int status, char *logdetail)
 			break;
 		case uaPassword:
 		case uaMD5:
+		case uaSASL:
 			errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
 			/* We use it to indicate if a .pgpass password failed. */
 			errcode_return = ERRCODE_INVALID_PASSWORD;
@@ -542,6 +558,10 @@ ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
 			status = CheckPasswordAuth(port, &logdetail);
 			break;
 
+		case uaSASL:
+			status = CheckSASLAuth(port, &logdetail);
+			break;
+
 		case uaPAM:
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 			status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, "");
@@ -762,6 +782,122 @@ CheckPasswordAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail)
 	return result;
 }
 
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------
+ * SASL authentication system
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+static int
+CheckSASLAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail)
+{
+	int			mtype;
+	StringInfoData buf;
+	void	   *scram_opaq;
+	char	   *output = NULL;
+	int			outputlen = 0;
+	int			result;
+	char	   *shadow_pass;
+	bool		doomed = false;
+
+	/*
+	 * SASL auth is not supported for protocol versions before 3, because it
+	 * relies on the overall message length word to determine the SASL payload
+	 * size in AuthenticationSASLContinue and PasswordMessage messages.  (We
+	 * used to have a hard rule that protocol messages must be parsable
+	 * without relying on the length word, but we hardly care about older
+	 * protocol version anymore.)
+	 */
+	if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
+		ereport(FATAL,
+				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
+				 errmsg("SASL authentication is not supported in protocol version 2")));
+
+	/*
+	 * Send first the authentication request to user.
+	 */
+	sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL, SCRAM_SHA256_NAME,
+					strlen(SCRAM_SHA256_NAME) + 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the user doesn't exist, or doesn't have a valid password, or it's
+	 * expired, we still go through the motions of SASL authentication, but
+	 * tell the authentication method that the authentication is "doomed".
+	 * That is, it's going to fail, no matter what.
+	 *
+	 * This is because we don't want to reveal to an attacker what usernames
+	 * are valid, nor which users have a valid password.
+	 */
+	if (get_role_password(port->user_name, &shadow_pass, logdetail) != STATUS_OK)
+		doomed = true;
+
+	/* Initialize the status tracker for message exchanges */
+	scram_opaq = pg_be_scram_init(port->user_name, shadow_pass, doomed);
+
+	/*
+	 * Loop through SASL message exchange.  This exchange can consist of
+	 * multiple messages sent in both directions.  First message is always
+	 * from the client.  All messages from client to server are password
+	 * packets (type 'p').
+	 */
+	do
+	{
+		pq_startmsgread();
+		mtype = pq_getbyte();
+		if (mtype != 'p')
+		{
+			/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
+			if (mtype != EOF)
+			{
+				ereport(COMMERROR,
+						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+						 errmsg("expected SASL response, got message type %d",
+								mtype)));
+				return STATUS_ERROR;
+			}
+			else
+				return STATUS_EOF;
+		}
+
+		/* Get the actual SASL message */
+		initStringInfo(&buf);
+		if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_SASL_MESSAGE_LENGTH))
+		{
+			/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
+			pfree(buf.data);
+			return STATUS_ERROR;
+		}
+
+		elog(DEBUG4, "Processing received SASL token of length %d", buf.len);
+
+		/*
+		 * we pass 'logdetail' as NULL when doing a mock authentication,
+		 * because we should already have a better error message in that case
+		 */
+		result = pg_be_scram_exchange(scram_opaq, buf.data, buf.len,
+									  &output, &outputlen,
+									  doomed ? NULL : logdetail);
+
+		/* input buffer no longer used */
+		pfree(buf.data);
+
+		if (outputlen > 0)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
+			 */
+			elog(DEBUG4, "sending SASL response token of length %u", outputlen);
+
+			sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT, output, outputlen);
+		}
+	} while (result == SASL_EXCHANGE_CONTINUE);
+
+	/* Oops, Something bad happened */
+	if (result != SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS)
+	{
+		return STATUS_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	return STATUS_OK;
+}
 
 
 /*----------------------------------------------------------------