diff options
author | Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com> | 2014-02-17 09:33:31 -0500 |
---|---|---|
committer | Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com> | 2014-02-17 09:33:39 -0500 |
commit | 98be8a6eaa9fe917f6be9e121187b912e19ab484 (patch) | |
tree | 1f0e51b7f00461208ee1bbf9103629b6b38885ca /src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c | |
parent | d0ed1a6c044452a529c1d544647ea1fcb90dcb81 (diff) |
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
Diffstat (limited to 'src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c | 32 |
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c b/src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c index aebc2baf1f5..3c15658c90f 100644 --- a/src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c +++ b/src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c @@ -138,12 +138,22 @@ bit_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS) sp = input_string; } + /* + * Determine bitlength from input string. MaxAllocSize ensures a regular + * input is small enough, but we must check hex input. + */ slen = strlen(sp); - /* Determine bitlength from input string */ if (bit_not_hex) bitlen = slen; else + { + if (slen > VARBITMAXLEN / 4) + ereport(ERROR, + (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED), + errmsg("bit string length exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)", + VARBITMAXLEN))); bitlen = slen * 4; + } /* * Sometimes atttypmod is not supplied. If it is supplied we need to make @@ -436,12 +446,22 @@ varbit_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS) sp = input_string; } + /* + * Determine bitlength from input string. MaxAllocSize ensures a regular + * input is small enough, but we must check hex input. + */ slen = strlen(sp); - /* Determine bitlength from input string */ if (bit_not_hex) bitlen = slen; else + { + if (slen > VARBITMAXLEN / 4) + ereport(ERROR, + (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED), + errmsg("bit string length exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)", + VARBITMAXLEN))); bitlen = slen * 4; + } /* * Sometimes atttypmod is not supplied. If it is supplied we need to make @@ -520,6 +540,9 @@ varbit_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS) /* varbit_out - * Prints the string as bits to preserve length accurately + * + * XXX varbit_recv() and hex input to varbit_in() can load a value that this + * cannot emit. Consider using hex output for such values. */ Datum varbit_out(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS) @@ -886,6 +909,11 @@ bitcat(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS) bitlen1 = VARBITLEN(arg1); bitlen2 = VARBITLEN(arg2); + if (bitlen1 > VARBITMAXLEN - bitlen2) + ereport(ERROR, + (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED), + errmsg("bit string length exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)", + VARBITMAXLEN))); bytelen = VARBITTOTALLEN(bitlen1 + bitlen2); result = (VarBit *) palloc(bytelen); |