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authorNoah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>2014-02-17 09:33:31 -0500
committerNoah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>2014-02-17 09:33:39 -0500
commit98be8a6eaa9fe917f6be9e121187b912e19ab484 (patch)
tree1f0e51b7f00461208ee1bbf9103629b6b38885ca /src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c
parentd0ed1a6c044452a529c1d544647ea1fcb90dcb81 (diff)
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter. Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow in related functions. Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0. Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane. Security: CVE-2014-0064
Diffstat (limited to 'src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c')
-rw-r--r--src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c32
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c b/src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c
index aebc2baf1f5..3c15658c90f 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/adt/varbit.c
@@ -138,12 +138,22 @@ bit_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
sp = input_string;
}
+ /*
+ * Determine bitlength from input string. MaxAllocSize ensures a regular
+ * input is small enough, but we must check hex input.
+ */
slen = strlen(sp);
- /* Determine bitlength from input string */
if (bit_not_hex)
bitlen = slen;
else
+ {
+ if (slen > VARBITMAXLEN / 4)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
+ errmsg("bit string length exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)",
+ VARBITMAXLEN)));
bitlen = slen * 4;
+ }
/*
* Sometimes atttypmod is not supplied. If it is supplied we need to make
@@ -436,12 +446,22 @@ varbit_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
sp = input_string;
}
+ /*
+ * Determine bitlength from input string. MaxAllocSize ensures a regular
+ * input is small enough, but we must check hex input.
+ */
slen = strlen(sp);
- /* Determine bitlength from input string */
if (bit_not_hex)
bitlen = slen;
else
+ {
+ if (slen > VARBITMAXLEN / 4)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
+ errmsg("bit string length exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)",
+ VARBITMAXLEN)));
bitlen = slen * 4;
+ }
/*
* Sometimes atttypmod is not supplied. If it is supplied we need to make
@@ -520,6 +540,9 @@ varbit_in(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
/* varbit_out -
* Prints the string as bits to preserve length accurately
+ *
+ * XXX varbit_recv() and hex input to varbit_in() can load a value that this
+ * cannot emit. Consider using hex output for such values.
*/
Datum
varbit_out(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
@@ -886,6 +909,11 @@ bitcat(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
bitlen1 = VARBITLEN(arg1);
bitlen2 = VARBITLEN(arg2);
+ if (bitlen1 > VARBITMAXLEN - bitlen2)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
+ errmsg("bit string length exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)",
+ VARBITMAXLEN)));
bytelen = VARBITTOTALLEN(bitlen1 + bitlen2);
result = (VarBit *) palloc(bytelen);